






'^^<:^ 




.0^ . V^!^V' ^^^^U"^' V^"^^*/ 



>> 



-^^0^ 









A 












% -° ^^^ 





>^ 



^^-n^ 



A 






^0^ 



^°-;^ 



.^-^ °- '.^ 



,, '<^'^'\y "-^^^^V V^^^^^\^^' % 






rO' 










^^ A^ ^^- 







o 










Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/fromdespotismtoaOOprid 




1 Fro 
Despot 
to 







PORFIRIO DIAZ fo VICTORIANO HUERTA 



? RAMON PRIDA ^^^^^^ 



19 14 



li i MMi wii ' i i ii nww i — i iM ii 



EL PASO PRINTING COMPANY EL PASO, TEXAS 
— — — — — — — PRINTERS AND BINPERS —>- : '■ "•" ' " ' 



From Despotism 
to Anarchy 



By 
JUDGE RAMON PRIDA 



f/6 



Facts and Commentaries about the Mexican Revolutions 
at the Begmning of the Twentieth Century 



Copyrighted 1914 by Ramon Prida 



/' / ^ 





©CI,A3 74 9 36 



JUL 25 1914 



Not 



This is an abridged translation of a complete Spanish edi- 
tion, several chapters of which have been omitted because the 
author deems them of no interest to English speaking readers. 

However, by carefully reading the introduction, where the 
gist of these chapters is clearly outlined, a fair conception of 
the matter will be formed. The chapters omitted refer exclu- 
sively to Mexican polities prior to the revolution of 1910. The 
facts relating to this revolution and to subsequent events, are 
given in full, exactly as in the Spanish edition. 

The translation has been made under the immediate super- 
vision of the author, thus assuring a correct version in English 
of his opinions and statements, — something not always realized 
in translations of works of this nature. 

New York, March, 1914. 



i 



I 



Introduction 



'History is not a Flatterer 'but a Witness."— Ch.Sir]es XII. 



General Porfirio Diaz remained in power for so many 
years, because his government gave to the country that which 
it craves — PEACE! The moment, therefore, that the govern- 
ment was unable to quell the incipient revolution incited by 
Madero, the people for the first time became aware of its weak- 
ness and its inability to supply their wants — ^peace, order, and 
the opportunity quietly to earn their daily bread— and at that 
moment they rose in a body and peremptorily demanded back 
the rights which they had sacrificed, and summarily overthrew 
the government which could no longer satisfy these natural 
cravings. 

At first they turned to General EJeyes, looking again for 
the energy and strength of the iron hand of a soldier to con- 
tinue the work whereby General Diaz had formerly compelled 
the peace they craved. It did not take them long to realize their 
mistake. With his many ready but empty speeches General 
Reyes insured his own downfall. T!he nation was soon convinced 
that the soldier with whom she was coquetting was not the man 
who could guide her to her goal ; and she scornfully cast him off. 

Then, as in German legends, there appeared at this trying 
moment a man simple in bearing with the halo of an apostle and 
the vocation of a martyr; a man who had traveled over most 
of the country offering life and welfare and preaching demo- 
cracy and an equality verging on socialism. He was the last 
hope, the only refuge, the one man to arise from the cringing multi- 
tude ; so the country resolutely turned to him and delivered itself 
body and soul to Francisco I. Madero. He was the pamperecl 
child of fortune. His was the privilege of reaping the accu- 
mulated fruits of three generations; his the gathering of pro- 
ducts maturing from labors since the French Intervention and 
almost ripe at the time he rose to power. Unfortunately, either 



4 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

he did not fully appreciate the situation, or appreciating it, he 
did not know what remedies to apply to our ills. 

What was Madero? An apostle, as his friends called himi 
A visionary, as some considered him ? A madman, as his enemies 
declared him? Flattery clothed him in purple of various hues; 
his deriders made him a ludicrous figure ; his own oratory, which 
was affluent and of great scope, presents in him contradictory 
characteristics. But for the cold, dispassionate thinker, he was 
not an apostle, nor a visionary, nor yet a madman, — he was 
a symbol. 

When in 1867, after the W^ar of Intervention, the country 
had secured its independence, it wished to close the door to all 
ambitions and devote itself to work. It wished to banish the 
specter of revolt which for half a century had repressed its de- 
sires for liberty, and stayed its material progress. The wish was 
disappointed, simply because the soldiers, both victors and van- 
quished, had to live. For those who for so many years had led 
a life of hardship and peril, it was necessary that the govern' 
ment should find employment in time of peace, if peace were to 
be maintained. This was beyond the power of the government; 
and strife was inevitable. 

The war of '71 was a national crime, but a necessity to the 
military element. The rebellion of Ttixtepec in '76 headed like 
that of '71 by General Porfirio Diaz, was likewise justified be- 
cause it completed the amalgamation of the soldiery uniting them 
all under the flag of the Republic. However, in full justice to 
the rebels of Tuxtepec it must be added that this revolt was also 
unavoidable because the government of Don Sebastian Lerdo 
had totally ignored all the essentials on which every government 
in countries like ours should be based, and the selfish arrogance 
of Mr. Lerdo himself entirely overshadowed his wonderful in- 
tellect. 

After the war of '76, every attempted revolution was sub- 
dued by the iron hand of Diaz; and during his first term of 
office and the four years of his successor. General Manuel Gon- 
. zalez, the calm of peace pervaded our social orga^-ism. From 
the moment of General Diaz' reelection in 1884 when General 
Manuel Gonzalez peacefully yielded him the reins of government, 
we Mexicans seem to have resigned ourselves to live undeir the 
dictatorship of Don Porfirio, exacting from him only peace, 
tranquility, and the opportunity for work. This explains the 



FEIOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 5 

power of General Diaz and the submissiveness of the people. 
It explains why, when the revolution of 1910 first broke out, it 
found so slig'ht an echo in the national conscience, which was 
not dead as many have believed but simply resigned. But the 
government, inwardly conscious that the nation had just cause 
for rebellion, became panic stricken at the very first murmurs 
of it. As a result, the revolution instead of dying out, flickered, 
suffering blows and defeats, but not entirely extinguished, until, 
by its very inability to cope with it, the government showed its 
own weakness and proved conclusively that instead of a real 
tower of strength and power it was merely a phantom. Then 
were awakened ambitions dormant through fear; then burst 
forth energies theretofore restrained by a desire for peace; 
and then, suddenly and inexplicably to all but the close observers 
of the phenomenon, the revolution, which had seemed a dying 
ember, extinguishable by a breath, leaped into flame, became an 
all -c onsumin g con f 1 agr ation . 

The rebels themselves were dumbfounded at their success 
and the rebellion thus suddenly triumphant was entirely unpre- 
pared to receive the government turned over to it by General 
Diaz. Events followed each other closely; men had to be ob- 
tained quickly; there was not time to pick and choose; it was 
necessary to take what first came to hand. .A^ a result, the new 
administration was not entirely revolutionary, nor was it by any 
means competent to carry out the work before it. When finally 
forced to resign. General Diaz, estimating the man at his worth, 
disdainfully and contemptuously accepted as his successor, Mr. 
Ftancisco L. de la Barra. Mr. de la Barra, no less surprised at 
the outcome than the rebels themselves, was equally unprepared 
to face it ; in fact, he utterly failed to grasp the situation. H'ad 
he grasped it, the course of his administration would have led 
through a different channel. TW definite courses lay open be- 
fore him, either of which would have insured his success: he 
could either personify and develop the revolutionary principles 
not held by him, but thrust into his hands by fate, or he could 
become an independent self-reliant organizer. To follow the 
first, it ould have been necessary for him to surround himself 
exclusively by capable men closely identified with the revolu- 
tion, in order to carry out immediately the great promised re- 
forms. To follow the second, it would have been necessary for 
him to direct public sentiment into a common channel by impos- 



6 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

ing himself equally on rebel and non-rebel, but bound by neither, 
being in truth the real head of the nation, controlling with an 
energetic hand the excesses of both and ignoring the demands 
and ambitions of all. In other words, he would oblige everyone 
to maintain order and to obey the law without listening to the 
honeyed words of flatterers who would attack his vanity, nor to 
the clamor of the ambitious who would endeavor to intimidate 
him with their outcries. 

I insist that de la Barra failed utterly to grasp the situation ; 
for, unconscious of these two courses, he chose rather a via 
media between the victorious party and the vanquished, attempt- 
ing at one and the same time to represent a revolution, of whose 
principles he was ignorant, and to continue the work of the 
old government which was crumbling through senility. In other 
words, he tried to please both sides and succeeded in pleasing 
neither. There we have in a nutshell the whole reason for his 
failure. The rebellion, as we have said, found itself totally with- 
out organization when it came into actual power, so naturally, 
the old system continued to flourish and conditions continued 
iu the same rut as formerly. Justice, that illusive ideal we always 
so covet, was ministered under the same system, the same 
curse, the same anathema, and the only thing worthy of note in 
this period of transition, is the wonderful vitality of the country, 
which resisted, as it continues to resist, the blows of those who 
had joined the revolution from purely mercenary and self-seek- 
ing motives, the inertia of the government, the appetites of those 
who were yet insatiable even though for many years they had 
been glutting themselves at the table of the old regime, and the 
lust of those who had joined the armed rebellion impelled by 
their eagerness to satisfy their feverish greed for honor and 
riches. 

"When Madero, who had been virtually the head of the na- 
tion, finally reached the presidential chair, he found nothing 
organized; for— let flatterers say what they will, and de la 
Barra had more than most men — the provisional government 
had utterly failed to accomplish, the work of conciliation and pre- 
paration to which it was pledged, which was its primary duty, 
the salient feature of its program, and which, if accomplished, 
would have enabled the new administration to dedicate itself at 
once to the great reforms which, inscribed on its banner, promised 
life and prosperity to the nation. 



FEjOM despotism to ANARCHtY 7 

Let us suppose that Madero was alive to the task before him, 
Hjow could he begin? On what resources could he count? The 
men who were closely identified with the revolution and who 
had gone through the mill should in all justice have been given 
precedence in the work of reconstruction. Mladero, fully realiz- 
ing this, felt it his duty not to break entirely with them, but the 
fact is they had proved their ineompetency ; — the provisional 
government had fully tested them and found them wanting, not 
one of them all deserving the name of statesman. Don Mlanuel 
Bonilla, though much maligned by the press, was the best one, 
a good official, honorable, just, and painstaking, but inexper- 
ienced in politics. Don Ernesto Mjadero, the most promising of 
them all, was unequal to the task of checking the scandalous 
w^aste of public funds which characterized the provisional govern- 
ment as well as that of Madero, and, in the crucial moments of 
the downfall of the government, showed his entire lack of polit- 
ical foresight. Could Madero throw himself into the arms of 
men identified with the old regime f This would have been gross 
folly as the revolutionists would have considered themselves be- 
trayed. Where then could he find the men to assist him in a task 
of such gigantic proportions? For besides the ordinary work of 
reconstruction resultant from a revolution there would be the 
control and direction of the strong current of immigration, 
which, attracted by the wonderful resources so widely advertised 
by the Centennial Celebration was sure to invade the country, 
if, at that very moment, it could present a serene and peaceful 
front and a determination to proceed in the paths of progress. 

H'ow could Madero find men of the necessary calibre when 
for the last thirty years all activities which came to life any- 
where had been struck down and smothered and all legitimate 
ambitions had been considered rebellion ? Could he by his blind 
faith and love of justice create these statesmen as the Almighty 
made man by the breath of his msh? Could he give life to 
the marble images of his illusions and by the strength of his 
imagination break the heavy clouds which hung over our coun- 
try ? Impossible ! The task wihich confronted him demanded an 
exceptional man, and this Mladero was not. To carry out the 
tremendous work before him, Madero needed not only qualities 
he did not possess, but a different education, and, above all, a 
thorough training in statesmanship. Like de la Barra, Madero 
was headed towards an absolute and complete failure. Though 



8 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

a good man at heart and full of the best intentions his weakness 
of character, his childish caprices, his lack of mental capacity 
and stamina, were all insurmountable obstacles, but there was 
an even greater obstacle, which was the regime of the Madero 
family. 

The Madero family may be properly compared to a Scottish 
clan whose chief had been Don Evaristo Madero, deceased on 
the very eve of his grandson's victory. This Don Evaristo was 
the indisputed head, lord and master of the whole family and 
as such his word was law. Don Francisco I. Madero as Presi- 
dent tried to wield the same power over the nation that his 
grandfather had wielded over the clan ; but at one and at the same 
time he desired to be a democrat ruler and finally he failed to 
impose himself even over his own family. F'or, though they had 
naturally and, one might say, as a matter of course, obeyed Don 
Evaristo, a man of experience, talent, and dominent personalty, 
they balked at submitting them'selves to him whom they had been 
wont to consider the meanest of them all. Unable to dominate his 
own clan, Mr. Madero was doubly unable to control the nation. 
Besides, he had one other great fault which lead to his downfall : 
namely that he was never known to reward services rendered him, 
a glaring illustration of which we have in his attitude towards 
General Pascual Orozco, Jr., who, though practically responsible 
for Madero 's triumph, was by no means adequately rewarded.* 

Such, then, was the man who led the Nation at the outbreak 
of the revolution of Vera Cruz instigated by Felix Diaz. This 
uprising in the "Thrice Heroic City" was the first step towards 
the tragedy which was later to be enacted in the very City of 
Mexico itself; and it was of so great a magnitude that it could 
leave no doubt of the subsequent downfall of Madero. Unfortu- 
nately, it also indicated the beginning of an era of anarchy which 
should at all costs be avoided. But Mladero and his followers 
not only failed to realize the dangers which hung like a cloud 
over them, but failed utterly to grasp the meaning of the move- 
ment, the consequences of which we are now feeling. The men 
who overthrew Madero and have taken the power into their 
hands, have instituted a military despotism, their main weapon 
being to inspire terror, thinking that in this way they can per- 
petuate themselves and quell the rebellion headed by Don Venus- 



*The same was done with Maximo Castillo who saved Ma- 
dero 's life at Casas Grandes. 



FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 9 

tiano Carranza. They should arrive if it will be necessary to 
assure their ambitions, even to provoke a war against the United 

States. 

My object in writing these incidents is to study the crisis 
through which the country is passing; to clearly establish facts; 
and to place the responsibility on the shoulders of those upon 
whom it should be placed, the real actors in the tragedy we are 
now enacting. I wish to call the attention of my fellow country- 
men to the great catastrophe which threatens our nation ; and 
T also wish to tell the world of that which has occurred and is 
occurring in Mexico. In order to accomplish this purpose, I 
shall relate facts, all of which have been secured from the best 
sources of information and I shall relate them not as pictured 
by the imagination or by political prejudice and passion, but 
as they really occurred. Throughout, I judge deeds and men 
with the merciless and impersonal severity of the historian, who, 
like myself, is under obligation to no man; and putting aside 
all feelings of friendship and rancor, I tell the truth so that it 
may be perpetuated in history. I have no intention of teaching 
anybody nor offering a remedy for anything, for no doubt the 
book will be issued too late to prevent any of the evils which I 
foresee. It is merely a crj' from the very depths of my soul as a 
patriot, a cr}^ that will probably go unheeded by all, but which 
1 still feel it my duty to give. It will not improve our con- 
dition but it will, I hope, at least contribute to the study of this 
period of our history which we have all anxiously witnessed and 
bewailed; and may it especially serve to teach my children, to 
whom I dedicate these pages. In them may they learn what 
human nature really is, to what human ambition can lead, and 
above all how some people interpret patriotism. May they, my 
children, in whom I have always endeavored to inculcate the 
noble spirit of patriotism, they who have shared with me my 
hopes and fears, they who have closely assisted me in my labors, 
and have appreciated the fact that I have never been ambitious 
and have always been willing to sacrifice myself for my country, 
may they live anew when in future years they read these pages 
dealing with this sad period in the life of our Nation. To them 
I dedicate these lines. They, and perhaps they alone, will esti- 
mate the true idea that inspired them. 

RAMON PRIDA 
Mexico, November 1913. 



CHAPTER I. 



REELECTION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS. 



The life of Porfirio Diaz presents four striking phases. Up 
to the year 1867 he is a stainless patriot, a soldier of the repub- 
lic, making all the necessary sacrifices to preserve the integrity 
of his country and dedicating all his energies to defend and pro- 
tect its institutions. His enemies, and he has very bitter ones, 
will cite this or that military event as questionable, but without 
reason. The military life of General Diaz, is, I repeat, stain- 
less, and his conduct during the war of the Reform, during the 
three years war, and during the war against the Intervention and 
empire, is absolutely above reproach. From 1867 to 1884 he is 
a revolutionist who has forgotten all affection and duty, who 
devotes himself solely to securing the power he covets, bribing 
his employees and perverting his former subalterns ; indifferent 
to everything but the fixed purpose of climbing to the presi- 
dency. From 1884 until the centennial celebration in 1910 he 
is a statesman, empiric but able. Although personal ambition 
governs all his acts, and although he respects co duty, remembers 
no service, has no affection, and is hindered by no obstacle which 
could prevent him from carrying out his main purpose, which 
is to retain the power in his hands, nevertheless he devotes him- 
self earnestly to the material progress of the republic under- 
taking the development of all the branches of the government, 
except the administration of justice and the action of the courts, 
in which he never had any faith and which, as a matter of fact, 
he never for one single moment left free. After the centennial 
celebration he is a sick man, without will or energy, swayed to 
and from by reckless and ignorant men, but still clinging to the 
power, and in his more lucid intervals willing to sacrifice every- 
thing and everybody rather than give up the presidency, which 
he feels is fast slipping from his grasp. Finally, he surrenders 
iu an incomprehensible way leaving behind him his friends and 

(10) 



REELECTION WITHOUT RESTKICTIONS 11 

loyal servants seriously compromised and leaving ruin and deso- 
lation for his country. In these final supreme moments he re- 
veals himself cold and selfish with no thought for the future, 
with no solicitude for his country which has been sprinkled with 
his own blood, and with no anxiety for his good name and his 
glory which he leaves to be dragged in the dirt and trampled 
upon by the mob in the streets of Mexico. 

The period of most interest to us and which deserves a 
brief survey even in this short history is that of his statesmanship. 
When General Diaz was reelected president in 1884, he was 
an entirely different man from the one who had been elected in 
'76. He had acquired a distinguished bearing and an aristocratic 
air, in fact, his whole physical appearance had changed so radically 
as to make him look even like a different man. Politically, he 
was now almost a statesman, as the make up of his cabinet proved. 
As Secretary of State, he appointed Mr. Ignacio Mariscal, for- 
merly Secretary in the Juarez Cabinet; as Secretary of the In- 
terior, Mr. Manuel Romero Rubio ; as Attorney General, he re- 
tained Mir. Joaquin Baranda, who had held that office under 
President Manuel Gonzalez; as Secretary of Development, he 
appointed General Carlos Pacheco, then Governor of Chihuahua ; 
as Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Manuel Dublan; and as Sec- 
retaiy of War, General Pedro Hinojosa. His chief task ought 
to have been to conciliate the various factions, by drawing to- 
gether the most capable men, irrespective of former enmities. 
The most able and capable men of the time were at his disposal 
to help him, in the great task which he had undertaken. His 
work was highly beneficial, and the material progress and de- 
velopment of the country, particularly in the first twelve years 
from 1884 to 1896, were stupendous. We see close to him three 
men who not long before had figured as his enemies : Mr. Manuel 
Romero Rubio, head of Mt. Lerdo's last Cabinet; Mr. Joaquin 
Baranda, a representative under Mir. Lerdo 's administration, and 
implicated in the revolution so severely suppressed on June 25th, 
1879 ; and Mr. Manuel Dublan, a man who had served the Empire 
and who had been sentenced to death as a traitor by General Diaz 
himself, at that time head of the Army of the East. It is worthy of 
note too that General Carlos Pacheco was the only member of 
the Cabinet chosen by Diaz, really representing the revolution 
of Tuxtepec. General Diaz having acquired by experience a 
considerable knowledge of statesmanship, knew that men truly 



12 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

revolutionary were usually unsuited for government positions; 
therefore to the subordinates with whom he did not break en- 
tirely, he gave only second rate positions taking care, however, 
to enrich them, while the heads of the movement he remembered 
only to watch them. General Pacheco was there to play an im- 
portant part in the development of affairs, for he, a pure 
Tuxtepecan, the sole representative of the revolution in the 
Cabinet, was destined to be the one to introduce the abolition of 
the anti-reelection reform that had been the banner of the re- 
volutions of Noria and Tuxtepec. Had the measure been intro- 
duced by any other Cabinet officer, all of whom had been reelec- 
tionists, either under Juarez or under Lerdo, it would not have 
been so remarkable, but no, the important and almost unbeliev- 
able fact is that it was introduced by the very member of the 
Cabinet representing those who, by force of arms, had upheld 
the anti-reelection principle against Juarez and Lerdo. Thus 
General Diaz, secure in power, condemned those revolutions 
instigated by himself as well as all future revolutions, and he 
was determined to throttle them, no matter by what measures, 
even by sacrificing his own friends and followers as he did in 
Vera Cruz on June 25th, 1879. General Dia^ figured that the 
best plan for him to follow in order to perpetuate himself in the 
government would be to make the prominent men around him 
bitterly jealous of each other. Thus , at every subsequent elec- 
tion, each man rather than see his dearest enemy rise to power, 
would conclude that the only way to prevent it would be for Gen- 
eral Diaz himself to be re-elected. Those with whom he did not 
come into direct contact, he would either keep friendly by en- 
riching them if necessary, or else would declare them under sus- 
picion, persecute them, and if they revolted, annihilate them. 
Such was the unhappy fate of Division General Trinidad Garcia 
de la Cadena, who had incited the State of Zacatecas in favor 
of General Diaz in 1871 and in 1876 ; both he and his devoted 
companion, Colonel Lazalde, meeting their death on the estate 
of Gruiiidora on October 31st, 1886. To the generals, who, by 
their renown and popularity in various sections of the country, 
might instigate new revolutions, he gave large grants of land, 
making the exploitation as easy as possible. Thus enriching them, 
he gave them interests which would be of value only in times of 
peace and which would naturally make them the defenders of 
the government and the advocates of the indefinite re-election 



EEELECTION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS 13 

of the Rebel Chief of Tuxtepec. Immediately upon reaching 
the presidency in 1884, General Diaz began to put these plans 
into force; in fact, no sooner had his Cabinet entered upon its 
duties than a three cornered strife broke out between Mt. Romero 
Rubio, Mir. Manuel Dublan, and G-eneral Carlos Pacheco, Gen- 
eral Diaz added fuel to the flame by insinuating to each man the 
possibility of his succeeding him to the presidency. This jealousy 
and strife resulted in the increasing of his own power, for each 
secretary, confidentially informed upon this point by the Presi- 
dent himself, believed that by increasing the latter 's power, he 
was gaining prestige with the President and making his own 
ultimate triumph certain. 

Towards Don Manuel Gonzalez who had loyally given up his 
power, Diaz ' actions were as follows : At a meeting of the House 
of Representatives, on the 28th of May 1885, he forced the 
friends of Mr. Romero Rubio, led by those who had opposed his 
own election, to question the accounts of the former adminis- 
tration; and against the expressed stipulation of law, on Octo- 
ber 30th of the same year, at an ordinary public session, a public 
impeachment was instituted against Ex-president Don Manuel 
Gonzalez, by those very persons who had questioned the accounts. 
The object of this action was to discredit General Gonzalez in 
the estimation of the people, and at the same time to open a way 
to his destruction with public approval, should he, while under 
impeachment by the House, make any attempt at revolt or be- 
have in a suspicious manner ; for then, on the slightest provoca- 
tion, he could easily be put out of the way by Diaz himself, who 
would be applauded by the people as a zealous defender of na- 
tional justice. 



CHAPTER II. 
LOYALTY UNTO DEATH. 



During the convalescence of General Diaz at Cuemavaca, 
though, his family tried to prevent him from attending to public 
duties, still the Cabinet members consulted with him personally 
over the more important affairs of state, one of v^rhich was the 
nomination for governor of the Federal District. For this they 
had launched the candidacy of Don Ramon Corral, then in 
Europe consulting specialists about a throat trouble from which 
he was suffering. Upon receiving the cable stating that the 
government needed him, Mr. Corral at once sailed for Mexico, 
where just a few days after his arrival, he assumed control of 
the government of the Federal District. His troubles began very 
shortly, for he at once undertook to reform the various depart- 
ments which he found entirely disorganized, but on all sides he 
was hampered by the administration which had for its motto the 
statu quo. However, by infinite patience, and by surmounting 
great obstacles, he finally succeeded in instituting several 
reforms, one of the most important was: the suppression of the 
gambling houses in the Federal District.* 

When General Mena left the Cabinet, obliged by his phy- 
sician to go to Europe, General Diaz, with Limantour's approval 
decided to appoint Mr. Corral to fill the position of Secretary 
of the Interior, at the same time appointing Mr. Guillermo de 
Landa y Escandon as Governor of the Federal District. 

The position of Secretary of the Interior presented a much 
broader field to Mr. Corral, who at once set to work in the De- 
partment of Public Charities, where he succeeded in complet- 
ing the General Hospital and the Insane Asylum as well as 
radically reforming the Juarez Hospital; he also formulated 
laws for public and private charities. In addition, he organized 



*The gamblers paid $20,000 dollars monthly for the per- 
mission. 

(14) 



LOYlALTY UNTO DEATH 15 

tlie ^iirales, endeavoring to choose the personnel very carefully; 
be enlarged the penitentiary; and he drew up the plans for the 
new city jail, which was to do away with the present one, a 
center of unhealthiness and immorality due to its material con- 
ditions. On May 22nd, 1904, Lieutenant Colonel Felix Diaz, a 
nephew and favorite of the President, was appointed Police 
Commissioner. His work in this capacity was highly detrimental 
to the government, for he began by delivering himself body 
and soul to Mr. Celso Acosta, Secretary of Police, who with the 
cooperation of several subordinates, soon succeeded by means 
of flattery and adulation towards the Commissioner, in making 
Police Headquarters a center of political intrigue directed in 
general against the "cientificos" and in particular against the 
Secretary of the Interior. 

Shortly after Mr. Corral had been appointed Secretary of 
the Interior, the constitutional amendment creating the office 
of Vice-President was passed. General Diaz, now completely un- 
deceived concerning General Reyes, advocated that the position 
be filled by a civilian, and named two persons, the only ones 
who in his opinion could be entrusted with the office: Mr. 
Olegario Molina and Eamon Corral. These two, he thought, 
were the only men who could fulfil the duties of Vice-President 
without making trouble for the administration. Mr. Molina hav- 
ing been finally eliminated, Mr. Limantour was commissioned 
to solicit the consent of Mr. Corral ; his candidacy being launched 
in 1904. 

' "When the elections were held, the President's candidate 
as was fully expected, was elected by a large majority, and on 
December 1st, 1904, General Diaz and Mr. Corral took the oath 
of office as President and Vice-Presidentl respectively. No 
change was made in the Cabinet, so everything went on as before. 
On his part, Mr. Corral refrained entirely from participation in 
political affairs, but in spite of that, General Diaz would tell 
any one who would listen, that he had found an ideal vice presi- 
dent and that it was a pity that so valuable a man should be so 
unpopular. As a matter of fact Mr. Corral, entering upon his 
new duties with the determination of giving the office the pres- 
tige it ought to have, was an ideal vice president. But General 
Diaz neither understood the part the Vice President should play, 
nor did he take measures to give Mr. Corral the prestige needed 
so that in case of necessity, he might assume the position of head 



16 FliOM DESPOTISM TO A-NARCH?Y 

of the nation. On the contrary, he, the President, listened 
willingly to any and every gossip, to the most slanderous tales 
aimed at the Vice President, and repeated them, always regret- 
ting that he should be so talked about. 

After the lapse of several years, just following the inter- 
view given by General Diaz to Mir. Creelman, the American 
newspaperman*, the question of reelections again arose. As usual, 
General Diaz made himself out to his friends a victim of duty, a 
martyr to patriotism. Not a month elapsed after the famous inter- 
view was published, before General Diaz called together Mr. 
Limantour, Mr. Corral, and Mr. Olegario Molina, to tell them 
that every day he received letters urging him to accept reelec- 
tion, and that before deciding anything he wished to consult 
Avith his friends. He added that he believed himself too old 
to begin another presidential term, but that as he was resolved 
to sacrifice himself for the good of his country, he would accept 
another term if his friends believed that the nation still needed 
his services, and that he was not mentally incapacitated to con- 
tinue at the head of the country From the way he presented 
the subject, there could be no doubt that what he wanted was 
not advice but approbation. Mr. Limantour, the first to answer, 
said that the friends of the administration believed that General 
Diaz could undertake another term ; that it was known that his 
intellectual faculties were still intact; that his reelection would 
be accepted without protest provided, however, that he make 
a number of radical changes in his platform and, above all, in 
order to preserve peace, that the make up of the Cabinet be 
completely changed ; and that he, Limantour, should be the first 
to leave, as he had been a member for fifteen years. General 
Diaz agreed to make as many changes as his friends deemed ad- 
visable except in the Vice Presidency, for Mr. Corral had met 
all the requirements, and had filled the position with loyalty 
and honor. 

Mr. Molina agreed mth Mr. Limantour and General Diaz, 
but added that it was his opinion that the Vice President be 
given a much more actively political life; especially that he be- 
come thoroughly acquainted with the military leaders of the 
country so that in case of necessity they should not be unknown 
to him, and should during the life of General Diaz become 



*In Pearson's Magazine, MJay 1908 edition. 



LOYALTY UNTO DEATH 17 

accustomed to obey him and look on him as the head of the 
Nation. 

Then, for the first time, Mr. Corral spoke, saying that he 
believed that although it was possible and even advisable for 
General Diaz to accept reelection, still it would be an error to 
retain himself in the vice presidency. After having shown his 
good will by serving six years, he wished to retire to private life, 
and he therefore begged General Diaz to name another candi- 
date. Either Mr. Limantour or Mr. Mlolina could replace him. 
General Diaz interrupted him to say that on his part he was 
resolved not to accept reelection unless Mr. Corral should accept 
it. At the same time Mr. Limantour and Mr. Molina said it 
would be impossible for them to accept the nomination, the 
former on account of ineligibility, since his nationality had been 
passed upon, and the latter, on account of advanced years and 
illness. Both urged Mr. Corral to accept, but he insisted that 
either of them or some other friend of the President should be 
nominated. They, however refused to accept, and the President 
refused even to consider another man, claiming that the only 
way the reelection could be justified was if both the officials 
accepted, since there was no good reason for eliminating Mr. 
Corral, who had filled the office with so much circumspection. 
Mr. Corral still refused, until at last General Diaz stated that 
he solemnly promised that from that day he would decide no 
matter of importance without consulting the three of them, 
'^^ unless," he added, "Mr. Corral has some personal grudge 
against me thiat causes him to take this stand." With that, Mr. 
Corral was forced to acknowledge himself beaten and agreed 
to appear on the ticket for reelection. The President repeated 
that in accordance with Mr. Molina's suggestion, no military ap- 
pointment would be made without consultation with the vice 
president, who would become acquainted with all the military 
leaders and that nothing of any importance would thereafter be 
resolved without the majority vote of those present at that 
meeting. 

From that day on, Mjr. Corral had not one moment of rest 
or peace. The whole pack of hounds at the President's beck 
and call hurled itself upon him and respected nothing. News- 
papers, orators, gossips at large, friends, and enemies of the 
administration, all hurled themselves against the man whose only 
crime was his loyalty. This infamy reached the lowest depth 



18 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHS 

when Mr, Corral, advised by his physician that a change of cli- 
mate was essential, complying with the Constitutional provision, 
asked Congress for a leave of absence. At once, a group of 
the personal friends and relatives of the President opposed the 
granting of the leave, insisting that it be refused so that he 
should be forced to resign or die. I will quote the following 
passage from one of the most striking speeches, that made by 
]\Ir. Munoz, a nephew of General Diaz^ "If Mr. Corral is iU, 
let him try to cure himself, but let him die here where duty calls 
him, for we shall then mourn a man who has died perserving 
in his duty as a good patriot, but let us not out of pity, as Wr. 
Prida says, allow the Nation to suffer irremediable disasters."* 

The leave of absence was finally granted, whereupon Mr. 
Corral made his preparations for the journey, and on the morn- 
ing of the 11th, of April, 1911, left with his family for Vera 
Cruz. Up to the very last minute that he was on Mexican soil, 
he gave his whole energy and strength to the good of his country, 
which he was leaving in the midst of great disasters never to see 
again, for whose future he had fought and suffered, and to 
which he had sacrificed life itself. In our last interview, when 
we talked over the situation, his voice was the voice of a Prophet. 
With what clearness he foresaw events! "With what firmness 
he suffered disillusionment! The President had been to see 
him on the eve of his departure, and had timidly broached the 
subject of his resignation. Mr. Corral had answered him with 
dignity: ''Yes, sir," he said, "you may count upon it, but it 
will be submitted with yours. I will accompany you even in 
this supreme act." 



*As chairman of the House Committee on Interior Affairs, 
in my speech I had said that Mr. Corral's enemies were merciless 
in prosecuting him, sick as he was. 



CHAPTER III. 



THE REVOLUTION OF 1910. 



On aceoTint of the personal attacks aimed at him, G-eneral 
Diaz decided to order Mr. Madero's arrest, and in issuing the 
order, he took advantage of a speech delivered by the candidate 
of the anti-reelectionists at the railroad station in San Luis 
Potosi as he passed through that city on his way to the border. 
This particular speech was chosen not because it was more impas- 
sioned or fiery than others made by Madero, but for the signi- 
ficant reason that it had been heard by Congressman Kr. Juan 
Ri. Orci. As this gentleman was a particular friend and protege 
of Vice President Ramon Corral, and widely known to be close- 
ly identified with him, Diaz felt quite sure that should he be 
the principal witness against Madero, the whole blame would 
be placed upon Mir. Corral, who would then naturally bear the 
brunt of unpopularity resulting from such a measure. As soon 
as the step was decided upon, orders for the arrest of Madero 
were i^ued to General Jose M. Mier, Military Chief of the Zone 
of Nuevo Leon, who succeeded in making the arrest in the city 
of Monterey just as Madero was about to board a train for the 
Laguna region, where he was to deliver another speech. By reason 
of the fact that the judge of the Federal District Court of San 
Luis Potosi was the judge within whose jurisdiction the offense 
had been committed, the prisoner was taken to that city and con- 
fined in the penitentiary, where all his correspondence was 
opened and examined by the government which was then in a 
position to prove that he was planning an armed revolution. 
However, by the time the proofs were collected, he had escaped 
to the United States, having been released on bail by express 
orders from General Diaz to the judge of the Federal District 
Court, Mr. Tomas Ortiz. These orders were issued in compliance 
with a petition made by Don Ignacio Montes de Oca, Bishop of 
the diocese of San Luis Potosi, who in order to intercede for the 

(19) 



20 , fejom despotism to anarchy 

prisoner had made a special trip to Mexico City where he had 
succeeded in winning the favor of the President's wife on behalf 
of the accused, and where he also had the support of Mr. Liman- 
tour who was a personal friend of the Madero family and, as 
such, had received various telegrams from (fchem begging him to 
use his influence with Diaz in favor of the petition which Madero 
had presented to the Judge of the Federal District Court. The 
Bishop experienced no difficulty in having his request granted, 
for in addition to these facts, President Diaz did not think that 
Francisco Madero could do him any harm, nor did he consider 
him of very great importance. Upon the receipt of orders from 
Diaz, the act being according to law, the District Judge placed 
the bail at $10,000. This sum was at once deposited by M!r. 
Madero who though released, was expected to remain in the 
city of San Luis Potosi until the conclusion of the trial which 
had already begun. 

By this time, which was the beginning of October, the elec- 
tions had already taken place and the House had made its cus- 
t-omary declaration concerning them, so with Madero free, every- 
thing was ripe for a rebellion against Diaz, which was neverthe- 
less not started until the 20th of November. The delay was 
due to the fact that the anti-reeleetionists, though resolved to 
revolt, as they were friends of J\'Iladero, thought it dangerous to 
start the revolution while he was still in reach of the govern- 
ment police, so in order to eliminate this difficulty, they planned 
that he should escape on the train to Laredo. This, Mr. JMladero 
easily accomplished, for one night, disguised as a mechanic, he 
walked out of the ciiy to the suburbs where an automobile await- 
ed him. Along the road which the machine was to take, spies 
were posted by friends of the cause in order that at the slight- 
est alarm, or at the first indication of discovery, the fugitive 
could be hidden in the mountains of Matehuala. However, as 
the escape went unnoticed by any one, Mr. Madero was able 
calmly to board the train at a flag station. Still disguised as 
a mechanic and clean shaven, he managed with the help of the 
Auditor who was also in the plot, to gain the frontier of the 
United States. The first news the government had of the flight 
was from a telegram addressed by Don Andres Garza Galan to 
the Director of the Reelectionist Club advising him of Madero 's 
arrival at Laredo, Texas. Several days later, in November, the 
revolutionary plan signed by ^Miadero in the city of San Luis 



THE REVOLUTION OF 1910 21 

Potosi, was made public. The movement was at once seconded 
in Chihuahua by Pascual Orozco and Abraham Gonzalez who 
W€re soon joined by Caraveo, Emilio Campa and others. Gen- 
eral Manuel Mi. Plata, Chief of the Zone, immediately notified 
the government of the movement, urgently requesting that 10,- 
000 men be sent him so that he might suppress the rebellion.* 
This report was received with derision in government circles 
where it was deemed so erroneous that the chief was relieved of 
his command. General Juan Hernandez was appointed as his 
successor for he had previously engaged in the campaign against 
the Indians of Chihuahua and was considered capable of mas- 
tering the situation with the meagre resources at the command 
of the second military zone. 

In the meantime, General Diaz sent an intimate friend of 
his, Don Inigo Noriega, to interview the rebels. He was willing 
to sacrifice everybody in order to give the rebellion its death 
blow, at the very beginning. General Diaz thought that this plan 
would have the same success it had at the time of the rebellion 
of General Neri, but Mr. Vasquez Gomez, who was appointed 
by the rebels to interview the President's envoy and hear the 
propositions he had to offer, demanded that Noriega present 
his credentials in due form; in other words, he demanded that 
the government should recognize the revolution in its belliger- 
ent character. As it happened, Mr. Noriega had nothing but 
the private telegraphic code by which he was to communicate 
the proposals of the revolutionists to the President. In view of 
this fact, Mr. Vasquez Gomez very wisely refused to enter into 
any agreements with him, and the negotiation was a complete 
failure. By this time, public opinion, greatly excited over the 
unfruitful results of military affairs, demanded a brief and 
energetic campaign that should immediately reestablish com- 
munications and restore to the country the peace which it had 
lost. Colonel Martin Guzman had been badly defeated at Mai 
Paso, where he lost many of his soldiers and where he received 
a wound from which he died a few days after his arrival at 
Chihuahua. The President's assistants and his son Lieutenant 
Colonel Porfirio Diaz, made all the arrangements and plans 



*Enrique C. Creel, Secretary of State, questioned by Presi- 
dent Diaz, on the subject, answered that with the cowboys of 
the Terrazas' estates only the rebellion would be drowned off in 
a few days. 



22 FKOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHiZ 

for the campaign, as the President was personally incapaci- 
tated by illness. 

Mr. Madero, when he escaped from San Luis Potosi, went 
to San Antonio, Texas, where he organized the revolutionary 
junta. According to an understanding with Don Catarino Bena- 
vides, he was to go into the interior of. the State of Coahuila, 
but on the 18th of November, he lost his way and wandered about 
for two days. Finally, on the 20th he met his partisans 
in the ranch called "El Indio." Twenty days he waited for 
those who had promised to join him, but as they did not appear, 
it was decided that the forces on hand in Coahuila were not 
enough to head a rebellion and that it would be better for Madero 
to establish his headquarters in Chihuahua. Therefore, towards 
the middle of December, assuming a disguise, he again crossed 
the border. His adherents in San Antonio were anxious that 
he should go by way of Havana to Yucatan, where it was stated 
by Mr. Jose Maria Pino Suarez he could count on resources far 
superior to those on the frontier. They were still doubtful as 
to the best course of action to follow, when it was learned that 
through the efforts of the Mexican government an order was to 
be issued by the United States for the arrest of Don Francisco I. 
Madero and Abraham G^onzalez, both accused of violating the 
neutrality laws. 

On February 14, Don Francisco I. IMJadero and his followers 
re-entered Mexican territory, where they were soon joined by the 
guerrilla bands marauding in that vicinity; on the 19th, in the 
Charco de Grado, there began the organization of the revolution- 
ary forces. Don Eduardo Hiay was given charge of destroying 
the railroad tracks in order to prevent the mobilization of Fed- 
eral troops. Ooi' the 22nd, Mir. Madero and his forces entered 
Villa Ahumada, and on the 28th, they invaded San Lorenzo, 
encountering absolutely no resistance. On the 1st of M^arch, 
they Avere joined ia San Buenaventura by 200 men led by Colonel 
Jose Flo res Alatorre, but on account of the numerous complaints 
against the man, he was relieved of his command and his soldiers 
were incorporated into the column commanded by Hay, RIoque 
Gonzalez Garza, and the Italian Garibaldi. The column marched 
towards Casas Grandes, arrived there on March 5th, and im- 
mediately proceded to attack the town. Colonel Garcia Cuellar, 
leader of the 6th Battalion since the defeat of Colonel Guzman 
at Mai Paso, who with a section of the artillery under Colonel 



THE ElEVOLUTION OF 1910 23 

Eguia Liz had been for some time in the vicinity of the town, 
immediately came to its defense. The commanders, Jose de la 
Luz Soto, G^aribaldi, Hay, and G-onzalez Garza, although none 
of them knew anything about military tactics, refused to take 
advice from the officers in the column who had technical know- 
ledge. The federal attack was so fierce, and the surprise of the 
rebels so great, that Soto's forces were completely demoralized, 
and this demoralization spread disorder among the rest. Mr. 
Madero, who was watching the scene from a distance, was ad- 
vised to take to flight. A carriage and mules were provided, 
but on hitching, it was found that one of the mules was a pack 
mule and could not draw the carriage; so Madero was forced to 
hide in a ditch to escape capture. 

Colonel Garcia Cuellar was badly wounded in the hand but 
in spite of this, he refused to leave his post. In answering Col- 
onel Equia Liz' remonstrations and entreaties that he should 
attend to his wound and leave him in command, enough time 
was lost to give Madero the necessary opportunity to escape. 
Don Benito Goribar in his book entitled "El Maderisma en 
Cueros" says^ "If, Colonel Garcia Cuellar had been a soldier, 
he would at that very instant have ordered fifty cavalrymen 
to charge, and there and then would have put an end to Madero 
and the Maderista revolution of 1910." Mr. Goribar fails to 
take into consideration the fact that Colonel Garcia Cuellar was 
wounded, and that therefore the only mistake for which he can 
be held responsible is for not having resigned his command and 
for his over anxiety to fulfil his duty. 

In the meantime, the guerilla bands in Chihuahua had suc- 
ceeded in cutting off Ciudad Juarez, for with the men Pascual 
Orozco, Caraveo, Salazar, and Campa in Guerrero, Batopilas, 
the Sierra 'Tarahumara, and the Sierra de las Mestenas, they 
had advanced on Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga in their efforts 
to take possession of some border town. The government, ap- 
parently believing that it was merely a local uprising against 
the domination of the Terrazas, forced the resignation of the 
Governor, Mr. Alberto Terrazas, son of General Luis Terrazas, 
owner of most of the land in the State, and appointed as his 
successor, Colonel Miguel Ahumada who had just been relieved 
of the governorship of Jalisco in favor of Don Manuel Cuesta 
Gallardo, Ahumada had formerly been Governor of Chihuahua 
and had won the esteem of all the inhabitants. The government 



24 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

at tihe same time had ordered General Lauro Villar, chief of the 
forces in Laredo, to lead the campaign in Chihuahua, but events 
were hastened when towards the beginning of May, Ciudad 
Juarez was besieged by a large number of rebels commanded 
by Pascual Orozco, Jr., as commander-in-chief, with Francisco 
Villa, Salazar, Caraveo, and Emilio Campa, next in command. 
Of these, Villa, besides being very well acquainted with that re- 
gion, was also an excellent marksman ; Salazar was a very intel- 
ligent and brave young man; Caraveo a daring fellow dearly 
beloved by his troops and of an unflinching courage ; and Emilio 
Campa was also a young man of exceptional qualities ; but none 
of them had had any military schooling whatsoever. These forces 
had, separately, various encounters with the Federals in 
Coyame, in Cuchillo, Parade, besides other places, and had never 
been routed, so now coming together into one group, they formed 
a nucleus of some importance. 

The forces in Ciudad Juarez were under the command of 
General Navarro, now an old man, who had always fought with 
courage, but whose strategic knowledge was almost nil. This, 
it is true, was offset to some extent by the presence of Colonel 
Tamborrel who belonged to the corps of engineers and had made 
scientific preparations for the defense of the town. The Federal 
columns had up to that time been moved by direct orders from 
the "War Department, although as a matter of fact. General Diaz 
himself directed the campaign from his house, assisted by hia 
aides, particularly by his son, Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz. 
So long as General Diaz was able personally to issue orders and 
direct the movements, these movements suffered only because of 
the fact that the directing power was so far away from the scene 
of action and was unfamiliar with the country where the forces 
operated; but as soon as General Diaz was prevented from per- 
sonally attending to the campaign, which was then carried on 
chiefly by his son, these movements suffered from the appalling 
incompetence of the directing power. It was never known at a 
given time where the columns were, for they were moved about 
without reason and needlessly exhausted. The Secretary of War, 
General Gonzalez Cosio, not wishing to displease the President, 
said nothing, and consequently the results of the campaign be- 
came worse every day. General Mondragon, an intimate friend 
of Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz, was also there, but with an 
eye to business. One proposition which he submitted was an 



THE REVOLUTION OF 1910 25 

offer of a large quantity of anmninition at 70 marks per thous- 
and, made to the government by a German factory through a Mr. 
Perez. The President ordered it to be bought, but the Sub-sec- 
retary of the Treasury, Mr. Nunez, who had a personal aversion 
to Mondragon, suspecting that there was something crooked in 
the deal, cabled to Mr. Limantour at Paris. Mr. Limantour 
answered that the ammunition was in fact German, but that it 
had been refused by the Chilean government and that it could 
be bought at about 40 marks per thousand. In view of this reply 
and in spite of the decisive order from the President, Mr. Nunez re- 
fused to approve the contract. General Diaz, who, as I have said* 
was a slave to formalities, canceled the contract that had already 
been drawn up by the Secretary of War. The army administration 
was also in frightful disorder. The Sanitary Department was con- 
tinually complaining of not having the requisite materials because 
orders for them were not given in due time. The failure of the cam- 
paign in Chihuahua was due to the weakness of the Secretary of 
"War who in deference to the President's son, did not himself take 
actual direction of the Campaign, It has been said that General 
Gonzalez Cosio was incompetent, but in my opinion such a charge 
should not be made for he did not actually direct the movements, 
but simply transmitted the orders he received. Another cause of 
disaster was the untimely death of Colonel Tamborrel in Ciudad 
Juarez at the very beginning of the assault, because General 
Navarro, though a good column commander, was not capable 
enough to carry out the defense as it had been planned. Thus 
the fall of Ciudad Juarez, though in itself really an insignifi- 
cant event, was, as we shall see later, the death blow to General 
Diaz and his government; with this single battle, and with the 
capture of this single small town, the revolution begun in Novem- 
ber 1910, had triumphed. 



*In the complete Spanish edition. 



CHAPTER IV. 
THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS. 



As a rule, whenever elections were to be held, General Diaz 
would show Mr. Limantour the list of the Congressmen who were 
to be elected as soon as made out, and listen to his suggestions 
and comments, but in 1910, the first glimpse Mr. Limantour had 
of this list was when he read it in the newspapers. However, 
in spite of the express agreement made the previous year by 
Greneral Diaz with him, Corral, and Molina, Mir. Limantour did 
not complain nor in fact did he in any way show that he was 
aware that elections would be held in July of that year ; but when 
the names of the candidates for magistrates of the Supreme 
Court of Justice of the Nation were published by the newspapers 
of the different states, and he saw that among them figured a 
protege of Mr. Dehesa, he could not but remonstrate, though in 
a respectful and amiable way, stating that the course of action 
of General Diaz on this occasion was entirely different from his 
usual attitude towards him, and that, above all, it was absolutely 
contrary to the express agreement made when Corral Jiad ac- 
cepted the re-nomiuation. iThe President offered some explana- 
tions, and the conversation, less cordial than usual, ended by 
Mr. Limantour asking for a leave of absence to accompany his 
wife on a trip to Europe for her health. This was immediately 
granted, though the President requested him to postpone his 
departure until after the elections. No sooner were the pri- 
mary elections over than Mr. Limantour left with his family for 
Europe promising to return in time to assist, on December 1st, 
in the inauguration of Don Porfirio Diaz and Mr. Ramon Corral, 
which was to be the beginning of the six year term of office for 
which they had been elected. 

Mr. Limantour 's friends considered it a mistake on his part 
to take the trip at this particular time. They showed him clear- 
ly that it would cause much unfavorable comment, and it would 

(26) 



THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS 27 

be open to criticism for tlie Secretary of the Treasury to be ab- 
sent from the oonntry just at the time of the centennial celebra- 
tion, a celebration which General Diaz intended should surpass 
all previous ones in brilliancy and luxury. They also argued 
that it would be particularly unfortunate for him to be away 
should the revolution really break out, as there was every indi- 
cation to believe it would, judging from Madero's actions. But 
Mr. Limantour, deaf to all arguments, would listen to none of 
them, and firm in his resolution, left for Europe in July, ap- 
parently determined to break entirely with Diaz. 

In Europe he was, therefore, when things began to happen 
in Mexico, and in Europe it was he met General Reyes with 
whom he became so intimate that hardly a day went by that they 
were not seen together in the streets of Paris. Both seem to 
have completely forgotten their former mutual grievances. When 
events grew worse, and the rebellion finally broke out. General 
Diaz cabled and wrote to Mr. Limantour urging his return, but 
Mr. Limantour, offering as an excuse now the illness of his wife, 
now the illness of his daughter, stayed where he was. The Presi- 
dent was compelled to demand from his minister an explanation 
of such conduct, but it was not until February 1911, when events 
were reaching a crisis, that Mr. Limantour finally decided to 
come back to the side of Diaz. He returned by way of New York, 
where he conferred with Messrs. Madero, Vasquez Gomez, and 
Ambassador de la Barra. What they discussed and what they 
agreed upon, they have refused to divulge. Mr. Vazquez Gomez 
alone has thrown out hints about it, but not enough on which 
to base a statement ; his reticence is even more eloquent, but not 
even from that can a logical deduction be made. Time alone can 
throw light on the discussion held in the American metropolis. 

Mr. Limantour was met on the way by his best friends, 
headed by Mr. Macedo and by Mtr. Nunez. His first words of 
greeting were that in returning to his country he did not wish 
to identify himself with any particular political faction, that 
what he wished was to be entirely independent so as to be able 
to attract to himself the most able men the nation could supply, 
regardless of what their ideas or affiliations had heretofore been. 
Those who up to that time had been Mr. Limantour 's political 
friends, but had been aware of Mr. Limantour 's intimacy with 
General Reyes in Paris, immediately understood that what Mr. 
Limantour wished was to be entirely at liberty to join his old 



28 FEIOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

enemies, believing it to be the best way of attaining the power 
which had slipped through his fingers when he had been faithful 
to his old friends. Therefore, from that very moment they tacitly 
agreed to separate, making no comment whatsoever on what 
had occurred.* 

Limantour, ex-chief of the Cientificos, entered the Capital 
on March 19th, 1911, after having broken completely with his 
old friends. On his entry he was accorded an ovation that might 
almost be called frantic, prepared for him by the Cientificos 
who naturally had not been able to foretell his change of mind. 
There were speeches at the railroad station, and acclamations 
in the streets. It seemed as if the Savior of the country had 
arrived. The popularity so eagerly sought by Mtr, Limantour 
for nearly twenty years was his at the most unexpected moment. 
And this, in spite of the fact that the people did not know that 
Mr. Limantour was no longer a Cientifico! 

A conference was immediately held between General Diaz 
and Mr. Limantour at which it was decided to call a special 
meeting of the Cabinet. At this meeting, he urged the necessity 
that the Cabinet resign en masse. Mr. Corral, who although se- 
riously ill attended to his official duties, approved the course 
suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, but turning to Gen- 
eral Diaz he openly reminded him of his words at the conference 
with Limantour, Molina, and himself; he brought before him 
his failure to keep his promises made at that time as to what he 
would do, and finally he declared that events had reached such 
a climax because of the government's weakness, because of the 
hesitancy of the President in making any changes in the per- 
sonnel of the Cabinet, and because of the unwillingness of Mr. 
Limantour to provide the necessary funds when and where 
needed. 

On March 24th, it was decided that all members of the Cabi- 
net should resign. The President placed the formation of the 
new Cabinet in charge of Mr. Limantour who from the nature 
of things was its head. "When this new Cabinet became known to 
the general public, it was christened by Mr. Bulnes in one of 
his brilliant articles ''The Cabinet of High C," for this famous 
orator argued that it would only last as long as a high C sung 
by an opera tenor. On the 28th of March the Cabinet was defi- 



*From the next day, 20th of March, 1911, the Cientifico 
party was no longer in Mexican politics. 



THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 29 

nitely appointed as follows: Secretary of State, Francisco de 
la Barra, Ambassador of Mexico in Washington, to whom Mr. 
Limantour had offered the portfolio on his way through the 
United States; Secretary of the Interior, vacant, because the 
President had suggested as a candidate, Mr. Rafael BeboUar 
whom Mr. Limantour flatly rejected, because on his side, fol- 
lowing his new policy of flattering his old enemies, he had pro- 
posed Mr. Teodoro A. Dehesa, but General Diaz, in spite of the 
persistence of his own nephew, Congressman Ignacio Mlunoz, 
refused to countenance the appoinjtment ; Attorney General, 
Demetrio Sodi, Justice of the National Supreme Cburt, and son 
of an intimate friend of General Diaz; Secretary of Public Li- 
struction, Jorge Vera y Estanol, law partner of Mr. Calero, and 
suggested by this gentleman to the President and Mr. Liman- 
tour. (It was Mr. Vera Estanol who was given charge of the 
portfolio of the Interior towards the end of the Diaz regime in 
order that he might intervene with Madero for the restoration 
of peace) ; Secretary of Development, Mr. Manuel Marroquin y 
Rivera, a man in whom Mr. Limantour had absolute confidence ; 
Secretary of Communications, Mr. Norberto Dominguez; Post 
Master General, a man in whom General Diaz had full confi- 
dence, although the public accused him of having given assis- 
tance to violation of the mails that passed through the post 
office; the office of Secretary of "War Mr. Limantour had pro- 
mised to General Reyes, but the President flatly refused to 
appoint him ; in the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Porf irio Diaz, 
Jr., a great friend of General Gonzalez Cosio, the incumbent, 
made the most of the opportunity for supporting the latter, and 
finally succeeded in convincing his father that it would be a mis- 
take to remove him ; General Diaz was well enough pleased with 
General Gonzalez Cosio, not to desire a change, nor did he under 
any circumstances want General Reyes appointed to the post. 
Secretary of the Treasury, filled again by Mr. Limantour. 

As soon as the new Cabinet was organized, Mr. Limantour 's 
first thought was to cable to General Rieyes, who should be placed 
in charge of the campaign, and whose sword would then come 
to save the government; but the President strenuously opposed 
such a course and it took aU the persuasive powers of Mr, Liman- 
tour finally to secure his consent. General Reyes then imposed 
conditions, one of which was the elimination from politics of Mr. 
Limantour 's former friends. General Reyes stated that in the 



30 PE'OM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

agreement made in Paris, Mti*. Limantour had pledged his word 
that Mr. Corral would resign; that all the Cientificos would be 
eliminated from public posts; that there would be no compro- 
mise with the revolution; that he, Reyes, would be appointed 
Secretary of War and would be given all the supplies he might 
ask for. 

The Cabinet completed by the arrival of Mr, de la Barra, 
presented itself before Congress on the 1st of April. In his 
message, the President proposed the constitutional reform that 
there should be no reelection. This proposal was presented in 
due form on the following day and its speedy dispatch was re- 
commended. After a three days discussion, in which individuals 
rather than political principles were discussed, the proposed re- 
form was accepted on April 25th. In this way the new govern- 
ment thought to calm the storm that threatened its deposal; a 
gross error, for the revolution had already taken such a strong 
hold on public opinion all over the country that nothing could 
stop it. Besides, the government had made a change of persons 
but not of program. Mr. Limantour continued his old method 
of not spending the national funds; he defended them as though 
they were his own, and for what? In order that at his downfall 
he should have a large sum in the treasury for his successor. 
How much better would it have been had he spent some of the 
money in preventing the evils caused by the revolution ! Above 
all, he continued negotiating with the rebels, against whom he 
defended not the personnel of the government nor its institu- 
tions, but the funds which the revolutionists demanded of him. 

In defense of this course of action, Mr. Limantour would 
say that his main object was to prevent American Intervention, 
a phantom with which Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was al- 
ways threatening. It is rather peculiar and inexplicable though, 
that Mr. Limantour who had made his return trip from Europe 
via the United States, should not have learned there the i-oal 
attitude of the American government towards the Mexican situa- 
tion, and should not have come to the conclusion that the threats 
of invasion came only from Henry Lane AA^ilson himself Rud 
not direct from the Cabinet nor from the peaceful President. Ml*. 
Taft, at that time the occupant of the White House. 

Fearing intervention, or pretending to fear it, Mr. Liman- 
tour ordered Oscar Braniff, who had gone to the United States 
for the purpose of entering into some agreement with the rebels. 



THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 31 

to move to El Paso that he might be nearer to the revolutionists. 
There, aided by Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, who accompanied 
him, he began negotiations. In these negotiations, Dr. Vazquez 
Gromez, who was gifted with much more shrewdness and sagacity 
than the government envoys and even than the chief of the Cabi- 
net himself, brought things to such a pass that the government, 
unconscious of the fact, was made to recognize the revolutionists 
as belligerents. The way Vazquez Gomez accomplished this was 
by demanding that the government send a special envoy with 
credentials so that in case there should be a break, they could 
extend as an argument to the American government the fact 
that the Mexican government itself had already recognized them 
as belligerents, and that therefore a foreign government could 
not do otherwise. Mr. Limantour, falling nicely into the trap, 
appointed as a special envoy, Supreme Court Justice Francisco 
Carvajal to whom were given written instructions and creden- 
tials that the rebels could not reject. The government was treat- 
ing with the rebels as equals and therefore the government was 
lostj^/ln the conferences which took place in Mexican territory 
near Ciudad Juarez, Vazquez Gromez, acting as spokesman for 
the revolutionists, was more exacting than ever. He demanded 
the resignation of General Diaz, although Madero had already 
relinquished this demand; that all Cientifieos leave the House; 
that men proposed by the revolutionists be appointed governors 
for eight or ten states; and that furthermore, a heavy sum of 
money be paid by the government to defray the expenses of the 
revolutionists. The government was willing to sacrifice all of 
Mr. Limantour 's friends, and to change a considerable number 
of the governors, but it was by no means willing ,to give the 
money demanded, nor to have General Diaz resign^ The Presi- 
dent imposed another condition which was accepted by the re- 
volutionists, namely, not to recognize the military standing of 
any rebel, as he did not wish to hurt the army that had been 
faithful to him. This condition then was agreed upon by the 
revolutionists and as I have said before, Mr. Madero even con- 
sented to have Diaz remain in power; but the revolutionists, 
headed by Mr. Vazquez Gomez balked and the negotiations were 
interrupted. General Diaz then issued to the Nation a procla- 
mation drawn up by Mr. Rosendo Pineda, one of the former 
friends of Mtr. Limantour, for, it may be noted, Mir. Limantour 
is a man of such character, that though he was quite willing, 



32 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO AJ^ARCHiY 

ill order to please General Reyes, to have his old friends de- 
barred from politics and quite willing to have them leave the 
House of Representatives, where they had loyally defended the 
government, still he was always ready to use them when occasion 
demanded and did not hesitate to call upon them and earnestly 
request work of this kind.* 

As the negotiations were interrupted, the rebels in view of 
the moral support which the government's attitude had given 
them, broke the armistice and on May 9th took Ciudad Juarez 
by assault. Among their prisoners was General Juan J. Navarro, 
Commander in Chief, whom they intended to execute. Mr. 
Madero declared this assault an act of disobedience as he had 
not ordered such a step; the government's envoy entered a vigor- 
ous protest, in answer to which Mr. Madero complained of his 
own powerlessness to impose his will. Nevertheless, with great 
energy he opposed the execution of General Navarro, personally 
defending him and conducting him to the American side, thus 
compelling obedience to his desires. Two days later, there was 
a new disagreement when the military commander of the revolu- 
tionists, Pascual Orozco, carried matters so far as to arrest 
Madero in the City Hall. This building had been converted by 
the revolutionists into their Federal Building. Once more Mr. 
Madero succeeded in imposing himself, and he regained his liberty, 
thus asserting the authority with which the rebels had invest- 
ed him. 

Mr. Limantour did not recall either of the envoys from 
El Paso; on the contrary, he continued negotiating for peace 
until finally on the night of the 21st of May, a treaty was signed. 
On the following day, the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Vera 
Estanol, appeared before the House and read the following mes- 
sage from the President, concerning the matter: 

"Gentlemen: You are duly informed by the Secretary of 
State that the President, always solicitous for the welfare of 
his country, declared his intention to listen to any peace proposals 
that might be made to him by the revolutionists then in arms. 
For this purpose he appointed as his envoy, Mr. Francisco Car- 
vajal, whom he authorized to negotiate with the envoys that Mr. 
Francisco I. Madero, publicly considered chief of the revolu- 
tion, might appoint. The President's desire was to ratify pub- 



*The proclamation can be read in the Spanish edition. 



THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS 33 

lie opinion, but he would make only such concessions as would 
be compatible with the dignity of the government as well as 
practicable within constitutional limits." 

Official negotiations took place at the beginning of this 
same month of May, Mr. Francisco I. Madero having appointed 
as his representatives Messrs. Francisco Madero, Sr., Francisco 
Vazquez Gomez, and Jose Maria Pino Suarez. Unfortunately, 
it had been necessary to break off negotiations because the re- 
volutionists demanded as a necessary condition for declaring their 
propositions that General Porfirio Diaz should first announce 
his intention to resign from the Presidency within a specified 
time. However, it was unofficially known that in order to end 
the revolution the chiefs intended to propose among other terms, 
some that it would be impossible to accept without violating the 
Constitution. 

The Cabinet believed that the sudden announcemenl) of the 
resignation of the President, without first adjusting the terms 
under which the revolutionists should lay down their arms, and 
especially without knowing officially what these terms would be, 
would have loosened the ties of order and legality withi which 
the greater part of the country was still bound together, thus 
bringing about a state of anarchy which was already threaten- 
ing some parts under the name of a revolutionary agitation. 
Moreover, the government correctly jiudged that if peace was 
reestablished by means of unconstitutional arrangements, instead 
of being permanent it would merely be the beginning of deeper 
and more lasting national troubles. 

When it was necessary to break negotiations, the President 
issued his proclamation of the 8th of May, calling upon the 
nation to support the government and stating that he would 
withdraw from power when, in his judgment, the country would 
not run the risk of falling into a state of anarchy at his with- 
drawal from office. The fall of Ciudad Juarez, in spite of the 
heroic defense made by our army, furnished resources and gave 
new strength to the revolution, increasing not only the number 
of its forces, but also the number of its sympathizers. These 
two important facts induced the government to facilitate the 
renewal of negotiations to which, in view of the President's proc- 
lamation, the leader of the revolution also consented. In the re- 
newed negotiations, the revolutionary chiefs no longer insisted 
that the President resign, nor did they insist that he even fix a 



34: FKOM DEiSPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 

date for his resignation. They did, however, propose conditions 
which could not constitutionally he made the terms of an agree- 
ment, but could only be decided upon if demanded by public 
opinion through legal and authorized channels. In view of these 
facts and of the general clamor throughout the country for the 
reestablishment of peace and security, the government thought 
it necessary to find a radical solution to the conflict. What was 
finally determined upon was that General Diaz should publicly 
announce his intention of withdrawing very shortly from office, 
at the same time stating that Don Elamon Corral's resignation 
was also on its way. O'n their side, the revolutionists should 
pledge themselves to support the provisional government which, 
as provided by the Constitution, would in that event take office 
and should aid it to reestablish peace and satisfy public opinion 
within constitutional bounds. 

Such an act of patriotism by the President of the Republic 
produced good results, as the revolutionary leader at once con- 
sented to come to an agreement and in fact did agree with the 
government's envoy to a general armistice through all parts of 
the country, an armistice which is to end today. 

Mr. Carvajal, the government's envoy, was immediately 
given instructions to enter into negotiations with Mjessers. Vaz- 
quez Gomez, Madero, and Pino Suarez to arrange for a definite 
cessation of hostilities. The result of these new negotiations 
was that an agreement subject to ratification already asked for, 
was agreed upon. This was as follows : 

"At a meeting held in the border Custom House in Ciudad 
Juarez on the 21st of Miay, 1911 by Mr. Carvajal representing 
the government of Porf irio Diaz and Messrs. Francisco V. Gomez, 
Francisco Madero, Sr., and Jose Maria Pino Suarez, represent- 
ing the revolutionists, to try to readjust matters and put an 
end to hostilities throughout the country and whereas Porf irio 
Diaz declared his intention of resigning before the end of the 
present month; whereas it is gathered from reliable information 
that Mr. Ramon Corral will also resign within the stated time; 
whereas as provided by law, the Secretary of State, Francisco de 
la Barra will become president ad interim and will, according to 
the constitution, call a general election ; whereas the new govern- 
ment will carefully study present conditions in order to grant 
within lawful limits to each state what it may require and will 
consider payment of indemnities for damages caused directly 



THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 35 

by the revolutioD, the contracting parties represented at this 
conference have agreed upon the following terms: That hos- 
tilities between the government and the revolutionary forces 
shall from this day cease; that the revolutionary forces be dis- 
banded as soon as each state takes steps towards the reestablish- 
ment and guarantee of peace and public order. TRANSITiOiRiY : 
that the reconstruction and repairing of telegraphic and rail- 
road lines at present interrupted shall be taken up immediately. 
The present agreement shall be signed in duplicate." 

The attitude of the government had naturally caused revo- 
lutionists to spring up all over the country. On the 20th, Co- 
lima fell into the hands of the rebels. 0!n the 21st Cuemavaca 
fell, and on the following day Acapulco and Chilpancingo. On 
the 22nd it also became known that Tehuacan and Torreon had 
turned against the government and so on, all over the country, 
revolutionists whose very existence was unknown sprouted in 
every place. The ambitious and the hungry, all joined the revo- 
lution where it was succeeding, in order to share the booty. 

General Diaz though ill and without energy, and though 
urged by the Secretary of the Treasury and his friends; still 
resisted. Though the agreement demanding his resignation was 
already signed, the President still refused to resign. The mobs 
shouted in the streets and the riots increased so that the troops 
had to be called out to quell the disturbances; blood flowed 
through the streets of Mexico City ; the House had been waiting 
since the 24th for the resignation of the President and the Vice 
President, but still the President wavered. The scene in the Presi- 
dent's house on the morning of the 25th of May was really pa- 
thetic. T!he House of Representatives was about to go into ses- 
sion and the de facto head of the Cabinet was at the President's 
side with the written resignation in, his hand. His family begged 
the President to resign; Mr. Limantour, never before showing 
so much energy, demanded his resignation, but it was not until 
half past two o'clock when the representatives were already be- 
ginning to arrive at the House to approve that humiliation and 
sacrifice, that General Diaz, in the delirium of fever, almost un- 
consciously, submitted and signed his resignation. Mr. Corral's 
resignation had arrived several days before. Mr. Limantour, 
with a deep sigh of relief, left the President, taking with him 
both resignations in order that the House might consiunmate 



36 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHr^T 

the act. Both documents are worthy of passing into history. 
That of President Diaz is stated in the following terms : 

Mexico, May 25, 1911. 
Gentlemen : 

The Mexican people, that people who have so generously 
overwhelmed me with honors, who proclaimed me their leader 
in the International War, who have patriotically supported me 
in all works undertaken for the industrial and commercial im- 
provement of the country, to establish its credit, to give its name 
international prestige, and to gain for it a worthy place among 
friendly nations; that people, gentlemen, have revolted, and in 
armed bands of thousands, declare that my continuance as chief 
executive of the country is the cause of the insurrection. I do 
not know of what I am accused that would give rise to this social 
phenomenon but granting for the sake of argument that I am 
unconsciously guilty, this would make me the person least able 
to reason about and decide my own guilt. Under such circumr 
stances, respecting as I have always respected the will of the 
peeople, and in accordance with Article 82 of the National Con- 
stitution, I appear before the highest representatives of the 
people to present my resignation as constitutional president 
with which the national vote has honored me; and I do this all 
the more because to retain my position, it would be necessary to 
continue to shed Mexican blood, to destroy the Nation's credit, 
to squander and drain the fountains of her wealth, and to ex- 
pose the government to international conflict. 

I hope, gentlemen, that when the passions, always brought 
out by a revolution, cool down, a deeper and more unbiased 
study shall form in the public conscience a fair judgment which 
will permit me to die having in the depth of my soul a recipro- 
ation of that esteem which all my life I have held and shall con- 
tinue to bold for my fellow countrymen. 

Respectfully, 

Porfirio Diaz. 

Mir. Corral's resignation reads as follows: 

To the Secretaries of the House of Representatives of the 
Congress of the Union. 
G-entlemen : 
On the two occasions when the National Convention offer- 



THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 37 

ed me the candidacy for the Vice Presidency of the Eiepublic 
on the ticket headed by General Diaz, I informed them I was dis- 
posed to occupy any position in which my country deemed my 
services most useful, and that if the public vote placed me in 
a position so far above my deserts, my aim would be to support 
at all times the policies of General Dia,z so as to co-operate with 
him in so far as it lay in my power for the aggrandizement of the 
nation, which had to such an extraordinary degree been developed 
under his administration. 

Let those who take an interest in public affirs and have 
watched their development during the past years judge whether 
I have achieved my purpose. What I can declare is that I 
shall at all times endeavor even at the sacrifice of personal con- 
viction to raise not the slightest obstacle to the policy of the 
President or to his work of development, not only because such 
was the basis of my program and demanded of me by my duty 
and my loyalty, but also because I seek to give prestige to the 
office of Vice President, so useful in the United States, and 
so entirely underrated in Latin countries. 

The events which have shaken the country in the past few 
months have forced the President, out of pure patriotism, to 
withdraw from the high office given him by the practically unani- 
mous vote of the MIexican people at the last elections, and at the 
same time, it seems necessary for the national welfare, that the 
Vice President act likewise so that with new men and new ener- 
gies, a stimulus may be added to the national prosperity. There- 
fore, pursuant to my program of seconding the policy of Gener- 
al Diaz, I add my resignation to his, and do hereby surrender my 
office as Vice President, respectfully requesting the House to 
accept my resignation when it accepts that of the President. 

I beg of you, Messrs. Secretaries, to present this request, 
which I submit with the assurances of my most distinguished 
consideration. 

Liberty and Constitution. 

Paris, IVljay 1911. Ramon Corral. 

On the 22nd, Mr. Limantour had accepted the resignation 
of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Roberto Nunez, 
and had appointed as his successor Mr. Jaime Gurza. It was 
to Mr; Gurza that he left the Secretaryship when a few days 
later he unexpectedly fled from the city, accompanied to the 



38 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

station by his successor, and accompanied to the frontier by Mr. 
Emilio Madero, homage which the triumphant revolution paid 
to the chief of the fallen government. 

On the night of May 25th, democracy held a veritable orgy, 
the mobs marching and shouting all over the city. What were 
they celebrating? What was the cause of that exultation, of 
that rapture of joy? They themselves did not know! 

General Diaz from his house in Cadena Street could hear 
the shouting of the frantic mobs as they passed the corner near 
his residence. Through the street itself they could not go for it 
was closely guarded by a heavy cordon of troops and was closed 
at both ends by a compact column of dragoons, behind which, 
as a reenforcement, stood a double line of infantry. The Presi- 
dent's house was guarded by one hundred men from the Engi- 
neers' Battalion and by the whole squadron which composed the 
President's body guard. On the roofs there were rapid fire guns, 
and policemen held the points of exit. Faithful friends stood 
armed at the entrance on the main stairs, and even on the second 
floor of the ex-president's house. Yain precautions! The peo- 
ple did not hate Porfirio Diaz, they were merely celebrating their 
liberty to run through the streets shouting down anybody they 
pleased. The mob scenes were not the work of the anti-reelec- 
tionists, nor of the victorious Maderista party; they were pre- 
pared by old government partisans, men who had fattened their 
purses from the budget of the Diaz government and who owed 
Diaz many a good turn. ]\1>. Lalanne incited the mobs, and 
Mr, Joaquin Baranda McGregor, son of erstwhile cabinet mem- 
ber of the fallen government, paid the expenses of the demon- 
stration. The leaders of that demonstration were well known; 
recalcitrant Reyistas, servants of Mr. Dehesa, and ex-employees 
of Mr. Felix Diaz. All were united on that occasion to give 
vent to their feelings by shouting. If at even the most riotous 
moment of the celebration some practical joker had passed the 
word that General Diaz was mounted and ready to personally 
disperse the crowds, there would not have been a single one of 
those thousands of rioters left in the streets. I myself saw that 
human wave as it was passing by the House of Representatives; 
with several gentlemen I was leaving the House on our way home 
from a meeting which had been called by Mr. Calero. Of our 
party, Mr. Calero himself, Mr. Sierra M'endez, and M!r. Ricardo 
Mlolina e:ot into the latter 's automobile which was waiting in 



THE FALL OF THDE COLOSSUS 39 

front of the Bouse and were able quickly to leave by way of 
Canoa Street. I tried to get on a street car which was passing 
at full speed so as to cross before the mob, but I was prevented 
from so doing by Don Benito Juarez who jumped on while the 
car was moving. Others of my companions had gone through 
the Treasury of the Congress out to Factor Street, whereupon 
the servants had locked the doors of the House so that I was com- 
pelled to take refuge in another street car which was held up 
by the passing mobs. From there, I was able to see everything 
and to hear the insults that were hurled at all of us. Whether 
they did not see me, or seeing me did not recognize me, I do 
not know, but the fact is they did not interfere with me at all. 
Among that motley mass of humanity that passed so short a 
distance from me, I saw two women standing in a hired carriage 
and carrying a tri-color banner and a picture of Madero. One 
of these women was a teacher in a national school. I saw in 
other carriages, men who would often address the multitudes or 
would shout insults in incoherent phrases against the govern- 
ment, against the congressmen, and, above all, against the Cien- 
tificos. 

Once in a while, a "Viva Madero!" was shouted, but the 
ci'> that was most frequently heard, was "Viva el General 
Reyes!" I knew quite a number of the leaders of these groups. 
Some of them had been bribed to take part in the celebration 
of the reelectionists ; others were obstinate Reyistas, and still 
others in fact the greater part of them, were men who had serv- 
ed the government up to that very day and would serve the new 
one. 

Fortunately, a heavy and timely shower put a stop to the 
orgy, which might otherwise have degenerated into a riot with 
very serious consequences, for some of the more violent had 
already begun to propose to set fire to the homes of the re-elec- 
tionists. The police had remained stock still with arms crossed, 
probably watching the sight with great complacency. 

The following day at daybreak, without telling anybody, not 
even his most intimate friends like Don Guillermo de Landa y 
Escandon, ex-governor of the Federal District, General Diaz 
left for Vera Cruz escorted by a force composed of Engineers 
of the 7th Infantry, and a detachment of the President's body- 
guard, comimanded by General Victoriano Huerta. He was also 
accompanied by his aides-de-camp, by Mr. Gonzalo Garita. In- 



40 FEIOM DiBSPQTISM TO' ANARCHY 

spector General of Police, and two sons of the former President, 
Manuel Grionzalez. In these supreme moments, these two men 
in payment of the treachery and disloyalty shown to their father, 
offered a sublime act of loyalty and self sacrifice. On the arrival 
of the party at Tepeyahualco, on the border of the States of 
Puebla and Vera Cruz, a large band of revolutionists, who had 
been concentrating there with the full knowledge of the Gover- 
nor of Vera Cruz, had the audacity to attack the train ; somehow 
or other they knew the time of its departure and the route which 
it was to take, facts which seemed to be unknown to everybody. 
The chief of the escort immediately detached three columns 
under command of the Messrs. Gonzalez and of the Lieutenant 
Colonel of the Engineers, whereupon the revolutionists instantly 
fled. General Diaz also got off the traini and once again he 
was the calm and brave chief of former times. His voice was 
clear and sonorous, his orders curt and precise. The rebels 
were commanded by a protege of the ex-president, the son of a 
man whom Diaz had always served as a friend. 

After the flight of the assailants, the party resumed its 
journey arriving at Vera Cruz without further mishap. 

Due to the events of 1879*, General Diaz had no sympa- 
thizers in the city of Vera Cruz, and knowing it, he had al- 
ways stayed in the city as little as possible. Now in the hour 
of his misfortune, that magnanimous people treated him with 
every respect and consideration; and when on board the German 
steamer Tpiranga he was ready to sail for Europe, the send off 
they gave him was more than cordial, it was enthusiastic. The 
crowds acclaimed him. All rancor had vanished, and this was 
because the athletic figure of General Diaz, as it appeared on 
deck waving good bye to his country, did not remind the people 
of the overbearing ruler but rather of the magnificent soldier 
of the years from '57 to '67. Has countenance did not remind 
them of the Lord of the Castle of Chapultepec, but rather of the 
brave soldier of Jalatlaco, Miahuatlan, and Carbonera; and the 
tears that were running down his cheeks blotted out in the eyes 
of the people all his past mistakes. People in general are sim- 
ple and forgiving, but history is cruel and impersonal in such 



*The bloody repression inflicted by Governor Teran on the 
Lerdo party on the 25th of June, 1879, as related in the com- 
plete Spanish edition. 



THE FALL OF THIE COLOSSUS 41 

moments as these, for it is obliged to ignore tears, to remain un- 
moved by misfortune, and to look at events and men in their 
true aspect. 



As General Diaz had twice failed to carry out his promises 
to Mr. Limantour ; as he had deceived him many times, and had 
humiliated him even more, Mr. Limantour must have had a 
feeling of relief as from a distance he watched the Ypiranga carry 
General Porfirio Diaz away, anid with him all the ambitions of 
the old executive, and could have said to himself : 

"I am avenged." 



CHAPTER V. 

THE WHITE PRiESIDENT AND THE BLACK 
PRESIDENT. 



On the 25th of May Greneral Diaz finally sent in his resig- 
nation with that of Vice President Corral to the Hlouse of Re- 
presentatives and it was accepted that very afternoon, where- 
upon the Secretary of State, Francisco L. de la Barra, who was 
designed in the treaties of Ciudad Juarez as the man to take 
charge of the Grovernment until general elections could be held, 
became President ad interim of the Republic. On the following 
day, he took the oath of office and at once removed his resi- 
dence to the Castle of Chapultepec, He then proceeded to name 
his cabinet, or rather, decreed the appointment of the mem im- 
posed upon him by the revolution. In this instance, he was guid- 
ed by history, for in 1876, Jose Maria Yglesias lost the presi- 
dency by refusing to subordinate his constitutional powers to 
the terms of a treaty made with the revolutionists. Mindful of 
this fact, Mk". de la Barra, rather than risk having the same 
thing happen to him, accepted all the ministers that were im- 
posed upon him. 

The Cabinet, as finally made up, was as follows: Secre- 
tary of State, vacant, the President to discharge the duties of 
this office assisted by the Assistant Secretary Bartolome Carva- 
jal y Rosas; Secretary of the Interior, Emilio Vazquez Gomez; 
Attorney General, Rafael L. Hernandez; Secretary of Educa- 
tion, Francisco Vazquez Gomez; Secretary of Development, 
Manuel Calero; Secretary of Public Works, Manuel Bonilla; 
Secretary of the Treasury, Ernesto Madero, suggested by Mr. 
Jose Ives Limantour; and Secretary of War, General Eugenio 
Rascon. This last appointment was the only one left entirely 
to the President's judgment, and it was left to him either be- 
cause the revolutionary party had no one to suggest for the office 

(42) 



THE WHITE AND BLACK PRESIDENT 43 

or because it did not wish to hold up before the soldiers any of 
its leaders as implicated in the successful revolution. 

It may be noted that Mr. Limantour's work was now com- 
plete. He had seen to it that two of his friends, Ernesto Madero, 
and the Assistant Secretary, Jaime Gturza, were left at the 
head of the Treasury Department, thus preventing any attack 
that might hurt his good name. In the great disaster which was 
to bring so many ills to his fatherland, this thought alone filled 
his mind. He had not lost the hope of attaining the presidency, 
but though he did not realize it, he was dead politically. 

Owing to the fact that some of the new ministers were in 
exile, the govemmient was not finally installed until a few days 
had passed. Mr. Calero, the most intelligent of the new offi- 
cials not excepting the President, was expected to be the life 
and soul of the government, and was in fact from the very start 
its spokesman in Congress. But neither the Secretary of the 
Interior, nor the Secretary of Education had been bom to obey 
anybody, nor were they disposed to see another enjoy the bene- 
fits accruing from the success of the revolution. Consequently, 
from the beginning, they dispatched thie affairs of their respec- 
tive departments without taking the trouble of consulting the 
President nor much less of asking his consent. Emilio Vazquez 
Gomez at the head of the Department of the Interior, began to 
squander money in a most outrageous manner. In vain was the 
atteoition of thie Cabinet called to this state of affairs. The only 
change that was eventually agreed upon was to the effect that 
all drafts on the Treasury be countersigned by the Secretary of 
War, a thoroughly honorable man who would not lend himself 
to any questionable transaction. But on the day following the 
agreement, Vazquez Gomez sent to his coUeague in the War De- 
partment a stack of printed drafts to be signed in blank and 
returned. General Bascon consulted the President, but the latter, 
afraid of crossing the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, the intellectual lea- 
ders of the revolt, ordered that all the requisitions from the Secre- 
tary of the Interior be honored. Thus did the new plan bring 
results directly contrary to its purpose, for not only did old 
abuses continue, but the responsibility for them was removed 
from the perpetrator. Then there foUowed an unheard of loot- 
ing. Not only did the Department receive pay rolls of soldiers 
who had never existed, but it even received notes given in saloons 
and dives of the capital by the revolutionary leaders whom 



44 FROM DESPOTISM TO A2s'ARCHT 

the Cabinet officer was anxious to please. ]\Ioney was given to 
everybody, even to those who had not even dreamed of joining 
the rebellion. In less than one month, over one million dollars 
pa^ed out of the public coffers by order of Emilio Vazquez 
Gomez. But even this was not the worst. Arms and ammuni- 
tion were distributed all over the country to people entirely un- 
worthy of this confidence, under pretext of preparing against 
a counter revolution which was impossible at the time. In this 
way, the foundation was effectually laid for the revolution 
which broke out at the opening of ]Mr. Madero's constitutional 
term. 

On all sides the friends of ]\Iadero sought to throw obstacles 
in the way of the government. In Tlaxcala, six hundred !Mader- 
ists, who formed a body of Rurales paid by the state, revolted 
against Governor Sanchez and the legislature, with a view to 
imposing their wishes on their superiors, and it finally became 
necessary to bring some of the regular troops to quell them. 
In Toluca, the chief of the Rurales, Joaquin ^Miranda, acting in 
accord with ]\Iunguia Santoyo, whom ]\Iadero had sent as his 
political leader in the State, issued an order prohibiting in the 
name of free suffrage the nomination for governor of anybody 
connected with the fallen regime. In Xalapa, blood was shed 
through the imprudence of the ]\laderista leader. In Torreon, 
the so-called General, Adame jMacias, after the massacre of the 
Chinese by his troops, jjlotted with the 6th Battalion at the time 
of the evacuation of the city by General Lojero, finally securing 
its desertion in a body; and in Chiapas, a conflict in which even 
the bishop was mixed up, occasioned an encounter in which sev- 
eral atrocities were com mi tted. 

In Puebla the insolence of the rebels knew no bounds. After 
the barbarous excesses at Atencingo and Covadonga, Abraham 
]\Iartinez calling himself the chief of staff of Zapata, proceeded 
with the aid of the rurales, and, as he said, by order of the 
Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Vazquez Gromez, to imprison in 
the bull ring in the City of Puebla itself, a large number of 
prominent persons with a view to executing them. Among these 
was the son of General I\Iucio Martinez, at that time Represen- 
tative in Congress. The Governor of the State, Mr. Canete, per- 
sonally went to the rescue of the unfortunate prisoners, but soon 
found that INIartinez refused point blank to obey him, on the 
ground that he had direct orders from the Secretary- of the In- 



THE WHITE AND BLACK PRESIDENT 45 

terior. The result was tthat the Grovemor was forced to call 
federal troops under the leadership of Colonel Aureliano 
Blanquete, who after a bloody conflict, in which over three hun- 
dred were killed, finally reduced them to submission. 

On the 7th of June, the leader of the revolution', Mir, Fran- 
cisco I. Miadero, made his triumphal entry into the capital where 
he was greeted with an indescribable enthusiasm and a formid- 
able earthquake. The reception accorded to Madero that day 
can be compared only with the ovation given to Juarez on his 
entry to the city after his victory over the French intervention 
and the Empire. All streets through which he passed were in 
festal array, and not for a single moment did the throngs cease 
to acclaim him. An attempt was made to unhitch the horses from 
his coach, so that the people themselves might draw it along. 

Madero standing up in his carriage and smiling to the right 
and to the left, was really an object of pity. When he arrived 
at the palace where he was to review the parade, he was ex- 
hausted; his fatigue was so evident that he looked more like 
a sick man than a triumphant chief. Mr. de la Barra accompan- 
ied him to the balcony, flatteritig him and waiting on him, with- 
out reeeivinig any attention from Madero nor muchi less from 
his companions, for at that moment, to the revolutionists, the 
real head of the nation was Madero, and they wished to impress 
that fact upon the provisional president. 

Madero opened offices in the Paseo de la Eieforma, and, 
utterly ignoring the President of the Republic, began to handle 
the more important matters, while his brother, Gustavo, the most 
energetic member of the family, opened offices in the Avenida 
Juarez and began to arrange for the elections which were to 
give legal sanction to the power already held by the revolution- 
ists, and which were, moreover, destined to be the apple of discord 
between the various factions, who' fearing the weakness of their 
common leader, wished at all costs to get hold of the vice presi- 
dency. 

These offices could not exist simultaneously. It was impos- 
sible that at one and the same time the Secretary of the Interior, 
and Mr. Francisco Madero, and his brother Gustavo, should 
govern the country while the President of the Republic was al- 
lowed only (to. entertain and draw the applause of the people 
as he drove through the streets bowing to everybody. 

The Secretary of Education, on his side, paid no attention 



46 FEX)M DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

to the provisional president, but occupied himself chiefly with 
his campaign for election to the vice presidency, which the eant- 
didacy of de la Barra threatened to deprive him of, for the 
latter had grouped around him last-minute revolutionists, and 
especially the catholics organized ostensibly as a political party. 
In the contest with Vazquez Gomez on one side, incapable 
of obeying anybody, and on the other with Goistavo Madero, 
constitutionalist party leader, demanding that he be heard and 
even obeyed, an absolute break between these men was bound to 
come, and finally did come. An inevitable and obvious result 
of the conflict seemed to be the removal of the Messrs. Vazquez 
Gomez from the Cabinet, but the Secretary of Education, a cun- 
ning man and more highly versed in political intrigue than his 
brother, realized that his resignation would raze to the ground 
all the plans he had built up to attain power; in consequence, 
he so modified his course of action that both Francisco Madero 
and the provisional President exerted their influence in his be- 
half fearing that his removal from the government would alien- 
ate all those revolutionists who had been flattered and protected 
by Messrs. Vazquez Gomez. Thus the only one to leave the Cabi- 
net was Emilio Vazquez Gomez, who up to that time had been 
the black president, in contradistinction to de la Barra, known 
as the white President. 



CHAPTER yi. 



ZAPATA. 



Wheii the government first assumed control, all the revolu- 
tionists bowed down to the new order of things, but as Secretary- 
Vazquez Gromez squandered money, arms and ammunition promis- 
cously, many of the rebels soon found that it was by far more 
advantageous to continue in rebellion, surrendering occasionally. 
By this plan they could live like lords without any great risk 
and when their prodigal life began to pall on them, they could 
seek diversion and more riches. In Mbrelos, the revolution had 
been led by Emiliano Zapata, a former federal soldier. Accord- 
ing to his own story, he had served in the army only because of 
an arbitrary act by the Prefect of his counity who without right 
or reason had drafted him into the ranks. When his term 
of service was completed, he had returned to his home where he 
had earned his living as a plowman, or as a herder, or as the 
head of some small business, or engaging more or less honestly 
in other affairs. "When the revolution broke out, thinking that 
the time was propitious for avenging ancient wrongs, he plunged 
into the struggle having as his primary motive the punishment 
of the Prefect who had forced him into the army. An absolutely 
fearless man, with a good knowledge of his section of the coun- 
try, well known to the people, and with some knowledge of mili- 
tary discipline gained during his service in the army, Zapata 
sooni had many followers. By the time the revolution triumphed, 
his company had increased to a force of eight hundred men 
which popular imagination further increased to several thous- 
ands. Among those who came to his side during the revolt 
was a certain high school teacher, Otilio Montano by name. In 
the capacity of secretary, he followed the leader around from the 
very beginning and finally came to be the moving spirit of that 
revolt. Zapata himself had neither ideals nor program, his only 

(47) 



48 FROM DEiSPOTISMi TO ANARCHY 

idea was to try his luck at fighting until the sowing season, al- 
ways with the hope of getting in the meantime the revenge so 
dear to him. This man Montano, however, did have both ideals 
and a program, besides cherishing a desire for vengeance, but 
a vengeance much broader than Zapata's since it was not against 
an individual but against the whole of society. For eight years 
he had studied zealously in the Normal School where he obtain- 
ed a degree, but he soon found that as a professor the only re- 
ward for his labors was a position as teacher ini his native vil- 
lage with a salary insufficient to meet the necessities of life, and 
with a future which promised, if he were successful after years 
of toil and privation, only the possibility of obtainiag a slightly 
better position where his renumeration would be less than that 
received by men of much inferior education!. Montano felt that 
something was radically wrong and aimed to set it right. He 
could, however, not unfurl as a flag for a revolution the in- 
justice of which he personally felt himself the victim, so he 
broadened his grievance so that it should attract supporters to 
his side. What others were there, victims like himself for social 
injustice? Obviously the "peones" of the ranches whose daily 
wage was hardly enough to enable them to eke out a bare exis- 
tence. On these he fixed his attention, and chose to use them as 
the instrument of his vengeance on society— that society which 
had made him study, throw away his youth in class rooms, only 
to find at the end of his career that he was a nobody with barely 
enough to live on, like the day laborer on the ranch. Therefore, 
taking as his own the cause of the day laborer, he began at 
one and the same time to preach a brutal socialism and to carry 
on with the forces of his chief a war of extermination. 

The Indian of today has only two interests for which he 
will go to extremes ; his land and his wife. As part of a primi- 
tive race, he should have one other, his religion, but the uncivil- 
ized Indian still gropes between the memory of his aboriginal 
beliefs and the Catholic religion forcibly imposed on him by 
the conquerors. This causes the Indian 's fanaticism to be localized 
se that although he would never think of fighting for his religion 
in the abstract, he is quite capable of suffering the worst torture 
and making all manner of sacrifice for the saint of his particu- 
lar parish. Fundamentally, it is his idol— the white conquerors 
have changed its name and its appearance, but for him the St. 
Anthony or the St. Joseph, which is venerated in his village 



ZAPATA 49 

cihurch is the teotl* which his forefathers worshiped. It is not, 
therefore, a rare occurrence for priests, especially in remote 
towns, to find hidden between the fold of the Virgin's mantle, 
or behind the carvings of the tabernacle, or beneath the pedestal 
of the monstrance, a little clay figure, which is really what the 
fanatical element adores when the people flock to church to 
recite the novena of the Immaculate Conception, or the vespers 
of St. Joseph. 

In this connection it may be recalled that the original cause 
of the persecution and subsequent death in 18i71 of Gteneral 
Felix Diaz, father of the present general of thait name, at the 
hands of the Indians of the village of Juchitan, was that among 
the outrages and cruelties which as Grovernor of Oaxaca he had 
perpetrated he had scourged and then burned in effigy the 
patron saint of that village. When General Felix Diaz rose 
against the government of President Juarez, the Secretary of 
War, Ignacio Mejia, aware of thds grievance and familiar with 
the traits of the Juchitan Indians, authorized the formation of 
a guerilla band of natives of that region to go out in search of 
the fugitive ex-governor. The band led by Apolonio Jimenez, 
and Mr. Cartas, caught up with Diaz near the city of Pbchutla, 
and after torturing him horribly, put him to death and tore his 
body to pieces. Without a doubt, it was a horrible crime, but yet 
comparable with the many acts committed by Felix Diaz himself 
during his campaigns and his tenure of office in Oaxaca. Gen- 
eral Forey, confusing General Porfirio Diaz with his brother 
Felix, delivered a speech before the French Senate, in which he 
related heartbreaking atrocities. His mistake lay not in the 
deeds narrated, for these were on the whole true, but in at- 
tributinig them to Porfirio Diaz, who was always a humane leader 
and never committed such horrible acts as those related by the 
Commander in Chief of the army sent to Mexico by Napoleon. 

To tell an Indian in any part of the country that he has 
some rights to the property of the neighboring landowner, or 
that he must fight the neighboring village to take its laoid for 
himself, or his village, is to sow a seed that instantly bears fruit. 
There is no village chief or village lawyer who does not know this, 
and who does not establish his authority or prestige on a lawsuit 
over the question of lands with the nearby ranch or town. 



*Aztec for God. 



60 YROU DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

It is not that the Indian needs that land for his sustenance, 
for our Indian can live on almost anything, few races being 
by nature so frugal, and so impervious to privations, nor does 
his love of land spring from any exact notions of private owner- 
ship; but he has in the very depth of his soul a profound con- 
viction that that property has been snatched from him though 
he knows neither when nor how. The only concrete idea he has 
on the subject is a determination) to recover it. Hfe has in the 
fastnesses of the mountain disposable property, which he has 
obtained from nobody, but which he owns by right of first occu- 
pancy. Thither he betakes himself when his inborn melancholy 
impels him to flee from civilized man, and on a piece of ground 
in the wildest part of the mountain he establishes his temporary 
abode which he frequently changes according to the necessities 
of Hf e. 

This idiosyncracy is perfectly well known to all exploiters 
of the aboriginal race, and Professor MIontano made -ase of it 
to incite the people of Morelos to rebellion. This was the first 
seed he sowed and he found fruitful soil, as I shall explain here- 
after; other factors contributed powerfully to renew a struggle 
which originated long before the existence of government and 
which was exactly what caused its establishment. 



CHAPTER VII. 



THE REVOLT IN MOEjELOS. 



Exceptional conditions exist in the state of Mbrelos, whicli 
must be examined in order to understand why the revolutions 
have been able to thrive there through so long a period. The 
one million seven hundred and twenty nine thousand acres com- 
prising the state's arable lands, are under control of exactly 
thirty-two people, who alone reap the benefit of their cultivation. 
T3ie result of these holdings has been the building up of im- 
mensely wealthy plantations equipped with the most costly ma- 
chinery and with great hydraulic works, facilitating the pro- 
duction of sugar and spirits which bring to the proprietors fabu- 
lous profits. The climate of that region (I speak of the agri- 
cultural region) is very rigorous and can be withstood by few 
people besides the natives. Foreigners especially suffer a great 
deal from it, except Spaniards, who get used to it very quickly 
and resist it with ease. For this reason the majority of superin- 
tendents and managers of the haciendas are of that nationality. 

The country in Morelos is extremely broken, encouraging the 
formation of small clans which live comfortably in the moun- 
tains surrounding the state. These mountains' are of the most 
rugged type, having as their limit along the Puebla boundary the 
summit of Popocatepetl; along the side contiguous to the State 
of Mexico, the peak of Zempoala ; along the Guerrero border the 
Ocotlan range ; and along the boundary of the Federal District, 
the Ajusco range, whose spur on joining the Zempoala is called 
the Tepoxtlan range. 

The Popocatepetl chain divides the districts of Cuautla and 
Jomacatepec, extending until it meets at right angles the spurs 
of the Ocotlan range. Those spurs in their turn divide the districts 
of Jonacatepec and Jojutla. Between Jojutla and Tautepec there 
extends another range, that of Tlaltizapan, along the foot hills 

(51) 



52 FBOM DESPOTISM] TO AiNARCHiY 

ot* whicli runs the Jojutla River, chief tributary of the Amacusac, 
which divides Morelos from Guerrero. 

The great canyons formed by these ranges are natiural forti- 
fications which a small band of men can defend successfully; 
therefore persuit of the rebels is difficult. 

The climate, as I have said above, also materially helps the 
defense, since those who are not native take sick very easily. 
Besides, the abundance of vegetation due to the fertility of the 
region is so great that it can easily furnish sustenance to bands 
of men hidden even in the most remote parts of the mountains. 

With cheap food, with rich plantations from which money 
can be obtained by threats of destroying the costly maehiuery, 
and with the facility to flee at a moment 's notice to places where 
pursuit is practically impossible, the life of rebel or bandit is 
extremely pleasant. 

At the close of the war against French intervention and 
the Empire, the State of Morelos, as at present, was the scene 
of bloody warfare. So also had it been before 1862, for as a 
matter of fact, it was the murder of some Spaniards at the San 
Vicente and Chiconcuac plantations that had served as pretext 
for the intervention. But at that time there was not even a re- 
volutionary standard, it was merely a band of marauders who 
under the name of "The Silver Plated Band" were the terror 
of that region. 

The government of Juarez in order to handle the situation 
efficiently, separated what is now the State of Morelos from the 
State of Mexico and under a purely military regime managed 
to give security to the people of that neighborhood. But the 
termination of the war against the "Silver Plated Band" and 
the complete extermination of these highwaymen was not fi- 
nally accomplished until five years later, when during the ad- 
ministration of President Lerdo, General Francisco Leyva, as 
governor of Morelos succeeded in suppressing brigandage through 
extraordinary power conferred on him by the government and 
through his own personal ability. 

The germ was not dead, however, but merely latent, and 
made its reappearance on several occasions during the adminis- 
tration of Diaz, only to be put down with pitiless rigor. G^eneral 
Preciado and Colonel Alarcon were governors who were obeyed 
because of the terror they inspired ; thus, they were able, thanks 
to their energy, to preserve peace in the State. 



THE REiYOLT IN MORELO'S 53 

At the death, of Colonel Alareon, in the last days of the 
Diaz administration, the desire to be elected governor seized 
Don Pablo Escandon, a very worthy and very rich man, proprie- 
tor of a magnificent plantation in the state and chief aide de 
camjp of the President of the Republic. 

Conditions throughout the country had changed radically. 
The preachings of Madero had had their effect and the opposi- 
tion to General Diaz had gained many converts. Mr. Leyva, son 
of the military governor whom I have mentioned as successful 
in reducing to submission the outlaws of the state, also presented 
his candidacy for governor against Escandon, the man desig- 
nated for the office by General Diaz. The latter, instead of im- 
posing his will without allowing any discussion of the question, 
as had been his custom, authorized appeals to the people to 
counterbalance those made by Leyva. Accordingly, Jose Maria 
Lozano, afterwards Cabinet Minister in BDuerta's administra- 
tion; Diodoro Batalla, and Heriberto Barron, leader of the 
Reyista party, went to Morelos to promote the candidacy of 
Escandon by making speeches which stirred up the latent spirit 
of disorder. 

Naturally, it become necessary to speak of democracy and 
to promise all manner of freedom and privileges, but the sup- 
porters of Leyva promised still more. Therefore, in this battle 
of promises, there was preached a truly socialistic propaganda 
with the full knowledge and tolerance of the authorities. These 
authorities, though themselves products of a dictatorship, were 
utterly at a loss how to proceed in the dilemma when a propagan- 
da made under the auspices of the government was notoriously 
opposed to all that the government had theretofore preached. 
When the period of oratory reached its zenith, stone throwing 
at public meetings marked the first mjove towards armed re- 
bellion. The moment that stone throwing began, however, Gen- 
eral Diaz, judging that law and order might be seriously upset, 
sent Brigadier General Juvencio Rubles and the 23rd battalion 
which was under his command, to the city of Cuernavaca, capi- 
tal of the State of Mlorelos. 

The presence of the Federal troops in the state capital was 
the deciding argument in the electoral campaign, forcing the 
partisans of Leyva temJ)orarily to see ' ' the light of reason. ' ' Es- 
candon was declared the elected Governor of the State and took 
office shortly afterwards. 



54 FRIOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

Thereupon, the supporters of Leyva began to make a pro- 
paganda which was purely revolutionary and, as was to be ex- 
pected, they allied themselves with the rebels in the north who 
were fighting in favor of Francisco I. Madero, The new gov- 
ernor of the state, a very worthy man, as I have said before, 
but wholly without political acumen, wished to flatter the people 
and for this reason abolished the poll tax. But at the same time, 
since he himself was a large landowner in the state he yielded 
to the entreaties of his partners and friends appointing to 
office men who would protect the interests of the landed class. 
Some of these appointees abused their powers and were prompt- 
ly removed by Escandon, but at that, the demands of the revo- 
lutionists only became greater, since they believed that the gov- 
ernment was entering on a period of vacillation and weakness 
which it behooved them to take advantage of. Some landowners 
on the other hand, considering that they could count on the abso- 
lute backing of the new governor, under titles more or less legiti- 
mate, began to take away from neighboring villages certain lands 
which they could develop better than the natives. "With the leaven 
of revolt already at work, with landowners attempting unreason- 
able things, with those who had given their aid in the elections 
making demands, and finally, with the authorities, weak and at 
a loss as to which way to turn, the result was a condition of dis- 
order which the triumph of the revolution converted into a verit- 
able chaos very much like an agrarian revolution. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
THE AGRAEIAN PROBLEM 

Since the beginniiig of the present period of revolution 
everybody has been speaking of the agrarian problem. Hardly 
a day goes by that in some newspaper, large or small, there does 
not appear a sententious article proposing remedies for the na- 
tion's agrarian problem, all more or less adequate according to 
the intelligence of the writers themselves. All this, in my opinion, 
is building castles in the air. 

Our agricultural population is divided into three great 
classes ; the landowners, the tenants, and the peons. Concerning 
the first of these, the great majority as a rule would willingly rent 
half of what they own if they could be assured that the land thus 
disposed of would be worked, and but one-third of its product given 
to them in payment of rent. The tenants as a rule do not want 
land either.* They ask for it, certainly, just as the Indian asks 
lor it, but whenever they succeed in acquiring a strip, their imme- 
diate concern is to mortgage and sell it. The tenant is satisfied 
if he has enough wherewith to live. "When his crop is good, enab- 
ling him to pay all or part of ihis debts, he does not generally care 
about anything but the whereabouts of the next county fair where 
he may spend in cock fights and roulette his year's earnings buy- 
ing some jewels for his wife, that he could put in pawn on the 
bad days. Following this, he will once again go to his landlord 
begging for seed on credit and for loans against his next crop. 
Concerning the peon, in the majority of cases, if he has enough 
to enable him to live and drink his gin, he cares little or nothing 
for anything else. The whole trouble lies in the fact that nearly 
all lack the spirit of thrift, and that the peon especially lacks 
necessities. Hie eats little, and requires as clothing merely un- 
bleached cotton sheeting in winter as weU as in summer. So much 
for the classes of people. 



*I speak on the majority of cases, and especially, those not in 
the border states. 

(55) 



56 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

Our lands are not worked as they should be because there 
is no cheap money available to develop their productivity. Until 
a few years ago, there was hardly a mortgage on rural property 
at ten per cent, the majority being at twelve per cent and even 
higher rates of interest. What business of any kind is possible 
with money ait that rate? Furthermore, for our lands to pro- 
duce what they should, works of irrigation are indispensable, and 
these are so costly, that they can be undertaken only when cheap 
money is available and when a great, productive, easily develop- 
ed plantation is used as the basis. 

Taking into consideration the characteristics of the people 
in conjunction with the aforementioned facts, it becomes evi- 
dent that a universal distribution of property, such as is de- 
manded by the majority of writers, would be the ruination of 
the country. 

And yet, it is an undeniable fact that the laborer is exploited. 
No other term can be used to describe a system in which the la- 
borer receives only 28 to 40 cenits a day* and then has that 
pittance further reduced by means of ranch, stores, inventions 
admirably suited to deprive the laborer of the fruits, in them- 
selves inadequate, of his toil. 

The ranch store is a highly important factor in the wide- 
spread discontent of the rural population, for on account of, 
or rather by means of this institution, the laborers are really 
held to the plantation, and as a matter of fact, become its slaves. 
Although the peon 's wages are so scant that he can hardly live on 
them, still, small as they are, they are seldom given to him in cash. 
For in spite of the fact that he requires little food and less cloth- 
ing, as I have already said, they are given to him in the shape 
of credit to order what he needs at the store, which is kept 
opposite headquarters by the proprietor of the plantation. The 
account which the landowner opens with the peon will never 
be fully paid, as the former well knows, but that is all part of 
the exploiter's plan. Under these arrangements, the peon can 
do nothing but buy at the store what is necessary for himself 
and family, and in so doing run up a debt which his scant wages 
cannot begin to pay, and which on his death falls to his son as 
an inheritance. This effectively prevents him from seeking em- 
ployment at another plantation where wages might be higher, 



*Mexican money whose value is now 0.10 to 0.13 U. S. 
currency. 



THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM 57 

for his original employer would bring Ihim back as a debtor. Tlie 
law, it is true, does not protect this abuse, but powerless to pre- 
vent it, tolerates it. On the other hand, it is also true that the 
peon, whenever he pleases abandons the ranch, and laughs at his 
creditor if it happens tha* the owner or manager is not in league 
with the prefect. But if the owner or manager is a friend of 
the prefect, what happens then?* The laborer is brought back 
to the plantation by force, or is drafted into the army as a sus- 
picious character; and so great as well as so justifiable is the 
terror on the part of our country people of being forced into 
the ranks, that the mere threat of conscription is enough to pre- 
vent anybody from having sufficient courage to tempt the wrath 
of the superintendent, who in most plantations is the only mas- 
ter the peon knows. 

Conditions are noticeably better in the plantations which 
are personally directed or at least frequently visited by the 
owner ; and where no ranch store exists, there is no grievance, no 
discontent, no agrarian problem; everything goes along smooth- 
ly and the peon is the first man to defend Ms employer. 

In the towns, there does truly exist the desire to own land, 
for most of our towns in some states owe their exisifcence to grants 
of commons by the Spanish government for the use of the en- 
tire community. Wlhen a boom in the business affairs of the 
nation brought with it the thirst for land, which in certain busi- 
ness men amounted to a craze, the encroachments on the village 
commons began. Using as a pretext that the lands would be 
much more productive in the hands of large plantation owners, 
the expropriation of the lands of the towns began in earnestt, the 
principal victims being those who were the weakest, most de- 
fenseless, and least able to reach the ear of the men in power. 
AVhat was done to some frightened all, and there grew up a hatred 
on the part of the villagers toward their neighboring plantation 
owner, not for what he did, but for what he might do in the 
future. 

But the agrarian problem does not consist in reclaiming 
from the usurping planters the nine square miles of land which 



*The Spanish farm managers are invariably in league with 
the prefect. 

tThis occurred especially in Morelos and Mexico. 



58 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHIY 

is what was generally granted to villages as a eonunons. The 
problem is a different one and can be stated as follows : 

Is it better to have large plantations or to divide the 
land up into a large number of small holdings? The latter ap- 
pears to be preferred by the majority of those who consider the 
subject, but it seems to me that it would be the country's ruin 
under the present circumstances. 

The topography of Mexico is such that there is a very un- 
even distribution of rain throughout the republic, though the 
rainfall is not as bad as is generally supposed, yet there 
is need of regulation so as to utilize it, to the best ad- 
vantage, for much rain is no good if it does not come when 
it is needed, and in sufficient quantity for all the works of the 
field. In other words, what is necessary is the regulation of 
the distribution of waiter. This can be attained only by large 
works of irrigation, which the small landowner cannot afford, 
and which in view of the expenditures involved cannot bring 
adequate returns unless undertaken with a large plantation as 
a basis. 

Small holdings are useful only when the desired end is in- 
tensive cultivaltion such as is needed in highly developed coun- 
tries where land is scarce and labor plentiful, where, conse- 
quently the industry of man must make up for the niggardli- 
ness of nature. But even at that, the products of intensive culti- 
vation cannot compete in price with the products of extensive 
cultivation carried on with appropriate machinery. 

It requires cheap capital to install great works of irriga- 
tion, for with money at ten per cent as a minimum, it is impos- 
sible to obtain desired results, unless the plantation in question 
happens to be of extraordinary richness, and such plantations 
are the exception in all parts of the world. 

During the last years of the Diaz administration, when there 
was a surplus in the Treasury and a credit which made possible 
loans at low interest, the government might have been able to 
undertake works of this kind, but Mr. Limantour was never in- 
terested in the agricultural problem. 

Mf. Olegario Molina, when he was Secretary of Develop- 
ment, did do something in this regard, ordering surveys in the 
region of the Nazas River in order to ascertain the character as 
well as the cost of the works necessary there. This survey was 
completed but the outbreak of the Madero revolution prevented 



THE AGE'AMAN PEOBTJEM 59 

the formulaJtioii of a plan of action based on the information thus 
gathered. Mr. Rafael L. Hernandez, later Secretary of Develop- 
ment, finding this iindertakiag already started by his prede- 
cessor, Mr. Molina, attempted to make a study of the question, 
but he had neither the required preparation nor the necessary 
experience to tackle the problem adequately. Besides, the re- 
volution or rather the state of anarchy of the country, made 
difficult the consideration of any question not purely political. 
The study made of conditions at the Nazas is needed for other pro- 
ductive regions where the land can be apportioned for irrigation as 
is done in the Nazas district ; but it should be borne in mind that 
only a comparatively small part of the country is of this char- 
acter. Miost of thie great ranches and plantations include moun- 
tainous regions, where the only possible source of income is lum- 
ber and cattle, and here, obviously, division into small holdings 
would spell ruin. 

Up to the present, the experiment stations which have been 
established in the country have yielded no results because they 
have been placed under the direction of men of theory who have 
devoted their time to theoretical experiments, whereas what the 
agriculture of our country needs is practical methods wihich will 
enable the rude farmer to utilize the teachings of modern science 
without having to take a formal course of study. For the same 
reasons our School of Agriculture has been a failure up to the 
present. Its students have been required to make extended 
studies in mathematics or military problems and have not been 
taught what every agriculturist should know — how to increase 
their produdts and lower the cost of production. 

The agrarian problem, therefore, in my opinion, can be 
boiled down to the consideration of four measures. First, giving 
back to the villages the commons taken from them. By the re- 
moval of this traditional grievance, the dissatisfaction among the 
rural population in certain quarters could be entirely removed. 
Second, is the construction of great works of irrigation after a 
detailed survey of the various parts of the country. Third to 
enforce thie law ordering that all wages must be paid in cash. 
Last, but not least, is to seek the means to obtain cheap capital 
without which development is impossible. The division of the 
land among many small landowners will follow as an inevitable 
result of the accomplishment of these measures. 



CHAPTER IX. 
THE BRAINS OF THE REVOLUTIOQST 



The result of the withdrawal as Secretary of the Interior 
of Vazquez Gomez on the 2nd of August, was a complete break 
between the Vazquez Gomez brothers and the Constitutional 
Progressive Party, or what amounts to the same thing, with 
Gustavo Madero, the party boss. Don Gustavo Madero, realiz- 
ing how difficult it would be for his brother to govern if Don 
Francisco Vazquez Gomez were elected vice president of the Re- 
public, worked zealously to have the convention nominate some- 
one else. On their side, Vazquez Gomez and his friends also work- 
ed strenuously for victory at the convention. This conven- 
tion was held in the Theatre Hidalgo in the City of Mexico. 
After a desperate contest, Gtistavo Madero 's candidate, Jose 
Maria Pino Suarez, was nominated. This nomination, the death 
blow to all Dr. Vazquez's ambitions, made him break complete- 
ly with his former friends, because, claiming as he did to be 
the brains of the revolution, he believed that he and he alone 
deserved the power*. He probably thought that with the title 
of vice president he would as a matter of fact govern the country. 
When he lost the nomination, he correctly judged that his am- 
bitions had received a fatal blow. From that moment he began 
to form plots against Mr. Madero and his government even 
going so far as to reach a temporary understanding with the 
partisans of Don Felix Diaz and Don Bernardo Reyes, who were 
also conspiring against Madero and who had been considered 
bitter enemies by Vazquez Gomez while he was in power. 

Because of gifts he had made while Secretary, Don Emilio 
Vazquez Gomez had left a very good impression among the re- 
volutionists and among people not fond of order. As a conse- 
quence, his brother found little difficulty in gathering around 



*At the convention Mr. Luis Cabrera, speaking in behalf of 
Vazquez Gomez, called him the "brains of the revolution." 

(60) , 



THE BRAINS OF TIHE EEVOLUTION 61 

liim a group of supporters wlio saw in Mm not only tlie brains 
of the revolution, but also, and principally, the man who could 
satisfy their craving for money. The provisional government 
did not cease squandering money with the withdrawal of Vazquez 
Gomez from the Cabinet, for as it had started, it was very diffi- 
cult to retrocede. To stop the waste, it would have been 
necessary for the Secretary of the Interior who received 
the drafts signed by the Secretary of War, to be not only 
of strong character, but a man of great intelligence and politi- 
cal foresight, with a knowledge of men keen enough toi discrim- 
inate between those really influential and worthy of considera- 
tion, and those adventurers who should be dismissed without 
ceremony. Mr. Garcia Granados was a man of character, but 
ill every other respect he was unqualified for the position and 
soon proved his incompetence to such a degree that he was 
obliged to resign from the Cabinet in the same year, 1911, on 
October 27th. On that day the HDouse of Representatives sum- 
moned the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior 
to render an account of conditions in the State of Morelos. In 
compliance, the President sent Mr, Granados and General Gon- 
zalez Salas to give the desired information and they both met 
with a very cold reception. Oti the following day, Mr. Calero, 
Attorney General, went before the Hjouse to explain matters 
more fully, but public opinion was against the Cabinet and the 
ill feeling between the Constitutional Progressive Party and the 
Cabinet was so great that Messrs. Garcia Granados, Dr. Vazquez 
Gomez, and General Gonzalez Salas, were forced to resign. 
Another change had taken place in the Cabinet soon after it 
had begun operations. This was the exchange of offices on July 
3rd, 1911, between the Secretary of Development and the Attor- 
ney General, Mr. Calero assuming the duties of Attorney Gen- 
eral and Mir. Hernandez those of Secretary of Development. 
From the moment Mr. Bemandez had been assigned to the De- 
partment of Justice, there was not much doubt that he would 
not last long in that capacity because he did not possess the 
necessary qualifications to fulfill its duties. As a lawyer he 
had had scant experience in the courts. He knew neither the 
personnel nor the requirements of the profession. Having but 
a superficial professional knowledge, he could not even attempt 
legislative reform, so his work was confined to the appointing of 
employees and other functionaries. In making these appoint- 



62 FKiOM DBSPOiTISM] TO ANARCHY 

ments, he always met with, great obstacles since the President ad 
interim as well as Mr. Mladero and the Messrs. Yazquez Gomez 
always had somebody in mind for these positions and naturally 
it was impossible to please them all. In this respect, the Secre- 
tary of the Interior had the advantage over his colleagues since 
he was well acquainted with the personnel of the Department 
as well as with its procedures. 

On his side, Mr. Calero, the most intelligent of all the Cabi- 
net members, was not satisfied with his portfolio in the Depart- 
ment of De^'elopment as he could neither carry out the 
physically impossible reforms promised by the revolution, 
nor could he initiate the projects he had in mind because 
the Provisional President was fearful of any innovation. As 
both these men were dissatisfied with their respective positions 
and both were unwilling to withdraw from the Cabinet, it was 
easy for them to make arrangements for the exchange of offices. 

At the same time, Mr. Calero, with high hopes for the future, 
was able to devote himself to the task of impressing the future 
President with the fact that he was the man best fitted to solve 
the great problems which the new government would necessarily 
have to face. Thus was he paving the way for his appointment as 
Secretary of State, which might eventually be the stepping stone to 
the presidency. For was not de la Barra president simply be- 
cause he had been Secretary of State during the conflict result- 
ing in the resignation of Don Porf irio Diaz ? Furthermore, Mr. 
Calero had a superior intelligence as well as a deeper knowledge 
of public affairs than the provisional President. Therefore, what 
had been possible for Mr. de la Barra was not only possible, but 
even easy for Mr. Calero. At leasti so he thought. 

General Rascon, an honorable man and a conscientious com- 
mander, as I have said, did not want the officers of the artillery 
regiment who had conspired against the Diaz government 
to go unpunished even though they were exempt from punish- 
ment by the law of amnesty. On moral grounds, he ordered their 
dismissal as unworthy members of the army. This measure, 
though worthy of the highest praise did not meet with the ap- 
proval of Francisco I. Madero or "uith that of the rest of the revo- 
lutionists, who compelled the provisional President to revoke it. 
But General Rascon rather than withdraw the order sent in his re- 
signation on July 19th. General Gonzalez Salas, the subsecre- 
tary, assumed charge of the department. 



THE BRAINS OF THE EEYOLUTION 63 

Mr. Bobles Dominguez had been corrmiissioned to disband 
a second time the revolutionary troops remaining in the State of 
Morelos, as the first disbanding when Mr. Vazquez Gomez was sec- 
retary had failed. The revolutionists once they had received their 
pay, instead of returning to their homes reorganized, taking 
back the arms which had been collected from them as a pre- 
cautionary measure against a new revolt. Zapata, leader of the 
rebellion in Morelos, protested to Mr. Robles Dominguez, where- 
upon he was summoned to the Capital. There he was interviewed 
by Secretary Vazquez Gomez and the provisional President. After 
the interview, there were rumors that because he had been inso- 
lent to the head of the nation, the Chief of Rurales, Ambrosio 
Figueroa, had begged permission to execute him in the public 
square. This permission had been refused. Zapata and his com- 
panions had then returned to Morelos in the same automobile 
which had brought them to the Capital. On his arrival at More- 
los, he denounced the government and re-started the revolution, 
forcing the government's representative, Mr. Dominguez, to re- 
turn quickly to Mexico City. The government sent a division 
under General Victoriano Huerta to suppress the rebels ; but be- 
fore he was able to accomplish anything, General Huerta re- 
ceived orders to suspend action because that Ml*. Francisco 
Madero urged by Vazquez Gomez and cithers had gone as 
mediator to Morelos. OIn his reiturn, orders were again given 
to General Huerta to advance; but this time the "Big Stick 
Clique," already fully organized, prepared a popular demon- 
stration and even went to the Castle of Chapultepec to request 
the recall of General Huerta, or rather, the immunity of 
Zapata. 

Up to that time Mr. de la Barra had received only the ap- 
plause of the multitude, but now for the first time, he saw the 
disagreeable aspects of a position of power; but impotent to 
assert his authority, he had to resign himself to listen to the 
discordant yells of the mob headed by Mr. Urueta. As a result 
of the demjonstration. General Huerta was again ordered to 
halt, and a few days later he was withdrawn from the command 
of the division. 

* » * 

General Bernardo Reyes arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana 
on June 4th, and three days later held a conference with Fran- 
cisco I. Madero at which it was agreed between them that Reyes 



64 FKjOM DEiSPO'TISM TO ANARCHY 

should not present his candidacy for president or vice president, 
but in exchange, he would be appointed Secretary of War. 

Mr. Madero made this agreement because he dreaded a 
reaction against himself fearing that the Porfirista fac- 
tion together with the partisans of General Reyes, which ac- 
cording to the latter were very numerous, would rob him of the 
triumph he had gained by the agreement signed at Ciudad Juarez. 
The anti-Reyista party soon persuaded him that the Reyes fol- 
lowers were not so numerous as claimed ; that once appointed Sec- 
retary of War, Reyes would as a matter of fact, be the real master 
of the situation, and above all, that he, Madero, would lose pres- 
tige in the eyes of the people for having made such a pact. Ma- 
dero 's only thought after that was to find a decent way out of 
the agreement. 

General Reyes on his side, after his interview with Madero, 
realized that this idol of the nation was losing prestige, and 
therefore with an impaitiience which was his leading character- 
istic, he rebelled at biding his time in the position of Secretary 
of War. Overestimating both his popularity and the influence 
of his name, he decided to tempt forttane by presenting himself 
as a candidate for the presidency, ignoring his pact with the 
leader of the revolution. At the first inkling of General Reyes' 
intention, Mr. Mladero freed him from all obligations, and the 
agreement made early in June was by mutual consent declared 
void, towards the 1st of August to the great relief and satisfac- 
tion of all concerned.* 

In view of the resignation of General Diaz and Ramon Cor- 
ral, Congress had ordered the elections for president and vice 
president. The election of the electors was held on the 1st of 
October, while the vote of the electoral college took place on the 
15th of the same month. The triumph of Mr. Madero was over- 
whelming; he was elected president of the republic almost unani- 
mously, t Such was not the case with the vice presidential elec- 
tions which were bitterly contested though they resulted in the 
absolute majority of votes for Jose Maria Pino Suarez, the candi- 
date of the Progressive Constitutional Party. 



*The meeting between Madero and Reyes was held at Tehua- 
can in the State of Puebla. 

tHe obtained 20,000 votes in the electoral college, each of 
which vote represents about 100 votes in the elections for presi- 
dential electors. 



THE BEGINS OF THE REYOLUTION 65 

The candidacy of General Reyes had received little re- 
sponse in the country; it had merely caused him to be derided 
and abused by "The Big Stick Clique" in the streets of the city 
at a demonstration of his own partisans on the 4th of September. 
On appearing before the public, Oeneral Reyes was pelted with 
stones, and he had to take refuge in a photographic gallery in 
Juarez Avenue opposite the National Theatre.* General Reyes was 
as a matter of fact the victim of his own methods. What was done 
to him in Juarez Avenue that day was but a repetition of what 
he himself had ordered done in San Luis Potosi in 1902 and in 
Monterey on the 2nd of April 1903. t 

Reyes hoping thaJt in the course of time Mladero's candi- 
dacy would lose prestige, had tried to induce the House of Re- 
presentatives to postpone the elections. t Unable to have this 
granted by a majority of the representatives, he decided to be- 
gin at once an armed revolt and as a preliminary he tendered his 
resignation from the army leaving the Capital on the evening of 
September 27, disguised as an invalid. On the following day he 
sailed from Vera Cruz for the United States from where as it was 
planned he should cross the border to lead the revolt. 0!n Nov- 
ember 2, in accordance with its Constitutional rights, the 
House of Representatives ratified the election of Madero and 
Pino Suarez and ordered the inauguration for the 6th. 

As his last official act, the provisional President asked per- 
mission to submit personally to the House of Representatives a 
report he had drawn up for the purpose of showing whalt his 
administration had accomplished. Though the Constitution did 
not provide for such a contingency, the House out of respect for 
Mr. de la Barra, granted the permission and appointed the 4th 
of November for its reading. In this report, Mtr. de la Barra 
attempted to excuse his deficiences in a great oratorical speech, 
but the fact of the matter is that the provisional President had 
been president in name only. His administration, as I have 
said in the Introduction, was disastrous to the nation because 



*This same gallery was used as a refuge on February 9th, 
1913, by Madero himself. 

tSee next chapter. 

$This information is first hand as he spoke to me about it 
wishing to count on the support of myself and friends in the 
House, which I refused. 



66 FROM DEiSPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

ho permitted the scandalous waste of public funds, because he 
allowed the Cabinet members to usurp rights granted by the 
Constitution to the President alone, and, above all, because he 
suffered the dignity of th'e Chief M'agistrate of the Nation to 
be trampled upon, thereby completely eradicating the prestige 
gained for the office by G^eneral Diaz. Neither the Cabinet 
nor the State governors in any way attended to Mr. de la Barra's 
orders. Congress alone, faithful to its traditions, showed him 
the deference, which as Chief Executive of the Nation was his 
due. But when, following the precedent set by Diaz, he tried 
to impose his candidate as Speaker of the Hlouse, the members 
totally ignored his recommendation. They chose as their speak- 
er a Reyista, not because the Reyistas were in the majority in 
Congress, but just to show the President that they had decided 
to assert their absolute independence. 

When Porfirio Diaz tendered his resignation as President, 
all the State governors either resigned or asked for an indefinite 
leave of absence. These offices were then filled either by men 
closely identified with the revolution or by men who up to that 
time had taken no part in the political movement. The pro- 
visional governors were : Alberto Fuentes, governor of Aguas- 
calientes; Urbano Espinosa, of Campeche; Venustiano Carranza, 
of Coahuila; Miguel G^arcia Topete, of Colima; Reynaldo Gor- 
dillo Leon, of Chiapas; Abraham Gonzalez, of Chihuahua; Luis 
Alfonso Trejo, of Durango; Juan B. Castelazo, of Guanajuato; 
Francisco Pigueroa, of Guerrero; Jesus Silva, of HUdalgo; David 
Gutierrez Allende, of Jalisco; Rafael M. Hidalgo, of Mexico; 
Dr. Miguel Silva, of Michoacan; Juan M. Carreon, of Morelos; 
Leobardo Chapa, of Nuevo Leon; Heliodoro Diaz Quintas, of 
Oaxaca; Riafael P. Caiiete, of Puebla; Jose Antonio Septien, of 
Queretaro; Dr. Rafael Cepeda, of San Luis Potosi; Celso Ga- 
xiola Rojo, of Sinaloa; Carlos E. Riandall, of Sonora; Manuel 
Mestre Ghigliazza, of Tabasco; Lie. Espiridion Lara, of Tamau- 
lipas; Augustin Sanchez, of Tlaxcala; Leon Aillaud, of Vera 
Cruz ; Jose M. Pino Suarez, of Yucatan ; and Guadalupe Gonzalez, 
of Zacatecas. 

The majority of these men were unfit to perform the du- 
ties devolving upon them. However, with few exceptions, those 
really revolutionary began immediately to work to be consti- 
tutionally elected. 

A government with the task of uniting and controlling all 



THOE BRAINS OF THE REVOLUTION 67 

the revolutionary movements which had so radically upset the 
political system of the nation, needed at the front a man of ac- 
tion, of strong personality, with a keen knowledge of human 
nature, with a thorough understanding of political conditions 
throughout the country, and one who could count on the co-opera- 
tion of men possessed of similar characteristics. It would also 
require that the head of the Nation and his colleagues be men 
of great energy, able to prevent the wave of democracy from be- 
coming a tide of anarchy. 

Mr. de la Barra had been absent from the country for many 
years. He had never taken part in political affairs, in fact had 
only served a two year term as representative aJt the beginning 
of his career. He knew the men by hearsay only. Under the 
circumstances, his work must inevitably lack thoroughness. Of 
an easy good nature, weak in character, and well educated, he was 
totally unqualified to meet a situation which required men of 
energy like Juarez, Don Justo Benitez, or Don Protasio Tagle. 

When General Diaz assumed control of the government after 
his triumph in the revolution of Tuxtepec, he gathered around 
him the most able men of his time, men thoroughly familiar with 
the political situation, and acquainted with conditions, and men ; 
and yet, it took all his energy and force of character to check 
the avalanche which threatened to destroy the work of the re- 
volution. Mr. de la Barra had no such assistants. Mr. Calero 
was the only one with sufficient intelligence to really help; but, 
unfortunately, branded as disloyal, he was looked down upon 
by everybody. General Diaz had stated that he had used him as 
a spy in the democratic party, so naturally neither the revolution- 
ary nor the Pbrfiristas had any faith in him. The other members 
of the Cabinet were either men of only average qualifications, 
like Don Rafael Hiernandez, Don Ernesto Madero, Don Manuel 
Bonilla, or even General Rascon himself, or they were unprinci- 
pled men whose chief object was to gratify their personal 
ambitions, utterly ignoring the President. None of them had 
even been prominent in politics, and their ignorance of human 
nature, of the necessary steps to be taken, and of the natural 
course of events, was really astounding. Besides, three elements 
of disturbance sprang up after the inauguration of the provis- 
ional government; the Reyismo, the Vazquism.o, and the Big 
Stick Clique. The Reyismo consisted of the partisans of Reyes 
who were trying to win over to their side the old Diaz faction; 



68 FROM DElSPOTISM> TO ANARCHY 

the Vazquismo consisted of the partisans of Vazquez Gomez and 
considering him the brains of the revolution, wished him to reap 
the greatest harvest from the triumph achieved; and the Big 
Stick Clique consisted of the partisans of Gustavo Madero who 
claimed the real power, since by the very nature of things Gus- 
tavo Madero would presumably be successor to Francisco I. 
Madero at the expiration of his term of office. These were the 
disturbing elements that did not allow the provisional President 
a minute's rest. He wished to submit to none of them, and was 
unwilling to have any of them predominate, and yet he submitted 
to all of them and allowed them all to dominate. Always vacil- 
lating, and uncertain, he completely lacked the necessary energy 
to impose his authority on anybody or at any time. The personal 
friends of de la Barra also added to the difficulty of the situation 
because they began to suggest that he should retain the office 
placed in his hands by chance*. As a result he lost the confi- 
dence of Francisco Miadero, of Dr. Vazquez Gomez, and of the Big 
Stick Clique, and his troubles grew to such an extent that it 
would have been impossible for him to have continued as Presi- 
dent had his period of office been extended two months longer. 

The consent of Mr. de la Barra to run for vice president 
had an even more serious result than the mistrust of tibe 
revolutionary party,' who believed his weakness to be mere- 
ly a mask to cover his ambition to be president. It fos- 
tered an opposition to Madero 's government even before Madero 
began to govern, because de la Barra 's partisans on being de- 
feated, began to accuse the Big Stick Clique of committing frauds 
at the polls and to complain that their chance of victory was 
snatched away from them by illicit methods in conducting the 
election. That is, they echoed the protests of Vazquez Gomez and 
his friends, shielding these protests under the prestige of the 
Chief of the nation. Thus was the revolution germinated even 
before Madero came into power. 

Politically, Mr. de la Barra was a complete failure. He 
never had a definite idei of what course to follow. His firmest 
resolution came to nought at meeting the slightest obstacle or 
at hearing the faintest applause. He was an abject slave of the 
press, flattering and fawning to all newspaper men so that they 
in their turn might praise him before the public. Apparently 



*In fact, Mr. de la Barra never listened to that suggestion. 



THE BE^AINS OF TIHE REYOLUTIOiN 69 

this praise was all he craved. Unconscious of the role he was 
playing, and more desirous of attracting attention than of mak- 
ing friends, he placed the dignitiy of the head of the nation at 
the feet of the mob, and allowed himself to be dragged by his 
flatterers. 

Don Francisco I. Madero was a weak ruler, but even he 
at times asserted his authority. It may have been whimsical and 
childish, but at least it was the will of the President of the Re- 
public. The only energetic act of Mr. de la Barra was to appear 
before Congress to confess his own weakness. 

On November 6, escorted by Pascual Orozco, Jr., and other re- 
volutionary leaders, Madero went to the House of Representa- 
tives to 'take the oath of office as constitutional president of the 
Republic. On this solemn occasion Mr. Madero 's nerves forsook 
him completely. He quite ignored the constitutional method 
for the solemnization of the act. Instead of allowing Mr. Levy, 
Speaker of the House, to administer the oath as prescribed by 
law, he took the words out of the Speaker's mouth and himself 
asked as well as answered the questions formulated by law. He 
then retired to the National Palace amid the shouts and accla- 
mations of the populace. Tbese shouts and acclamations, how- 
ever, were not as enthusiastic nor as spontaneous as those on 
the Tth of June when Madero entered the capital. 

On November 6, Pascual Orozco, Jr., eclipsed Madero in pop- 
ularity. 

Mr. de la Barra was awaiting Mr. Madero at the National 
Palace to turn the reins of government over to him. Cordial 
phrases were exchanged between them though at heart they were 
already separated by an abyss. 

Vazquez Giomiez, with an inscrutable smile which might mean 
either contempt or anger, was taking the measure of both presi- 
dents. His mind was already nourishing the idea of a trium- 
phant revolution which would give him the office he thought he de- 
served, him who both presidents ignored without realizing that he 
had been the brains of the revolution which was that day conse- 
crated by the inauguraltion of Francisco I. Madero as constitu- 
tional President of the Republic. 



CHAPTER X. 



THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQUE. 



The place of Vazquez Gomez in the Cabinet was filled by 
Alberto Garcia Granados, Governor of the Federal District, a 
man who had been opposed to General Diaz since 1892 when he 
was put in prison as author of an anti-reelection newspaper 
known as the "Republic." He was held in esteem by the gen- 
eral public in spite of rumors that he had been forced to give up the 
managership of the mine "San Francisco" in Pachuca. Mr. 
Granados, of morose disposition and scant intelligence, was 
bound to fall out with the group led by Gustavo Madero 
who were impulsive and uncompromising men of action. 
The proclamation for the election of president and vice 
president had been made, and the Constitutionalist party 
girded itself for the fight. Even though there was no possible 
contest over the presidency in spite of the fact that General 
Bernardo Reyes had appeared as candidate against Madero, the 
same cannot be said about the vice presidency. 

As I have stated in a previous chapter. General Reyes had 
been an avowed enemy of Limantour and his adherents, and in 
consequence of his suspicious conduct had been exiled by Gen- 
eral Diaz to Europe. There, the startling events in Mexico took 
him by surprise, and when the Secretary of the Treasury in his 
trip to Europe in 1910 met him in Paris, forgetting old grudges, 
they made up their quarrels and promised each other effective 
co-operation. It was not surprising, therefore, that Limantour, 
when he took the reins of government in March 1911, should count 
on the support of Reyes and should cable him to return and give 
to the government the assistance of his sword. Reyes started 
immediately for Mexico, resolved as he said, to tear the revolution 
to shreds, but by the time he arrived at Havana, negotiations 
with the rebels had reached such a point that they were able to 

(70) 



THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQUE 71 

stipulate among other conditions that the ex-governor of Nuevo 
Leon should not return to the country. In consequence, he was 
ordered by cable to disembark at Havana and there await fur- 
ther instructions. 

With the triumph of the revolution, Rodolfo Reyes, son 
of the General, ingratiated himself with the rebels and offered 
them his father's aid in pacifying the country, making them be- 
lieve that he could coun^t on a large following. The result was 
that they consented to allow General Rieyes to return to the 
country, and went so far as to offer him the position of Secre- 
tary of War in the cabinet Madero was to form on taking office. 
Thus Reyes, with astounding rapidity, had traveled the distance 
from an uncompromising Porfirista to a triumphant Maderista, 
and his sword, unsheathed to quell the revolution headed by 
Madero, had now become one of the supporters of that same 
Madero 's administration. At that time, the favorite scheme of 
all who sought public approval was to revile the Cientificos, 
so General Reyes, always fond of granting interviews and hav- 
ing the papers make a fuss over him, let loose a tirade against 
the ancient friends of Limantour, in which he denied even hav- 
ing allied himself with the former Secretary of the Treasury. 
Furthermore, he declared Limantour to blame for the fall of 
the Diaz government.* 



Once in Mexico, the old ambitions returned to Reyes. At 
first he attempted to gain from the friends of Madero the nomi- 
nation for vice president, but as the revolutionists refused to 
accept him among their number, even forming a political party 
which called itself anti-reyista, he had to desist from his at- 
tempts at alliance, and gradually drifted away from the Mader- 
ista group until he finally became its greatest enemy. 

Among the revolutionists there were two groups essentially 
opposed to Reyes. One was led by Fernando Yglesias Calderon 
who was bitterly opposed to any compact between Madero and 
Reyes on the ground that such an alliance would threaten the 
very principles which the rebellion had proclaimed. This group, 
composed of people of weight, including among others, Mr* 



*T!he portion included in the asterisks will be found in de- 
tail in the chapter entitled "General Reyes," in the Spanish 
edition. 



72 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

Jesus Flores Miagon, had not participated actively in the revolu- 
tion but had sympathized with the rebellion because of their 
conviction that the government of Diaz was not a constitutional 
government, as they understood it. They limited themselves to 
pointing ou't to the public by means of the press, and to Madero 
confidentially, that Reyes represented dictatorship, which could 
in no way be amalgamated with the basic principles of the plat- 
form of the revolt. The Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, seeing in Reyes 
a probable competitor for the office of vice president which 
Francisco Vazquez Gomez already deemed his, joined their ef- 
forts to those of Mr. Calderon's coterie. Tlie other group con- 
sisted of the fiery younger element, who held a grudge against 
Reyes for his dissolution by force of their convention in San Luis 
Potosi, years before, when under tihe title of Liberal Party they 
had been in fact displaying symptoms of the revolution soon to 
break out. The leaders of this fiery group were Camilo Arriaga, 
Juan Sarabia, and Conrado Diaz Soto y Gama, who were also 
the founders of the aforementioned anti-reyista party, whose 
main purpose was to prevent the rise of General Reyes. The 
first group sought to accomplish its end through the future presi- 
dent, Francisco I, Madero, while the anti-reyista party soon made 
a quick alliance with Gtustavo Madero 's Progressive Constitution- 
al Party. As the anti-reyistas had been dissolved by forcible 
measures at San Luis Potosi, they considered themselves justi- 
fied now in using the same forcible methods in subduing their 
enemies. Accordingly, they decided to suppress by force all 
manifestations which the adherents of Reyes might make in 
honor of their candidate, just as Reyes with the aid of Heri- 
berto Barron and Captain Cristo had prevented by force the 
rally they had organized in San Luis Potosi. 

"When the principle of violence proposed by the anti-reyista 
followers had been accepted by the Constitutional Progressive 
Party, there grew up within the party itself a clique to which 
the press gave the very appropriate name of "Big Stick" in re- 
membrance of the similar organization formed by Felipe Ducaz- 
cal in Spain during the political upheaval of 1868-70. The Big 
Stick was not therefore the handiwork of Gustavo Madero nor 
of the Progressive Constitutional Party. When they entered 
politics, the Big Stick already existed. It had arisen under the 
auspices of General Reyes, Secretary of War, in 1902, in the city 
of San Luis Potosi. 



THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQIUE 73 

Tbe Maderista "Big Stick Clique," like the original Reyes 
clique, received the abuse of the press and of the public in street 
rallies. Confident as it was of absolute immtunity and of the 
help or at least the tolerance of the police, the clique widened its 
scope until it became truly hated, and its actions became highly 
subversive to the general welfare. 



CHAPTER XL 
MADERO'S ADMINISTRATION. 



Immediately on assuming the presidency, Madero announced 
the following appointments to his Cabinet: Secretary of State, 
Manuel Calero ; Abraham Gonzalez, Secretary of the Interior ; 
Miguel Diaz Lombardo, Secretary of Public Instruction ; Manuel 
Vasquez Tagle, Attorney General; Manuel Bonilla, Secretary 
of Public Works; Rafael L. Hernandez (,his own cousin,) Sec- 
retary of Development; Ernesto Madero (his own uncle,) Sec- 
retary of the Treasury; Secretary of "War, General Jose Gon- 
zalez Salas, who had been obliged to resign the post of Assis- 
tant Secretary in the Cabinet of Mir. de la Barra on account of 
the opposition which the House of Representatives had shown 
him. Madero thus began his administration by nlaking the 
grievous mistake of defying both the House and public opinion. 

The only new Cabinet officers in this list were Abraham 
Gonzalez, Yasquez Tagle and Diaz Lombardo. All the rest had 
held positions in the provisional government. The first named 
of these three had been copartner with Orozco in organizing 
the revolution in the State of Chihuahua. The other two, al- 
though long dissatisfied with the government of Diaz had not 
been actively connected with the revolt. Both were men of high 
intelligence and of unquestioned professional standing. Much 
was expected of them, particularly of Vasquez Tagle who was 
known to possess special qualifications for the post to which he 
had been appointed and who was looked upon, because of the 
energy he was supposed to possess, as the one man above all 
others to correct the evils which had grown up in the Department 
of Justice. The appointment of both these men was received 
withi universal approval ; but not so that of Mr. Abraham Gon- 
zalez. Totally devoid of culture, he might have been fitted to 
discharge the duties of an officer of Rurales, but as to managing 
a department of the government, that was totally beyond his 

(74) 



MADERO ADMlCNISTRATION 75 

capabilities. Only his fellow revolutionists in diibnahua were 
pleased with his appointment to so high an office. 

Nevertheless, Madero's administration, as a whole, was very 
cordially welcomed and with extraordinary unanimity the people 
patriioitically determined to support [ham,. Few governmentis 
have begun their administration under such good auspices amd 
with public opinion so much in their favor. Consequently, 
when a few days after the inauguration it became known that 
General Reyes had crossed the border in armed rebellion and had 
distributed a revolutionary proclamation addressed principally 
to the army, the whole movement met with universal condem- 
nation, and the failure of the revolt was considered inevitable. 

General Reyes had left Vera Cruz for Havana in the last 
days of September. From Havana he went to New Orleans 
and thence to San Antondo, TIexas, where he organized a force 
with which he was to join an uprising his partisans had promised 
to organize in the States of Nuevo Leon and T'amaulipas. De- 
spite the failure of his candidacy, the General continued to be- 
lieve that in those states he still had a numerous following. 

The Reyista party had tried to induce the whole country 
to rise in arms, but had succeeded only in a fevf widely separa- 
ted localities — in Yucatan, in the Laguna Region, in Ramos 
Arizpe, and in Michoacan. As the instigators of trouble met 
with slight response, these movements were all of little impor- 
tance and finally were disbanded. 

On November 19, General Reyes had been arrested by the 
United States authorities for his revolutionary operations in the 
United States and having been set at liberty under bail, there 
was no other way open to him but to engage in the fight. Oh 
December 19 he crossed the border into Mexico accompanied by 
Quiro4;a, owner of the gambling houses in Monterey during 
General Reyes' administration, David Reyes Retana, a friend 
and blind partisan of the rebel General, and two servants, and 
began to look for the troops that were to join him in accordance 
with the promises of his partisans and especially in accordance 
with the picturings of his own imagination. 

He crossed the Rio Grande at a ford called "La Vela," 
near the city of Camargo, in the State of Tamaulipas, and en- 
tering Nuevo Leon through the first spurs of the Pamorones 
Mountains, he proceeded in the general direction of the Ga- 
leana range. 



76 FROM DEiSPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

In vain did he seek his supporters; there were none. Of 
five hundred men whom he expected to meet, waiting only for 
his arrival to start a triumphant campaign, he met not one. What 
he did meet was a detachment of federal troops of the 11th cav- 
alry, which quickly scattered his faithful little band. General 
Reyes was left alone with his guide, and while in the grip of the 
terrible and bitter disillusionment which he had suffered, he 
ordered his companion to lead him at once to the nearest town. 
This happened to be the city of Linares, Nuevo Leon, where the 
General arrived on the evening of December 25th and gave him- 
self up as a prisoner to Corporal of Rurales Placido Rodriguez, 
who was then on guard. At first, the officer fearing that Reyes 
had come accompanied by a large force to which he could offer 
no adequate resistance, was at his wits end what to do, but final- 
ly he was convinced by the General himself that the man before 
him was his prisoner. Thereupon be telegraphed the news to 
General Trevino, Commander in Chief of the Zone, who ordered 
that the rebel leader be accorded every consideration and pa- 
roled within the city limits. Hie further ordered Lieutenant 
Colonel Garcia Lugo, in command of a body of Rurales near 
Linares, to take charge of the prisoner and conduct him to Mex- 
ico City vnth every arrangement for his comfort. 

On arriving in Mtexico on December 28, Reyes was placed 
in Santiago prison* where he remained until the uprising at the 
Ciudadela in which it was his lot to be one of the first victims. 

Fortune continued to smile on Madero, but unfortunately 
he refused to heed her smile, and as Fortune is a capricious 
mistress, she sooner or later was sure to turn against him. 

M'adero and those surrounding him began from the very 
first to create trouble for their own administration. In Vera 
Cruz, Governor Dehesa had sent in his resignation, and an elec- 
tion was ordered by the legislature of the state, t The President 
at first favored the election of Gabriel Gavira, an honest artisan 
who knew well his trade of cabinet maker, but who was not in 
any way fitted to govern that important state. Madero finally 
decided to support Francisco Lagos Chazaro also an incompe- 
tent man and in this case mentally unbalanced as well; his 



*As it is named the Military Prison. 

tMr. Leon Aillaud was named provisional governor, but a 
few days after was removed and Manuel Alegre took the place. 



MADERO ADMINISTRATION 77 

absolute lack of character could not but bring on grievous con- 
flicts during the period of his administration. In Aguascal- 
ientes and Tlaxcala, Madero insisted on the retention of the ig- 
norant governors whom the revolution had allowed to rise. One 
was a former coffin maker and the other, a doorkeeper in a cotton 
factory. Both were denounced by the intelligent people of the 
above mentioned states. In Jalisco, the provisional government 
had appointed as governor pro tem Alberto Robles Gil, a man who 
managed through his great popularity in the state to assert him- 
self and maintain perfect order. Madero was determined to 
have the election take place immediately. The provisional gov- 
ernor protested on the grounds that so premature an election 
would lead to serious troubles. At this point the Legislature 
declared itself in favor of the plan proposed by the Federal gov- 
ernment, or rather by Madero, and against Robles Gil. The 
latter finally was forced to submit, and in the ensuing election 
the victory was gained by the candidate nominated by the Catho- 
lics, Jose Lopez Portillo y Eojas, a man of tlie scantest ability 
and whose name had appeared in a notorious fraud case. In 
Michoacan also, Madero was undecided between two candidates 
for the governorship ; Miguel Silva, an honorable, liberal, and 
generally liked man, and Primitivo Ortiz, an old lawyer who had 
always boasted of being an enthusiastic liberal. Ortiz appeared 
to be the candidate of the Catholic Party whose displeasure the 
President was particularly anxious to avoid. Only Gustavo 
Madero 's vigorous protests prevented him from committing the 
grave error of deciding against the popular candidate. Serapio 
Rendon, a man in whom Madero had complete confidence, was 
sent to Morelia* to settle all controversy, and finally Silva was 
declared elected by a large majority. In Oaxaea notwithstand- 
ing the friendship between the Governor, Juarez Mazat and Ma- 
dero, a conflict had taken place during the last days of the pro- 
visional government that reached its critical period just after 
Madero assumed the duties of President, and which had a tragic 
ending and a disastrous result both for the local and the feder- 
al governments. 

On the 2nd of September, Juarez Maza had assumed the 
governorship of the state after defeating Felix Diaz decisively 



*Capital of the State of Michoacan. 

tSon of the great President, Benito Juarez. 



78 FEOM DEiSPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 

for that office. Almost his first official act was to remove all 
the prefects under his jurisdiction, and quite naturally, to sub- 
stitute in their places personal friends on whose assistance he 
relied in guaranteeing peace in the state. Among others, was the 
ill starred appointment for prefect of the District of Juchitan 
of a gentleman by the name of Enrique Leon. In Juchitan there 
had grown up, partly because of the Maderista revolution, but 
principally because of the introduction of true popular elections 
for the governorship, two distinct local parties, each of which as- 
pired to conitrol the government of that district. The impor- 
tance attached to the contest lay in the fact that the district is 
so far from the state capital that it is considered almost independ- 
ent of the state authorities. Juchitan is a city of some importance, 
head of the district that bears its name, and is situated on the 
isthmus near Tehuantepec. Both districts, Juchitan and T'e- 
huantepec, abound in wealth and their contribution to the ex- 
penses of the state form a considerable part of its total revenue. 
But, as mentioned above, they are so far removed from the state 
government at Oaxaca that the local authorities of those dis- 
tricts do not concern themselves with it at all, except to send their 
quota of taxes at regular intervals. Even, less attention is paid 
by the inhabitants themselves, since the state government refers 
all their controversies to the local authorities which in conse- 
quence are vested with greater power than the officers of simi- 
lar rank in other districts. 

Taking advantage of this situation, a certain native of 
Juchitan, Jose Gomez, popularly known as Che Gomez, had 
formed a party for which Vazquez Gomez procured money, arms, 
and ammunition, and with these elements at his disposal, he 
declared himself the cacique of the district, and under the title 
of Municipal President, claimed to be the governor of that region. 

As Governor of the State, Juarez Maza could not tolerate 
such presumption on the part of a municipal president, and 
chiefly for this reason he name Mr. Leon Prefect of Juchitan. 
This appointment, of course, displeased Che Gomez, and he tried 
his best to induce the inhabitants of Juchitan to reject the new 
officer. Ever since the uprising that occurred at the beginning 
of the Diaz government, the custom had prevailed that when a 
prefect was to be appointed, the miuiicipal government of Juchi- 
tan was consulted. The latter always gave its consent, or rather, 
reported favorably on the candidate proposed by the governor. 



MADEiBO ADMINISTRATION 79 

In this instance, the Governor failed to comply with the required 
formality. This oversig;ht suited Che Giomez' purpose admir- 
ably. On account of the opposition of the inhabitants of Juchi- 
tan to the new prefect, Governor Maza asked for federal as- 
sistance in asserting his authority. Mr. de la Barra sent him 
federal troops and later a body of Hurales under the command 
of Gabriel Hernandez*, a ferocious man who in Pachuca had 
committed innumerable atrocities, and Candido Aguilar, a man. of 
a more quiet disposition and who, thougih a native of the State 
of Vera Cruz, knew well the character of the Juchitecos. On 
the arrival of Hernandez, an encounter took place in the streete 
of Juchitan, but when Aguilar arrived, negotiations were enter- 
ed into and an agreement was drawn up in which it was stipu- 
lated that a new prefect should be appointed with due regard 
for the local custom of consulting the Board of Aldermen re- 
garding the proposed candidate. Madero, who had suggested 
that Aguilar be sent, judged that the affair had received a sat- 
isfactory solution and telegraphed Juarez Maza recommending 
Aguilar for the post of prefect. The Governor, however, 
thought that it would greatly weaken his authority in the State 
if he should allow the Federal Government to take part in the 
affair and settle the conflict directly without consulting with 
the State Government, and in consequence insisted that the pre- 
fect that had been appointed should take charge, and in return 
he promised to substitute him later on and declared that he would 
then submit to the established custom of Juchitan in thie matter 
of choosing a new prefect. Mr. Madero, angered at the attituJe 
of the governor, gave orders that the federal troops should take 
no part in the affair and thus left the governor's appointee en- 
tirely without support, and as a result, the State Government, 
without federal backing, became a mere mockery. Che Gomez 
headed a force too powerful to be attacked by the local mili- 
tia, which was the only force that Juarez Maza had at his com- 
man:d. Seeing that the stage was set for a conflict, Governor 
Juarez Maza immediately set out for the scene of action, judging 
that by his presence he could impose his authority. When the 
attitude assumed by the respective State and Federal govern- 
ments became generally known, and it was seen that the Governor 
was defending the sovereignty of the State of Oaxaca, the entire 



*Hernandez was murdered in his prison during Huerta's 
adminstration, by order of the governor of the City of Mexico. 



80 FROM DE'SPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

state rose as one man and placed itself side by side with Mm. 
His arrival at the is'thmus was a veritable triumphant march 
and the occasion for demonstrations against Madero. Seeing the 
stand taken by the populace, Che Gomez recognized that his was 
a lost cause and surrendered, but exacted from the federal govern- 
ment guarantees for himiself and his followers. Madero who 
had also suffered a defeat in this conflict, immediately agreed 
and ordered that a passport and safe conduct be given Gomez. 
The Governor, however, ordered the arrest of the ringleader 
in order to submit the case to the State Courts. Che Gomez and 
Governor Juarez Maza had met in San Geronimo, a railroad 
junction on the isthmus, and Gomez had sought an interview 
with the Governor who not only refused to listen to him but even 
ordered his arrest. The military authorities did not dare to dis- 
obey the Governor's orders, but satisfied themselves by tele- 
graphing the fact of the arrest to Mr. Madero. Now, as a favor 
and not as a command, the President requested Juarez Maza 
to send Che Gomez to Mexico City. Unfortunately, this tele- 
gram was received by Juarez Maza too late for him to grant the 
request. During the night previous to its receipt, some of the 
residents of Juchitan, adherents of the party opposing Che Gomez 
had taken him forcibly from jail with his eight companions and 
had lynched them all near the outskirts of San Geronimo. When 
the Governor received the President's telegram on the follo^ving 
day at Juchitan, he already had had a message from the author- 
ities of San Geronimo advising ihim of the occurrence. 

The officials who took charge of the remains of Che Gomez 
reported that they had found on his person som^e papers which 
seriously implicated Don Einilio Vazquez Gomez. Even while 
Secretary of the Interior, he had been preparing and fomenting 
a revolt in Juchitan and after his withdrawal from the Depart- 
ment he had held conferences with the ringleader in which he 
showed him the possibility of segregating the districts of Juchi- 
tan and Tehuantepee from the State of Oaxaca, and together 
with the Cantons of Acayucan and Minatitlan in the State of 
Vera Cruz, forming a small state or territory on the isthmus 
which Che Gomez was to receive as feudal land. He, in his turn, 
Avas to bind himself to aid and abet the Vazquez Giomez brothers 
in that region. 

The conflict in Oaxaca proved fatal to the Madero govern- 
ment, chiefly because it was one of the first official acts of his 



MADERO ADMINISTRATION 81 

administration and its failure had been complete. He had not 
even been able to save the life of his protege. Moreover the con- 
duct of ]\I]r. Juarez Maza without doubt deserved some applause. 
He had energetically asserted his rights as an executive and 
had at once proceeded to the scene of the conflict. This act 
presented even a heroic phase and aroused a general sentiment 
of independence in the other states v^hich later caused serious and 
important troubles to the federal government. 

Men guilty of highly reprehensible conduct had been elect- 
ed governors in jruanajuato, Puebla, and San Luis Potosi ; those 
of the two latter were not even natives of the states to which they 
had been elected ; all three were incompetent and had been repu- 
diated by the thinking class of these respective states. In Guer- 
rero and Iq other points, differences were constantly arising be- 
tween the various leaders, each of whom claimed to be lord and 
master of the whole state ; these differences were becoming more 
serious because Miadero, well intentioned but utterly impracticable 
in such matters, did not know his men sufficiently, and con- 
sequently delayed his decision regarditig which of these aspirants 
he should support in the scramble for power. 

All of these local strifes could have been easily suppressed 
if there had been at the head of the Department of the Interior 
a politician of even mediocre ability, but, thanks to the poor 
handling of the affair by Mr. Gonzalez, who was even worse than 
the President himself, they were assuming serious proportions 
and day by day were weakening the government which had at 
first had thie united sympathy of the public. Now, after two 
months, it found itself practically isolated. The President, 
though upright and tender hearted, was practically nullifying 
his best intentions through lack of training in public life; he 
became excited at the least contradiction and although he attempt- 
ed to hide his displeasure, his treacherous nerves exposed him and 
transformed him in most instances from a man affable even to 
familiarity to a man of the most peevish and insolent character. 



CHAPTER XII. 
THE NEW REYOLUTION. 



The most serious conflicts were those in Chihuahua and in 
Morelos. The one in Chihuahua was headed by Pascual Orozeo, 
Jr., who had been a leader in Madero's army. At the time, it 
was said in Chihuahua that his change of attitude had been 
caused by the work and influence of Don Gonzalo Enrile who 
had just arrived with instructions from General Diaz and Mr. 
Limantour for Mr. Terrazas. This may or may not be true, but 
one fact is certain, that the Orozquista revolution was supported 
by funds furnished by members of the Terrazas family. The one 
in Morelos was led by Zapata who still continued to revolt al- 
though Mr. Madero was already President and had offered to 
satisfy all his demands. The uprising of Orozco was due to the 
lack of tact with which he was treated. For the most part Ma- 
dero's advisors are responsible for this, although, as a matter 
of fact, Madero should not have forgotten that Orozco had been 
the moving spirit of the uprising which had made him trium- 
phant. Instead of showing Orozco his gratitude and honoring 
him as he deserved, he treated him harshly, put him aside for 
men worth much less, and more than that, he even refused to help 
him secure work to gain a livelihood.* What less could have been 
requested by him who had been the commander of Mladero's 
whole army? 

The flatterers supported by the American jingoism were also 
responsible that Orozco, Jr., and Madero had broken. From the be- 
ginning of the revolt they lifted up Oi*ozco, praising his work as a 
wonderful one, and exhibiting him as the real head of the rebell- 
ion. Orozco during the campaign did not heed these flatteries 
but when Madero was President and did not reward him, as he 
expected, through the every day renewed flatteries he lost Ms 



*The same Mr. Madero did with Maximo Castillo. 

(82) 



THE NEW EJEVOLUTION 83 

ii(;ad and, believing that he was strong enough to be the leader 
of a new revolution, revolted.* 

The uprising in Morelos was serious because of its dura- 
tion and because of its proximity to the Capital of the Republic. 
General Juvencio Rtobles, a man well acquainted with the state 
besides being esteemed for his prudence and energy, was sent to 
take command of the federal troops and to put an end to the 
disturbance. General Robles immediately began an active cam- 
paign, guaranteeing security to every one. When Zapata real- 
ized that the fight was almost lost, he appealed to Madero ask- 
ing that he be allowed to deal directly with him and asking that 
all fighting be suspended. This same thing had happened dur- 
ing the provisional government when General Hluerta had been 
at the point of killing the leader of the rebels. Now as then, 
the soft heart of Mladero interposed, causing incalculable dam- 
age to his administration and to the country at large. General 
Riobles M^as relieved of the command and was superseded by Gen- 
eral Felipe Angeles, a very sincere and good hearted man, but 
entirely theoretical at that moment and totally unadapted 
for a campaign like that of Morelos. T\vo days later, the hordes 
of Zapata attacked the passenger train in Ticuman and killed 
Mr. Herrerrias and Mr. Strauss, both newspaper men. In spite 
of so many missteps, fortune still smiled upon Madero. The 
campaign in Chihuahua like that in Mtorelos had been disastrous 
to the government. General Gonzalez Salas, the Minister of War 
had been forced to resign and in order that he might have an 
honorable pretext, he had been appointed to lead this campaign. 
General Pascual Orozco at the head of his army had taken pos- 
session of the State Capital on the 3rd of March, forcing Mr. 
Abraham Gonzalez, the constitutional governor, to flee. When 
the rebellion broke out in Chihuahua, Mr. Abraham Gonzalez had 
resigned from the Cabinet and had gone there reassuming 
the governorship on the 29thi of February. He believed 
that through his friendship with Orozco he could reestablish 
peace. He was too late. His tactless efforts alienated 
even the few friendships he still could claim and caused the loss 
of the State to the Federal Government. Until then Orozco had 
wavered, but as soon as he saw Mr. Gbnzalez summoned the rebel 
leader. Villa, to put him in command of 'the federal troops, he 



*The same is doing now vnih General Villa. 



84 FROM DElSPO'TISM TO) ANARCHY 

brake openly with the government, placed himself at the head 
of the revolution, rapidly organized his forces, and took imme- 
diate possession of Chihuahua. Within two' weeks he had under 
him a good army and was making his authority felt throughout 
the whole sitate. 

Mr. Jesus Flores Magon who though hostile to the govern- 
ment of General Diaz had not been a revolutionary, succeeded M!r. 
Abraham Gonzalez as Secretary of the Interior. Under normal 
conditions, he would have made a good Secretary of the Inter- 
ior, because though passionate and inexperienced in polities, he 
had good commion sense. But under the abnormal conditions 
at the time of his appointment, a far superior man was needed. 
He had to cope not only with the very delicate affairs of the 
moment, but also with two other important factors : the Presi- 
dent, almost childishly capricious at times, and Gustavo Madero 
and his followers. The first one with aspirations to the office 
of Secretary of the Interior. This gentleman was day by day 
becoming more politically influential, backed by the Consti- 
tutional Progressive Party and especially by the Big Stick 
Clique with which he dominated the House of Representatives. 

Mr. Flores Magon because of his ignorance of conditions 
auid not from any personal ill will, was largely responsible for 
the removal of General Robles from command of the campaign 
in Morelos. The unfortunate result of this step was that the 
government failed to put a decisive end to the campaign in More- 
los although success was then almost assured. 



When General Gonzalez Salas withdrew from the Cabinet, he 
was appointed to direct the campaign in the north against the 
forces of Pascual Orozo, Jr., who with a regularly organized army 
threatened to invade the neighboring states. The two forces met 
at ReUano, near Jimenez, on the 22nd of March. The resultis 
were disastrous to the federal troops, in spite of the fact that 
the rebels through lack of artillery were unable to press their 
advantage. General Gonzalez Salas, who was entirely unfitted 
for the work assigned to him, committed a series of blunders 
which it is unnecessary to enumerate in this book. After his 
retreat, judging that the defeat had been more ignoble than it 
really was, and believing that the artillery abandoned by him 
had been lost, he committed suicide on the train to Torreon. 



THE NEW EjEVODUTIOIN 85 

Thus through its own misjiudgment, the government suffered 
great losses and the President suffered the loss of a friend whom 
he highly respected and esteemed. 

When the federals retreated, Pascual Orozco thought that 
General Gonzalez Salas would reorganize his forces and with re- 
newed strength would reopen the attack. Therefore, as his amanu- 
nition had run short, he ordered a retreat. When General T'el- 
lez, commander of the federal artillery, saw himself aban- 
doned by the Chief of Division, he failed to realize what had 
happened, but in obedience to the command he had received, broke 
camp and retreated to Torreon where he took command of the 
straggling bands that arrived there little by little. Brigadier 
General Trucy Aubert had by far the worst share in the battle. 
Pursued by Orozco 's troops, he was compelled to make a long 
detour in order to rejoin the main army. In this retreat he lost 
all his ammunition and artillery and nearly all his men, arriv- 
ing in Torreon with only sixty odd men. The government re- 
warded the conduct of General Aubert with an immediate pro- 
motion and with twenty thousand dollars in cash. This last 
they gave as if it were a tribute from a group of friends of the 
government. 

General Angel Garcia Peiia, an entirely mathematical man, 
had succeeded General Gonzalez Salas as Minister of War. He 
had devoted his whole life to mathematics and had no experi- 
ence as a commander of troops. His sole comimand had been 
over the escorts which accompanied him on his scientific ex- 
peditions. Nevertheless, he was somewhat wise and competent in 
organizing the material ait his disposal. Unfortunately, he was 
impulsive and violent to such an extent that one day he actually 
came to blows with the motorman of a street car. Naturally 
such a character was not thie best; suited for the position at that 
time. The Department needed at its head a man of sense and 
poise who would not foolishly waste the resources of the govern- 
ment and who would be respected for his dignity and his 
fairness. 



Mr. Calero was not at ease in the Cabinet because he had been 
cut off from all interference with the House of Representatives, 
and because the President did not take his advice as much as he 
\Aasih'ed. Moreover, he could not agree with the fiery opinions 



86 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHIC 

of the niajority of the Cabinet members who were dragging the 
government to ruin. He, therefore, secured the appointment as 
ambassador at Washington. Don Gilberto Crespo, Mexican Minis- 
ter to Austria Hungary, who occupied the position at that time, was 
' again sent to Vienna. Mr. Pedro Lascurain was appointed on the 
9th of April to fill the vacancy left by Mr. Calero. For the fii-st 
time he took an active part in politics from which he had been 
excluded because of his religious beliefs, for he was an ardent 
Catholic, and because of his own character which is little given 
to seeking strife and trouble. Mr. Lascurain is a man of good 
intelligence but inexperienced in the affairs entrusted to him. 
He is calm, affable and upright, but lacking in decisiveness and 
in initiative. He, as well as Ernesto Miadero, was to be swept 
away by the strong current of passions let loose by the other Cabi- 
net members. When at the supreme moment, events placed him 
in a most precarious situation and gave him executive power, 
he was merely the plaything of the men who took an active part 
in this momentous drama. The responsibility he assumed in his- 
tory when he presented the resignations of Mr. Miadero and Mr. 
Pino Suarez, contrary to the agreement made with them, can 
only find an excuse in his absolute good faith or in his absolute 
lack of political acumen. When Madero fir^t: heard of the step 
taken by Mr. Lascurain, he believed himself betrayed, but Mr. 
Pino Suarez exclaimed: "It is not treason, it is stupidity, but 
iL will cost us our lives. ' ' Mr. Pino Suarez was right. Mr. Las- 
curian had been deceived like a child; he had been impelled to 
catastrophe through force of circumstances, and had been un- 
consciously and against his will forced to contribute to the death 
of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez.* 

Mr. Diaz Lombardo had been obliged to resign as Secretary 
of Public Instruction in order that the Vice President, Mr. Pino 
Suarez, might have a position in the Cabinet. 

Since taking the oath of office as Vice President, j\Ilr. Pino 
Suarez had presided over the Senate and had even taken an ac- 
tive part in some matters. A fiery and impulsive young man 
by nature and a zealous revolutionist, he chafed under the pas- 
sive duties of the Vice Presidency. He was the tool of Don 
Gustavo Madero who was constantly recommending him to the 
President for a more active part in the affairs in order that he 
might have a voice in all tihe business transacted by the Presi- 



^See chapter XXIX. 



THE NEW DEVOLUTION 87 

dent. Mr. Madero esteemed Mr. Pino Suarez and made him 
attend the Cabinet meetings, but at these meetings there was no 
free play for his activity. When Conigress adjourned, the Vice 
President's life became even more monotonous. For this reason 
both he and Gustavo Madero wished that he might be a. Cabinet 
member so that their schemes might become actual facts. 

When the Secretary of the Interior, Mir. Abraham Gonzalez, 
resigned, Gustavo .Madero concentrated his energies to obtain 
the portfolio either for himself or for Mr. Pino Suarez. Neither 
Mr. Ernesto Madero, Secretary of the Treasury, nor Mr. Rafael 
Hernandez, his companion in politics, wanted the President to 
be obsessed with the advice of his favorite brother. The family, 
divided upon, this point, was continually quarreling. 

Mr. Ernesto Madero strenuously opposed the appointment 
as Secretary of the Interior of either Gustavo Madero or Pino 
Suarez, because he believed that either appointment would raise 
a storm of criticism. The President wavered between his per- 
sonal affection and his duty as president. His affection inclined 
him towards pleasing his brother, but he fully realized that such 
an action would create scandal. Weak, he wavered in 
his decision. Mr. Calero, still Secretary of State, solved the 
question by suggesting Mr. Pino Suarez for Secretary of Public 
Instruction and recommending Mr. Jesus Plores M'agon for Sec- 
retary of the Interior. With no excuse to offer, Mr. Diaz Lom- 
bardo resigned from this post merely as an act of friendship to- 
wards Mr. Calero who had originally recommended him for the 
portfolio. He was then appointed MSnister to France to fill the 
vacancy created by the resignation of Mr. Sebastian de Mier at 
the time of the fall of the Diaz government. 



Mr. Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of Development, had at- 
tempted to secure for the government a majority in the House 
of Representatives. This was a comparatively easy matter as 
a large number of the representatives wished to help the new 
government and had already fulfilled their pledges to ex-Presi- 
dent Diaz. In order to have greater assurance, Mr. Hernandez had 
personally offered reelection to the majority of congressmen. 
IMost of these, however, realizing the weakness of the govern- 
ment, knew quite well that these were merely empty promises, 



88 FRIOM DESPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 

but still, they did their utmost to help the executive power which 
needed the backing of Congress in order to establish itself firmly. 

=^ ^ # 

Such were the existing conditions at the time for the elec- 
tion of representatives, senators, and justices of the Supreme 
Court of Justice of the Nation. These elections had to be carried 
out in accordance with the new law passed by Congress at its 
last session. The government and the Constitutional Progressive 
Party, or, we may say, Gustavo Madero, each made out its slate. 
The governors, who had no slate of their own, wavered between 
the two parties, uncertain from which they could gain the great- 
er advantage. The candidates of these two parties were op- 
posed by the nominees of the Catholic Party from nearly every 
district of the Republic, and by the candidates of those who un- 
der the name of "Independents," were trying to profit by the 
general confusion. 

The number of excesses committed was astounding. With 
the exception of the Secretary of State and thie Secretary of 
War, each Secretary presented his candidates for congressmen or 
senators, and they were victorious, all more or less legally. The 
Constitutional Progressive Party adopted all sorts of measures 
tc' gain victory for its candidates. Though legally defeated for 
many offices, it found revenge at the time of examination of 
credentials, since it caused many credentials to be accepted when 
they were palpable frauds. 

In the State of Vera Cru2, Mr. Tomas Braniff in league 
with Messrs. Giustavo Madero and Pino Suarez, nominated can- 
didates against all law and order at the eleventh hour. These 
candidates were upheld by the governor. In Misantla, the pre- 
fect even had two men shot; on the eve of the elections and had 
their bodies paraded through the streets shortly before the vot- 
ing began. Such an argument was decidedly successful and the 
prefect was able to forge all papers with impunity in his own 
office, naming Jose R. Aspe congressman. In Zongolica the 
ballots arrived on the day following the elections, but they were 
not for that reason declared illegal. In the State of Mexico the 
scandal did not reach the point of murder, but there were pre- 
fects like the one in Ixtlahuaca who brutally enforced the can- 
didacy of the nominees of the Secretary of the Interior. There 
was not one state where the law was not trampled upon in a 
miost shameless way. Under cover of these abuses, there were 



THE NEW EiEVOLUTIOiN 89 

districts as for instance Juchitan in Oaxaca, where the prefects 
paid no attention to the reconimendations of Gnstavo Madero's 
party nor to the recommendations officially miade, nor even to 
the protests made by the independent parties and candidates, 
but they elected their own personal friends or relatives. 

Of the representatives who made up the Twenty-fifth Consti- 
tutional Congress only twenty-one were elected, among whom 
were Messrs. Calero and Hernandez. Of these twenty-one, ele- 
ven were proteges or nominees of the government; or of the Con- 
stitutional Progressive Party. The rest obtained their election 
through personal relations. In other words, there were only 
eight who did not owe their victory to the backing of the govern- 
ment. These eight men were: From Vera Cruz, General Gre- 
gorio Riuiz, native of the district of Jalacingo where he had many 
relatives and friends; from the State of Mexico, M,r. Francisco 
M. de Olaguibel, a man well known and esteemed in his state; 
from Hidalgo, M'r, Javier Torres Rivas, a large landowner ; from 
Jalisco, Mir. Jose Maria Lozano, a native of the district of San 
Miguel el Alto, where he is well connected; from Nuevo Leon, 
Mr. Nemesio Garcia Naranjo,* elected for the district of Lam- 
pazos, where be is well known and esteemed ; from Oaxaca, M'essrs. 
Jose Maria Garcia, Francisco Modesto Ramirez, and Prisciliano 
Maldonado, all well known citizens in their towns. There were 
others who secured backing in their respective districts but their 
nominaltions did not go through the discussions at the prelimin- 
ary meetings. The scandals perpetrated at these meetings have 
no precedent in our constitutional history. There were creden- 
tials that the committee tried to reject although the members of 
the committee confessed that they had not even opened the do- 
cuments relative to the business at hand. Even after this fla- 
grant confession, thiey still attempted to reject credentials al- 
leging that they had not been correctly filled out. Mr. Querido 
Moheno,t a congressman, one day admitted before the House 
that he had submitted two different opinions concerning the same 
credentials so that Mir. Giistavo Madero might choose the one he 
preferred. The credentials of Mr. Francisco Pascual Garcia of 
Michoacan were approved since the elections in his district were 



*Both Mr. Lozano and Mr. Garcia Naranjo are Cabinet Min- 
isters in Huerta's administration. 

t Secretary of State in General Huerta's administration 



90 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

declared legal; but when the votes were cast, he himself was re- 
jected without any explanation for the action. 

The debates were endless. In the majority of cases the 
•Board of Elections did not know how the documents stood, nor 
did they bother to answer the arguments of those who opposed 
their actions. They merely imposed their decision by force of a 
majority vote. These debates lasted so long that the Hiouse had 
to convene even though all the credentials had not been duly 
examined. The debates did not come to an end until October, 
thiat is, until two weeks after the opening of the session of 
Congress. 

The Catholic Party which had contended in nearly every 
district, played a most unworthy role in these debates. Fearing 
that the credentials of their party leaders would be rejected, it 
supported the Constitutional Progressive Party, voting with it 
even in the most flagrantly shameless cases. In fact, it did not 
even protest in favor of some of its coreligionists but rather 
sacrificed them disgracefully. As a result, it secured only about 
twenty seats in the Congress. The Constitutional Progressive 
Party obtained a majority thougih not an overwhelming one. The 
rest of the Congress was made up of representatives of all varie- 
ties, lacking discipline as well as definite affiliation. In each 
question, therefore, a majority had to be formed, a majority that 
at any moment might become a minority through lack of subor- 
dination of the elements that composed it. Yet there was al- 
ways a tendency to group around Gustavo Madero who was the 
man of power. When the session was opened and the House began 
its work, it commenced a series of insults against every one, 
unprecedented in any constitutional body. The House did 
nothing useful for the country. It seemed as if the representa- 
tives had convened solely and exclusively to insult each; other 
or to insult those who could not defend themselves since they 
were not representatives. The Speakers elected in the months 
of September, October, November and December, were powerless 
to bring to order these excited enthusiasts. To make matters 
worse, the administration in spite of the behavior of the repre- 
sentatives, had the brilliant idea of calling a special session, 
which began at thie end of December and lasted until the faU of 
the Madero administration. 



CHAPTER XIII. 
OROZCO AND VAZQUEZ GOMEZ. 

In the North the revolution began as a Vazquista movement; 
that is, it took as its leader Mir. Emilio Vazquez Giomez who 
after his disappearance from Mexico City had appeared in San 
Antonio, Texas. But it soon deteriorated into nothing but an 
anti-administration movement.* 

Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez who had remained ia Mexi- 
co City, was arrested one day as he was about to get into an au- 
tomobile. He claimed that he was merely leaving the city to 
visit some property he owned just outside the Federal District. 
In spite of his remonstrances he was taken to prison, but he soon 
managed to gain his liberty although the government ac- 
cused him of complicity with the rebels. It was even said that 
the telegraph operator of the Treasury Department had inter- 
cepted a telegram to tlhe Doctor which left no doubt as to his com- 
plicity with the forces of Zapata. 

To my mind there is absolutely no doubt that Dr. Vazquez 
Gomez was in close touch with the revolutionists. The rebel lead- 
ers, Limon, the Samano brothers and others of the State of 
Mexico in league with Zapata, were constantly receiving instruc- 
tions as well as pecuniary aid through Representative Pedro 



*The first proclamation issued by Pascual Orozco, Jr., was 
as usual against the cientificos or rather against the Terrazas co- 
terie, known in Chihuahua as the cientifico party, claiming that 
Governor Abraham Gonzalez had been subdued by General Luis 
Terrazas. The meeting at Enramada with David de la Fuente and 
other chiefs openly showed that the revolution was a Vasquista 
one, but some days later Orozco, Jr., changed his mind and pro- 
claiming that the only purpose of the revolution was the down- 
fall of the Madero regime, ordered Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez 
to leave Mexican territory at once, notwithstanding that Colonel 
Orozco, the leader's father had welcomed Mr. Vazquez Gomez 
in Ciudad Juarez and honored him as Provisional President of 
the Republic. 

(91) 



92 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECKY 

Galicia Rodriguez from Dr. Vazquez Gtomez or from some com- 
mittee over which he presided. This I affirm because I myself 
handled a letter from Limon and other leaders addressed to 
Mr. Galicia Rodriguez. In this letter they complained that Dr. 
Vazquez Gromez had not sent money nor ammunition as he had 
promised to do ; they, moreover, threatened to abandon the 
Vazquista cause unless the ammunition were sent on the very 
days promised. Scarcely two months after the receipt of this 
letter, Limon and the Samano brothers were marauding in the 
State of Miexieo, not exactly stealing, for they usually paid for 
what they took, but always parading the fact that they had 
plenty of ammunition. In fact Limon was in arms up to the very 
time of the successful revolt of the Ciudadela after which he 
was executed by the Federals in the State of Mexico. According 
to the official statement this was done through an error but it 
is more likely that it was done to wipe out by his death the un- 
derstanding which the rebel leader had had with those who at 
that moment were victors. Tlhie best proof of the understand- 
ing between Dr. Vazquez Gomez and Zapata is the letter which 
follows, in which Dr. Vazquez Gomez clearly states that the re- 
volt led by Zapata was a revolution founded on principle, and 
thiat the Plan of Ayala is the clear and definite echo of an 
agrarian revolution which will save the country. This letter, 
published in "El Pais" on the 19th of June 1913, read as follows : 

Washington, June 4th, 1913. 
To the Editor of El Pais. 
Dear Sir: 

After much delay, I have at last received copies of news- 
papers in Spanish from your city and from the southern fron- 
tier of this country. I have read the articles as well as the news 
items concerning my jpurney to the northern part of Mexico. 
Some of these are groundless, others inexact. In order not to 
make this letter too long, I will just correct the news items, for 
since the articles are all written anonymously by my political 
enemies, they do not deserve any comment or notice ; moreover, 
the very same charges were made from the very same sources in 
1912, and their falsehood has already been passed upon by those 
in authority. As for the news items published by the press of 
that city, I shall correct the most important. It has been stated 
that the revolution of the North agreed to proclaim me Provis- 



OROZCO AND VASQiUEZ GOMEZ ^3 

ional President as soon as the administration of 'this country 
should recognize the belligerency of the revolutionists. This is 
absolutely incorrect. In the conference I had in Piedras Negras 
with Mr. Venustiano C'arranza, this was not even mentioned. 
Besides, the United States has declared, and rightly, that it 
will not recognize any government proceeding from violence. 
Perhaps my approbation will surprise many who only seek that 
by which they profit for the moment; I, however, seek as usual 
only that by which our country will really profit. For this 
reason, I believe that the precedent established by Mr. Wilson 
is a guarantee for the legal administration of the countries, which 
like ours, are frequently the scene of political revolutions. I 
may be wrong, but, be that asi it may, I sincerely believe it. 

It has been stated that I am working among the revolu- 
tionists in order to be made provisional president when the re- 
volution triumphs. This is absolutely groundless and false. 
There is not a single rebel who can bear witness to such an en- 
deavor. These rumors come from a source that every one knows 
but which I shall call to mind in a very few words. 

Politically, I figured in a secondary capacity in the revo- 
lution of 1910. It was due to my efforts, though my enemies 
deny it even at present, that the revolution did not complete- 
ly fail. 

At the time of the negotiations at Ciudad Juarez, had it 
not been for intrigues, well known to all, I w^ould have been elect- 
ed vice president of the Republic. The complete failure of the 
revolution of 1910 followed my withdrawal from politics. I 
do not, however, pretend to believe that this downfall was due 
to my withdrawal. 

Very well then; these facts as well as others that I do not 
mention', because I am not trying to write history, are the ori- 
gin of the good will shown me by the revolutionists of 1910, the 
greater part of whom have again taken up arms; but between 
this good will and leadership there is a vast difference. Oiie 
of the newspapers of your city has said that the work ascribed 
to me does not agree with my ideas of revolutionary unity ; that 
lack of agreement would be true if the actions ascribed to me 
were true, but as they are false, I confirm my ideas, and I still 
believe that if there had been' unity in the revolution the country 
would have been saved from anarchy and all its consequences. 
It is not hard to prove that what I say is right. After the armed 



94 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHrF 

moveiaent in the capital w'hich changed the order of things and 
established a very serious precedent for the country, the revolu- 
tion is still in full swingi and no one can say how or when it 
will end. 

But just as I am a friend of revolutionary unity when the 
revolution is real and not imaginary, I am a decided enemy of 
revolutions when they have no other aim but to change the per- 
sonnel of the government. It has been clearly shown in our 
country that the result of such a change does not compensate 
for the blood shed. 

Fortunately, the main object of the revolution of 1910 was 
not to change the personnel of the Government. It tried 'to 
institute a real reform, to solve the agrarian problem, to better 
the economic conditions of the country, and to assure the wel- 
fare and liberty of the people. 

The agrarian revolution only roughly sketched in 1910, and 
not understood by many has had a clear and well defined echo 
in the Plan of Ayala;* it is a revolution of principles and not 
of personal ambition, it originated in support of ideas and not 
on behalf of men. This fact in itself is an advantage, because 
when men are the standards, the practically inevitable result 
is that the victorious leader or chief sets up a personal and tyran- 
nical dictatorship which renders null and void the sacrifices 
of the people. Our contemporaneous history is filled with eases 
that bear out this statement. 

Consequently convinced as I am of the true tendency of the 
present revolution, my efforts cannot be directed in behalf of 
one man, even though that man be myself, because principles 
come before men, and when these principles triumph, men— 
not one man — will appear to carry them out. 

Begging you, Mr. Editor, to have this letter published in 
your distinguished paper, and thanking you in advance, I beg 
to remain, 

Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez. 

In the north the revolution had begun to take a truly vaz- 
quista character and Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez had even gone 



*Signed by Zapata and written by Doctor Vazquez Gomez 
himself. 



OiROtZCO AND VA'SQiUEZ GOMEZ 95 

to Ciudad Juarez. Pascual Orozco, father of the leader of the 
revolution in Chihuahua accorded him the honors due to the 
Presidemt of the Republic. But, when on the following day he 
received decisive orders to leave Mjexican soil, the revolutionists 
themselves rescinded the title they had given him, and the re- 
volution was thus left without an avowed leader. 

Months later, in December, the principal leaders of the re- 
volt issued a proclamaition in which they all adhered to the plan 
of September 22, made public by Gieneral Gaudencio de la Llave 
in the State of Puebla, 

In Sinaloa, the revolution also had at the beginning a vaz- 
quista tendency, but later, it recognized Paseual Orozco as its 
head. Then all those who had personal ambitions tried to lure 
Orozco to submission. Even 'the administration, under the di- 
rection of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Jesus Flores Magon, 
sent agents to the rebel leader to see whether his conditions were 
acceptable to the government. Representative Juan Sarabia was 
entrusted with this mission, but as hie was unable to come to an 
agreement, negotiations were broken off. The league for Social 
Defence headed by Alberto Garcia Granados, ex-Secretary of 
the Interior, also opened negotiations with Olrozco, but the only 
result was a friendly intercourse which in no way compromised 
the leader of the revolution. 



CHAPTER XIV. 



RBLLANOS— CONEJOiS— BACHIMBA. 



After his victory sit Rellanos, Pascual Orozco, Jr., had march- 
ed southward, taking possession of Escalon, Zavalza, Conejos, 
etcetera, and was approaching Tbrreon. The government real- 
izing that he was the nucleus of the revolt, wished at any cost to 
prevent his advance. It therefore sent a strong force undeir the 
command of General Victoriano Huerta. General H'uerta was 
a good soldier, well known throughout the army. H;e had studied 
his profession scientifically at the Military College from which 
he had been graduated with the rank of Staff Officer. Besides 
this theoretic training, he hiad had a vast practical experience 
for he had escorted General Diaz during his flight to Vera 
Cruz; he had commanded the column against Zapata during de 
la Barra's administration; he had been in command of the 3rd 
Battalion of Infantry during the campaign against the rebels 
of Guerrero, led by General Neri; he had later been sent to 
Yucatan as second in command of the forces fighting the Maya 
Indians in the Territory of Qiuintana Roo; and, lately, he had 
been Commander in Chief of the campaign in Mbrelos.* There- 
fore, well versed in military affairs, he calmly made prepara- 
tions, leaving Mexico City on the 10th of April to assume com- 
miand of his forces. Hie first went to Monterey where he con- 
ferred with General Geronimo Ttevino, Chief of the 3rd Mdli- 
t.iry Zone. General Treviiio was able to put at his command 
forces organized by him comprising three thousand men 
accustomed to the climate as well as to the mjethod of warfare 
in that region. From Monterey, General Huerta went to Tor- 
reon where he began his plan of attack, reorganizing the forces 
left by General Gonzalez Salas. Towards the end of April he 



*In all of their commandings. General Huerta was drowned 
off, accused of misappropriation of funds. 

(96) 



REiLLANOS-CONEJOS-BACHIMBA 97 

began, to attack the position iheld by Orozco. He sent a detacliment 
under Colonel Mercado with a repair train to restore the rail- 
road towards Bermejillo. These repairs extended from Ber- 
mejillo to Escalon, a distance of one hundred and twenty-one 
kilometers, but as thie bridges were burned down and the railroad 
destroyed, the advance of the main army was made very slow- 
ly. In the meanwhile, Orozco was advancing towards the south, 
having established headquarters at Escalon, After several at- 
tempts to flank General Huerta's forces, among which were the 
skirmishes at Tlahualilo and Cuatro Cienegas, the main encoun- 
ter took place on the 11th of Miay, eight kilometers from the 
station of Conejos. The result of the battle which ended on 
the 12th, was that Orozco retreated toward the north taking 
his position between Asunsolo and Corralitos. 

The next battle was on the 22nd and 23rd of May on the 
Canyon of Riellano. Once again thie artillery played an impor- 
tant part in the struggle. Orozco 's forces had to retreat hur- 
riedly toward Jimenez and there again met the federal in Ba- 
chimba. While Orozco was fighting at Conejos and Rellano, he 
had ordered his lieutenants to make flank movements in order 
to cut off the retreat of Ceneral Htierta. In spite of the dis- 
asters of Tlahualilo and Cuatro Cienegas, he ordered Campa 
and Argumedo to start for the South with the inltention of tak- 
ing Torreon just disoccupied by Oeneral Htuerta. The rebel 
forces met and defeated Colonel Pena, the chief of the federal 
troops at Velardena, forcing him to retreat to Pedriceiia, to Nazas 
and to Picardias. There Colonel Pena met General Blanquete 
who had been hurriedly sent North because of General Htuerta 's 
reports concerning the movements of Orozco 's lieutenants. Blan- 
quete had met and had been defeated by the revolutionists at La 
Loma, a point near Aviles, about twenty-five kilometers from 
Torreon. He had therefore, been forced to fall back to Picar- 
dias, from where he sought assistance of the troops in Torreon. 
Upon receiving reenforeements from Torreon, General Blan- 
quete reorganized his forces and joined Colonel Pena. He was 
then able to attack Argumedo, who was now alone. Campa had 
gone to the assistance of Orozco who had been defeated by Gen- 
eral Huerta on the very day, May 22nd, that General Blanquete 
had been defeated by the revolutionists. Since Nazas, Pedri- 
cena, and Velardena were by that time restored to the Federals, 
Torreon was free from an attack and the rear of General Suer- 



98 FEjOM despotism TO ANAECHiY 

ta's army was protected. He was therefore able to march with 
entire freedom upon Orozco for the attack at Bachimba. 

Before the beginning of the battle of Bachimba, General 
Huerta ordered the concentration of all forces in the vicinity. 
Among these was the division of Francisco Yilla, former highi- 
wayman, afterwards revolutionist with Orozco, and at that mo- 
ment Chief of the regiment of Rurales in the service of the 
government. Villa arrived at the camp of General Huerta from 
Parral where among other outrages committed by his troops he 
himself had seized a handsome horse, the property of one of the 
most prominent men of the place. Tlhie owner of the horse appealed 
to General Huerta as Comjnander in Chief for the return of 
his property. Hluerta ordered Villa to return the animal, not 
to the owner but to headquarters, but Villa unaccustomed to 
such things, most decidedly refused. General Hxierta was equal- 
ly decided in his orders and an immediate clash ensued. The 
result was the imprisonment of Villa and a summary sentence 
of death on June 4th. Eaoul and Emilio Madero who command- 
ed bodies of Rurales in the division of General Huerta, inter- 
ceded in his behalf, and telegraphed to their brother, the Presi- 
dent, the details of the affair. General Huerta suspended the 
execution and upon the express command from the President 
sent Villa as prisoner to Mlexico City.* Saved from death, Villa 
arrived in Mexico City where he was put in Santiago prison. 
He was soon allowed to escape and was even provided ^^dth the 
means to flee to the United States. 

Before General Huerta left Santa Rosalia, he was joined 
by Mr. Abraham Gonzalez, Governor of Chihuahua. This gentle- 
man had been obliged to hide when the capital of Chihuahua had 
declared itself in favor of the revolution. General Huerta also 
received a visit from a German merchant who as representative 
of the merchants of Chihuahua, came to seek guarantees for the 
residents who had contributed voluntarily or by force to the 
revolution. General Huerta was soon jpined by General Sangines 
who had marched from Ojinaga to reinforce him, and by Col- 
onel Ortega who had received orders in Cuchillo Parado to join 
him. Thus reinforced. General Htierta prepared for the 
attack. The battle began on July 3rd at nine o'clock 



*Huerta ordered the chiefs in command along Villa's route 
to Mexico City to shoot him, but not one dared obey. 



REiLL'ANOS-CONlEJOS-BACHIMBA 99 

in the morning and lasted until five o 'clock in the afternoon, 
when the rebels were completely routed. This was not confirm- 
ed until the following day when, upon the failure to receive an an- 
swering fire from the rebels a reconnaissance was ordered. It 
was then learned that the rebels had abandoned the field during 
the previous night. 

Orozco's forces reorganized at Mapula. However, they did 
not interrupt their retreat, and instead of entering the City of 
Chihuahua, kept right on to Mocitezuma. Since the nucleus of 
Orozco's powerful army was now broken up, guerrilla warfare 
began, a warfare that was to last until the revolt of the Ciud- 
adela. Orozoo fell sick not long after and had to hide in order 
to take care of himself. The real leadership of the rebellion then 
fell on Jose Inez Salaz^ar. On the other side. General Hhiertia 
also gave up the command of the division as he was forced to 
go to Mexico City to be treated for a disease of the eyes that 
was threatening him with blindness. Upon his arrival in Mex- 
ico City, he went to the Sanatiorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia* 
to be operated on by that skillful surgeon a few days later. In 
the meantime, he was raised to the rank of General of Divis- 
ion. But he did not again take the field, because the adminis- 
tration, for some unknown reason, sub-divided his command, 
placed Gjeneral Antonio RIabago over one part and General Joa- 
quin Tellez over another. General Sangines who had also had 
command of some of the troops was recalled to Mexico City as 
was Colonel Rubio Navarrete, chief of the artillery. General 
Huerta was greatly displeased at the course of action of the 
government which kept deceiving him for a long time telling 
him again and again' that he would shortly receive orders to 
resume command of his division ; but he says he was mostly dis- 
pleased because the leaders who had assisted him in his cam- 
paign were not rewarded as he desired. Brigadier General Blan- 
quete, who fought ceaselessly and untiringly ever since the fall 
of General Diaz' administration, who had been wounded at the 
battle of Rellano under General Gonzalez Salas, who had after- 
wards so bravely protected the rear of General Huerta 's army, 
who, recalled to Mexico to fight against Zapata now invad- 
ing the States surrounding Morelos, biad not been accorded 
the promotion so well earned. General Huerta himself had not 



* Afterwards Secretary of Interior in Huerta 's adminis- 
tration. 



100 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAKICH^^ 

been promoted until after the battle of Bachimba although 
Generals Lauro Vlillar, Jose Maria Mier, and Jose Maria Vega 
had all received promotions the previous December. It is true 
that some of the promotions, as for example, that of Greneral 
Villar, were entirely justified, but none of the other generals 
had fought for the Mladero government as had General Hlierta. 

The very same thing happened with General Juvencio Robles, 
who had fought for six months in Miorelos and had not yet been 
rewarded. Had the administration made no promotions at all, 
none of the generals would have felt slighted, but Mr. Madero 
raised to Generals of Divisions leaders who had never been in 
a single battle, and ignored those who had served him efficiently 
and loyally. 

In Oaxaca, immediately after the death of the Governor, 
M]r. Juarez Maza, deceased on the 20th of April, there had begun 
a revolt of the highlanders of the Ixtlan Mbuntains. In order 
to quell it, the administration sent Brigadier General Manuel 
Rivera who had been in charge of the 5th Mlilitary Zone, with 
headquarters in the City of San Luis Potosi. General Rivera, 
with tact and prudence, was successful in reestablishing peace 
after severely punishing the leaders of the insurrection. He re- 
ceived no recognition for his services from the administration 
which seemed to wish to slight the ablesit leaders of the army 
who served it best.* 



*Brigadier Rivera was promoted on the last days of Madero 's 
administration, but the promotion did not reach him until after 
Madero 's downfall.— See chapter XXV. 



CHAPTER XV. 



THE EliECTIONS IN VERA CRUZ. 



The governors wlho had been elected to office at the triumph 
of the revolution were only completing the unexpired term of 
their predecessors; for this reason elections were due in Vera 
Cruz and in Puebla, while in Oaxaca they were necessary be- 
cause of the death of the constitutional governor. 

Again Mr. Mladero entangled the electoral situation. For- 
tunately the elections in Puebla were carried on without great 
difficulty but those in Vera Cruz were the source of great 
scandals. 

In Vera Cruz many candidates had come to the fore. Among 
the most important were: Representative Guillermo Pons, a 
large landowner on ithe coast of Sotavento, very well thought 
of in his state because he was intelligent, kindly, and well versed 
in the politics of his country; Adrian Carranza, a merchant of 
Vera Cruz, prominent in his city but little known throughout 
the rest of the state ; Antonio Perez Rivera of Xalapa, a man of 
culture but violent and passionate, little known in the state out- 
side of Xalapa and the district of Jalacingo where his estates were 
located ; Mr. Manuel M, Alegre, a newspaper man who had sided 
with Mladero in his propaganda against General Diaz, and who 
at the suggestion of Mr. Dehesa was the candidate of the members 
of the State Legislature ; Ml*. HIilario Rodriguez Malpica, a naval 
commander, chief aide to the President, known only in his native 
city of Vera Cruz ; Mr. Tomas Braniff , son of a highly respected 
American citizen, and although an intelligent man, phlegma- 
tic alnuost to indolence; but he was a capitalist of Mexico City 
and as such, able to spend a great deal of money on (his cam- 
paign. Therefor,e, although completely unknown throughout 
the state, except in Cordova where his wife is a large landowner, 

(101) 



102 FR'O'M DESPOTISM] T0( AH'AKCHiY 

he was neverthieless one of ithe strongest candidates for the rea- 
son that he was able to make an expensive campaign as well as 
an extensive one. The other candidates, comparatively unknown 
citizens, were minor factors of no importance. 

Of all the candidates, Mr. Madero at first favored his chief 
of staff. This candidate was no* only, as we have said, com- 
paratively unknown, but moreover, hie had no means at his dis- 
posal to carry on his campaign. Convinced of these facts, Mir. 
Madero soon realized that it would be impossible to impose him 
except by brute force, which the government was in no position 
to consider, much less to adopt. He then began to vacillate be- 
tween Mr. Alegre, an old friend and co-religionist; Mr. Tomas 
Braniff, who was backed by the vice president, Pino Suarez; 
and Mr. Antonio Perez Rivera, candidate of the Catholic party. 
Mr. Rivera was a close friend of Don Alfredo Alvarez, an in- 
triguer whose official position— head of the President's household 
—gave him daily intercourse with the President. Yacillating be- 
tween these three candidates, M,adero, who was not bom intri- 
gant, soon succeeded as usual in entangling himself hopelessly. 
He broke completely with Mr. Braniff with the result that a 
controversy was started between the two in which Braniff seem- 
ed to be trying to force his candidacy by power of money, while 
Madero, forgetting the dignity of his position, became a dema- 
gogue, openly reproaching the methods of Braniff. The contro- 
versy soon degenerated into nothing less than mud slinging, Mr. 
Braniff going so far as even to give the lie to the President. 

The whole fact of the mat^ter is that from the very begin- 
ning, Mr. Miadero's one fear was that Mr. Pous might be elect- 
ed. He was particularly opposed to this man because he had been 
managing editor of the "El Debate," a newspaper which had 
hotly campaigned against him in 1910.* 

According to the press, Mr. Francisco Lagos, the governor, 
was offered a large sum" of money to back the candidacy of Mr. 
Braniff. The disclosure of this bribery caused such; an uproar, 
that Madero judged it expedient to interfere; he called the prin- 
cipal candidates to a meeting at the Castle of Chapultepec at 
which he ordered the immediate removal from office of Mr. 
Lagos Chazaro. As his successor he appointed Congressman 
Manuel Levy to complete the unexpired term, pending the new 



*Details in the complete Spanish edition. 



THE ELECTIONS IN VEKA CRiUZ 103 

elections. Such an act was a direct encroachment on the sover- 
eignity of the State, but it was done openly by Mkdero without 
any attempt at disguise, and without taking its significance into 
account. 

Mr. Lagos retired in favor of Mr. Levy as ordered. In pre- 
paration for the elections, Mr. Levy's first act was to remove 
many prefects who had had dealings with Mr. Braniff. A ma- 
jority of the new officials appointed, recommended by the mem- 
bers of the Legislature, were friends of Mr. Alegre, for the Legis- 
lature was hand in glove with ex-Governor Dehesa. At the time, 
however, their only instructions were to accomplish the de- 
feat of Mr. Pons, since Madero was still obsessed by his 
animosity towards the former editor of "El Debate." As 
a matter of fact, Mr. Pous had a state wide popularity 
and was really the best fitted for the office. Besides, 
owin,g to the fact that he had guaranteed to maintain peace in 
Vera Cruz, he was also the candidate most advantageous to the 
Central Government. Mr. Madero in league with a majority of 
the State Legislature, openly favored -the candidacy of Mr. 
Alegre. In the meantime, partisans of Perez Rivera, consist- 
ing in the main of the Catholic Party which had first nominated 
him, were successful in winning G^abriel Gavira over to their 
support. Gavira was a former carpenter who had run against 
Lagos Chazaro. After his defeat at the elections for governor, 
he had publicly declared himself against the local government, 
for which he had been imprisoned in Ulua. With Gavira* on 
his side, Mr. Perez Rivera was soon able to gain the support of 
the working class. They had been wavering between all the 
candidates, though with leanings toward Mir. Pous. But now at 
the call of a comrade they flocked around Gavira 's ally and be- 
gan an active campaign for him. The greatest aid lent by 
Gavira to Perez Rivera was that, through his old friendship with 
Madero and through his old reputation as a revolutionist, he 
was able to win over the President who now declared himself 
in favor of the candidate of the Catholic party. This in turn 
caused Gustavo Madero and naturally Pino Suarez to desert 
Braniff and support the candidate favored by the President. 

The elections held on the last Sunday in July showed Mr. 
Pous victorious with thirty-eight thousand votes against thirty- 
four thousand for Perez Rivera, fourteen^ thousand for Alegre, ele- 

*S'ee chapter XI. 



104 FROM DESPOTISM TO AiNAECHY 

ven thousand for Braniff, and the balance scattered among the 
remaining candidates. The votes east for Mr. Alegre were gen- 
erally fraudelent ; those cast for Mr. Braniff were obtained only 
by the power of his money; thus there were only two real and 
legitimate contenders and the decision now lay with the Legis- 
lature. The members whose term was about to expire, refused 
to render a decision. Therefore, in order to induce them to 
act on that way, they were led to believe that all the intrigants 
would be reelected. In fact, Llr. Levy gave credentials to five, 
credentials which were revoked when the services of the re- 
presentatives were no longer needed. 

The prefects, realizing that the results of the elections would 
greatly displease the President of the Repablic, began to with- 
hold votes east for the popular candidate. The new Legislature 
was composed entirely of partisans of Braniff and Perez Ri- 
vera because the credentials of the Dehesistas had been rejected 
and the votes of the partisans of Pons had been declared null 
and void by the Board of Elections under pressure of the pre- 
fects. Nearly twenty thousand votes for Mr. Pons were thrown 
out, with the result that Mjr. Perez Rivera now showed a major- 
ity, and was duly declared Governor of the State. 

In this election, frauds more flagrant than those during 
the elections for congressmen were perpetrated. But the govern- 
ment was fortunate in that the defeated candidates were serious 
minded men like Mr. Pons who accepted the decision of the 
Legislature, and putting politics aside, went about their busi- 
ness, or like the others, were men of little or no importance. 
Therefore, no revolution resulted directly from the election, 
but it left a bad taste and paved the way for a revolutionary 
movement in the future. 

The question in Vera Cruz had not been quite settled when 
there was trouble in Tlaxcala. The Governor, Antonio Hidalgo, 
although his term had expired and it was so declared by the 
Legislature, refused to turn over the office to his successor. 
Tlie governor-elect was practically under siege in the Capitol 
and it was necessary to send regulars to his aid. The situation 
was further complicated when the commander of the irregular 
troops, Rafael Tapia, a former revolutionist under Madero, sided 
Math Mr. Hidalgo. It was then necessary for the government to 
send troops, and only upon their arrival did the retiring governor 
surrender his office. 



THE ELECTIONS IN VEKiA CRiUZ 105 

In Chiapas, Madero, in order to please his friend, Flavio 
Guillen, appointed him governor.* First, though, he forced the 
incumbent, Mr. Reynaldo Gordillo Leon, to resign by appointing 
him Minister to Guatemala. The appointment of Mr. Guillen, who 
was very unpopular in the state, caused unrest and dissatisfac- 
tion. After a short time, Mt. Reynaldo Gordillo Leon resigned as 
Minister to Guatemala and returned to Mexico to resume his 
office as governor. Madero unwillingly gave his consent to this 
procedure, but not until the storm had broken and his overthrow 
was inevitable. 



*It was thereupon stated in Mexico City that the appointment 
of Mr. Guillen was made at the urgent request of the President of 
Guatemala, who offered im exchange, to prevent any revolutions 
against the ]\Iexican government from being fomented on the 
Guatemalan frontier. M]r. Guillen was charged to be a former 
Guatemala spy. 



CHAPTER XVI. 
TH'E FIRST MILITARY REVOLT.— VERA CRUZ. 



The loss of prestige of the governinent was increasing in 
geometric progression ; a revolution, though not in tangible form, 
was in the air and everybody felt that it was bound to break 
out at any moment. Moreover, it was suspected that Brigadier 
General Felix Diaz was at the head of it. He had asked to be 
retired from the army and had suddenly left the capital for 
Vera Cruz where he had taken up his residence. 

Tihe government, unable to shut its eyes to these facts, sent 
two detectives to shadow him constantly. In addition Secretary 
Hernandez commissioned Mr. Celso Acosta* to go to Vera Cruz 
to secure all possible information as to the actions and inten- 
tions of General Diaz. This was inconceivable stupidity for 
there was nobody who did not know that Acosta was closely 
allied with Diaz, and was in fact one of his most ardent suppor- 
ters and as deep in the conspiracy as the ex-General himself. 
Their relative position then was that the government was de- 
luding itself with the idea that it had Diaz under strict surveil- 
lance, while as a matter of fact Diaz was well posted as to every 
move of the government. Things kept on in this way until fi- 
nally one day Diaz disappeared. He left the house of his brother 
in law, Notary Aleolea, with the avowed intention of going to 
the Regatta Club, but he failed to return. The fact was known 
in Mexico City that very afternoon as pre-arranged, and the 
government, learning of it through rumor, immediately tele- 
graphed its agents. They reported that Felix Diaz was still in 
Vera Cruz closely watched by them. Within a few hours they 
admitted they were unable to see their charge because upon in- 
quiry at his home they learned that he was ill and unable to 
receive callers. They still insisted that he had not left the city. 



*Former secretary of Mr. Felix Diaz when he was Police 
Commissioner. 

(106) 



THE FIRStT MILIT'ARiY RCEVOLT 107 

In the meantime, Felix Diaz ihad proceeded from Vera Cruz 
to Orizaba where Colonel Diaz Ordaz was stationed with most 
of the 21st Battalion. Diaz had persuaded this Colonel to begin the 
movement of the revolt against Miadero's government, proclaiming 
Diaz himself head of the nation. Owing to the fact that the con- 
spirators took absolutely no precautions, the government knew on 
the following day where Diaz was hiding ; but still it hesitated 
to order his arrest, and still Secretary Hiernandez continued to 
depend on Celso Acosta even going so far as to assign to him the 
task of confirming the news.* Needless to say, Acosta immedi- 
ately notified Diaz that his hiding place was discovered and 
urged him to hurry matters. On the night of October 15th, 
Colonel Diaz O'rdaz demanded special trains for the purpose of 
transferring his force from Oirizaba to Vera Cruz where he ar- 
rived on the morning of the 16th. 

At that time, General Hernandez, head of the Prison of 
Ulua, was provisional Military Conunander of the city. The 
rebels of course attempted to win him over to their side by al- 
luring inducements; but G-eneral Hernandez refused all over- 
tures and remained a prisoner in Military Headquarters, under 
guard of the men of the 21st B'attalion, commanded by Colonel 
Diaz Oirdaz. Nevertheless, Gieneral Hernandez devised the fol- 
lowing stratagem to obtain his freedom : Be requested permission 
to go to Ulua for his family. Upon receiving it, he proeeeded 
thence under escort, or rather in the custody of two officers be- 
longing to the rebel force. When he arrived at Ulua, where he 
lie was still the acknowledged head as well as commander of all 
the troops in that post. General Hjemandez, as he entered the 
guard house, ordered the arrest of his two guards. Thus he not 
only regained his freedom but he also placed the prison be- 
yond the power of the rebels. Commodore Azueta, chief of the 
Arsenal, had acted in more or less the same way. Hie also had 
been removed at daybreak from his home and invited to join 
the rebels. Upon learning what their intentions were, without 
giving a definite consent, he said he would gO' on board one of 
the warships to see that there was no disorder. No sooner had 
he boarded the Morelos, than hei hoisted the ensign of Comman- 
der in Chief of the fleet. A number of the commanders of the 

*I obtained this information on October 14th, 1912, from 
Antonio Villaviciencio head of the detective force in charge of the 
political bureau. 



108 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

vessels had gone ashore to receive orders from General Diaz: 
these he supplanted by the second in command. He thus put 
the fleet beyond the power of the revolutionists even though the 
commanders had agreed to assist the rebellion. In the early 
morning, Colonel Diaz Ordaz marshalled his troops, and at their 
head, paraded through the streets proclaiming the downfall of 
the Madero government, and acclaiming Felix Diaz as Provis- 
ional Head of the Nation, at the same time rendering him all 
honors due the President. 

The news spread like wildfire throughout the country and 
the very audacity of the coup delivered at Vera Cruz gained for 
it sympathizers on all sides even though not a single military 
chief supported the uprising. As a whole, the army continued 
loyal to the constitutional government: in spite of the great dis- 
content evident throughout the country. 

All communication with Vera Cruz was cut off and there- 
fore the government could learn what was happening there 
only by cable. Thus it was that for several days the public did 
not learn the real attitude of the fleet, a very important fact, 
because had the rebels been able to^ count on its support, they 
could have takeni possession of the remaining Gulf Ports. The 
government would then have been in sore straits. It had strong 
evidence that the fleet commanders were in league with Diaz 
but at the same time it had the conviction that Azueta had taken 
command of the squadron and was on board the Morelos. His 
unwillingness to land left no doubt as to his lack of sympathy 
with the revolutionary movement. The capture of Vera Cruz 
M^as of grave importance for several reasons, firstly, because there 
was a large quantity of munitions of war in the Warehouses of 
the Custom Houses, which gave the rebel leader means for arm- 
ing eight thousand men, furnishing them with heavy artillery 
and machine guns which had just arrived from Europe; secondly, 
because there were large amounts of available funds, for there 
were not only those produced by the Customs as well as large 
amounts in the banks, but there was also the possibility of induc- 
ing the merchants and brokers of the city to pay their indebted- 
ness to the Custom House within short terms by offering them dis- 
counts; and finally, because revolts once started by the soldiery 
would take root with the result that occurrences like that 
in Vera Cruz would soon be duplicated at other points. The 
government, therefore, took immediate steps to smother the move- 



THE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT 109 

ment and ordered General Joaquin Beltran, recently appointed 
Military Commander of the city tibongh not yet in command, 
to march with all his available forces to recapture the seced- 
ed city. 

The advance was at once begun by the troops stationed on 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec under Brigadier Zozaya, and those 
in Xalapa under Brigadier Celso Vega. From Mexico City there 
were sent the 2nd, 11th, and 18th Regiments under their respective 
heads, Lieutenant Colonel O'caranza, Colonel Jimenez Castro, 
and Brigadier Agustin Valdez, as well as a body of volunteers 
from Xico, commanded by Captains Limon and Preciados, and 
a body of irregular troops under General Tapia, and two bat- 
teries commanded by Captains Oropeza and Prida. Later or- 
ders were sent to Colonel Blanquete instructing him to proceed 
with his regiment, the 29th Infantry, to reenforce the column 
under General Beltran, while bodies of Rurales stationed at 
Tehuacan, Perote and Tierra Blanca were mobilized and sent 
under Brigadiers Davila and Gtistavo Maas to cooperate in the 
attack on the city. 

Vera Cruz was defended by the 21st regiment brought by 
Colonel Diaz Ordaz from Orizaba, by a part of the 19th 
which had been stationed in the city, and by the stationary bat- 
teries of Vera Cruz consisting of six cannon mounted on one 
of the forts and a few cannon of little tactical value. 

When he arrived before Vera Cruz, General Beltran began 
to entrench himself around the city. General Felix Diaz had 
believed that General Beltran would make common cause with 
him in view of their friendly relations and comradeship, but 
the steps taken by the commander of the column admitted no 
doubt as to his attitude in the matter even though the tone of his 
messages to Ceneral Diaz declining to join the revolt was quite 
affectionate. As each detachment of federals arrived before the 
city, Felix Diaz would send emissaries to the leaders to try tc 
win them over to his cause; but none of them accepted his over- 
tures. Some replied that if a general revolt embracing the whole 
army were intended, they would lend their co-operation, but 
that in no case would they initiate a revolt nor would they lend 
themselves to isolated movements. Others, like Colon.el Jimenez 
Castro, replied that if any person should again come to him with 
such overtures or missives he would shoot him down on the spot. 
The inferior officers who were approached, invariably replied 



110 FRiOM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

that tbey would only act in conjiinction with their superior 
officers. These mediations which were carried on by various 
persons, some passing themselves as members of the Red Cross, 
and others as newspaper correspondents, lasted up to the very 
moment of the fall of the city. 

Felix Diaz judg'ed that the underlying note of the replies sent 
him was really one of adherence, for he believed that the whole 
army would support him; in fact he was convinced that every 
division arriving before Vera Cruz would make common cause 
with him. 

The arrangements he made for defense were without rhyme 
or reason ; not even what had happened with Commodore Azueta 
and Brigadier Hernandez caused him to take precautions ; every- 
thing was in disorder and confusion. From the Coast of Sota- 
vento he received reports to the effect that there was great en- 
thusiasm for his cause, that if arms and ammunition were sent, 
an army of nearly four thousand men could be raised to arrest 
the advance of General Zozaya and his forces. General Diaz 
replied by ordering these men to proceed immediately to Vera 
Cruz, an absurdity of which he soon became convinced since 
it was ridiculous to suppose that a column of such strength 
could undertake an advance unarmed as it was, without making 
it not only possible but easy for General Zozaya to intercept 
and annihilate it with only five hundred well armed men. Con- 
vinced of this fact, Diaz ordered that arms be sent by train under 
a guard commanded by Miajor Zarate and one of his aides. 
When the train arrived at its destination it was found that only 
the officers were on board as the arms had been left behind in 
Vera Cruz. This naturally served to greatly discourage the re- 
volutionists of Sotavento, and was the cause of desertion of many, 
who, grasping the situation, realized that with leaders such as 
those in Vera Cruz, disaster was inevitable. Diaz, in order to 
obtain funds with which to pay the revolted troops and the peo- 
ple who had joined him, sent for the Collector of Ctistoms, 
Mr. Azcarraga, and ordered him to turn over to the paymaster 
all the funds at hand in his office. Mr. Azcarraga pretended that 
since all his funds were deposited in the bank it would be neces- 
sary for him to go to the Custom House to make out the neces- 
sary cheque. As a matter of fact, he did go to his office to secure 
the cheque book, but thereupon, accompanied by his Account- 
ant, he escaped on board the gunboat Morelos which flew the 



THlE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT 111 

ensign of the Commander in Chief, Commodore Az-ueta, and 
thus made a laughing stock of Diaz. 

There remained a few funds in the Treasury of the General 
Treasurer's Office which General Diaz seized to pay his troops. 
He even continued to pay the men of the fleet and allowed them 
to obtain their supplies in the very city itself. In this way in- 
tercourse was maintained between the land and naval forces to 
such an extent that not even Vera Cruz, let alone the general 
public, could determine whether the naval forces favored the 
rebels or favored the government. 

However, the government itself was fuUy informed of the 
true state of affairs because Commodore Azueta had communi- 
cated by cable with the Secretary of War. There was also in- 
tercourse between the opposing land forces for the messengers 
of General Diaz had free access to the Federal camp, while at 
the same time federal spies could enter the city unmolested. 
Since, as we have stated, overtures were made to superior and 
inferior officers of the federals up to the very moment of the 
attack, and since, in spite of the repeated refusals, Diaz never 
for one instant doubted that the whole army would join him, 
it is not out of place to ask, why these illusions? "Were they 
merely deceits practised by the emissaries in order always to ob- 
tain money, or were they incomprehensible illusions of Diaz? 
This is a mystery impossible to fathom. But the fact remains that 
although not one single officer accepted the overtures, there was 
not one, with the exception of Colonel Jimenez Castro that gave a 
decisive refusal warranted to convince Diaz that the path he pro- 
posed to follow was impossible. These symptoms of wavering 
were fatal to the government, for they clearly showed that the 
officers of the federal forces were defending the government 
only half heartedly, merely from a sense of discipline; but this 
would easily disappear if a daring man in whom all officers 
had complete confidence should place himself at the head of 
the rebellion. The government did not notice this fact or if 
it did, failed to give it the importance it deserved. When the 
federal forces placed at his command had assembled. General 
Beltran notified the residents of the city to betake themselves 
to the neutral zone which had been designated at the request of 
the foreign consuls, and on the 22nd of October at six A. M. he 
began the attack. The attacking force was divided into several 
columns, one under Colonel Jimenez Castro entering' the city 



112 FKOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

from the north; another under General Agustin Valdez, advanc- 
ing from the east through the Parque Ciriaco Vazquez ; a third 
under Brigadier Celso Vega entering from the southeast; and 
the fourth under Brigadier Zozaya, approaching the cemetery 
from the south. The artillery under Brigadier GrUstavo M'aas 
took up a position on the sand dunes commanding the whole 
city. A body of irregular troops conunanded by Don Eafael 
Tapia, formerly a saddle maker, but promoted to general during 
the revolution, took up a position between the forces of General 
Valdez and those of General Vega. 

The defenders of the city held positions on high places such as 
the railroad terminal, the roof of the City Hall, the tower of the 
Church of the Parroquia, the match factory, as well as on 
the roofs of the tallest buildings of the principal streets, but 
they failed to send out scouts and to erect breastworks. In fact, 
all their actions indicated clearly that they were commanded by 
a brainless soldier. 

At the first exchange of shots, the federal artillery com- 
pletely silenced that of the rebels and put it out of commission ; 
at the second discharge, the roundhouse at the railroad terminal 
was abandoned by the rebels. It must be noted here that such 
a blunder was inexcusable. The roundhouse had been occupied 
by fifty men whose -object no one has ever explained, especially if 
we take into consideration the fact that just across the way 
from this building there existed at the time an extensive trench 
about seven feet wide by four feet deep throughout its length. 
This trench could have been used as a protection by the sharp- 
shooters had it been necessary to defend this point. Neverthe- 
less, instead of taking advantage of this available defence, the 
soldiers were shut in the roundhouse which had no loopholes 
and served only to render the force useless. The assaulting 
party soon learned this fact and ordered their artillery fire to 
be aimed at the building which could not have withstood a 
bombardment. This the defending officers realized so well that 
at the second discharge they abandoned their position. When 
Colonel Jimenez Castro, who led the attack against that part of 
the city saw that the soldiers were abandoning the building, he 
charged them sharply. Thrown into disorder, they retreated 
headlong towards the center of the city. General Diaz had left 
his home on horseback at: early dawn to inspect his lines of de- 
fense, reaching the railroad terminal just when the attack was 



THE FIRST MILITARY ElEVOLT 113 

begun. He was still fully under the impression that this was 
n]ierely a sham and that the attacking party would declare it- 
self for him. In vain did his companions try to persuade him 
that this was no sham since the bullets were even now beginning 
to fall near them. Diaz remained firm in his idea that he would 
be joined by the opposing force and that the attack was nothing 
but a farce. As the firing grew hotter, his aides forced him to 
seek shelter in the city hall where they dismounted and pro- 
ceeded to the roof.* Meanwhile Colonel Jimenez Castro had 
pursued the fleeing rebels through Main and 5 de Mayo Streets, 
passing through the Parque Ciriaco Yazquez where he met Gen- 
eral Valdez who had advanced tO' this point without meeting with 
opposition. General Valdez informed Colonel Castro that in his 
opinion it was not yet time for an advance ; he had not only not 
encountered the enemy, but had also lost touch with Headquar- 
ters and therefore was receiving no orders. Colonel Castro re- 
plied that the time was so ripe that he was even then in pur- 
suit of General Diaz, apparently whom he had seen through 
his field glasses retreating from the Terminal making for 
the barracks of La Merced. Colonel Castro continoied his 
advance. When he arrived at the corner of Benito Juarez and 
Main Streets, he divided his forces into two columns. One, un- 
der Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza, he ordered to proceed along 
Benito Juarez Street to the Customs Warehouses, thence to the 
right towards the Municipal Building, which it should enter 
through the north wing of the Prefecture, The other with him- 
self at the head, he led along Main Street towards the barracks 
of La Mierced. As he passed the Portales de Diligencias, he was 
struck by the fact that he had not been fired on by the troops 
in the Parroquia nor yet by those on the roof of the Town 
Hall; but without stopping to investigate the reasons for this, 
he proceeded at quick step until he arrived at the Cafe 
Zamora where he encountered an armed detachment of citi- 
zens advancing from' the opposite direction under command of 
Major Delgado. This force' did not fire, but the two officers 
met and there ensued a violent altercation which ended by Major 
Delgado firing at Colonel Castro and at the same time ordering 
the troops on the roofs to fire. As Colonel Castro fell wounded 



*I obtained this information from Mr. Enrique Tejedor 
Pedroza who was with General Felix Diaz that morning and was 
captured with him. 



114 FROM DESPOTISM! TO ANARCHY 

lie fired pointblank at Mlajor Delgado, killing him instantly. He 
then attempted to rise, but his horse, also wounded, had him 
pinned down by one leg making it impossible for him to move. 
His faithful comet then ran to his assistance and by raising the 
dying horse enabled the Colonel to extricate himself. This 
deed cost him his life, for his body had served as a shield 
for his Colonel, against the bullets which were poured on 
him from the roofs. Colonel Castro dragged himself to the 
Cafe Zamora, miraculously escaping a certain death. His field 
glasses and his watch had deflected two bullets which had struck 
him in the skirmish. When the men of the 11th Regiment saw 
their Colonel fall, they resolutely charged upon the house from 
which the volleys had been fired and quickly dislodged the enemy. 
This was really the only encounter of the assault in which any 
blood was shed, hence the small number of fatalities. In 
the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza arrived at the Pre- 
fecture and ascended to the roof of the building, in which, as we 
have noted. General Diaz then was. Lieutenant O'caranza met 
General Diaz on the staircase as the latter was descending from 
the roof with several citizens and two aides. ' ' You are my pris- 
oner," exclaimed the federal officer. "How is that?" asked 
Diaz, "Have you not joined me?" They were in the 
midst of this dialogue when General Valdez, who had advanced 
with his forces against the Municipal Hall, entered and com- 
manded Diaz to surrender his arms. 

Diaz handed General Valdez a Mauser which he carried slung 
from his shoulder and a revolver from the holster at his hip. 
Neither of these arms had been discharged even once. His com- 
panions then surrendered as prisoners of General Valdez. 
The city had fallen into the hands of the government 
with no effort at all. Why did Diaz persist in his error up to 
the last moment? The answer is simple. Negotiations were 
steadily carried on to win over to his cause not only the com- 
manding officers but even their staffs. In fact they were car- 
ried on to such a degree that as a column was entering Miguel 
Lerdo Street on the point of beginning an assault, the leader, 
an officer in a battalion of irregular troops, was approached 
with overtures to join the rebels. While the officer hesitated, 
women of the town surrounded him and urged him earnestly to 
jioin the revolt. They tied towels and handkerchiefs around 
the rifles of the soldiers, all the time hurrahing for Felix Diaz. 



THE FIRST MILITAB)Y EIEYQLT 115 

The poor officer, either utterly confused or else convinced that the 
same thing had happened with the other columns as no firing had 
been heard, continued his march accompanied by the shouts of the 
populace, who flocked to the balconies believing as they saw him 
march by, that the whole force had joined Felix Diaz. The latter 
from the roof of the Mlunieipal Hall saw the column advancing 
with what appeared to be white flags and heard his name acclaim- 
ed ; he therefore, naturally supposed that his victory was an accom- 
plished fact and gave orders to cease firing. He then descended to 
receive the federals whom he believed to- have come over to his 
side. The above column had just reached 'the Plaza de Armas, 
when, as before stated. Colonel Jimenez Castro with his forces 
marched past. This explains why he was not greeted with vol- 
leys from the tower of the Parroquia nor yet from the roofs of 
the Municipal Building, and why no one seemed to be aware of 
what was actually happening. However, when Lieutenant Colonel 
Qicaranza, with part of the 11th Regiment, reached the Pre- 
fecture and observing the actions of the irregulars, sharply 
called them to order. These soldiers in reality had no interest 
either way in the struggle, and mierely followed their officers 
like sheep. Therefore, as soon as they saw themselves shut in 
by General Yaldez, they began shouting for Colonel O'caranza 
and returned to their allegiance to the jgiovemmient, which they 
had foresworn but a few moments before. This action, though, 
was due more to the stupidity of their conOmander than to their 
feelings of sympathy for the revolution. Theses circumstances 
led to the belief that Ceneral Bieltran had made use of an 
unsoldiery stratagem to gain possession of the town. It can- 
not be denied that the irregular soldiers did actually ar- 
rive at the City Hall flying white flags, for this deed was wit- 
nessed by many residents of Vlera Cruz, but it can be asserted 
that neither Colonel Jimenez Castro nor Lieutenant Colonel 
Ocaranza authorized such a deed nor did they avail themselves 
of it in the capture of Ceneral Diaz. This can be testified to 
by all the residents of Vera Cruz who saw the federal regulars 
participate in the assault and duly engaging in the fighting which 
took place. Diaz, as may be seen, had some reason for falling 
into the error. The replies to his overtures were not decisively 
negative on the part of the federal leaders, but on the contrary, 
were evasive audi hinted at the possibility of au' understanding 
with him. If G'eneral Beltran had listened to the overtures and 



116 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

had consulted his officers, an agreemjent favorable to the revolt 
might have been made because the sympathy of the officers 
with the exception of Colonels Jimenez Castro and Ocaranza, 
lay with Diaz. As we have said, they were only deterred by their 
inherent habit of discipline and their honor as soldiers. As 
a matter of fact, their real feelings were such that if the call 
had been formally issued by a leader of prestige, or if they could 
have seen that the revolt was headed by a true soldier, that 
very day would have witnessed the fall of the government. Ji- 
menez Castro and Ocaranza would have been powerless to stay 
the revolt. But General Bteltran did not accede to the offers 
nor did he waver or if he did waver, he concealed it well, for he 
made no mention whatever of the affair to his staff. His char- 
acter, quixotic and formalistic, gave his reply to the proposals 
of Diaz an under current which might indicate a possibility of 
concurrence with him although his actual words carried a direct 
refusal. I repeat, though, that in his own mind, there was no 
thought that the friendly tone of his reply could be open to double 
construction or could be interpreted as aceedinigi to the proposals 
submitted ; neither his words nor his deeds show even the faintest 
shadow of treason. 

Immediately upon the surrender of General Diaz, all his 
troops stationed in the Parroquia, in the barracks, and in the 
match factory, began to disperse and their officers went into 
hiding to escape the death prescribed by the military code, which 
they felt sure would be their fate. 

As soon as Brigadier Valdez had captured the city and ar- 
rested the rebel leader, he notified headquarters, but the 
Commander in Chief did not march into the city until five 
o'clock that afternoon. Immediately upon receipt of the news 
in Mexico City, Captain Gustavo Garmendia,* son-in-law of 
General Beltran and Military Aide to the President, was sent in 
a special train with full instructions to convene a drumihead 
courtmartial at once for the execution of the leaders of the revolt. 
On the following day, Oetober 23rd, the necessary orders 
were issued and on the 24th, the special court was convened, com- 
posed of Generals Maas and Vega, and Colonels Zaldo and Fi- 
gueroa., and presided over by General Rafael Davila. The deliber- 
ations of the Court lasted until the 25th at which time sentence of 



*K!illed when assaulting Ctiliacan at the head of a constitu- 
tional force in October 1913. 



THE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT 117 

death was pronounced against Felix Diaz, Colonel Migoni, Major 
Fiernando Zarate, and Lieutenant Salustio Lima. A sentence 
of ten years imprisonment was imposed on Captains Manuel 
Mallen, Hermilo Martinez, and Lieutenant Oscar Camacho. Na- 
val Lieutenant Vicente Solache and Tejedor Pedroza, a civilian, 
were acquitted. 

The friends of Felix Diaz had at once actively sought the 
District Judge to obtain a writ of Habeas Corpus and a sus- 
pension of the proceeding of the Drumhead Courtmartial, which 
had convened in strict infraction of the Military Code; but it 
proved impossible to find the Judge of the District of Vera 
Cruz. As every minute was precious, they appealed to the First 
District Judge of the City of Mexico. This official, acting against 
the law, admitted the appeal and by telegraph requested full in- 
formation from the drumhead courtmartial, but owing to the 
fact that the President of that Court had given strict orders 
that under no circumstances were its proceedings to be interrupt- 
ed, Gieneral Davila did not receive this telegram until sentence 
had been pronounced and the Court adjourned sine die. 

Colonel Diaz Ordaz, one of the chief instigators of the revolt 
and in fact the most seriously implicated of them all, had suc- 
ceeded in escaping. Protected by some Spanish merchants, he 
remained concealed in Vera Cruz for a few days. When the 
police slightly relaxed their vigilance, he left the city disguised 
as a milkman with a young Spaniard who was willing to under- 
take the hazardous task of guiding him to Tiixtepec. Unfor- 
tunately, they stopped for a drink at a wine shop in the out- 
skirts of the city, where they were recognized by a policeman who 
immediately notified his superiors. A police officer and a de- 
tective were sent in pursuit. When Colonel Otdaz arrived at 
Boca del Rio, a town near Vera Cruz, he again stopped to quench 
' his thirst and there he was found by his pursuers and arrested 
together with his companion without offering the least resis- 
tance. He was taken to Vera Cruz M^here he was remanded that 
very day to the custody of the military authorities for trial by 
courtmartial in its regular sessions. 

Only Captain Ordorica really succeeded in escaping. With 
one hundred soldiers, he took refuge in the nearby mountains, 
that is, in the Sierra Negra running from Zongoliea to Misantla 
and separating the central part of Vera Cruz from the coast 
of Barlovento. HIere he continued in rebellion until the subse- 



118 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

quent revolt in the Ciudadela. A few days after his escape, he 
was pursued from Vera Cruz by Lieutenant Ocaranza, now a 
Colonel, commanding the 11th Battalion. Jimenez Castro, former 
commander of this Battalion, had been sent seriously wounded to 
the Military Hospital of Mexico City from which he was trans- 
ferred to the private Sanatorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia. 

An incident worthy of mention occurred during the siege 
of Vera Cruz. The prison was in charge of a detachment of the 
21st Infantry, and although the Superintendent of the prison 
placed no confidence in them, he was in no position to have them 
relieved. He did, however, take all the precautions in his power 
but even so, he was unable to prevent a revolt which was 
started by the reserves stationed daily on the northern break- 
water connecting the city to the islet. These reserves attempted 
to incite the whole prison. Captain Avalos, commanding the 
troops, was the instigator, and was ably seconded by Lieutenant 
Salustio Lima, commanding the reserves as well as the main 
guard on the islet itself. The shouts and the cries of the sol- 
diers brought General Hernandez to the scene. He imposed him- 
self so forcibly upon them that he prevented an abandonment of 
the prison, and kept the disturbance from extending to the pris- 
eners insid'e. He was, however, unable to prevent the escape 
of Lieutenant Lima and the soldiers under his command. They 
were fired upon by Conunander Azueta from the gunboat Mbre- 
los but without success. Lieutenant Lima ran along the break- 
water carrying his wife in his arms and answering the fire from 
the fleet and from the fort. He finally reached the city in safety 
where he received an ovation for the courage and coolness he 
bad displayed. Captain Avalos disappeared nobody knew when 
nor how. 

When sentence was pronoimced on the prisoners of war, 
they were confined in the prison of Ulua where they were 
well treated and visited daily by their families, friends, and par- 
tisans. A launch was specially detailed by the Military Comman- 
der for the use of Mrs. Diaz who was permitted to visit her hus- 
band every day and at any hour. 



CHAPTER XVII. 



IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION. 



From that time the government was confronted by the 
very serious problem of what to do with the prisoners. The 
members of the Cabinet held diverse opinions. Some were in 
favor of deaJth without pity for the culprits, while others were 
of the opinion that they should wait for the reports from the 
Courts before coming to any decision. Even the Madero family 
disagreed within itself. Gustavo Madero favored quick and ener- 
getic action, other members held out for clemency. The Presi- 
dent as usual, wavered, bult decided in favor of reprieve. Don 
Ricardo del Rio, counsel for the defendants from the very be- 
ginning, had as his associates, Don Rodolfo Reyes, Fidencio Her- 
nandez, and Esteban Maqueo Castellanos. Together they began 
to interpose objections so as to delay proceedings. They obtained 
the backing of the Slipreme Court of the Nation which granted 
a stay of execution while the writ of Habeas Corpus was decided. 
The Military Court rendered even more efficient aid by admit- 
ting testimony during the review of the proceedings. 

It can safely be said that from the moment the government 
agreed to abide by the law, the defendants were safe, because the 
time required for preparation of proofs and briefs was long 
enough to aUow the cooling of hot blood and consequently to 
secure a pardon for the culprits. At the same time, the friends 
and partisans of Diaz began to make demonstrations in his favor. 
The most important of these was one made by the women at the 
urgent request of the leading women of Oaxaca, headed by the 
worthy Mlrs. Castellanos de Maqueo. The ladies sought an in- 
terview with the President to ask for the pardon of Felix Diaz. 
During the interview Mladero conducted himself very courteous- 
ly, but made no promises and committed himself in no way 
There was, however, a slight altercation between the President 

(119) 



120 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

and one of the young ladies of the committee, unpleasant in 
itself, but of no subsequent importance. 

There was a further demonstration made by the students 
of the Military Academy when the ladies, on leaving Chapul- 
tepec, crossed the academy grounds. 

The Big Stick Clique, which could not possibly remain in- 
active at such a time, organized a demonstration in favor of 
the immediate execution of the prisoners. The students of the 
IVIilitary Academy met this demonstration with a hostile demon- 
stration for which they were severly reprimianded and command- 
ed not to meddle again in politics. The demonstration of the 
Big Stick Clique could not have been more iajudicious. In fact, 
it bordered on cruelty. The public indignantly protested against 
it, thus gaining for the culprits greater sympathy, although among 
the educated class the predominant feeling was that the govern- 
ment should be inexorable if it wished to maintain discipline in 
the army. But from the moment the abstract thought and feel- 
ings of all were put into concrete form by the deeds of an un- 
popular group, it gave the act the appearance of a political re- 
prisal, killed all sentiments of justice, and gave rise to feelings 
of clemency which were being; trampled upon by the Porra. 

The leniency of the government, or rather, its desire to 
conduct itself in strict accordance with the law, lent wings to 
the conspirators. In fact it can safely be said that from about 
the middle of November there was not a resident of Mexico 
City who was not in the conspiracy, with the exception of office 
holders. 

Secretary Hernandez was still reposefully trustful of Major 
Celso Acosta Who was thus able to be the link between the con- 
spirators and the rebels of Viera Cruz. Colonel Giaudencio Gonza- 
lez de la Llave who early in September had rebelled against the 
government and had organized his forces in conjunction with 
General Higinio Aguilar, was now in possession of part of the 
State of Puebla. He was also in league with the rebels which 
Tello had raised in Zongolica, and across the mountains with 
those of Alvarado and Aguirre Perea had under their com- 
mand at Tiixtepec. When the revolt at Vera Cruz broke out, 
Gonzalez de la Llave sent his son to confer with Diaz on the 
proposition that Diaz should leave the city with all the men he 
could gather, join forces with those now directly and indirectly 
commanded by de la Llave and thus form an important nucleus 



IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTilON 121 

which properly organized, could impose itself on the whole coun- 
try. De la Llave's plan was to occupy the roads to Vera Cruz 
with the forces on which he could at present count, threaten 
Puebla where he had importanti partisans, take this city, and 
then immediately throw all his forces against the Capital which 
had few if any defenses. For this plan it was absolutely neces- 
sary to take advantage of the munitions and arms which had 
been captured by the rebels in Vera Cruz and which, in his 
opinion, would be wholly wasted if Diaz shut himself up in 
Vera Cruz. 

Colonel de la Llave could also count with partisans on the 
coast of Siotavento because these people were indignant at the 
treatment which had been accorded the candidate of that section, 
Don Gf^uillermo Pous, at the popular elections, and were anxious to 
enter a struggle for the overthrow of the government of Madero. 
There is no shadow of a doubt that had Diaz accepted the plan pro- 
posed by de la Llave, a few days would have seen an army of ten 
thousand men, against which the garrisons of Orizaba, Cordoba, 
Tehuacan and Puebla would have been totally powerless to offer 
adequate resistance, and within fifteen days these towns would 
have fallen into the hands of the rebels. B*ut Diaz was obsessed 
by the inexplicable idea that under no circumstances should he 
leave Vera Cruz. He therefore, invariably replied that if he 
had had the intention to abandon Vera Cruz it would hardly 
have been worth his while to capture it. He failed to grasp 
the fact that the fall of Vera Cruz had been rich iq results as 
it had given to the revolution very necessary resources and that 
there was no object in shutting himself up in the town and ex- 
posing it to bombardment or to recapture, as indeed happened, 
for such d capture only nullified all the sacrifices made and the 
advantages acquired. When the coup of Vera Cruz was frus- 
trated through the obtuseness of Diaz, the enemies of the govern- 
ment sought a different flag around which to rally, but there 
was none. General Bernardo Reyes was also a prisoner and 
though his surrender at Linares did not tend to gain him par- 
tisans, there was still a group of his loyal followers who believed 
that in him lay the only salvation of the country. Headed by 
Dr. Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, these men succeeded in 
forming an alliance with other enemies of Madero. 

The partisans of Diaz who was a prisoner in Vera Cruz, 
formed the principal nucleus. It was judged dangerous to 



122 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

make any move while the heads of both parties, Diaz and Reyes, 
were imprisoned in separate prisons, since a move in favor of 
one might prove fatal to the other; they therefore began to set 
wheels in motion to effect the transfer of Diaz to Mexico City. 
In this they were so successful that it appeared as if the govern- 
ment itself and not the partisans of Diaz, was the one who de- 
sired this transfer. Hbwever, as a precaution, he was lodged 
in the Penitentiary rather than with Rieyes in the Military Prison 
of Santiago. The partisans of Diaz submitted themselves to 
the leadership of General Manuel Mondragon who had boasted 
of his friendship for Diaz and who, because he had been Chief 
of the Artillery in the War Department for many years, pos- 
sessed a great many friends among the officers garrisoned in 
Mexico City. 

The Reyistas had obtained aid from' G'eneral Gregorio Ruiz, 
a distinguished cavalry officer, who had been at the head of this 
branch of the "War Department. Hie was, besides, a member 
of Congress under protection of Constitutional guarantees, and 
therefore immune from arrest even if found guilty of conspiracy. 
Communication, or rather the contract between the two leaders, 
was arranged through Mrs. Sara Baeza de Miranda who pretend- 
ing to be a niece of General Reyes had daily access to the prison. 
She in turn commiunicated daily with General Ruiz through the 
latter 's two daughters who were daily callers at church and 
only in pressing cases saw her at her home. 

Besides these two, there were several other conspiracies in 
Mlexico City at that time, the most important of which was that 
headed by Alberto Garcia Granados and Carlos G. de Cosio. 
Both these leaders had an understanding with the rebels in the 
north and with those headed by IMb:*. Vazquez Gomez, in league 
with Zapata and the rebels in the State of Mexico. The Felic- 
istas and the Reyistas were soon able to make an agreement 
with the group under Garcia Granados but they were unable 
to come to terms with Vazquez Gomez. Though in sympathy 
with any movement to overthrow the Madero government, he 
could not consider any one a better substitute than himself; he, 
therefore, deliberately prolonged the conferences in no way com- 
mitting himself. He gave as an excuse for his delay, that it was 
necessary for him to communicate with his brother at San An- 
tonio, Texas, in order that the latter might renounce the right he 
claimed to lead the revolt. 



IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION 123 

The army leaders as a whole were thoroujgihly dissatisfied. 
General Pena, a very brusque and harsh man, entirely devoid 
of military spirit and training, and quite unfit to be a leader, 
had been promoted to General of Division over the heads of 
many generals older in the service. As a consequence, he was 
very unpopular among the soldiers. The President, quite una- 
ware of the real situation, still thoug^ht himself the objicct of a 
popularity which had been sapped on all sides by the greed and 
passions of all those around him. Gustavo Madero was gradually 
falling from the good graces of his brother, the President, and 
he was daily becoming more unpopular mainly because of the 
implacable war waged on him on one side by people supported 
or encouraged by the Secretary of Development, and on the other, 
by the press. 

Gustavo Madero was an intelligent man, but ponderous and 
slow in thought. He needed time to grasp an argument 
or to understand a fact, and sometimes it was even necessary 
tc put details before him in the simplest form possible before 
he could fully grasp the trend of an argument or circumstances, 
but once in his grasp, he looked very deeply into current events 
and into sociological phenomena and was able ahnost infallibly 
to estimate their importance. He was trustful, but not easily 
imposed upon ; wilful and imperious, but with a wonderful con- 
trol over his nerves which rarely failed him; he was affable in 
manner, but at heart perhaps he was somewhat of an egotist, 
possessed with a great ambition which he strove at all costs to 
hide. Hie was, besides, a hardworker, daring and energetic. 
From thie moment of triumph, he was the target for attack, be- 
cause, since he was surrounded on all sides by the impulsive, 
the irreconcilible, and the resolute men, he was thought the 
author, or rather, the instigator, of all deeds of violence pro- 
mulgated by the Mladeristas. As a matter of fact, however, he 
not only took no part in many of these affairs, but he even 
strongly disapproved the measures. Thus at the mercy of an 
anti-government press which afraid to attack the President di- 
rect, vented its spleen on his brother, he little by little gained 
the reputation of a merciless monster, a reputation which he 
was far from deserving. "El Pais" in its columns had fiercely 
attacked him even to the point of personal slander, and a foolish 
friend sought to avenge the offence by a personal assault on Di- 
rector Sanchez Santos. This attempt gave rise to new slanders 



124 FROM DESPOTISM TO^ ANARCHY 

and attacks not against the assailant but against Giwstavo Ma- 
dero, though as a matter of fact he had had no foreknowledge 
of the intended assault. 

In view of the great wave of unpopularity which swept over 
Gustavo Madero, and in view of the public clamor, even his 
family became convinced that he was endangering the govern- 
ment and that it would be best for him to leave the country. 
To this end he was appointed Ambassador to Japan with the fixed 
purpose of keeping him out of the country for several years. 
Gustavo Madero fully resigned and submissive to the wishes of 
his family, began his preparations for the journey which at one 
and the same time killed all his political ambitions and sounded 
the death knell of constitutional government. 

As soon as the intended journey of Gustavo IVlkdero was 
made public, all fear of the government was lost. It was be- 
lieved though the belief was perhaps unfounded, that Gustavo 
Madero was the only man in the government capable of firmly 
suppressing any attempt at revolt. As soon as it was perceived 
that there was a break in which the leader of the Constitutional 
Progressive Party was to be sacrificed, there was no doubt that 
he would cease to bring further hatred on himself for a govern- 
ment which was so badly repaying all his sacrifices. Besides, 
the Big Stick Clique, not bound by any ties, and having no one 
to suppress its excesses, gave full rein to the passions of those 
who composed this depraved group. "La Nueva Era," a news- 
paper founded by Gustavo Miadero to defend the government, 
had frequently changed directors as none came up to the re- 
quirements demanded by Gustavo Madero. This also gave loose 
rein to the intemperate ideas which were the dominating note 
of those who composed the Constitutional Progressive Party. 
Up to that time the members themselves had considered Gustavo 
Madero a weakling because he restrained his friends and ener- 
getically forced them to keep certain limits in their attacks. On 
some occasions, with political acumen, he held his partisans in 
leash, on others, he incited them to make themselves feared by 
their adversaries; but he always succeeded in controlling the 
attacks and in restraining the impetuosity of his friends. When 
this restraint was removed, that paper became an insane in- 
strument which contributed to a marked degree to the unpopu- 
larity of the government. And that even before Gustavo Ma- 
dero had left the country ! 



IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION 125 

Thus disgraced before the public, former animosity now 
became open hatred; there was no crime which was not attri- 
buted to him, no fraud but he had had a hand in it. Because of 
this hatred, his reputation for daring was now interpreted as an 
unscrupulousness in business deals, and his political ambitions 
as an insatiable desire for power and riches. 

It is probable that in his heart he cherished the ambition of 
succeeding his brother; but that ambition which he strove at all 
cost to hide was a very clear one for the public and still more 
reflected the public opinion, which believed that the whole family 
was fully resolved not to abandon the power it had obtained by 
conquest. And since the supposedly dominant thought of the en- 
tire family could be easily crystallized in Gtistavo Madero, the 
more resolute partisans grouped themselves around him. For 
this same reason, public opinion saw in him its greatest peril. 

The hatred for Grustavo Madero was due not to his charac- 
ter nor to his deeds but to his alleged ambitions for the future ; 
it was feared that he was to become the second of a series of 
rulers from his family. 

Although the material progress of the country during the 
regime of Porfirio Diaz was undeniable, a struggle had been un- 
dertaken to oust him because he had enthroned himself in pow- 
er, and it could not therefore be tolerated that such a perpetuity 
should be the patrimony of a family whose first attempt had re- 
sulted in national disaster. There we have the reason for the 
intense hatred which possessed the whole nation against this 
man who in realty had no power and had filled no position 
nor did anything which could cause this hatred. The enemies 
of Gustavo Madero took a new lease of life on learning of the 
decision to send him out of the country. Their attacks were now 
directed towards those wiho it was believed had been appointees 
of the leader of the Constitutional Progressive Party. Pino 
Suarez was viciously attacked, but as he was an impassioned man, 
he retaliated. His chief enemy was Mr. Flores M&,gon, Secre- 
tary of the Interior, with whom he was always at swords points. 
The fact that their controversy was made public through the news- 
papers, caused the removal of Magon as Secretary. The tone of 
Magon's resignation clearly shows the state of mind of those 
who composed the government. 

Flores Magon was succeeded by Don Rafael L. Hernandez, 
Secretary of Development, whose portfolio was taken over by Bo- 



126 FROM DEiSPOTISM TO ANAE^OHY 

nilla, Secretary of Conununication. To this latter position 
Don Jaime Griirza, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was 
appointed. These changes were natural, and it can be said that 
they were the first logical steps taken by Mr. Madero. As 
soon as it had been resolved to eliminate Gustavo Madero and 
his influence in politics, it was natural that the parties who had 
fought him until they dislodged him should now predominate. 
Gustavo Madero began preparations for his journey and 
was in the midst of them when the events which brought about 
the fall of the government, his own death and that of Francisco 
Madero and Pino Suarez took place. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
THE SECOND MILITARY RIEVOLT. 



Practically everybody surmised that the revolution would 
break out within a few days. It was generally known that there 
was a conspiracy, that the soldiers garrisoning the city had 
been undermined, and that the overthrow of the government was 
decreed. The meetings of the conspirators were held almost open- 
ly at their favorite rendezvous, the candy shop "La Opera." 
On Saturday, February 8, the artillery officers who had entered 
most deeply into the plot, had committed the imprudence of bid- 
ding their families farewell, at the same time advising them of 
what was to occur; therefore, it is not at all strange that by noon 
the Secretary of War, General Angel Garcia Pena, was in full 
possession of the exact details of the conspiracy engineered by 
the Ex-Generals, Gregorio Ruiz, and Manuel Mondragon. The 
Assistant Secretary of War, General Manuel M. Plata, was also 
advised of the plot, but after a conference between himself and 
the Secretary, the only precaution deemed necessary by them was 
to lay the facts in their possession before Lauro Yillar, Military 
Conunander of the City. 

Just about the same time, Don Rafael Hernandez, Secre- 
tary of the Interior, was informed of the plot by the Comman- 
der of the Riurales as well as by Don Leopoldo Martinez,* a close 
friend, who told him what was more or less public knowledge, 
that on that very night the garrison of the city would revolt 
with the definite purpose of overthrowing the government and 
imposing as rulers Generals Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz. 
Mr. Hernandez claims that he immediately notified Mr. Madero, 
but the real fact was that Mr. Hernandez rebuked his friend for 
propagating such sensational stories. Indeed he gave not the 
slightest importance to a report so minutely detailed as to ren- 
der it creditible. The truth of the matter is that rumors of plots 



*That was told to me by Mr. Martinez himself. 

(127) 



128 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

had spread so many times that M'adero and his advisers thought 
that this, just like all the rest, would be nothing but a cry of 
"Wolf." They therefore gave it no importance whatsoever 
not realizing that this time, and this time alone, the secret ser- 
vice had furnished tangible and trustworthy proofs. The Presi- 
dent laughed as usual, and his Secretaries went to their homes as 
if they knew nothing at all. Only the Vice President, Jose 
Maria Pino Suarez, was precautious enough not to sleep at 
home, but spent the night at the house of the mother-in-law of 
a very intimate friend, Domingo Barrios Gomez. Gustavo Ma- 
dero received news of the plot while attending a banquet given 
in honor of Engineer Reynoso, recently appointed Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury. It was then about eleven o'clock 
and he withdrew from the banquet very shortly after to ascertain 
personally the truth of the rumors in circulation. He hurried 
away in an automobile to Tacubaya. When he reached the 
artillery barracks the guard came out to arrest him, but the 
men were too slow. There was another machine besides his, 
and in order to surround both, the men forming the guard were 
obliged to separate into two parties. With the time lost they 
succeeded only in capturing a plain clothes man whom Gustavo 
Madero had sent to speak with the officer of the guard. Gus- 
tavo Madero, quicker witted than usual, realized as soon as he 
saw the movements of the guard that they wanted to make him 
prisoner; he therefore speeded up his machine and escaped for 
the time being the terrible death which was to be his fate. The 
detective who had been captured by Lieutenant Vazquez.* was 
led into the guard house where, beset with questions, or rather 
cowed by the threats of death, he confessed his mission and the 
purpose of his journey to Tacubaya as well as the names of his 
companions. 

Immediately upon escaping, Gustavo Madero hurried to 
Mexico City to tell the Secretary of the Interior and the In- 
spector General of Police, Don Emiliano Lopez de Figueroa, 
what was happening. Mr. Figueroa showed his utter incom- 
petence to grapple with such a situation, for he was content 
merely to confer over the telephone with the Military Conmian- 
der and with the Secretary of War at the same time sending 
new agents to investigate facts which ]\Ir. Madero himself had 



*Lieutenant Vazquez told me these details. 



THE SECOND MILITARY REVOLT 129 

already laid before him with perfect clearness. The officer of 
the guard at Tacubaya* when called to the phone by the Sec- 
ond in Command of the City, not only made a reassuring report 
himself, but even forced the captive detective to call up the Inspec- 
tor General of Police and completely reassure him. In the mean- 
time, there were serious complications in the artillery barracks. 
Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon, commander of the 2nd Regiment 
of Artillery, who was seriously involved in the plot because 
his regiment, the Military school at Tlalpam, and the 1st Regiment 
of Cavalry, the life and soul of the revolt, began to waver, 
He refused to fulfill his promise, hoping to gain time or at least 
a postponement. This frame of mind was due to the fact that the 
Military Commander, Lauro Villar, had addressed the officers of 
several military divisions reminding them of their duties and had 
ordered them to place their barracks on a war basis. In order to 
convince him anew it was necessary to send to Dr. Osorio's house 
in Tacubaya for General Manuel Mondragon who had great 
influence over the Commander of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery. 
General Gregorio Ruiz, although warned that an order had 
been issued for the arrest of anyone involved in the plot, went 
in person to bring General Mondragon to talk with Aguillon. 
It was not long before Mondragon was persuaded to leave his 
hiding place, and with the greatest precaution to betake himself to 
the barracks of San Diego. Once there, he installed himself 
in the quarters of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery to await the 
arrival of Aguillon. In obedience to orders issued by the Mili- 
tary Commander of the City, Aguillon was sleeping in the 
barracks. 

In the meantime, it was decided that Lieutenant Francisco 
Hijar should go to the commander of the detachment at Cua- 
jimalpa, which was guarding the powder factory of Santa Fe, 
to order him to join his forces to those of the artillery regiment 
in Tacubaya. 

After Gustavo Madero had told the Inspector General of 
Police what was happening he returned to Tacubaya because 
he wished to ascertain exactly w'hat measures were being taken ; 
but before reaching the barracks of San Diego, another detec- 
tive informed him that an automobile filled with artillery offi- 
cers was proceeding to Cuajimalpa. Instead of continuing on 



* Captain Armino. 



130 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

his way, he started in pursuit of this machine driven by Lieut- 
anant Hijar, hut failed to catch up to it owing to the inexperi- 
ence of his chauffeur. 

"When the conspirators assembled at the barracks of the 
2nd Regiment of Artillery in Tacubaya, the place chosen 
as a rendezvous, it was perceived that many were missing. Among 
the arrivals was Don Martin Gutierrez, son of the late Gen- 
eral Alejandro Gutierrez, at one time the terror of the Das Graces 
Hills, and later com m ander in chief of the auxiliary brigade 
which patrolled the roads to Ajusco. Gutierrez was accom- 
panied by a number of trusty men who were entirely familiar 
with the roads that lead from Santa Fe to the Hills of Ajusco. 
It was there that the plotters were to escape if their attempt 
should fall through, a not unlikely event, because, as the plotters 
well knew, the government had complete details of the conspir- 
acy. As I have stated above. Captain Armino, commanding 
the guard in the barracks of Tacubaya, was asked over the 
telephone by General Villareal, 2nd in Command of the city, 
what he intended to do with the automobiles which the Inspec- 
tor General of Police had advised were even then standing in 
front of the barracks. The officer replied that these machines, 
filled with fast men and stylish women, were no longer there, 
for he himself had ordered them to withdraw from the barracks. 
To make the deceit more complete, the captive detective was 
forced to call up the Inspector General of Police and give him 
the same account that Captain Armino had given the 2nd in 
command of the city. Major Trias, 2nd in command of the 
artillery at San Lazaro, arrived half an hour later. He ex- 
plained that when Messrs. Duhart and Ramon Diaz had appear- 
ed at the barracks with orders for him to join the movement, 
with his men, they had encountered his chief, Lieutenant Colonel 
Gamboa, who becoming suspicious, had demanded from him an 
explanation of his conduct. Trias saved himself by denying 
that he knew the said gentlemen. Besides he not only volun- 
teered to arrest the suspects, but even offered to conduct them 
himself to Military Headquarters. While on their way to Head- 
quarters, Dulhart and Diaz agreed to remain there as prisoners 
in order to prevent a discovery of the plot ; but on their arrival, 
they were informed that General Villar was ill at his home and 
had given orders that he should not be disturbed. On leaving 
Headquarters, Trias, Duhart and Diaz, instead of returning to 



THE SECOND MILIT'AKY REVOLT 131 

the San Lazaro Barracks proceeded to Taeubaya. Ttias re- 
mained at San Diego while his companions were sent to watch 
the house of General Gregorio Ruiz to prevent any surprise. In 
the meantime, General Mondragon and Colonel Anaya, Comman- 
der of the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, were arranging the final 
details. Shortly afterwards. Colonel Anaya proceeded to his 
barracks. As soon as he arrived there, he gave orders to sound 
boots and saddles, to have everything in readiness to leave as 
soon as they were joined by the force due from Santa Fe. Just 
after Colonel Anaya had left, a message was received from the 
sentry of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, advising that three police 
automobiles had just passed him on their way up. General Mon- 
dragon issued orders that they be detained on their return. For 
this purpose, officers and men were ambushed among the trees 
along the street. A few moments later, the first was seen re- 
turning. As it passed near the ambushed mien. Lieutenant 
Colonel Aguillon shouted: "Get at them!" His officers, with 
revolvers cocked, forced the occupants to step down from the 
machines. One of these men was the Commander of the 2nd 
Regiment of Mounted Police. After the passengers had been 
disarmed by Lieutenants Pena, Vazquez, and Castillo, and others, 
they were imprisoned in the barracks of the 2nd Regiment of 
Artillery. The police surrendered without offering any resis- 
tance. About twenty were made prisoners and their arms were 
distributed among the followers of Don Martin Gutierrez who 
were unarmed. About 3 A. M. on the morning of Sunday, Feb- 
ruary 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon ordered the revolt of 
his regiment as well as of the 5th Artillery which occupied the 
same barracks. Although the assistance of the respective heads 
of these regiments was not relied upon, all the other officers, 
partisans of the rebellion, had given their promise. Lieutenant 
Colonel Catarino Cruz, commander of the 5th Artillery had 
flatly refused to second the movement as had also Major Bal- 
domero Hinojosa in spite of the offers and persuasions of Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Aguillon and General Mondragon. They did how- 
ever agree to retire early to their respective quarters and to 
lend a deaf ear to anything which might occur in the barracks. 
Colonel Aguillon personally went through the officers quarters 
of both regiments, awakening the officers and inviting them to join 
him ; all accepted with pleasure. Shortly afterwards, he ordered 
out a battery of service guns which he had previously put aside 



132 FROM DESPOiTISM TO ANARCHY 

for the purpose; distributed anununitioii among the soldiers of 
the 2nd and 5th regiments, assembled them in the main yard of 
the barracks and in the presence of General Mondragon and all 
the officers and civilians, he harangued them, explaining the 
object of the uprising and the great benefits, which, according 
to him, would accrue to the country by tihe fall of the government 
of Madero, which was sowing ruin and desolation. The haran- 
gue of Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon aroused the soldiers who 
broke into cheers for the national army and their respective re- 
giments. These ignorant men were going into danger charmed 
by the voice of their chief probably unaware of the transcendeni 
importance of their act and the sacrifices they were about to 
consummate. 



OHIAPT'EK, XIX. 

THE DIE IS CAST.* 



To one of the conspirators, Captain Romero Lopez, was left 
the task of inciting to revolt his own Machine Gun Regiment. 
He was to be in readiness to unite it as soon as he received due 
notice, with the column proceeding from Tacubaya under Gen- 
erals Ruiz and Mondragon, and together they were to liberate 
General Reyes from the Military Prison, and Felix Diaz from the 
Penitentiary. On the eve of the outbreak, however, Captain 
Lopez was in such a nervous state that he could not wait for 
the signal, but assembled his regiment in conjunction with his 
officers at four o'clock in the morning and proceeded to the Li- 
berty Street Barracks where he found that the other officers had 
already assembled their men. The commandants of these regi- 
ments had, without exception, refused to enter into the plot but 
had agreed to retire to their quarters and turn a deaf ear to 
the acts of their subalterns. As soon as these two forces had 
united, they started for the prison of Santiago where General 
Reyes was confined, taking with them two cannon and fourteen 
machine guns from the Barracks of San Cosme; at the prison 
they were joined by Major Zozaya who was leading the horse of 
General Reyes. 

It had been impossible to count on the support of the Com- 
mander of the Military Prison, Colonel Miguel Mayol, whose 
attitude had been such as to force the plotters to desist from 
further attempts to obtain his co-operation. The under officials 
of the prison did, however, lend themselves to the plot ; these, to- 
gether with the Captain of the Guard, were awaiting anxiously the 
arrival of the conspirators to give the coup d' etat. The first 
step taken on arriving was to train a cannon on the main gate 



*I obtained the facts related in this chapter from several 
sources, but chiefly from Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Mr. 
Mallen and other officers. 

(133) 



134 FKiOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

and another on the quarters of Colonel Miayol. Captain Romero 
Lopez then entered the prison and reappeared shortly accom- 
panied by General Reyes, already in uniform and enveloped in 
his military cape. With him were several officers, who had also 
been prisoners and about two hundred soldiers, besides a large 
part of the prison guard who from that moment joined 
the rebels. The forces from Tacubaya entered the square 
just as General Reyes was leaving the prison.* Before leaving, 
General Mondragon suggested the advisibility of executing Col- 
onel Mayol who had already been made prisoner in his quarters 
by the prison guard itself, but General Reyes opposed such an 
act, in consequence, the commander was merely detained under 
guard while the plot was carried to its conclusion. 

The force was further augmented at this point by the timely 
arrival of a detachment of citizens, some on foot, some on horse- 
back, and others in automobiles, and organized by Don Samuel 
Espinosa de los Monteros, by Rodolfo Reyes, Ramon Cosio Gonza- 
lez, and several others. The whole force with General R^eyes 
commanding, now set out for the Penitentiary to liberate Gen- 
eral Diaz and not till day was breaking did they reach their 
destination. The precaution was again taken of training the 
guns on the gates, and a delegation was sent to release Diaz. The 
head of the prison Octaviano Liceaga, had in no way compro- 
mised himself in the plot, but not so his sons, who had promised 
to set the prisoner free as soon as the conspirators should reach 
the Penitentiary. 

Wlien the rebels appeared, one of the sons of Liceaga told 
Diaz that his friends awaited him outside and that he could 
now leave his cell. Although aware of the movement on foot, 
the General had not been told the exact date for his execution, 
and fearing at that moment a scheme to kill him under the pre- 
tense of an attempt to escape, he became suspicious and refused 
to budge unless advised by a mature man rather than a mere 
boy. The head of the prison saw in this hesitation a means of 
saving himself from all responsibility in case the plot should fail 
and immediately began to place difficulties in the way of the re- 
lease of the prisoner. Hb was unceremoniously pushed aside by 
Generals Reyes and Mondragon who then entered the prison. The 
presence of these two leaders at once convinced both the head of 
the prison and General Diaz who then abandoned his cell and 



*Some hours later the prison caught fire. 



THE DIE IS CAST 135 

in civilian dress joined the column. As he came out, a young 
lady delegated by her friends presented him with a bunch of 
violets which he placed in his hat. The march was then begun 
towards the National Palace. Early that morning, the Battalion 
from the National Training School, together with all the other 
students, had left Tlalpam under the officers of instruction, Es- 
coto, Garcia Armino, and Zurita, and had joined the column at 
Santiago. The infantry of the school made the trip on a train 
bound for Xochimilco but Which the cadets had seized and com- 
pelled to take themi to Mexico City, arriving before the National 
Palace at about 4 a. m. as I shall detail in another chapter. With 
them were the boys from the Cavalry School. In a wagon seized 
for the purpose near Tlalpam, two machine guns used in the 
school for demonstration purposes, had been brought to the city. 
After the two heads of the revolt had been liberated, and 
as the column was about to set out from the penitentiary, several 
of these Training School boys suddenly appeared on the scene to 
give warning of what had been done at the Palace by General 
Villar. On receipt of this news, the 1st Riegiment of Cavalry, 
Colonel Anaya commanding, was sent ahead at the double quick 
with General Giregorio Ruiz, to prevent if possible the National 
Palace from remaining in the hands of the government forces. 
While General Ruiz and Colonel Anaya with the 1st Cavalry, 
hastened towards the' Palace, General Reyes duly organized the 
remaining troops into column formation and sounded the march. 
As they reached the Calle de la Moneda,* they were joined by 
other students who had fled from the^ Palace when General Vil- 
lar had taken possession and these confusedly related the oc- 
currence. General Mondragon was of the opinion that the ad- 
vance should be halted and a new plan of attack devised, but 
General Reyes, who was highly excited, would not listen to reason, 
but judged that with the troops at his command, no serious re- 
sistence would be offered him. His son, RIodolfo Reyes, attempt- 
ed to dissuade him but he replied, " If I back down at this time, 
everybody will call me a coward as happened at Linares. The 
die is cast." So saying, he spurred his horse, threw aside his 
cape and resumed the advance, turning the comer of the Calle 
de la Moneda and making straight for the Palace. When hie ar- 
rived at the corner, the comet stationed there by General Villar 
began to sound the salute. General Reyes, firmly believing that 



*At the north side of the National Palace. 



136 FROM DE SPOTISM TO A.N ARCHY 

the salute denoted his complete success advanced without sus- 
picion, accompanied by Don Martin Grutierrez, Dr. Espinosa de 
Ids Mionteros, Don Emilio Perez de Leon, who was on foot and 
carried a rifle. Captain Cervantes, and Don Enrique Fernandez 
Castello. 

Generals MJondragon and Felix Diaz remained in ' ' Licenciado 
Verdad" Street in command of the reserves. 

Greneral Velazquez who had also joined the revolt, was in- 
jured by being thrown from his horse which shied at the first 
discharge. He was assisted into one of the automobiles at hand 
by Lieutenant Colonel Ottiz Monasterio, and then, accompanied 
by Rodolfo Reyes, and Cosio Gonzalez, left the scene shortly 
after the firing had become general. 

When the civilians who had received strict orders from 
General Reyes to remain at the comer of Moneda Street until he 
had taken possession of the Palace, saw him passing between the 
double files, they began to advance little by little but dispersed 
at the first volley. The advance guard of the column commanded 
by General Reyes, composed of cavalry of the Training School, 
reached the southern corner of the Palace without meeting oppos- 
ition ; to the rear of General Reyes came a detachment of artil- 
lery with four pieces commanded by Captain Jose Tapia, and 
to the rear of this came regiments of artillery on foot, but these 
did not reach the firing zone as they were obstructed by civilians. 
The latter had thrown the whole column into disorder by enter- 
ing the double file* and finding themselves unthinkingly brought 
up against the forces of the 20th Infantry which was drawn up 
at the north of the Central Gate. The ex-prisoners who had been 
set free from the Military Prison and the prison guard who had 
abandoned their post, brought up the rear together with the 
artillerymen of the M,achine Gun Regiment. 



*At the west side, the 1st Regiment of Cavalry and the loyal 
troops at the east. 



CHjAPTER XX. 
THE 9TH 0¥ FEBRUAEY.* 

The Military Commander of the City, General Lauro Vil- 
lar, had received a warning a few days previous to February 
9th, concerning an attempt to incite the rebellion against the gov- 
ernment by several officers, especially those of the Artillery Regi- 
ments and he had transmitted this news to the Secretary of War. 
At the same time, he had called together the Commandants of 
the several regiments and had cautioned them to keep a strict 
watch over their staffs, especially those officers: who were sus- 
pected of complicity. On the afternoon of Saturday, February 
8th, the Secretary of War, who as I have said previously, had 
received notice from General Villar of the proposed plan, sent 
for the Military Commander and told him that the War De- 
partment had just received the very warning which he had com- 
municated to them eight days before, and advised him to take 
all precautions necessary to prevent possible surprise. 

The Military Commander called the Secretary's attention 
to the fact that he had warned him of the danger some days pre- 
vious and had reported at the time that there were insufficient 
forces in the city to control a military outbreak if any should 
occur. There were only two bodies in the garrison, the 20th Bat- 
tation, which he did not trust but which enjoyed the full confi- 
dence of the President, and the 1st Cavalry, Colonel Anaya com- 
manding, which was fully trusted by Secretary Garcia Pena. 
Besides, there were a few detachments from various regiments, 
composed entirely of recruits tactically useless should a crisis 
arise. 

On his return to Headquarters, General Villar called Ms 
regimental leaders, cautioned them to keep strict watch and 
ordered that all troops be called to quarters and held in readi- 
ness against any alarm. He further instructed the officers 
to remain in their respective barracks until further orders. 



*The facts related in this chapter were obtained from the 
official and from private sources. 

(137) 



138 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAHCHY 

General Villar was suffering from an injury to his leg which 
prevented him from walking and therefore he did not sleep 
that night at Military BDeadquarters, but ordered his second in 
■command, General Villareal, to remain there all nigLl and to 
advise him by telephone of any new developments. 

At 2 A. M. the Inspector General of Police telephoned Gen- 
eral Villar to inform him that word had been received to the ef- 
fect that two suspicious looking automobiles were near the 
Barracks of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery in Tacubaya. Gen- 
eral Yillar thereupon telephoned orders to his second in com- 
mand to find out what was going on at Tacubaya and to report 
by telephone the results of his investigations. General Villa- 
real spoke with the Captain of the Guard who informed him that, 
in fact, several automobiles had gone past the barracks, but that 
there was nothing new and that things were quiet. 

At 4 A. M., the Inspector General of Police again tele- 
phoned, this time to notify the Commander that the 2nd and 
5th Batteries and the 1st Cavalry had left their barracks under 
the leadership of ex-Generals Gregorio Ruiz and Manuel Mon- 
dragon. General Villar immediately dressed and literally drag- 
ging himself, as his left leg was completely paralyzed, sallied 
out for the Palace. At a short distance from his home he found 
a carriage and ordered the driver to make all speed for the 
National Palace, but upon reaching the corner of Flamencos 
Street, a party of cadets from the Training School, who were 
convoying two machine guns on a wagon, held up the driver, and 
taking no notice of his fare commanded him to keep going and 
not to stop in front of the Palace ' ' because one of his horses might 
be killed. ' ' General Villar managed to remain unseen and clear- 
ly perceiving the condition of affairs, ordered his driver to make 
for the Portal de las Flores. As soon as the Cadets of the 
Training School were out of hearing, he countermanded these 
directions with new ones to proceed through the gardens of the 
Zocalo, and passing in front of the Palace, he perceived that the 
main entrance was open as was also the Entrance of Honor, 
and that the guard had been called out. He recognized the 
uniform as that of the students of the Training School and know- 
ing of the movement on foot, at once understood that the Palace 
was already in the hands of the rebels. General Villar there- 
upon ordered his coachman to convey him to the Barracks of 
St. Peter and St. Paul, where the 20th Regiment was quartered. 



THE 9TH O'F FEBRUARY 139 

Upon arriving near the comer of the barracks, he left the car- 
riage, moving very slowly, and dragging himself along, assisted 
by a passing Indian whose aid he had requested, he approached 
the barracks and announced himself at the door. He ordered 
the assembly of the troops, that is, of the recruits who were the 
only men in barracks because the regiment was doing duty in 
the city. When they assembled he directed Colonel Morelos, 
commander of this battalion, to proceed with his force to the 
Palace, to enter through the barracks of the Engineers and at 
all costs to dislodge the rebels who had taken possession of the 
residence of the Federal authorities. 

Assisted by two soldiers, he then made his way to the bar- 
racks of Teresitas, where the main body of the 24th was quar- 
tered, and he at once ordered it out. Here he found his second 
in com m and. General Villareal, who upon hearing what had oc- 
curred, had immediately left the Palace in search of the Mili- 
tary Commander, and not finding him at his home, was seeking 
him in the various barracks. General Villar ordered General 
Villareal to proceed at the double quick to take command at the 
Ciudadela in order to prevent any surprise by the rebels. He 
hiniself at the head of the rookies of the 24th,* set out for the 
barracks of the Emgineers. The brave soldier forgot his physi- 
cal pain, and did not stop to consider the meagreness of the 
force at his command nor the strength of the enemy he was attack- 
ing. His only thought was to do his duty and to retake the 
Palace before the city was awake. In those moments. General 
Villar embodied the spirit of the Mexican army, serene, tranquil, 
immutable, even to the point of heroism, and without fear or 
hesitation. In the barracks of the Engineers, he found a .^e- 
tachment of fifteen men who had arrived at the capital that 
very Saturday, and he ordered them to arm; themselves and 
follow him. He forced his way into the Palace, battering down 
the door which led from the barracks. H'ere he divided his force 
into three detachments; thirty men of the 24th under their 
Major, were sent to the main entrance ; twenty-two men also 
of the 24th, under a Captain, were sent to gain possession of the 
Entrance of Honor; the fifteen cavalrymen under the Aide-de- 
camp of the M!ilitary commander, Captain Malagamba, who had 
joined him on the way, brought up the rear as a reserve for 



*General Villar had commanded the 24th for many years 
and was revered by officers and men. 



140 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

both advances. Gleneral Villar himself led the three detachments. 
In order to avoid the alarm which would be given by rifle shots, 
all three forces, with fixed bayonets, fell simultaneously upon 
■the two guards of the Palace, at the cry of the Military Comman- 
der ' ' Surrender and silence ! ' ' The guard at the Entrance of 
Honor, the first to be attacked, as it was the nearest, surrendered 
at once, as did also the one stationed at the Main Entrance. 
This was accomplished without a single shot and with no casual- 
ties of any kind. Officers and men were disarmed, conducted 
to the stables of the Palace, and with the students of the training 
School, were held prisoners there under the imm^ediate super- 
vision of General Felipe Mier who had opportunely arrived at 
Military Headquarters to offer his services. The fifteen cav- 
alrymen were placed as a guard over the prisoners, and the re- 
maining fifty-two were so distributed as to prevent any possible 
surprise. At that moment Colonel Morelos made his appearance 
with the rookies of the 20th. As ordered by General Villar, 
Colonel Morelos had arrived at the Barracks of the Engineers, 
but aware of the number of the enemy in the Palace, he judged 
the enterprise foolhardy. He therefore decided to enter the 
National Palace from the roof of the adjoining building, the 
War Department Building; he met with no resistance on the 
roof of the Palace, entered the building with his force and joined 
General Villar. The latter immediately took the necessary pre 
cautions to resist the attack which undoubtedly would be made 
by the forces even then marching upon the Palace under Gen- 
erals Reyes, Mondragon, and Felix Diaz. After he had taken 
the Palace, General Villar ran across Gustavo Madero who had 
been imprisoned in the guard house at the main entrance, and 
General Angel Garcia Peiia, Secretary of War, who said he also 
had been made prisoner by the rebels and had even been wounded 
in the neck at the time of his capture. Gustavo Madero upon 
returning from Tacubaya, had gone to the Palace, not aware that 
it was then in the hands of the rebels. When he approached, 
no one opposed him, but as soon as he passed the sentries, he 
A\ as surprised and made prisoner by the Training S'chool Cadets, 
and on account of the suddenness of the attack, he was unable 
to offer any resistance. The Secretary of War had gone to 
the Palace when the Inspector General of Police had telephoned 
the news to him as well as to the Military Commander. On his 
arrival he met with no opposition but as he was ascending the 



THE 9TH O'F FEOBRUAHY 141 

stairs on his way to the office of the Military Commander, he 
met a group of cadets who were searching for General Yillar. 
He was immediately recognized and fired upon by one of the 
boys, but the bullet missed its mark and shattered a window. A 
piece of flying glass struck the Secretary, cutting his neck and 
spattering blood all over the front of his shirt. General Peiia 
retreated quickly and favored by the darkness of the corriders 
of the Palace, (all lights had been put out) he was able to reach the 
offices of the War Department where he remained with the Assis- 
tant Secretary, General ]\I;anuel ML Plata while the events I have 
related were occurring. "When Colonel Morelos entered through 
the roof of the War Depar'tment wing, the two secretaries became 
aware of what had occurred, whereupon General Peiia comman- 
deered an automobile and went with all speed to Chapultepec to re- 
port to the President. The Assistant Secretary went to his offices, 
and Gustavo Madero departed in his automobile. 

General Villar, as soon as he gained complete possession of 
the National Palace, divided his small force of only one hundred 
and fifty men into several detachments. General Felipe Mier 
with thirty men was placed as a guard over the prisoners who 
had been disarmed and the Training S'chool men who had remain- 
ed in the Palace after its capture by the rebels; in all, there 
were nearly three hundred prisoners. To this detachment was 
given the further duty of guarding the entrance to the Palace 
from the Barracks of Engineers. The detachment from the 20th 
Infantry, commanded by Colonel Morelos, was stationed at two 
meters distance from the sidewalks of the Palace and to the north 
of the center entrance in double file, the first stretched prone 
on the ground, and the rear rank crouched on one knee. The 
fifty-two recruits of the 24th Infantry, commanded by the major 
of that regiment, took up their station to the south of the cen- 
ter entrance but on the sidewalk in thie same formation, the first 
rank prone, the rear kneeling. The Military Commander with 
his aide. Captain Mlalagamba, placed himself in the center, be- 
tween the two detachments, with two machine guns. He ordered 
that not a shot be fired until he himself gave the word. As 
there were no ai^tillerymen to handle the machine guns, the 
soldiers who seemed the most capable, were put in charge of them. 
By this formation, General Villar with the fifty-two men in 
whom he had entire confidence purposed to defend the position he 
had so gallantly won, and at the same time to keep an eye on and 



142 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

control the detachmeint of the 20th Infantry. Hie feared that the 
latter would attempt to take sides with their rebel comrades 
especially if the fortunes of the fray should seem to be against 
the loyal troops. Shortly after the troops were in position, the 
advance of the rebels, two squadrons of the 1st Cavalry under 
the command of General Gregorio Ruiz and Colonel Anaya, ap- 
peared. The force advanced in columns, rifle in hand, as though 
executing a manoeuver. As they reached the Palace, General Ruiz 
halted at twenty paces distance from the loyal troops and gave 
the order to form into line of battle. The opposing forces were 
now face to face, but nothwithstanding the fact that the advance 
guard outnumbered his hiandful by more than two to one, the 
Military Commander did not for one moment falter. In an 
imperious tone he commanded the advance to halt. When Gen- 
eral Ruiz saw the stoicism with which General Villar was await- 
ing developments, he thought that he mlight be able to win him 
and the small force at his command to the rebel cause. With 
this object he advanced as far as the center entrance to confer 
with him. General Villar advanced a few paces to meet him but 
did not step beyond his own lines. In the colloquy that ensued, 
General Ruiz reminded his comrade of the friendship he had al- 
ways had for him, showed him the absolute futility of the steps 
he was taking on account of the great strength of the column 
marching against the Palace, and pointed out to him the damage 
which the government of Mladero had done to the country. He 
then proposed that he surrender this position and join the rebels, 
and made him enticing offers in the name of the leaders of the 
rebellion. General Villar listened attentively and slowly en- 
ticed his opponent until they were directly between the detach- 
ments of the 20th and 24th stationed in front of the Palace. 
When the General finished speaking, Villar with his left hand 
grasped the rein of the General's horse and his only reply was 
"You are my prisoner. A soldier since the French interven- 
tion, I have never yet been a traitor. I have always served faith- 
fully and I will not stain my service record for any price nor 
for any man. It is not for me to count the enemy, my only duty 
is to defend the post entrusted to my honor, and this I will defend 
to the death. It is not for us as soldiers to criticize the acts of the 
government ; our duty is to defend the constituted powers. Dis- 
mount immediately and do not force me to fire upon you. " Still 
holding the reins, he ordered that the two machine guns be train- 



THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY 143 

ed on the rebel general. G'eneral Ruiz made an attempt to draw 
the revolver he carried in his saddle holster, but Gleneral Vil- 
lar in a threatening tone said "'H]ands up and dismiount. As 
your superior, I command you to get down." Gleneral Ruiz obey- 
ed, and surrendered. General Villar was here informed that the 
main body of the troops of the rebels were now in sight. At 
that m'Oment General Cauz, head of the Cavalry Division of the 
War Department, arrived at the Palace, and General Villar 
who had no one else to whom to deliver the prisoner, handed him 
over to General Cauz, saying "I hold you responsible for this 
man, General; I entrust him to your honor as a soldier." Hie 
then returned immediately to the front. General Reyes who was 
now advancing had as his vanguard a squadron of Training 
School cadets. Except for two civilians, and a few horsemen 
immediately behind him, he was, however, practically alone wihen 
he entered between the double file formed by Villar 's men and the 
1st Cavalry Regiment. As he advanced, he was joined by man 
after man and by the time he passed the door of the center entrance 
to the palace, he was surrounded by a number of armed men some 
on foot, some mounted. Hb was followed by the 20th Infantry, the 
1st Cavalry, the 2nd and 5th Batteries, by a part of the regiment of 
police and by a squadron of mounted police. It was estimated 
that Reyes, Miondragon and Diaz at that time commanded near- 
ly three thousand men ; four hundred and fifty of the 1st Cav- 
alry; two hundred Training School cadets; one hundred and 
eighty men of the 20th Infantry; and four hundred and fifty 
men of the Batteries ; eleven hundred made up the machine gun 
battalion, the battalion of police, and the civilians raised by 
Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Mr. Martin Gutierrez, Mr. Fiden- 
cio Diaz Lopez, Mr. Jose Bonales Sandoval, and a Mr. Riamirez, 
and several others. To oppose this force, well supplied with am- 
munition, for it had four batteries of guns belonging to the 1st, 
2nd and 5th Batteries, and all the machine guns belonging to 
the regiment of that name, the Military Commander could count 
only on one hundred and twenty men, two machine guns, and 
sufficient ammunition for ten minutes fighting. General Vil- 
lar measured the overwhelming magnitude of the undertaking 
but did not hesitate. Turning tO' the officers near him he said 
"B'oys, if we are fated to die, let us die defending the honor of 
our Army." Shortly before the arrival of the main column at 
the Palace, a body of Training School cadets who, as scouts, 



144 FEjOM despotism TO ANAEjOHT 

had advanced between tlie force of General Ruiz and the main 
body, notified Reyes of the position of the troops in front of the 
Palace and of what had happened to General Ruiz. This occur- 
rence was witnessed by all the troops commanded by this hap- 
less man and by Colonel Anaya. General Reyes gave the mat- 
ter no importance whatever and to the comment of General 
Mondragon that he thought the enterprise dangerous owing to 
the attitude of the Military Commander, Reyes replied ' ' General 
Villar can not with his limited force resist the column- we our- 
selves command, and besides there is no doubt that when he sees 
us he will join us. If he does not, we will wipe him out." Not- 
withstanding the assurances of General Reyes, neither Mjondrag- 
on nor Diaz held this view and the column was therefore split. 
These two leaders remained in Licenciado Primo Verdad Street 
with the police and a few civilians to await there the result of 
the venture of General Rieyes. The latter proceeded with his 
forces down Moneda Street, turned to the left and immediately 
faced the Palace. Without halting, he advanced between the 
double file twenty-five paces apart, formed by the loyal troops 
on one side and on the other by the 1st Cavalry, lined up by 
General Ruiz. Upom arriving opposite the door that General 
Villar was guarding, the latter ordered them to halt, but Gen- 
eral Reyes continued to advance for about fifteen paces to the 
south of this door. Hiere death overtook him while he was ad- 
dressing the multitude that was following him and cheering him. 
Owing to the very limited quantity of ammunition. General Vil- 
lar had given strict connnand that no one fire until he himself 
gave the word. His intention evidently was to allow the leaders 
of the revolt to enter and then if possible to arrest them as he 
had arrested General Ruiz. As a last resort, he planned to kill 
the leaders, rightly judging that their death would put an end 
to the revolt and suffocate it with the minimiun bloodshed. 
When General Reyes passed through the Center Entrance and 
did not halt although commanded by General Villar to surrender, 
the men who followed him, seeing that no resistance was offered, 
fell upon the soldiers of the 20th stationed as I mentioned above, 
to the north of the Palace. As the latter were mere recruits 
under Colonel Morelos, they were easily driven back towards the 
Palace. Here General Villar, pistol in hand, checked their re- 
treat, and though the command was not actually given, the loyal 
troops opened fire in sheer self-defense against the assault. The 



THE gTH OF FEBRUARiY 145 

firing immediately became general. The men of the 24th were 
forced to fall back to the entrance of the Palace where the Mili- 
tary Commander was personally directing the handling of the 
two machine guns at his command. At the first volley, General 
Reyes had fallen shot through the brain and in the legs. The 
loyal troops reformed at the command of their superior officer 
and presented such a stubborn resistance that the rebels were 
forced to retreat shielding themselves behind the columns of 
the Gates of Las Flores and La Diputacion, and finally were 
completely dispersed. 

General Villar ordered his troops into the Palace and put 
General Jose Delgado who had just arrived, in charge of the 
two machine guns to guard the Center Entrance. With the 
remaining soldiers who had replenished their ammunition by 
appropriating that taken from the imprisoned guard and cadets, 
he at once proceded to the roof of the Palace from where he 
could better defend his position. He believed that the defeated 
column would advance against the Palace at once as it was 
known that his supply of ammunition was practically exhausted. 
But by the time General Villar reached the roof, the rebels had 
vanished. He organized sentries to patrol this height and he 
himself descended to take account of the fatalities resulting 
from the fray. 

The loyal troops had suffered heavily ; twelve of the recruits 
of the 20th had been killed and sixteen wounded ; Colonel Mbre- 
los, Lieutenant Anaya, and three other officers had been killed, 
and all the surviving officers of the battalion were wounded; 
five men of the 24th had been wounded and the Military Com- 
mander himself was suffering from a shattered collar bone. 
His aide, Captain Malagamba, had received four wounds. The 
rebels, on the other hand, had lost General Reyes ; and nearly 
two hundred men, dead or wounded, lay on the sidewalks. Many 
of these were dressed as civilians and it was therefore impossible 
to determine whether they were innocent bystanders or mem- 
bers of the rebel host. The surgeons who had arrived on the 
scene, attempted to remove General Villar in order to dress his 
wound properly for he was completely spattered with blood, 
but the punctilious leader would not, and in fact did not, abandon 
his post until he was relieved of his charge by order of the 
President himself. 

When President Madero arrived at the National Palace 



146 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO AN^^CHY 

two and one half hours after the battle, GHeneral Villar \vas still 
standing guard over the main entrance, ready to repel further 
attacks by the rebels. Here he received the President who 
greeted him with the words "Whiat a great man you are, Gen- 
eral." "I have only done my duty," replied Villar. "But 
you are wounded, ' ' exclaimed Madero. " I . have retaken this 
place, which is more important," rejoined the Military Com- 
mander. "Turn over your command to Oeneral Delgado and 
come mth me," said the President dismounting from his horse. 
He took General Villar by the arm, led him to the elevator and 
thence to the reception rooms of the Palace where he submitted 
to treatment for the first time. 

While he was being prepared for treatment, the Secretary 
of War said to ihim "Lauro, by order of the President, I have 
appointed Victoriano Military Conmiander of the City while 
you are convalescing, ' ' and he pointed to General Htuerta. Gen- 
eral Villar made an effort to sit up, and turning to General 
Huerta, said, "Swear on your honor that you will defend the 
constituted government to the last cartridge." As General 
Hnerta hesitated and did not give an immediate answer. Gen- 
eral Villar twice again exhorted him to swear and he finally 
answered, "Yes, brother, calm yourself, I do so swear." Gen- 
eral Villar, almost weeping in his excitement, feebly murmured, 
"to the last cartridge, to the last cartridge," and fell back in a 
dead faint. 

The surgeons who examined him declared that the wound 
was dangerous and ordered him to go home immediately as he 
was unfit for further duty. Mjr. Miadero then formally ordered 
General Victoriano Hhierta who had arrived at the Palace with 
him, to take over the post of Military Commander of the City. 
After being relieved of his command. General Villar requested 
to be taken to the Military Hospital. "You will be better off 
in your home," said Miadero. "Yes," replied General Villar, 
"but I must go where my men go, I was wounded with them 
and with them I should be cared for." He was taken in an 
automobile to the Military Hospital. His condition on his arri- 
val greatly worried his physicians because he was in a state of 
complete collapse. The stress he had been under had made 
him forget for the moment the pain in his leg, and the loss of 
blood he had suffered put him in grave peril of death. 



CHAPTER XXI. 
THE LAST OVATION. 



After General Villar regained the National Palace, General 
Garcia Pena, as I have said before, took an automobile and has- 
tened to the Castle of Chapultepec to report to the President. 
Mr. Madero decided to go to the city at once, escorted by the 
Cadets of the Military Academy and other forces which had 
been ordered by telephone to proceed immediately to Chapulte- 
pec. The Cadets of the Military Academy had not as yet break- 
fasted and as it was Sunday, they were making arrangements 
to leave when they received orders to supply themselves with 
arms and ammunition and assemble by companies on the parade 
ground of the Academy. As soon as they had assembled, the 
President informed them that there had been a mutiny in Mex- 
\eo City, whicih had been suppressed and as the Training School 
men had unfortunately participated in it, he wished to enter 
the city surrounded by the Cadets of the Military Academy. 
Tbat as there was no enemy, their entry would be in fact a 
triumphal procession, and it was his desire that the Cadets 
being educated at Chapultepec should take part, for he had en- 
tire confidence in their loyalty to him. When the Commandant 
had added a few words of praise and encouragement to the stu- 
dents, the President mounted his horse and set out from the 
Castle for the City of Mbxico without giving the students time 
to breakfast. When they reached the Forest of Chapultepec, 
a body of firemen waiting there under arms, fell in as an ad- 
vance guard. The rear was brought up by a detachment of foot 
and mounted police who had arrived with the Inspector Gieneral 
of Police. Miajor Emiliano Lopez Figueroa. In the center of 
the line of march was Madero surrounded by the Cadet Batta- 
lion led by the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Ker- 



*T!he facts set fort'h in this chapter were related to me by 
several cadets who were my wards. 

(147) 



148 FEjOM despotism TO ANARCOBY 

nandez Covarrubias. The advance was slow, for the line march- 
ed cautiously along the full length of the Calzada de la Reforma, 
and as it passed the Cafe Colon, General Huerta joined it. 
When the line reached the Statute of Charles IV, it turned into 
the Avenida Juarez to the spot where the National Theatre is 
in course of construction. Hfere they encountered the fugi- 
tives routed at the Plaza de Armas who, led by Captain Jose 
Tapia, in a semblance of order were proceeding to the Ciuda- 
dela in an attempt to rejoin the main column. As the two for- 
ces met, shots were exchanged and the forces under T'apia re- 
treated through the Avenida del Teatro Nacional, thence through 
the streets of Hombres Ilustres, and came up with the remainder 
of the rebels in the gardens of San Fernando. In the confusion 
that followed the encounter, the companions of President Ma- 
dero, fearing that the affair might assume serious proportions, 
forced Mjadero to seek shelter in the Daguerre Studios* where 
he remained under the escort of ten Cadets of the Military Aca- 
demy commanded by Sergeant Garcia Pena, and of fifteen 
mounted police, the only ones remaining of the detachment 
which had left Chapultepec as the President's guard. The 
rest of the escort was divided into three columns which pro- 
ceeded respectively through the Street of 5 de Mayo, San Fran- 
cisco Avenue, and the Avenue 16 de Septiembre, and advanced 
in battle line upon the Plaza de Armas under the command of 
General Huerta. 

As the firemen and police arrived at the corner of Profesa 
Street, they were fired upon from the roofs of the building "La 
Mexicana" and probably also from the spires of the Cathedral. 
The Cadets, however, were not fired upon. A\Tien some of the 
policemen and firemen fell wounded, the rest turned and fled 
headlong down the Avenida Isabel la Catolica, leaving the Ca- 
dets without a rear guard. The mounted police had already 
deserted almost to a man. some at the corner of Resales Street, 
and others at every cross street on the line of march, so that only 
fifteen remained when the advance halted at the Avenida del 
Teatro Nacional. Most of the deserters entered the ranks of the 
forces under Mondragon and Diaz, which shortly afterwards 
arrived as above mentioned, at Resales Street. 



*The same place where General Reyes took refuge when 
threatened by the Big Stick Clique, as related in Chapter X. 



TH[B LAST Or^ATION 149 

Generals Mondragon and Diaz were informed in Licenciado 
Primo Verdad Street of the death of General Reyes and instead 
of reinforcing the attackers and thus forming a party which 
the defenders could not have resisted through lack of ammuni- 
tion, they proceeded at top speed through the streets of Relox 
and Mina towards the Ciudadela. They reached Resales Street 
but a few seconds after the President and his escort, who were 
just at that moment arriving at the high ground where the 
National Theatre is in the course of construction. 

When the vanguard of the column under Mondragon and 
Diaz appeared, some sympathizers of the revolt carried the 
news to Captain of Artillery Jose Tapia, who with his reorgan- 
ized force of rebels was passing through the Avenida 5 de Mayo 
on his way to the Ciudadela. Thinking that he would be sup- 
ported by the rebels in RK)sales Street and thus catch the Presi- 
dent and his party between two fires, Tapia made an attack on 
them in the Avenida del T'eatro' Nacional. But either because 
he perceived that he was receiving no support from the forces 
in Rosales Street, or possibly because he wished to avoid eon- 
fronting the Cadets, he withdrew through the Avenida de Hom- 
bres Ilustres and rejoined the main column. The Cadets of 
Chapultepec continued their march through the three main 
streets of the capital until they reached the Plaza de Armas. 
Pliere again reigned confusion, which might have had very seri- 
ous results since either the commandant of Cadets as well as 
thd other officers leading the brigade failed to give correct or- 
ders, or the orders given T\ere misunderstood. For Avhatever 
reason it m.ny have been, the ihj-ee columns entered the Plaza 
de Armas with trumpets sounding the attack. The troops at 
the National Palace, were momentarily expecting an attack 
from the rebels under Mondragon and Diaz as soon as the latter 
should learn from the defeated contingent of the scarcity of 
ammunition among the defenders, and consequently, when they 
saw the advanee of the Cadet Battalion, of whose arrival they 
had not been notified, they prepared to resist. Fortunately, 
Sergeant Padiiia, a Cadet officer, took the situation in at a 
giance and ordered the trumpeters to sound "cease firing" and 
to gi\?e the bugle call of the Military Academy. Those inside 
the Palace recognized the call and immediately ceased firing, 
but not before an officer of Cadets had been killed. There 
were no further fatalities among the cadets for they quickly 



150 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARiCHY 

sought shelter behind the pillars of the Portal de Mlercaderes 
and advanced pillar to pillar, until an officer and three men who 
issued from the Palace for the purpose of reconnoitering, found 
that the arriving forces were friends. 

Upon arriving at the Palace, some of the Cadets formed into 
a cordon surrounding the dead still stretched on the pavement 
to await the arrival of the Hospital Corps; others were placed 
as sentries on the side streets leading into the Plaza de Armas, 
and others were sent to the roofs of the City Hall which could 
command the square in case of a new attack. After all these 
precautions had been taken, Mr. Madero was notified, and he 
immediately proceeded on horseback to the Palace, receiving an 
ovation all along the line of march. This ovation was to be his 
last. He entered the Palace on that fateful occasion amid the 
plaudits of a populace with whom he had always liked to rub 
elbows, whom he had always liked to flatter, and from whom 
he had always received proofs of esteem. 

Shortly afterwards, the assembly was sounded. The Ca- 
dets of the Military Academy were concentrated in the street 
de la Acequia, and some detachments were stationed inside the 
Palace to act as sentries where most needed. These latter were 
shortly relieved by a body of Rurales who had arrived from the 
Villa de Guadalupe, and by the soldiers of the 20th who had 
been held as prisoners but who were now put under arms with 
new officers. Thus scattered at their posts, the Cadets of the 
Military Academy went without food until six o'clock in the 
afternoon', without a moment's rest, with no apparent in- 
terest in their welfare on the part of the Commander who had 
exposed them to a participation in a fratricidal strife, although 
his main duty it was to care for these youths, with whose educa- 
tion he had been entrusted. It is well to recall here that at the 
time of the revolt of the Ciudadela in the year 1870, General 
Sostenes Rocha in his official report expressed himself in the 
following terms : ' ' There was also a noteworthy enthusiasm 
shown by some of the students of the Military Academy who were 
on leave and who came to me to ask for arms. But I ordered 
them to present themselves to you at the Palace because I did 
not think it right that the blood of this precious youth should 
be shed so early. ' ' People in the neighborhood of Acequia Street, 
pitying the situation of the youthful Cadets, began to bring them 
food, until at ten p. m.. the Military Commander of the City, 



THE DAST OVATION 151 

General Victoriano Hluerta, ordered them to the Castle of Cha- 
pultepec, where they finally remained without further partici- 
pation, as a body, in suppressing the rebellion. 

As soon as Mr. Miadero arrived at the Palace, he called a 
meeting of the Cabinet, and it was agreed that the President 
should leave that very day for Cuernavaca and join the army 
which, under the command of Gfieneral Felipe Angeles, was mak- 
ing a campaign against the Zapatistas. 

At four o'clock, the President accompanied by Messrs. Gar- 
mendia, Montes, and de los Eiios, left in an automobile for the 
capital of the State of Morelos. Preceding him was another 
machine carrying ten soldiers armed with Mausers and a Rexer, 
under command of a 2nd Captain of Artillery. 

That same morning, after Mr. Madero's appearance upon 
the scene, the Military Commander, General Huerta, had ordered 
the execution of General Gregorio Ruiz, officer of the 20th, 
and in command of the Palace guards, and of one of the Tirain- 
ing School men accused of firing upon Garcia Pena when he had 
arrived at the Palace at daybreak. The executions took place in 
the inner courtyard at about twelve^thirty on February 9th. 
Shortly after one o'clock is was known at the National Palace 
that the Ciudadela was in the hands of the revolutionists and 
that the second in command of the city had lost his life in the 
defense of that point. 



CHAPTER XXII. 
AT THE CIUDADEEA.* 



As I have already recounted, General Reyes met exactly 
the death he foreboded. His nerves killed him. With a little 
prudence, with greater calmness, his triumph would have been 
assured — the city would have been spared the tragic ten days 
M^hen so many innocent persons perished, and the country would 
have been saved from the shame of subsequent events. 

When Messrs. Felix Diaz and Mondragon realized that Reyes 
had lost his life, they began to march from the streets of Licen- 
ciado Primo Verdad towards the Ciudadela. When' they arrived 
at the ancient Boulevard of BUcareli, they began to organize their 
troops in order to make sure of the actual forces at their command^ 
but not even on this occasion did they take any of the necessary 
military precautions. Shortly afterwards, Major Trias and Mr. 
Enrique Zepeda arrived and they were the ones who put the 
troops into a semblance of order and directed the attack upon 
the Ciudadela. A cannon was placed in the School of Commerce, 
and the forces were arranged to the best advantage, taking the 
street of Donde as a base of operations. 

By order of the MElitary Commander of the City, issued in 
the early hours of the morning, Gr'eneral YUllareal had assumed 
command of the Ciudadela, which had been under Brigadier 
Davila. 

When Generals Mondragon and Felix Diaz presented them- 
selves on the Street of Bucareli, they demanded the surrender 
of the Ciudadela. Both felt certain of an immediate affirma- 
tive reply, because of an agreement made through Captain 
Izunza with the forces wfhich were in the Ciudadela and probably 
because of an agreement with General Davila himself. But the 
presence of General Villareal completely upset all former agree- 



*This chapter is based on information received verbally 
from Mr. Zepeda, Mr. Rt)driguez and several officers who were 
with the rebels. 

(152) 



AT THE CIU'DADELA 153 

ments and instead of an immediate surrender as had been agreed 
upon, the Second in Command of the City, General Villareal, 
gave orders to his mjen to prepare for a formal defense of the 
position. 

A few scattered shots were fired when the defenders of the 
Ciudadela saw that the rebels were mounting a cannon, but a 
few moments later all firing ceased. General Villareal who was 
the sole obstacle to a complete surrender, had just been shot 
dead by an officer in the Ciudadela who was involved in the re- 
volt. The white flag was raised at once and the surrender imme- 
diately took place, the former head of the Ciudadela, Brigadier 
General Rafael Davila, giving himself up as a prisoner with all 
the men and supplies in the building. 

The revolutionists soon had at their disposal all the reserve 
ammunition that there was in the City, with the cannon of the 
1st, 2nd and 5thi Batteries, except on-e that had been left in front 
of the Palace during the skirmish of the morning, and mth 
sixty machine guns in perfect condition and most of them 
brand new. 

The death of General Villareal had rendered void the act 
of heroism of the ]\i!ilitary Commander, General Lauro Villar 
and the officers under him. With a little daring on the part 
of the rebels, the government could have been in their hands 
that day. But Messrs. Mbndragon and Diaz did not stir, but 
rather preferred to lock themselves up in a trap and give the 
government time to assemble a strong force and to provide it- 
self with the cannon and ammunition that it absolutely lacked 
at the moment. Only treachery could save them. Fate was pro- 
pitious and instead of being annihilated, they emerged after ten 
days of fighting never to be forgotten by the inhabitants of Mex- 
ico City, apparently triumphant, and full of joy. The Madero 
administration had indeed fallen, but the Pelicista revolt itself 
had also fallen through. Its own leaders had smothered it at its 
birth. They lacked the daring necessary for undertakings of such 
a character. The momentary popularity that surrounded the 
seeming victor could not fail to die away completely in a very 
short time. General H!uerta who had been entrusted by the gov- 
ernment with the task of putting an end to the revolt, was to fulfil 
his charge, but he was to destroy the revolt for his own personal 
gain and to the disgrace of the national army which at that mo- 
ment he unfortunately represented. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 
THE TRAGIC TEiN DAYS. 



The first sensation of the rebels when once in possession of 
the Ciudadela was one of joyful elation ; but Mr. Trias and Cap 
tain Romero Lopez soon called them to order, and as a first pre- 
caution commanded them' to seize the barracks of the Presi- 
dent's Guard, since these men were not in the plot. The com- 
mander of this guard, Captain Blazquez, was in Vera Cruz 
owing to his wife's illness.* Aware of this fact, the rebel leaders 
attempted to win this regiment over to their cause but the offi- 
cers refused. They did agree, however, to remain neutral. Oti 
the following day, General Mondragon annulled this compact 
and ordered them to incorporate themselves with the rebels; 
instead of so doing, the officers with the greater part of the 
guards decamped and went to Chapultepec to place themselves 
under the orders of the officer there in command. Only a 2nd 
Lieutenant and fifteen men obeyed Mondragon 's orders. Major 
Trias after placing his sentinels, secured provisions by raiding 
all the stores in the neighborhood. Colonel Ig-nacio Munoz who 
had just arrived, was placed in command of the line to Bucareli. 
He established headquarters in a house on Tolsa Street. Cap- 
tain Tapia whose horse had been killed under him during the 
fight at the Palace, had managed to rejoin Felix Diaz in Resa- 
les Street and was now ordered to take possession of the Young 
Men's Christian Association and assume command at that point. 
Captain Landero, a brave soldier, was chosen to command the 
outposts stationed in the Calzada de la Piedad. There he met 
his death, because mistaking daring for valor, he neglected to 
take the necessary precautions to protect himself. 

Captain Escoto and Lieutenant Vazquez were placed in com- 
mand of the assault on the prison of Belem which fell into the 



*Capt. Blazquez himself related this to me. 

(154) 



THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS 155 

hands of the rebels that same afternoon. On the following day 
however, Mtr, Oiivera, Superintendent of the Prison, again chang- 
ed his mind and notified the Military Commander that he would 
support the government. The rebels gave him a few moments 
in which to decide definitely one way or the other; at the ex- 
piration of the allotted time, they opened fire on the prison, de- 
stroying parts of the walls. The escape of a large number of the 
prisoners was thus facilitated; two hundred of them were ad- 
mitted into the Ciudadela where they were set to refill the maga- 
zines of the machine guns. 

Mir. Pideneio Hiernandez assumed the duties of secretary to 
General Felix Diaz, who was now installed in apartments on 
the southeast side of the Ciudadela together with General Mon- 
dragon and his two sons. 

On the following morning General Diaz left the Ciudadela 
accompanied by Don Enrique Zepeda and Don Celso Acosta to 
keep an appointment with an emissary of GJeneral Victoriano 
Huerta, Military Commander of the City. The conference was 
to be held at a candy shop, "El Globo" on Providencia Street. 
The automobile in which Diaz rode was escorted by another in 
which were Don Ramon R-odriguez Pena and three men. The 
secret conference at "El Globo" with Colonel Guasque, Hhierta's 
emissary, was very short ; in fact, after a very few minutes Gen- 
eral Diaz returned to the Ciudadela. Later in the day he was 
visited by Lieutenant Colonel Monter, commander of one of the 
artillery regiments which had that very day deserted his bar- 
racks and was presenting himself m the rebel camp. 

Confusion reigned supreme in the Ciudadela. If the govern- 
ment had only made an attack, no matter with how small a force, 
the Ciudadela would have fallen immediately. 

Lieutenant Colonel ]\Ibnter, placed in command of the post, 
immediately began to bring order out of chaos. He, Mr. Trias, 
and Captain Romero Lopez, were from that moment the life and 
soul of the defense. Many false versions have been given of 
the events of those days — one in praise of the marksmanship of 
General Mondragon, when, as a matter of fact, General Mon- 
dragon not only did not fire a single shot, but did not even once 
appear outside the building. Lieutenant Colonel Monter miount- 
ed a cannon aJt each corner, and himself appointed the corres- 
ponding gun crews. Besides, he aimed the cannon stationed 
on the comer opposite the Prison of Belem and trained on the 



156 FKjOM despotism TIO ANARCHY 

National Palace; therefore his shots were those which reached 
the Mariana emtrance. Hie accompanied the advance of Felix 
Diaz to the Calles Anchas and duly allotted their positions to 
the outposts. He attempted to take possession of the 6th Pre- 
cinct Police Station, but after a fierce engagement it remained 
in the hands of the federals, under command of General Celso 
Vega. The Inspector General of Police, Major Emiliano Lopez 
FigTieroa, presented himself that day at the Ciudadela pretend- 
ing that he wished to come to some agreement whereby the 
police should remain neutral, and whereby he could get back 
those policemen now with the rebels so that he might- give the 
usual protection as usual to the city. 

Major Figueroa entered the building and went through it 
all even to the roof, unmolested. Finally, without having once 
been halted or challenged, he found General Diaz. When he 
learned the mission of the Inspector General of Police, Diaz 
peremptorily refused to sanction the withdrawal of the police, 
saying that since they had already participated in the fight, 
they could no longer be regarded as neutrals, and that it was up 
to the government to patrol the city as best it could. Major 
Figueroa had already been ordered to leave, when one of the 
bystanders suggested to Mondragon that it would be an act of 
sheer stupidity to allow him to leave for he had already had 
an opportunity to take full note of the dispositions made by 
the rebels. This knowledge would undoubtedly bring about an 
assault by the government forces with every probability of final 
success. Acting on this suggestion Felix Diaz immediately or- 
dered the Inspector General to be placed under arrest. Mon- 
dragon wanted him shot at once, but the person who had first 
cautioned against his departure, now opposed the execution, 
saying that such a step would challenge retaliation from the 
government, which might even take revenge on the families of 
the men in the Ciudadela.* Once a prisoner, Major Figueroa 
was treated so leniently and his guards were so lax, that many 
people were quite sure that the whole affair was nothing but 
a farce. 



*I obtained this information from Francisco Moreno, an eye 
witness. 



THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS 157 

That day the government ordered all the lights in the vicin- 
ity of the Ciudadela to be put out, but the telephones remained 
iritaet. Thus the rebels were able to keep themselves fully in- 
formed of the march of events throughout the city.* 

Oin Tuesday, February 11th, the siege of the Ciudadela was 
begun, following a conference held at the home of Wr. Zepeda in 
Naples Street between General Tictoriano Htuerta and Felix Diaz, 
at which in general terms, the overthrow of the Mladero govern- 
ment was agreed upon. 

General Huerta placed General Jose Delgado, his second 
in command, over the forces on the Alameda; General Celso 
Yega over those in the Streets of the Ayuntamiento ; and Gen- 
eral Felipe Mier over those in the Calazada de la Piedad, w'here he 
was later superseded by Lieutenant Colonel Catarino Cruz. 
General Felipe Angeles, who had arrived with his forces from 
Cuernavaca, was stationed in the Paseo de la Reforma; and 
General Gustavo Miaas in the streets of San Diego. Chapulte- 
pec was under command of Eear Admiral Angel Ortiz Monas- 
terio, but two days later he was superseded by General Joaquin 
Beltran.t The attack from the Engineers Park was entrusted to 
Col. Ocaranza who gained possession of it shortly after taking 
over his command. Colonel Francisco Romero, Speaker of the 
Bouse, who had brought a regiment mustered in the State of 
Hidalgo, was given command of the forces on Cinco de Mayo 
Street directly protecting the National Palace. 

As I have stated before, the government lacked artillery 
officers for field service, since most of the capable officers 
were in the Ciudadela. This deficiency was made up by call- 
ing as volunteers cadets from the Military Academy for field 
service with the rank of Lieutenant of Artillery. This absence 
would in no way prevent them from continuing their studies 
when peace should be reestablished. These volunteers were im- 
mediately despatched to take charge of the batteries which were 



*Tt is but justice to pay tribute here to the young ladies who 
acted as telephone operators throughout those days; their con- 
duct merits warm commendation. 

t After the fall of Vera Cruz, General Bteltran had been re- 
lieved of his duties as Military Commander of that city. His 
place had been taken by General Riefugio Velasco, the same who 
was later defeated by Villa at Torreon. 



158 FEjOM despotism TO ANAECHY 

mounted on the plains encompassing the city on the side towards 
San Antonio Abad. 

This disposition of the forces at hand, reenforced con- 
stantly by troops arriving' at the city from outside points, since 
orders had been issued to all garrison Commanders to rush 
their forces with all speed to the aid of the city, established a 
siege, which according to all tacticians, should have been brought 
to a successful close within a few hours. 

The new Military Commander of the city, in order to pre- 
tend that he would begin the assault on that Ttiesday, gave orders 
that a body of Riurales, commanded by Colonel Castillo, dis- 
tinguished for its loyality to M(r. Madero, should advance at 
the double quick down Balderas Street until they should enter 
the Ciudadela. 

Colonel Casitillo on receiving these orders thought them so 
foolish that he sent his aide to interview the Military Comman- 
der so that the latter should repeat the order to him personally. 
When the aide returned with the same identical orders. Colonel 
Castillo formed his men, and placing himself at their head, ad- 
vanced as he had been commanded, as punctiliously as if he were 
performing a mere dress parade manoeuver. When they reached 
the corner of Balderas and Morelos Streets, the machine guns 
on the roofs of the Ciudadela and in the windows of the Young 
Men's Christian Association building, under command of Cap- 
tain Tapia, opened fire on the dragoons, mowing them down by 
the hundreds and totally annihilating them, the dead reaching 
even to the gates of the Ciudadela. The horses which were not 
instantly killed galloped riderless through the streets of the 
Ayuntamiento as far as San Felipe Neri Street. 

This squadron so gallantly led by its colonel, was wiped 
out to a man. Colonel Castillo was a victim of military discip- 
line, a victim of one of the most cowardly and dastardly deeds 
^perpetrated in those tragic days. Colonel Castillo knew that 
he was being sent to his death and consummated the sacrifice with- 
out a word, without even a murmur of complaint. "Theirs 
not to reason why, theirs but to do or die." If the author of 
that deed had a like conscience, he would not have been able to 
sleep in peace, his remorse for those victims of his incompe- 
tence or of his infamy would have killed him ere this. 

General Angeles had stationed his battery in the Colonia 
Station, and when he tried to move it to a more favorable posi- 



THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS 159 

tion, he was prevented by the protests of Ambassador Henry 
Lane Wilson who did not wish to be disturbed by the roar of the 
guns nor to expose his residence to the fire of the rebels who 
would no doubt answer that of General Angeles. 

From the Station Colonia, Angeles opened fire on the Ciu- 
dadela, but as a capable artilleryman, he soon perceived that his 
guns were doing little if any damage. He therefore personally 
undertook the aiming of his cannon but with nio better success. 
It was said that the officers under General Angeles, in league 
with the rebels, had purposely put tihie sights out of commission 
and that to this is due the bad marksmanship of Gfeneral An- 
geles, a very plausible tale, in fact his inefficiency was a surprise 
to everybody because in France as well as in MexicO' he had a 
reputation for wonderful accuracy as an artilleryman. Be that 
as it may, thie truth is that few shots reached the rebel lines and 
those that did, caused little or no damage. It can be further 
stated that only the battery of General Angeles and that of 
General Maas in San Diego did any effective work. This ex- 
plains the few casualties among the followers of Felix Diaz. 
On the other hand, the city itself suffered havoc from a con- 
flict which in reality was but a farce though infamous in itself, 
for if there was little loss of life among the soldiers, there 
was a heavy loss among non-combatants, and the material dam- 
age done was not inconsiderable. 

General Angeles showed great force of character. His 
were the only forces to really maintain strict siege against the 
rebels who were receiving outside aid from a large number of 
persons. Some young men of thie best families who were caught 
spying for the rebels, were immediately executed by General 
Angeles, In this way he prevented the rebels from receiving 
exact details of what) was going on in his camp. 

These actions gave grounds for the court martial of Gen- 
eral Angeles which ended in his imprisonment after the fall of 
the Madero Government. However, nothing further was done 
to him ; he was liberated and immediately sent abroad on a mili- 
tary mission, but it seems that at the present writing, he has re- 
signed this commission and has joined the rebel government, 
which has thus gained a valuable asset. 

From Tuesday, February 11, when General Huerta simu- 
lated the attack, there was intermittent firing; but a serious 
assault on the Ciudadela was never undertaken nor even intend- 



160 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

ed, because the opposing leaders, the one of the giovernment and 
the other of the rebel forces, had come to a full understanding on 
that day, agreeing on the important question, the overthrow of 
Madero. But the government continued to place full confidence 
in General Hhierta. He was allowed to continue his prepara- 
tions so that he could usurp the power, and at one and the same 
time he was laughing up his sleeve at a government which trust- 
ed him fully and at the rebels who were also so innocently trust- 
ful. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 



TIHIE ACTION OF THE SENATE.* 



The American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, took the 
same attitude he had taken towards the end of Don Porfirio 
Diaz' administration. At that time he had stated on every 
possible occasion that his government was tired of quietly wit- 
nessing what was happening in Mexico and had intimated the 
possibility of an armed intervention. In fact, this was the very 
weapon which Mr. Limantour hiad wielded over General Diaz 
to secure his resignation. 

Mr. Lame Wilson now used thesie threats on Mr. Lascurain. 
The administration feared that the words of Mr. Lane Wilson 
really voiced the definite opinion of the American government, 
and therefore, by order of the President, the Secretary of State 
called a meeting of the Senators at the Hbuse of Representa- 
tives. At this meeting, held on February 13, there were thirty 
members of the Senate present. 

In his address to them Mtr. Lascurain, Secretary of State, 
said that relations between their country and the United States 
were at that moment very critical, judging from interviews with 
the American Ambassador; that at any moment the marines 
from the American men of war in Vera Cruz might land, and 
that it was therefore the President's wish that the Senate be in- 
formed of these facts. He then read a telegram and a memo- 
randum from the American government, neither of which really 
said anything. The occasion was propitious to those senators 
who sympathized with the revolution and they made the most 
of it. 



*The facts in this chapter were related to me by two Senators. 

(161) 



162 FKOM D'EiSPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

Senator Gumesindo Enriquez answered on behalf of those 
present that in view of the report of the Secretary of State, they 
thought it advisable to have an audienc^ with the President in 
order to impress upon him the need not v,nly of making any sac- 
rifice to avoid foreign intervention but, above all, in order to put 
a stop to the existing impossible state of affairs. The Secre- 
tary was commissioned to beg for an interview with the Presi- 
dent. The last action taken before adjourning was to call a 
meeting for the next day at the residence of Senator Sebastian 
Camacho. Only the nine followiug Senators kept the appoint- 
ment: Sebastian Camacho, Grumesindo Enriquez, Guillermo 
Obregon, Ricardo Guzman, Emilio Rabaza, Enrique Gioroztieta, 
Rafael Pimentel, Tomas Mancera, and Jose Castellot. At this 
meeting it was decided that since the interview requested hiad 
not been granted, they ask M'r. Madero to resign from the Presi- 
dency and at the same time beg Mr. Felix Diaz to withdraw as 
a candidate. A provisional president, acceptable to both sides, 
could then be appointed to call the elections. 

Mr. de la Barra, although not present at the meeting, be- 
gan on his own initiative, to work for the same end. He wrote 
a letter to the President offering to speak to Mir. Felix Diaz as 
agreed by the Senators. 

On the followinig day, Saturday the 15th, the Senators again 
met at the house of Mr. Camacho. Messrs. Obregon and Pimen- 
tel who had been appointed to approach Felix Diaz, reported 
that they had done so, but that the rebel leader absolutely in- 
sisted upon two things as a working basis for any discussion or 
provision ; first, the immediate resignation of Mr. Madero ; sec- 
ond, that no member of his Cabinet should be a nominee for the 
Provisional Presidency. 

As agreed upon with the Secretary of State, the Senators 
went to the Palace to give Diaz ' answer to the President, but the 
latter refused to receive them. By order of the President, they 
were told by ]M!r. Ernesto Madero and Mr. Btonilla that on no 
account was Mr. Madero willing to resign. The Senators then 
decided to go to Military Headquarters to address themselves 
to General Huerta, head of the government forces. 

When General Huerta was told the purpose of the visit, he 
begged the Senators that before beginning they allow Mm. to 
call the Secretary of War as a witness to the conference that was 



THE ACTION OF THE SENATE 163 

about to be held. Since the Senators raised no objection to 
General Htierta's proposition, the Secretary of War joined the 
meeting shortly after. Hardly was he inside the door than he 
faced them all and with an angry gesture addressed 'Ss'Lr. Obre- 
gon, saying that they were the prime corrupters of the army. 
He was not allowed to finish, for all the Senators sprang to their 
feet and angrily protested saying that no feeling hostile to the 
administration had led them there ; that they desired to corrupt 
no one; that they were moved only by the desire of finding a 
solution to the strife that was causiag countless misfortunes and 
w^hose end it was impossible to foresee, since they believed that the 
administration would gain nothing by fighting the rebels. They 
added that in view of the attitude assumed by the Secretary of 
War, they considered their mission at an end, and that the re- 
sponsibility for the future events would rest with General Gar- 
cia Pena. He, in turn, somewhalt. subdued, apologized profuse- 
ly, adding that since he too was seeking a solution to the matter, 
he would gladly hear the one proposed by them. The Senators 
then complained of the President's behavior and General Gar- 
cia Peiia offered to speak to Mr. Mladero in order to obtain an 
interview for the Senators who were there present. At the end 
of the meeting. Senator Obregon insinuated to General Garcia 
Pena that one solution might be the resignation of Mr. Madero 
and the subsequent appointment of General Garcia Peiia as Pro- 
visional President. He said that he himself would obtain the 
consent of Felix Diaz. General Pena answered that not only 
was it probable that Mr. Diaz would not accept this proposi- 
tion, but that he did not feel himself sufficiently authorized to 
propose it to Mr. Mladero. 

On Sunday the 16th, during the armistice, the Senators 
again met at Mr. Camacho's house, without reaching any agree- 
ment, for General Garcia Pena did not let them know at what de- 
cision Mr. Madero had arrived. On Monday morning, the 17th, 
while at Mtr. Camacho's home, they received word from Genera' 
Huerta to meet on the following morning at 10 :30 at Military 
Headquarters. Believing that this appointment was the one 
with the President, promised them by General Garcia Pena, the 
Senators met at the stated hour at Military Headquarters on the 
mezzanine floor of the Palace. On their arrival, and as if in 
answer to previous conversations, General Huerta told them 



164 FEjOM despotism TO ANARlCHJ 

that lie was at their ooininand and would carry out any orders 
they might see fit to give him.* 

The senators surprised by such an unexpected stand, and 
unable to grasp the significance of the Military Commander's 
attitude, kept silence for a few minutes. Finally, Mr. Enri- 
quez, who had been chosen spokesman for the interview with 
Mr. Madero, replied that they had nothing to command, but still 
insisted upon speakioig with the President. "When Mt. Enri- 
quez finished speaking. General Huerta sent an aid to the Presi- 
dential apartments. The aide returned almost immediately 
with the answer that the President would receive the Senators in 
the Audience Chamber. 

As soon as they joined Mr. Madero, Senator Enriquez began 
to expound their reasons for soliciting the interview ; but he had 
no sooner begun to speak than he was interrupted by Senator 
Guillermo Obregon who began a lengthy and involved speech. 
In fact, he talked in such a round about way, and expressed him- 
self in such terms that finally Mladero, losing all patience, said 
somewhat rudely, ' ' Speak out and say frankly what you want. ' ' 
He then proceeded to rebuke them all saying that he knew per- 
fectly well what they were after; they wanted him to resign so 
as to allow Porfirio Diaz to come back to the Presidency and re- 
main there until his death, but they could understand once for 
all that under no circumstances would he resign, that death 
only could remove him from the National Palace. He admitted 
that the day wlhen his term expired and he could turn over the 
office to his successor, would be the happiest day of his life ; but 
in the meantime, only death could remove him from power. 

Senator Enriquez retorted emphatically that their mission 
was not one of intervention in favor of General Diaz, but they 
did believe it their duty to take the necessary steps to prevent 
greater conflicts ; that was why they had come togiether. Their 
wislhes which were also those of the country at large, were that 
the government should come to an agreement with the revolu- 
tionists so as to put an end to the struggle. That the greatest 



*General Huerta knowing the insinuations made by Sena- 
tor Obregon to the Secretary of War, hoped that because of the 
latter 's refusal, these offers might be made to him. Thus in the 
acts that he had planned for that very day, he would appear to 
be carrying out the commands of the Senate and so could hope 
to be free from all blame. 



THE ACTION OF THE SENATE 165 

fear of the Senators was that this continued strife would force 
intervention by foreign powers. Mr. Mladero, quite calm now, 
answered that tihey oould banish all such fears since he would 
read to them a telegram jiust received from President Taft, the 
contents of which were pacific and entirely different from the 
attitude assumed by Henry Lane Wilson. 

Obregon then took the floor again, becoming so very much 
excited that Mir. Madero also became excited and the interview 
came to an end. Each of the Senators present had the firm con- 
viction that they would all be put under arrest as they lefti the 
Palace; but Mr. Madero took personal leave of each in such a 
way that they soon lost all fear. 

On their way to Military Headquarters to take leave of 
General Huerta, they were met by Lieutenant Colonel Riverol, 
an intimate friend of one of the Senators, wiho whispered ' ' Three 
o'clock this afternoon will see the beginning of the end. You 
just see!" 

Madero, as soon as left alone, summoned General Huerta 
and asked him when this state of affairs was going to end, in 
other words, when did he intend to gain possession of the Ciuda- 
dela. General Huerta told the President that everything would 
be settled that very afternoon, that at that very moment he was 
going to give orders for the final assault to begin. He then sa- 
luted and withdrew. It was true. General Huerta made the 
assault that very afternoon, but not against the Ciudadela, but 
against the very President himself; instead of giving a death 
blow to rebellion, he sounded the knell of constitutional law and 
order. 

Senators Obregon and Pimentel since the very first inter- 
view with Felix Diaz, had obtained passes from both the Mili- 
tary Commander of Mexico City and the leader of the rebels in 
the Ciudadela. In this way they went back and forth daily and 
were able to learn that just as the President was fully decided 
not to resign, Felix Diaz was fully as decided not to cede an inch. 



CHAPTER XXV. 



AN EVENT IN THE MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY. 



History relates how the Merovingian dynasty was borne 
down by the weight of the sword of Pepin, Steward of the Palace 
who usurped the power by abusing the confidence reposed in 
him by the last Merovingian emperor. General Huerta though 
not conversant with history, sought to imitate Pepin, and to 
scale the ladder to power by using the same means employed by 
the founder of the Carolinian Dynasty. General Huerta, un- 
fortunately, used this means but he was absolutely incapable to 
be a ruler such as Pepin, and much less capable to organize a 
government like that of the ances't'er of Charlemange. 

Resolved to usurp the power, his first effort was to force 
the Senate to take suchi steps as would give legality to his acts, 
but the senators were deaf to the insinuations whispered to them 
and would not do what the Military Commander wished. There- 
fore, General Huerta was compelled to resort to brute force, and 
arrest the President and the Vice President in the National Palace 
itself, and to shoot on the very spot any one offering resistance 
to the execution of this act. 

For these arrests. General Huerta made use of the services 
of Brigadier General Blanquete, Commander of the 29th Infantry, 
in whom he had entire confidence. Blanquete in turn could count 
on Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez Riverol and Major Izquierdo, 
his immediate subordinates in the 29th Infantry. 

General Huerta, some of his friends say, feared that he would 
be arrested and even executed by the government, which sus- 
pected that he was hand in glove with the revolutionists. Some 
of Huerta 's intimates even state that General Peila invited the 
Military Conmiander to visit Chapultepec Military Academy with 
the idea of placing him under arrest, but on arriving at the Cas- 

(166) 



AN EVENT IN THE MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY 167 

tie, he was so heartily dheered by the Cadets that the Secretary 
of War saw the impossibility of carrying out his plans. He there- 
fore attempted to induce H'uerta to go with him to the barracks 
of San Cosme so as to arrest him there. All this however is but 
imagination. 

General Hiierta ever since the battle of Bachimba had re- 
ceived whispered suggestions to depose Madero and usurp the 
power. The enemies of the government believed that a soldier 
like General Hhierta would alone be able to establish peace, and 
some of them had looked to him, while others had their eyes on 
General Geronimo Treviiio. The latter had refused to listen to 
any proposals, but General Hiuerta not only had lent a willing ear 
to the suggestions, but even broadhied the subject to some of the 
most prominent officers, notably to General Blanquete who warm- 
ly seconded the idea as he believed it to be the sole solution of the 
problem which was bringing ruin to the whole country.* 

When the revolt broke out and the first conferences were 
held between Felix Diaz and General Huerta, the latter hesitated 
at first, but finally accepted the main points. He did, however, 
impose as a condition that he should act as Provisional Presi- 
dent and should reserve to himself the right to decide on the pro- 
pitious moment for the execution of the plot. During the tragic 
ten days, the whispered insinuations were not hushed for a single 
moment. A very strong pressure was brought to bear especially 
on the wife of the Military Commander, to force him to repudiate 
Mr. Madero. 

General H'uerta could not count on the support of all the 
troops under his command. In fact, he was certain that some of 
them, in particular those under General Angeles, would not lend 
themselves to any action inimical to the government of Madero. 
He had the idea that perhaps the Senate would facilitate the reali- 
zation of his object and with that in mind, he had held his inter- 
views with the group of senators which had met at the house of Mr. 
Camacho. 

In order to be able to act with safety, he insisted that the 
29th Infantry, commanded by General Blanquete, be transferred 
to Mexico City, but General Blanquete who was not as yet in the 
plot, had delayed the transfer, offering first the excuse that he 



*I myself mentioned all this on Feb. 14th, 1913, to M'r. 
Madero 's relatives at Monterey. 



168 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

was not fully confident of the loyalty of his troops, and later 
that the bridges across the Lerma had been destroyed. However, 
when called directly by General Htuerta, he rebuilt the bridges 
which had been burned down by the 7th Regiment of Rurales 
under Major Cardenas. He then organised his regiment for the 
march, arriving in Miexico City on Stinday, and pitched his camp 
in the Calzada de Tlaxpana. Soon after his arrival, it was agreed 
that the troops acting as guards in the Palace were to be sup- 
planted by detachments of the 29th Regiment so that once in pos- 
session of the Palace, they could arrest Madero and Pino Suarez 
and force them to resign, that is if the Senate could not be induced 
to remove them and appoint General Huerta as President pro 
tern. This point was discussed by General Blanquete and Sena- 
tor Obregon at the Tlaxpana camp. 

When the plans had been ratified by all concerned, the nec- 
essary orders were issued. As soon as the 29th had been duly in- 
stalled in the Palace it was agreed that on Tuesday, the 18th at 
three o 'clock in the afternoon, while the high officials were lunch- 
ing, they should all be placed under arrest by Lieutenant Colonel 
Jimenez Riverol and Major Izquierdo, supported by a detach- 
ment of the 29th. 

It was decided that Gustavo Madero should be lured from 
the Palace because it was feared that his natural impulsiveness 
might cause the sihedding of blood. In order to carry out this 
scheme, he was invited to a luncheon given by General Delgado 
at the Restaurant Gambrinus, in honor of Colonel Francisco 
Romero. The hour of the banquet was set for three o'clock, but 
in the morning it was learned that General Manuel Rivera, com- 
mander of the 4th Military Zone, was to arrive that very day 
from Oaxaca with his brigade. It was therefore thought neces- 
sary to hasten events before this soldier should enter the city. 

When the brigade arrived at the San Lazaro station, an aid 
of General Rivera was sent ahead to Military Headquarters, 
arriving there shortly after noon, to request the necessary per- 
mission for the brigade to enter the city. He was instructed to 
await further orders. General Huerta then rushed out, called 
for Gustavo Madero, took him with the aid of General Delgado, 
to the Restaurant Gambrinus, and then pretending some pressing 
business left them and sped in an automobile to the San Lazaro 
station. On his arrival there he requested General Rivera to ae- 



AN EVENT IN THE MERlOVINGIAN DYNASTY 169 

company him in his automobile to Military Headquarters. Once 
there, General Rivera was placed under arrest and remained in 
confinement until after the death of Mladero. On his arrival at 
Military Headquarters, Huerta was informed by General Blan- 
quete that all the plans had been executed and that Madero and 
Pino Suarez were under arrest. 



CHAPTBK, XXVI. 
THE THIIRiD MD[LITLA.BY REVOLT. 



In accordance with the orders issued, Lieutenant Colonel 
Eiverol accompanied by Mjajor Izquierdo, by a Captain of Ar- 
tillery, and by Don Enrique Zepeda, took thirty men of the Palace 
Guard and proceeded by way of the main staircase to the Presi- 
dential apartments. He went through the waiting room and the 
aides' room to the Cabinet Chamber where he formed his men in 
line and left them under command of Mr. Zepeda. Then he and 
Major Izquierdo proceeded to the salon next to the Library where 
Madero and his Cabinet and a few friends were about to sit down 
to dinner. Lieutenant Colonel Riverol informed Mr. Madero that 
General Rivera with his troops, had revolted and was even then 
within the city, that since there was fear that the garrison might 
lend him its support, it was deemed of the greatest importance 
that the President should be taken to a safe place at once and 
that he had accordingly come to conduct him. Madero was greatly 
surprised by the news and asked for details ; Eiverol grasped the 
President's left arm and Major Izquierdo his right and in this 
way, they attempted to push him into the next room. Madero 
at once understood what was in the wind and said : "I will not 
go like this. ' ' As the two officers dragged him towards the room 
in which the gtuard was stationed, he asked Rliverol who had given 
such orders. When he saw the guard drawn up in the other 
room, he understood that he was lost and stopped as he crossed 
the threshold. Captain Garmendia, aide to the President, drew 
his revolver, saying : ' ' Ylou shall not lay hands upon the Presi- 
dent of the Republic, ' ' and fired point blank at Colonel Riverol. 
Don Marcos Hernandez at the same time fired at Major Izquierdo, 
both bullets taking deadly effect. Colonel Riverol fell dead across 
the door leading into the library from the Cabinet Chamber, and 
Major Izquierdo fell dead in the latter room. About twenty or 
thirty more shots were fired by the soldiers of the 29th Battalion, 

(170) 



THE THIRD MILITARY REVOLT 171 

the aides of the President, and Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Zepeda, who 
was in command of the detachment of the 29th, was hit in the hand. 
Zepeda answering the fire, killed Mr. Marcos Hernandez. Captain 
Montes a member of the Presidents 's personal staff, ordered the 
troops to about face and leave the room. Since Major Izquierdo 
had been killed by Captain Garmendia in the library, the men 
f onnd themselves without an officer in authority ; they therefore 
obeyed the orders of Captain Montes, the only man in uniform. 
With him at their head, they left the Pi-esidential suite, and the 
door was slammed behind them by Mir. Rodriguez Malpica, chief of 
the President's staff. The President, judging it dangerous to re- 
main, intending to abandon the National Palace, entered the ele- 
vator accompanied by Captain Giarmendia and others; but when 
he issued from the elevator to the eorrider beneath the Hall of 
Honor, he found General Blanquete there already with reenf orce- 
ments commanded by Captain HIernandez. 

Hernandez made as if to stop the President, but Garmendia 
shouted, "Mien, long live the President!" The soldiers at once 
presented arms in salute to the Head of the Nation. Captain 
Hernandez, perceivingi that the attitude of his men obviously was 
favorable to the President, fell back hastily. Madero began to 
address the soldiers, but in the midst of his speech, was interrupt- 
ed by General Blanquete, who, ghastly pale, advanced and plac- 
ing his hand on Madero 's shoulder said : ' ' Come here ' ' and push- 
ing him into the guard house; when he was into the room he 
said: "You have just killed a man of great worth, so you are my 
prisoner, ' ' and grasping him by the arm, pushed him quickly into 
the rear of the guard house. Madero, highly unstrung, asked 
repeatedly by whose authority this was done.* 

While this was going on, the Vice President and the Cabi- 
net members, as well as those who had accompanied Mladero, had 
escaped, each as best he could. Pino Suarez descended by the stair- 
way leading to the offices of the Secretary of tihe Treasury, but 
instead of issuing immediately to the street, went towards the 
Treasury. On perceiving his error and attempting to leave the 
building, he was taken captive by an officer from Military Head- 



*Some of the aids of the President tried to impede the arrest 
and went so far as to aim their revolvers at Gen. Blanquete but 
they were prevented of their purpose at the instance of one of 
the Cabinet Members who ordered "Don't fire! Don't fire!" 



172 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

quarters who conducted him to where General Blanquete was 
holding Madero prisoner, 

Mr. Bonilla, a less nervous man, had also descended the stairs 
to the office of the Secretary of the Treasury and had calmly 
and quickly quitted the National Palace, accompanied by Cap- 
tain Blazquez, commander of the President's guard. Both of 
these officials went first to Mr. Bonilla 's residence, but imme- 
diately after sought refuge in another house. 

While events were running their course at the National 
Palace, similar deeds were being enacted at the Restaurant Gam- 
brinus. Gustavo Madero had been invited to dine with Generals 
Huerta, Delgado, Yarza, Romero, and Sangines. Shortly after 
their arrival at the Rjestaurant Gambrinus, two officers, Luis 
Fuentes and Revilla, entered with twenty men from the forest 
guard of Chapultepec and ordered those present to put up their 
hands and surrender. The only one to make the least attempt at 
resistance was Ghistavo Madero, but Officer Fuentes, placing his 
cocked revolver at Madero 's head, showed him the futility of such 
an act. Mladero who was also covered by Revilla 's men, realized 
how useless resistance would be, and surrendered. Gustavo Ma- 
dero and Generals Yarza and Delgado were conducted to the coat 
room of the restaurant and placed under heavy guard strictly ' ' in- 
comunicado." Messrs. Romero and Sangines disappeared during 
the confusion without any one knowing how or when they had es- 
caped, for the attention of the party making the arrest had been 
concentrated on Gustavo Madero. 

At eleven o'clock that night, the prisoners were transferred 
to the National Palace and at two, the same night, officer Revilla 
conducted Gustavo Madero in an automobile to the Ciudadela 
where he met his death as will be described lalter. 

President Mkdero and Vice President Pino Suarez were eon- 
ducted that afternoon to the apartments used by the Administra- 
tive officers of Chapultepec at the National Palace, situated to 
the south of the Court of Hbnor. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 
AN ORGY OF BLOOiD. 

The Secretary of War was arrested in his office from which, 
at his own request, he was transferred under escort to the guard 
house where Madero and the other Secretaries were confined. 
Upon his arrival, the guard turned out to show him the honors as 
directed by the Militaiy Code. Greneral Garcia Peiia remarked 
that under the circumstances such honors were superfluous. He 
had only just greeted the President and his colleagues in the 
Cabinet, when new orders were received to conduct him to Mili- 
tary Headquarters. Shortly after, he was given his liberty. 

That afternoon at about five o'clock, Hiuerta arrived at the 
apartment where Madero was confined. He addressed Kadero 
as "Mr. President," but Madero interrupted, saying, "Oh, so 
I am still Presidenit. " Huerta then began again: "Mr. ex- 
President, I have already notified the Senate and the American 
Ambassador regarding what I have done, and they both approve 
my actions. Since I won the battle of Blachimba"— "Even then 
you were already a traitor," interposed Madero. This inter- 
ruption caused Hlierta to forget the speech he had been about to 
make, and after a few words, he took his leave. He shook hands 
with Mr. Lascurain and Mr. Hernandez, but on reaching Madero, 
the latter refused to extend his hand. General Huerta then of- 
fered his hand to Mr. Vazquez Tagle, who said : "I also refuse 
to shake hands with you. General. ' ' Huerta hesitated, then turn- 
ed away saying "God be with you."* 

At seven he gave orders that the Cabinet members be set 
free and be accompanied to their respective homes by aides from 
Military Headquarters. Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez, 
who left together, were escorted by Major of Rurales Francisco 
Cardenas and a Captain, personal aide to General Huerta. On 
their way back to the Palace, the escort stopped at the home of 



*These facts were related to me by one of the Cabinet Min- 
isters w^ho was at the side of Mr. Madero at the time. 

(173) 



174 FROM DESPOTISM TO AINARCH/Y 

Don Ignacio de la Torre to greet and give him an account of 
what had happened. Referring to Madero, Cardenas said : ' ' What 
I do not understand is why that contemptible dwarf is still alive. ' ' 
One of his hearers made some remark to which Cardenas replied : 

"Just let them give me the order and I'll kill him. That 

has done enough damage already. ' ' That same night Huerta was 
advised of Cardenas' willingness to be made executioner in the 
government which was being formed. 

No longer awaiting the appointment by the Senate, H'uerta 
sent for Mr. Lascurain on the following day, in order to persuade 
him of the absolute necessity that Madero resign so as to legalize 
the new government; that this was of urgent importance before 
the felicistas should recover and desire to take charge of the 
prisoners, as they had done with Gustavo Madero that morning. 
He reminded Mr. Lascurain of the tragic end of the President's 
brother. Finally, he assured Mr. Lascurain that as soon as Ma- 
dero and Pino Suarez resigned, they would be sent to Vera 
Cruz. Mr. Lascurain, who had been deeply moved by the tragic 
death of Gust:avo Madero, went immediately to see Madero. Gen- 
eral Juvencio Robles had, at the express command of General 
H'uerta, already taken the matter up with Madero, whose first 
impulse had been one of violence, and he had decisively refused 
to resign; but calmed by the remarks of the aged General, he 
had agreed to talk the matter over with his Cabinet, exacting 
first and foremost that he should have absolute guarantees that 
the life of Pino Suarez would be spared as also that of General 
Felipe Angeles, in Whom he was especially interested. General 
Robles offered to transmit! these conditions to General Huerta. 

When General Huerta had left the room, in which ]\%dero 
and his Cabinet were confined, he had gione immediately to the 
American Embassy where there were awaiting him Felix Diaz 
and the other persons who participated in the now celebrated 
compact described in the following chapter. At this moment, 
the orgy was started at the Ciudadela. 

Those w;ho had shared the danger of the tragic ten days 
with Felix Diaz, believing themselves triumphant, were celebrat- 
ing the event by carousing and singing. Some one proposed to 
finish the work by setting fire to the building of the champion 
of Maderismo, the newspaper ''La Nueva Era," a building 
which had been shelled from the Ciudadela during the battle. 
Soon after this suggestion, a party of men left the Ciudadela, 



AN OKGY OF BLOOD 175 

and presently the glare of the flames indicated that it had been. 
acted upon promptly. The same was done to the other Mladero 
newspaper. When Felix Diaz returned from the American 
Embassy after he had signed the famous compact, the orgy was 
at its height. It was impossible to command respect. The fumes 
of alcohol, the inebriety of triumph, the excitement caused by 
the flames, had transformed all these men into veritable beasts. 
The friends and partisans of F'elix Diaz besieged him and in- 
sistently demanded that he should force General Hberta to de- 
liver into their hands both Madero and Pino Suarez, so that 
they might execute them immediately in the very Ciudadela 
itself. Without waiting for the decision of General Diaz, Gen- 
eral Mondragion sent two aides in am automobile with a message 
to General Huerta, who refused absolutely to surrender his 
prisoners. They had not yet duly resigned. After the various 
exchanges of messages, the automobile returned to the Ciudadela 
with Gustavo Mladero about 2 A. M. 

Gustavo Madero arrived just as Felix Diaz had finisihed re- 
lating to his friends the happenings at the American Embassy 
and was about to retire. "General" said Revilla, an aide, who 
had brought Gustavo Madero, "General Huerta has ordered me 
to deliver this prisoner to you." "Turn him over to Mon- 
dragon, " said Diaz, and retired. When G^eneral Mondragon 
took charge of the prisoner, he turned to Zurita, an officer of 
the Military Academy who, with Messrs. Remes and Izabal, had 
just arrived at his quarters, and said to them. "Take this man 
and do to him what he and his men did to General Ruiz."* 

Zurita took Gustavo Madero by the arm, and ignoring his 
request to be allowed to speak with Felix Diaz or with General 
Mondragon, he pushed and pulled him out through the main 
gate to the small plaza where stands the statue of General Mbre- 
los. On reaching the threshold of the door, Madero who from 
the very first knew what to expect, offered a stubborn resis- 
tance. He talked entreatingly to the youngsters in an attempt 
to win them over. Grasping the frame of the door, he was able 
to withstand the pressure exerted against him, while in the mean- 
time he talked about his hapless children, about his own insig- 
nificance, claiminig that he had never had any real power. But 



*A11 these facts were related to me by an eye witness, whose 
name it is not yet advisable to publish. 



176 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

it was a mere waste of words and energy, for he was not allowed 
to continue, a cadet shot him inflicting a wound in the maxillary. 
An instinct of self preservation forced Madero to break and run, 
but he could only take a few steps and leaning against one of the 
wagons standing in the plaza, he let his head fall on his left 
shoulder. The pain caused by the wound must have been intense. 
Here he was caught by the men who had pursued him from the 
Ciudadela; they immediately fired on the hapless man, who, 
riddled by bullets, fell dead at the feet of his youthful murder- 
ers. When they saw him fall and ascertained that he was dead, 
they threw themselves on his inanimate body and stripped it of 
everything of value; sixty dollars, three letters from his wife, 
dated at Monterey, and a memorandum book whose last entry 
was "Everything is lost, the soldiers refuse to fight " 

Drunk with the taste of blood, these men returned to the 
Ciudadela, to demand that Hberta be forced to deliver in to 
their hands Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. Felix Diaz had 
already retired and could not be seen, but an aide again jumped 
into an automobile and went to the Palace. Huerta agiain re- 
fused to surrender them and the automobile returned to the 
Ciudadela. Rodolfo Reyes then said, "He should at least let 
us have Basso, who killed my father." The automobile again 
speeded to the Palace returning shortly with Mr. Adolf o Basso, 
Head of the President's Household, who had been held prisoner 
in Military Headquarters since the arrest of Madero and his 
Cabinet. Mr. Basso, an old sailor and retired major of artillery, 
immediately grasping what was in the air, turned to General 
Mondragon and said "I do not ask for mercy. I would not 
have shown mercy to you. ' ' 

General Mondragon, affected by the tragic death of Gustavo 
Madero, turned to Paulino Ortega, wtho had just arrived with 
fifty men from the cable office and said "Paulino, detail a firing 
squad for this man and see to it that the scene just enacted with 
Gustavo Madero is not repeated with him." 

Paulino Ortega, with his squad conducted Mr. Basso to the 
spot where Madero had died. When Basso saw the corpse he 
took of his hat, saying: "Poor man!"— "Hie died like a cow- 
ard,"* interrupted one of the men. Basso answered, "You 



*This is false. Mr. Gustavo Miadero was not a coward, but 
his enemies hated him even after death. 



AN ORiGY OF BLOlOD 177 

will not say that of me, ' ' and stepping in front of his guard, he 
added, ' ' Allow me to find the North Star, it has been my guide 
in many journeys ; I want to see it face to face now that I am 
making my last jjourney. " When he found the star, he fixed 
his gaze on it, again took off his hat and cried, "Viva Mexico! 
Shoot now!" A volley was heard and the body of Mr. Basso 
fell heavily ito the ground. Dr. Izabal* bent over him and order- 
ed the coup de grace to be fired, adding "It is useless now, he 
is dead." 

A few hours later, Mondragon's son arrived at the Ciuda- 
dela in an automobile with another prisoner, Mr. Oviedo, pre- 
fect of the neighboring! village of TIacubaya. Gieneral Mondra- 
gon had given orders that he also should be executed. Be fell 
shortly after, facing the statue of Morelos, on the very spot 
where Gustavo M'adero and Adolfo Basso had met their tragic 
end. All three bodies were interred on the spot. 

Om the morning of the 19th, after reading the newspaper 
reports, Don Angel Caso, a personal friend of Gustavo Madero, 
presented himself at the Ciudadela to claim the body of his 
friend; but there was no one to wihom he could speak; every- 
body was initoxicated.t Hje was finally able to obtain the desired 
order from Mir. O'con but no one would obey it. Then he went 
to Military Headquarters and General Blanquete gave him 
another very decisive order. But even this was ineffective. 
As a last resort, he went direct to General Huerta, who sent 
one of his aides with orders for immediate compliance with the 
instructions of General Blanquete. 

The disagreeable task of disinterrinig the dead from their 
sepulchre in the courtyard of the Ciudadela was then under- 
taken, to see if Madero's body could be found there. Thirty 
four were exhumed, but his body was not among them. The 
search was then abandoned. On the 25th, the Board of Health 
ordered that the bodies in the Ciudadela be exhumed and re- 
moved to the Dolores Cemetery. Wihen Mr. Caso heard of these 
orders, he went to the Cemetery to receive the bodies. Among 
the unsepulchred dead was the corpse of Gustavo Madero. It 
had been found in the yard, buried in a hole less than three 
yards deep and so small that it had been necessary to double up 



*Afterwards murdered by order of Huerta. 

tl do not include Felix Diaz, who is no drinker. 



178 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

the body so that it would fit in the grave. He, who in life had 
been the leader of the Progressive Constitutional Party, had 
been buried ignominiously at the foot of the statue of Mbrelos. 
Mr. Caso received the body, and escorted by two aides from 
Military Headquarters, he took it to the French Cemetery where 
it was laid to rest next to the body of the ex-President. The 
two brothers now sleep in a small roadway to the left as you enter 
the Cemetery. Here, loving hands frequently take floral gifts, 
a mute protest against the brutal deaths of which they were both 
victims.* 



*"When Gustavo Madero was arrested, knowing that he 
would be despoiled of everything, he hid a valuable stick pin in 
the lapel of his coat which he had carried with him during the 
tragic ten days in case he should suddenly need funds. When the 
corpse was found, Mr. Caso, aware of this fact, looked for the 
stick pin but it had disappeared; he was able, however, to obtain 
the pawn ticket from an employee of the cemetery, who had 
pawned it for two dollars and a half. This employee saw Mr. 
Caso looking for the pin and gave him the pawn ticket. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 



THE COMPACT AT THE EMBASSY. 



Under such existing conditions, the Diplomatic Corps could 
not remain idle. In those dark hours, those days of anguish for 
Mr. Madero, Mr. Pino Suarez, and their respective families, 
there was one man who played a conspicuous part, the Ambassa- 
dor of the United States, Mr. Elenry Lane Wilson.* Prom the 
9th of February, Mr. Lane Wilson had declared that the govern- 
ment of Mr. Madero no longer existed, and had proposed to the 
accredited Diplomatic Corps in Mexico the repudiation of the 
legitimately constituted government, but he was unable to gain 
the sanction of the Latin American Republics. He had on his 
side the Belgian Minister openly and the Guatemalan Minister 
timidly. When he saw that his suggestion was not accepted, 
the American Ambassador then suggested that Mr. Madero be 
asked in the name of the Diplomatic Corps to resign. This, 
he claimed, was the only way by which to reestablish order which 
had been disturbed by the military outbreak of Tacubaya. 
Hbwever, owing to the attitude taken by the representatives 
of Chile and Cuba, he did not dare to make the proposal openly 
at a meetinig of the Diplomatic Corps, but he chose rather to 
broach the subject privately to his colleagues. After he had 
obtained the consent of a number of them, he succeeded in con- 
vincing M]r. Cologan, the Minister of Spain, that it would be an 
act of Christian dharity to persuade President Madero that the 
Diplomatic Corps was of the opinion that he should resign in 
order to prevent the bloodshed that was imminent. Mr. Colo- 



*Mr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, Cuban Minister in Mexico 
at the time, has published in the "Heraldo de Cuba" nine articles 
beginning on March 14th, 1914, relating all the facts as referred 
to in ithis and succeeding chapters. 

(179) 



180 FRiOiMj DESPOTISM. TO AlNARCHY 

gan agreed to approach the President because with this plan, 
according to Mr. Lane Wilson, it was the desire of the Diplomatic 
Corps as a whole. He proposed it to Mr. Mladero bnt was flatly 
refused, though Mr. Madero understood quite well that Mr. 
Cologan was moved by no unworthy interest. Aside from the 
humanitarian emotion that had been aroused in his soul by the 
expressed fears of the American Ambassador, Mjr. Cologan had 
other reasons for believing himself justified in the step he had 
taken. Prominent members of the Spanish colony were involved 
in the movement headed by Mr. Felix Diaz, because they believed 
that the administration of Mr. Mladero was leading the country 
to destruction and that his downfall was essential to save the 
numerous interests in their hands. Some had personal inter- 
ests, the product of many years of labor; others had interests 
intrusted to them and dependent upon their wisdom and 
integrity. 

IVIir. Conzalo Giarita, who was entrusted with the collection 
of funds for the revolt of the Ciudadela, has made the stiate- 
ment that of all those wihio pledged themselves only the Span- 
iards had given the money they promised. This statement is 
not strictly true because I know that some Mexicans contributed 
for the support of the rebellion, but it does show the part play- 
ed by the Spaniards in the downfall of the Madero adminis- 
tration. Personally, I do not blame them. They were only de- 
fending their interests, which were gravely threatened; besides, 
the Spaniard in Mexico does not feel himself in alien land, nor 
in the majority of oases, does he consider himself a foreigner. 
According to definite facts obtained by the Spanish legation, 
there were fourteen Spaniards among the combatants of the 
Ciudadela. 

During the tragic ten days, Alnbassiador Henry Lane Wilson 
did not lose a single opportunity for putting obstacles before the 
government, nor for inciting his colleagues sio that daily diffi- 
culties arose ; sometimes he complained because bullets fell on 
the buildings occupied by the Legations, at other times, because 
troops camped near those buildings, and still at other times, 
because some of their own countrymen were wounded on the 
streets. 

The Ambassador did not once leave the Embassy. His 
house was a nest of conspiracy, but not once did he expose him- 



THE COMJPACT AT THE EMBASSY 181 

self to a bullet shot. On the other hand, the Spanish Minister 
was constantly within the danger zone; his automobile was hit 
by projectiles on several occasions and pierced in two places 
by bullets. 

When the Cuban government sent the cruiser "Cuba" to 
the port of Vera Cruz, the American Ambassador tried in every 
way to force a landing of the Cuban soldiers on board. His 
idea was to cause an international conflict, because he would 
then be able to intervene with the force on board the American 
ships. President Taft had forbidden the landing of these forces 
unless the troops of some other nation should land, or unless de- 
velopment of circumstances should render it absolutely essential. 

A paper to encourage the revolutionists was issued every 
day. It was printed on a press established for that purpose 
in the cellar of the very Embassy itself. Mr. Madero was never 
able to trace the origin or source of this paper. 

After Madero 's fall, the conduct of the Ambassador was 
even less that of a man of culture and education. On the after- 
noon of the 18th, a number of foreign ministers who wished to 
know the truth about what had happened, met at the Embassy. 
Mr. Henry Lane Wilson was not able to receive them imme- 
diately because he was busy with other callers. In one of his 
reception rooms and in his very presence, G<eneral Victoriano 
Hiuerta and Gemeral Felix D,4az were eonverlsing. Greneral 
Huerta was accompanied by Mr. Enrique Zepeda and Lieutenant 
Colonel Joaquin Mlaas. Brigadier Greneral Diaz was accompanied 
by Messrs. Eodolfo Reyes and Fidencio Hernandez. There was 
also present at the conference, Senator Guillermo Obregion who 
had come with M!r. Diaz. The object of the meeting was to discuss 
and agree upon; terms for the division of power between two con- 
flicting ambitions. The inevitable result was, as the fable tells 
us and as always happens in such eases, that the Lion took the 
Lion's share. Merely as a matter of form. General Huerta dis- 
cussed the merits of one or two of the Secretaries. For example, 
the portfolio of the TIreasury was taken from MGr. Carlos G. de 
Cosio in order to give it toi Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon. This 
gentleman was not consulted in the least. When the decision 
was reached, he was ordered to present himself on the follow- 
ing day at the Department of State to take office. 

When the list of Cabinet officers was complete. Ambassa- 
dor Henry Lane Wilson took it into the next room where the 



182 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

foreign Ministers were awaiting him. "Gentlemen" the Am- 
bassador said, to them, "the new rulers of Mexico submit to 
your approval the Cabinet that they are going to name. I would 
like to hear any objections that you may have in order that I 
may present them to General Huerta and General Diaz, who are 
waiting in Ihe next room. By submitting this list to us for our con- 
sideration, they show their desire to act in harmony with our 
respective governments. I firmly believe that with such methods, 
peace in Mexico is assured." Each of the foreign diplomats 
hastened to copy the list for himself. When they came to the 
name of Mr. Garza Aldape for Secretary of the Department of 
Agriculture, which was to be created, one of them objected, say- 
ing: "That man is a thief." "Mr. Garza Aldape," replied the 
Ambassador, "is only a prospective secretary." The Cuban 
Minister then said: "It is my opinion that we should neither 
disapprove nor approve anything. We should simply take note 
of all communications sent us and transmit them tO' our govern- 
ments." Since a majority of those present agreed with the 
opinion expressed by Mr. M'arquez Sterling, the Ambassador 
returned to the room where Hlierta and Diaz and their friends 
were awaiting him. H'e informed them that the Diplomatic 
Corps had no objection to the Cabinet as proposed. A few 
minutes later, the diplomats were invited into the presence of 
Huerta and Diaz. Then, before them aU, Riodolfo Reyes read 
with great emphasis what the public has called "The compact 
at the Ciudadela" but whidh in reality should be known by 
the name I give it, "The Compact at the Embassy." 

When the reading of this document was finished. Ambassa- 
dor Wilson and the Mlexicans present applauded. Then Huerta, 
stating that he had urgent business to attend to, took leave of 
those present. He intentionally left General Diaz for the last; 
on reaching! him, he hesitated a moment. It seemed as if both 
hesitated, but at length Hnierta opened his arms, and the two 
of opposing ambitions embraced, eaoh probably wondering how 
he oould destroy the other. Then applause broke out again, 
which as before, was led by his Excellenicy the American Ambas- 
sador, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson. 

The Ambassador accompanied Huerta to the door. On his 
return ih© met in the vestibule Felix Diaz whO' with his com- 
panions had just taken leave of the diplomats. On seeing Diaz, 



THE COMPACT AT THE EMBASSY 183 

Wilson cried ' ' Viva General Diaz, savior of Mexico ! ' ' The com- 
panions of Diaz ansiwered with a cheer; then, accepting an invi- 
tation from the Ambassador, they entered the dining room to 
partake with him a glass of champagne. At the time this took 
place, LHadero was still living and had not as yet signed his 
resignation !* 

The foreign diplomats heard all that occurred; they heard 
the clink of glasses, the popping of the corks when' the cham- 
pagne was opened. Obe of them passed the remark that it 
was strange that they themselves had not been invited to parti- 
cipate in the celebration; but the Japanese Charge d 'Affaires 
replied: '']\Itr. Wilson well knows whom- to invite on such 
occasions. ' ' 

When Mr. Wilson rejoined his colleagues, they simulta- 
neously exclaimed: ''Will not these men assassinate the Presi- 
dent ? " "Oh, no, ' ' rejoined Mr. Wilson, ' ' Madero will be locked 
up in a lunatic asylumi; as for the other, he is nothing but a 
scoundrel, so if they kill him it will be no great loss." "We 
must not allow it," said the Chilean MSnister. " "We must 
not meddle in the domestic affairs of Mexico," replied the 
Ambassador. "Let them arrange that themselves." Nobody 
spoke a word in reply. A few mioments later the diplomats si- 
lently withdrew from the American Embassy. Omce in the street, 
after crossing the threshold, one of them said: "This Ambas- 
sador is a queer man ; he does not refuse to allow a rebel chief 
under the very roof of his government to plot the downfall 
of the legitimate government to Vhich he is accredited; he 
is a willing witness to the compact; he even discusses the 
persons who will form the new government, without a thought 
as to whether or not the matter deals purely with the domestic 
affairs of the country ; but when the question turns to the sav- 
ing of the lives of two political officials, whom treason and in- 
famy are even now seeking to murder, then he finds that his 
position as a representative of a foreign power does not allow 
him to intervene, but he does criticize bluntly and with extreme 



*But Ambassador Wilson telegraphed to the American Con- 
suls all over Mexico to use pressure to have Ceneral Huerta re- 
cognized as President by the local authorities. A fac simile of 
the telegram was published by the " N. Y. World" verified by 
Consul Hanna of Monterey. 



184 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

indiseretiorL the executives of the government to which he is 
accredited." "You are right" replied another of the diplo- 
mats, "Maybe this is a secret cihapter of the IVlbnroe Doctrine 
of which we are as yet ignorant." "And talking about indis- 
cretions," he added, "will there be no newspape<r today?" 
"What for?" replied the other, "the printing plant has prob- 
ably been transferred today to a more convenient place." 



CHAPTER XXIX. 



THE RESIGNATION OF MADERO. 



On the afternoon of February 19ith a meeting of the mem- 
bers of the Diplomatic Corps was called by the American Am- 
bassador for the purpose of acquainting them with the communi- 
cation received from General Huerta announcing the fall of 
Madero and his administration. The Ambassador read before 
the meeting not only Htuerta's note, but also thie answer he had 
drawn up recognizing the new government. The Diplomatic 
Corps rejected Mir. Wilson's plan. They decided to wait until 
the following day before making a formal reply because so many 
rumors were afloat that they did not really know who was to 
be the head of the new government. 

After his plan was rejected by his oolleagtues, the Ambas- 
sador concentrated his efforts to force Madero to resign. The 
parents of the hapless President had addressed that same day in 
the morning, a note to Mr. Wilson requesting him, as ranking 
member of the Diplomatic Corps, to intercede on behalf of their 
sons. When they wrote, they were not; aware as yet that Gustavo 
Madero had been assassinated at dawn. They begged the Cuban 
Minister and the Japanese Charge d 'Affaires to personally con- 
vey their message to the Ambassador and to urge him to call a 
meeting of his colleagues. Messrs. Miarquez Sterling and Hari- 
goutchi knew well what to expect for they had been present the 
evening before at the interview between the American Ambassa- 
dor and the Chilean Minister. They therefore hastened to the 
Embassy where in the presence of several of the foreign repre- 
sentatives, notably Mir. Cologan, Minister from Spain, with due 
ceremony, they delivered their message. Mr. Wilson after taking 
note of the context, folded the paper and put it in his pocket, 
saying that the affair did not concern him at all. The Cuban 
Minister protested that the letter was not a private communica- 

(185') 



186 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

tion to the Ambassador, but an appeal to the Diplomatic Corps 
as a body, that therefore it was they and not the Ambassador who 
should decide the matter. The Japanese Charge d 'Affaires se- 
conded this opinion. Impelled by this opinion, Mt. Wilson hand- 
ed the letter from Mr. and M]rs. Mladero to the Spanish Minister.* 
On reading it, Mr. Cologan became highly incensed at Mr. Wil- 
son's attitude and declared that they should make every possibk 
effort to save the lives of the imprisoned officials. He further 
declared that if Mr. Wilson refused to issue a call for a meeting 
of the Diplomatic Corps, he himself as Dean would issue the 
necessary call and would lay before the Diplomats the attitude 
of the representative of the United States. After a very heated 
discussion, throughout which the Spanish Minister remained firm 
and unmoved. Ambassador Wilson consented to send a request 
to the new administration not to impose too severe a punishment 
on the ex-President. The gentlemen present openly opposed 
any such action for they rightly judged that such a step would 
be a tacit admission that Madero should be punished and they 
realized that by so expressing themselves, they would be over- 
stepping their functions as foreign representatives in Mexico. 
They could only interpose in the name of humanity ; above all, 
because they had been invoked by the parents of one of the vic- 
tims to save the lives of the prisoners ; but it was not for them to 
judge the actions of either those on one side or those on the other. 
It then seemed as if the Ambassador gave in, for he suggest- 
ed that the Diplomats go to General Siuerta and request him to 
spare the life of Madero. He urged however, that care should be 
taken not to call upon the authority of their respective govern- 
ments, since as a matter of fact, he himself had not received any 
instructions. H'is argument was that if the petition should be made 
in the name of the respective governments, the new officials would 
refuse their request so as not to give the world the idea that they 
had been coerced. When this proposal was accepted, Mr. Wilson 
offered to speak personally to Don Felix Diaz about the matter. 
The Spanish and the Cuban Ministers took charge of the affair 
and went immediately to the Palace. They were unable to see 
General Huerta there, but spoke instead to General Blanquete, 



*According to diplomatic usage, the Ambassador presides 
over the Diplomatic Corps regardless of the date of his appoint- 
ment ; next to him in rank follows the Dean, who is that Minister 
whose official reception dates back the farthest. 



THE RiESIGNATION OF MADERO 187 

who informed them that nobody had ever thought of killing Ma- 
dero ; that if he should resign, on that very same day he would 
be conducted under suitable guard to Vera Cruz where he would 
be allowed to board the first steamer sailing from that port. 
The Cuban Minister placed at their disposal the Cuban gunboat 
anchored at Vera Cruz for the deportation of Mladero and his 
family. Tlhen they discussed the details of the journey, even go- 
ing so far as to consider who would be the best person to put 
in command of the escort of the ex-President. " It is necessary, ' ' 
said one of those present, "that the leader of this escort should 
be not an irresponsible subaltern but an officer of rank, who will 
appreciate the responsibility of his position." "There is no 
objection to that," said General Blanquete, "in fact, the escort 
will be commanded by a General designated by Mr. Mladero him- 
self. ' ' Everything seemed satisfactorily arranged but the Diplo- 
mats, still desiring to have General H'uerta confirm the words 
of General Blanquete, went up stairs to the Pl-esident'si suite. 
Here they met Rodolfo Reyes, who immediately began to ex- 
press to thiem hisi regrets at the tragic end of Gustavo Madero 
and Mr. Basso, head of the President's household. The Diplomats 
remembered Mr. Basso because at a reception given by the Presi- 
dent on February 1st, they had ^had reason to praise the good taste 
and tact which Mr. Basso had displayed in his arrangements. 
Therefore, when they heard he had been killed, they naturally ask- 
ed the reasons which had led to his assassination. Reyes replied 
that he did not laiow the reasons but that he regretted the occur- 
rence ; then covering his face with his hands, as if in deep sorrow, 
he said : "I suppose my friends killed Basso because it was he who 
killed my father. ' ' Greatly alarmed at this news, Messrs. Ster- 
ling and Cologan insistently demanded an interview with Gen- 
eral Huerta in order to fulfil their mission, but without avail. 
Nobody seemed to know where General H'uerta was. Unable to 
see General Huerta, the diplomats went to the apartments where 
Madero, Pino Suarez and General Felipe Angeles were confined. 
Mr. Madero, surrounded by a majority of his Cabinet, was g'ently 
chiding Mr. Vazquez Tagle for having refused to shake hands 
with Hhierta. As soon as he learned the mission of the diplomats, 
he agreed to resign, but he stated that he would place the resigna- 
tion in the hands of the Chilean Minister who would turn it 
over to the proper authorities only after the prisoners were safe- 
ly aboard the Cuban cruiser. 



188 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAE'CHY 

The resignation was quickly drawn up and signed by Ma- 
dero and Pino Suarez. Wir. Lascurain took it to slbow to General 
Hnerta. Everything was now arranged. Madero with his short- 
sightedness, named General Angeles as commander of the guard 
which was to escort him to Vera Cruz. It was pointed out to him 
that this would be impossible since General Angeles himself was 
a prisoner and that such a choice would awaken the suspicions 
of his jailors. But argument was useless. The President would 
not yield the point. Still believing in his power, he thought that 
by such a course he could save himself as well as the prisoner 
for whom he had a great affection. He stubbornly clung to his 
idea and it was impossible to swerve him from his purpose. As 
usual, Madero through his obsessions was hastening events, ren- 
dering useless all efforts to save him. General Huerta would 
undoubtedly suspect that it was a trick. Madero with General 
Angeles in command of the escort, could frustrate his ambitions 
and nullify all his efforts, so naturally he would not sanction 
such a choice. Madero was personally signing his own death 
sentence. 

It was then and there decided that the prisoners should pro- 
ceed that very night to Vera Cruz accompanied in their journey 
by the Cuban Minister and the Japanese Charge d 'Affaires. The 
hour of departure was set for ten o'clock that nigiht, and Ma- 
dero requested the Cuban Minister to be at the prison at least 
two hours earlier. When all these arrangements had been made, 
without the knowledge or eonsent of General Hiuerta, the di- 
plomats again sought Huerta, but again without avail. They 
were unable to find him and were able to see only de la Barra 
and Vera Estaiiol, who assured them of the safety of the pris- 
oners. Thiey then returned to their respective homes hardly sat- 
isfied by the assurances they had received. 

Mr. Lascurain, Don Ernesto Madero, and Don Jaime Gurza 
had gone with the resignation in their hands to see General Huer- 
ta. The interview was a lengithy one. General Huerta consider- 
ed it out of place to allow the Fioreign Diplomats to meddle in 
the political affairs of the country. He maintained that the re- 
signation should immediately be placed in the hands of Congress, 
adding that if this were not done, he refused all responsibility in 
the matter, The army and the populace were both at a high 
pitch of excitement ; the followers of Felix Diaz were clamoring 
for a brutal slaughter; he himself had that very morning been 



THE E-ESIGNATION OF MADEBO 189 

seriously compromised by his repeated refusals to deliver the 
prisoners to the men at the Ciudadela, who, he held, were really 
the stronger party. He had heard rumors of an assault on^ the 
Palace with the object of murdering the entire Miadero family. 
He claimed that he himself could exert no authority until the 
power was turned over to him ; besides, he greatly feared that if 
this act were delayed much longer, deplorable events would take 
place; still, he refused to accept any responsibility whatever be- 
cause he feared the soldiers would not obey his commands. If 
the resignation should be withheld, there might be uprisings, for 
the suppression of whicih he did not have at hand the necessary 
resources. If uprisings were to break out, a veritable slaughter 
would result, for the populace was infuriated. Moreover, all 
the followers of Felix Diaz were hourly adding fuel to the flamies 
and not one of the family would be saved. The only salvation 
for all would be to make Ihis power real and effective by turning 
over to him the presidency. Hie could then assume all responsi- 
bility and he would then have the right to impose his authority 
■Rath the certainty that the army would obey him. 

M]r. Lascurain agreed that the Diplomatic Corps should not 
be allowed to mix in the affairs, but he hesitated to hand over 
the resignation. Then, in order that the transference of power 
should be accomplished in strict accordance with the Constitu- 
tion, it was agreed that the resignations of Madero and Pino 
Suarez be formerly accepted. Mr. Lascurain, as Secretary of 
State, would according to law, assume the presidency ; he would 
at once appoint General Hluerta, Secretary of the Interior, after 
which he himself would resign, thus leaving General Huerta 
Constitutional President. Huerta assured them that in this way 
everything could be satisfactorily arranged; that he would ans- 
wer for the lives of all, but only if immediate steps were taken 
so as to forestall any move on the part of the men in the Ciuda- 
dela. The picture thus painted before the eyes of Mr. Lascurain 
and his colleagues in those moments was one to cause real anguish. 
Mr. Lascurain still wavering, conferred with his companions and 
with some of the members of the Madero family. They all were 
of the opinion that necessity forced them to accept the harsh 
terms imposed by General Huerta in whose hands lay the fate 
of them all ; but they were also of the opinion that guarantees 
must be exacted from Huerta. Mr. Lascurain returned to Gen- 
eral Huerta and requested adequate guarantees for the lives of 



190 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAEiCHY 

Madero and Pino Suarez. "All that you like," replied Htierta, 
"you must either repose full confidence in me or none at all. 
If you do not give me this confidence, it is useless to continue 
this interview." He abruptly stopped talking, put his hand 
inside his shirt and drew out a scapulary, a medal of Our Lady 
of Ghiadaloupe, and another of the Sacred BDeart, which hung 
around his neck on a gold chain. ' ' These, ' ' he said, ' ' were placed 
around my neck by my mother; by her memory, and by these 
sacred images I swear to you that I will not allow any one to 
make any attempt against the life of Mir. Madero. ' ' Saying this, 
he solemnly kissed the sacred medals. Mr. Lascurain, an honor- 
able man and a devout Catholic, was fully convinced by this act 
and delivered into his hand the resignation. 

All present at once proceeded to the House of Representa- 
tives, after having made the necessary preparations for the ap- 
pointment of General Huerta as Secretary of the Interior, the 
swearing into office and subsequent resiguiation of Mr. Lascu- 
rain as Provisional President of the Republic. They found the 
Representatives already assembled. Roll call was omitted be- 
cause the affair was pressing, and because it would not be neces- 
sary to prove that there had been a quorum at this session. 
Everybody was called and everyone at hand was urged to enter 
the room. All were excitedly discussing the affair when the 
Hionse was abruptly called to order and the resignations of Ma- 
dero and Pino Suarez were read. Only five Congressman voted 
against the motion to accept these resignations. These five were : 
Leopoldo Hurtado y Espinosa, Antonio Alarcon, Manuel Men- 
dez, Francisco Escudero, and Luis Manuel Rojas.* 

Following the acceptance of this motion, the message of Mr. 
Lascurain, in which he appouited General Huerta as Secretary 
lof the Interior, was read; then followed the resignation of Mr. 
Lascurain, which was at once accepted. General Hiuerta and 
his aides had not for one moment quitted the room in which the 
session was held. They closely followed each move and probably 
prepared to take measures, no matter how extreme, to force their 
plan through. But its accomplishment was assured. The House 
of Riepresentatives of the 26th Constitutional Congress offered 
no opposition; it ignored the question of a quorum, and in no 



*Oopy of the minutes of the session will be found in the 
Diario de los Debates. 



THE EiESIGNATION OF MADERO 191 

way did it try to ascertaini whether or not the officials were act- 
ing with entire freedom in a matter of such great importance, 
A few of the memlDers of the House privately verified the sig- 
natures on the resignations as authentic. The Secretary of the 
Treasury could swear to them, if the honesty of Mr. Laseurain 
was not sufficient guarantee. The argument of terror was used 
against Mr. Laseurain. Against the Congressmeni General Buer- 
ta did not even take that trouhle. The followers of Don Felix 
Diaz took all the necessary toouble. Huerta dominated with his 
mere presence. 

The cowardice of the House made matters easy. That night, 
Huerta officially became Provisional President of Miexico. Im- 
mediately after taking the oath of office, he retired and no one 
was able to see him. 

In the meantime, the Madero family had arrived at the 
apartments of the Palace where Madero was confined. The Presi- 
dent embraced his mother saying : " I do not know what blind- 
fold God put over my eyes that did not let me see what Gus- 
tavo was pointing out to me." "My son," answered his mother, 
"this is no time for reproaches, we must pray God to save the 
living and with his divine mercy to pardon the dead." Until 
that moment Mtr. Madero had been unaware of the death of his 
brother, for he had not been permitted to read the newspapers 
containing the accounts of the occurrence nor had any of his 
visitors daTed tell him about the affair. Shortly thereafter, the 
family left in order to make preparations of the journey. 

Mr. Pino Suarez had written a long letter to his wife, w^hich 
he delivered, together with all the money he had at hand, to the 
Cuban Minister, Mr. Marquez Sterling, who true to his word, 
had arrived not two but nearly three hours ahead of the appoint- 
ed time, in order to accompany the prisoners on their contem- 
plated journey. Eimesto Mladero also came on a visit. The 
President questioned him closely, but he hesitated to answer and 
put him' off in every possible way even to leaving the room with 
the excuse that he had to telephone. Finally, however, he was 
so pressed by the President's questions that he reluctantly con- 
fessed that Mr. Madero 's resignation had, in spite of his express 
orders to the contrary, been presented to General Htierta as the 
only means of saving the lives of all of them. Mladero then cried : 
' ' I have fallen a second time into the trap set by that man ! 
Run, run," he said to Ernesto Madero, "and tell Laseurain not 



192 FROM DESPOTISiM TO ANARCHY 

to resign until we have all arrived at Vera Criiz." Don Er- 
nesto left at once, but returned shortly, saying, "I arrived too 
late. Huerta is already President and is even now arriving at 
the Palace after taking the oath of office before Congress." In 
fact, the Palace guards had just rendered the honors to the new 
president. 

"We are lost," said Madero, "no one can save me from two 
years in the Penitentiary at the very least." Poor Madero! 
Not for one moment did the possibility of his assassination enter 
his head. Pino Suarez on the other hand was not at all optimis- 
tic as to the end. He sat without saying a word, with his elbows 
on his knees and his head bowed down on his hands. Be was 
thinking of his family, of his children, all of them very young, 
who were to be left orphans and even perhaps in dire need. At 
intervals. Pino Suarez would toss his head as if trying to shake 
off the thoughts that obstinately occurred, but he would again 
fall into the silent and deep meditation in which he was wrapt. 
His wife arrived and they both exchanged a few words. Suarez 
took the letter and articles which he had turned over to the 
Cuban Minister and handed them to her. Both fully appreciat- 
ing the gravity of the position made the interview short. He 
seemed especially desirous of making it very brief. It may be 
that he wished to prevent his wife from witnessing the tragedy 
which he was momentarily expecting, for just as soon as she 
left the apartments, the Vice President gave a sigh of relief. 

Night fell, it was getting late, but still no preparations for 
the journey were visible. Ceneral Angeles observed that the 
sentries were being changed frequently and that the officer of 
the guard must have received new orders, because his attitude 
had undergone a change. As soon as this observation had been 
made, Madero sent messengers to inquire what the trouble was, 
but none of the messengers returned. They were "incomuni- 
cados." Gradually one after another of Madero 's visitors left. 
The Cuban Minister was the only one to remain. He had been 
requested to do so by Mr. Ernesto Madero who feared lest some- 
thing would happen to Madero and his fellow prisoners. The 
diplomat consented to remain, thinking that his presence might 
prevent the assassination of the prisoners that night. 

After Don Ernesto Madero had withdrawn, Madero re- 
covered his usual poise. Once convinced that the journey would 
not be undertaken, he had been unwilling to force the Cuban 



THIE DESIGNATION OF MADERlO 193 

Minister to pass an uncomfortable night, but he finally eonsent- 
ed to allow him to remain, owing to the insistence of Mr. Mar- 
quez Siterling himself and to that of Don Ernesto Madero, who 
in order to convince him, suggested the possibility that the jour- 
ney might perhaps have only been postponed until dawn. He 
made a couch for Mr. Sterling with three chairs and a blanket 
and then fixed one in the same way for himself. He persuaded 
the Minister to lie down, and covered him with another blanket ; 
then rolling himself in another, he lay down, and very soon fell 
into a heavy sleep. Mr. Piao Suarez remained all night in the 
position I have described. 

Mr. Lascurain, after he had relinquished the reins of govern- 
ment held by him for so short a time, left the House in search 
of the Cuban Minister. He went to the legation to accompany 
him to the station; not finding him there, he went directly to 
the station of Buena Vista, where he found the rest of the Ma- 
dero family waiting; but no Madero arrived. They telephoned 
to the Palace but no one seemed to know what the trouble was. 
At least, after a delay of two hours, they were able to speak to 
Colonel Maas, nephew of General Hluerta and Chief of Staff. 
The Colonel informed them that President Huerta had retired 
and had forgotten to sign the necessary orders. All understood 
by this that the journey would not be undertaken, and depart- 
ed. Lascurain first accompanied the members of the Madero 
family to their temporary residence and then retired to his 
own home. 

On the following morning, breakfast was served as usual 
at the Palace, but Pino Suarez with a dread that it might con- 
tain poison, did not wish to allow the Cuban Minister to taste 
it. But Mir. Sterling ia order to encourage the prisoners, 
quickly picked up a glass containing milk and took a sip. This 
act calmed the fears of Pino Suarez and they at once ate a hearty 
breakfast. 

That day Mir. Lascurain accompanied by M^. Vazquez Tagle 
and Mr. Gurza, made many efforts to see General Hluerta, but 
all were futile. The new President was very busy owing to the 
fact that he had to assist at the swearing in of his new Cabinet. 
He had to attend to a great many urgent and important mat- 
ters and therefore requested Mr. Lascurain and his companions 
to excuse himi, saying that he would see them later. On the fol- 
lowing day it was also impossible to obtain an audience with the 



194 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAE€H,Y 

Provisional President; he was again too busy. He had to re- 
ceive the Diplomatic Corps and to attend to pressing affairs. 

Then Mr. Lascurain and his companions attempted to 
speak with General Blanquete bnt were unable to do even that. 
They saw Mr. de la Barra and Mr. Vera EstanoL* These two 
gentlemen assured them that the lives of LDessrs. Madero and 
Pino Suarez were in no danger, that they would be transferred 
to the penitentiary. Permission was granted to Lascurain and 
Vazquez Tagle and Ourza to see Madero. In this interview, 
Lascurain explained to Madero why his orders in reference to 
the resignation had not been followed in strict compliance with 
the ex-President's instructions, whereupon Madero embraced 
Mr. Lascurain with warm expressions of his gratitude for what 
had been done. 

After his Cabinet had left, Madero turned to Pino Suarez 
saying with a smile : ' ' If I ever become head of the government 
again I will not have as my advisers men whose very courtesy 
and kindness makes them half men. I will surround myself ex- 
clusively with men who are really men." 

Mr. Madero did not lose his illusions even in the most tragic 
moments of his life. At the very instant when he was alluding 
to the possibility of coming into power, his death had already 
been decided upon. At the very moment, in fact, his execu- 
tioners were discussing the way in which he should be assassinated. 
He was day dreaming while his assassins, always alert, were 
preparing the scaffold on which he would be consecrated as 
a martyr! 



*0n his way with Mr. Gurza, they met Alberto Robles Gil, 
w*ho told them that the new Cabinet were badly disposed against 
Madero and wished to execute him, that he opposed it and would 
continue opposing it, but feared he would be overruled. All 
this was related to me by Mjr. Gurza himself. 



CHAPTER XXX. 
THE DEATH OF MADERO.* 



On February 22nd, 1913, the Cabinet met, as usual, at ele- 
ven o'clock in the morning. Besides the Cabinet officers, there 
were present expressly invited for the occasion, General Felix 
Diaz and General Aureliano Blanquete, Military Commander 
of the city and a blind instrument of Hnerta. 

Gjeneral Blanquete announced that as he himself did not 
wish to shoulder the legal responsibilities in a case of such impor- 



*The facts related in this chapter were given to me by a 
close friend of General Huerta. Later on, after the chapter was 
written, it was read by ex-Governor Enrique Zepeda who, in the 
presence of Lie Vicente Sanchez Gutierrez said this description 
of the facts is a perfect picture of the events. 

While I was in New York, at the snggestion of Mr. Calero, 
I called on Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon and also on Mr. Jorge 
Vera y Estanol, both Cabinet M&nisters of General Huerta when 
Madero was murdered. These gentlemen claimed that the ver- 
sion was wrong, as they didn't have any thing to do with the 
death of Madero, and they even denied positively that they knew 
anything about the events at that time. They were unable to con- 
vince me that my version is wrong. They contradicted each other 
and carried no weig'ht as evidence against the facts as related to 
me by an eye witness. 

Mr. Calero acknowledged that General Hhierta told him that 
when the facts are cleared up the public will be convinced that 
he had nothing to do with Madero 's death. The same statement 
was clearly sustained by Mr. Jose Maria Lozano, Secretary of 
Public Works, in a speech delivered at Xochimilco and cabled 
to "Le Matin" a Paris newspaper which published it on the 30th 
of March, 1914. 

Furthermore, this chapter was published in its full exten- 
sion by Mr. M. M^rquez Sterling, Cuban Minister in Mexico when 
Madero was mnrdered, and now chief editor of El Heraldo de 
Cuba, of Havana, on the 14th of April, 1914 issue of that daily 
paper. 

(195) 



196 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

tance and delicacy, it would be necessary for the Cabinet to de- 
cide the fate of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. Mjr. Bodolfo 
Reyes, Attorney General, opened the discussion by stating that 
in his opinion it was essential that they be executed in order to 
remove any possibility of a counter revolution, which would nulli- 
fy the sacrifices already made and the blood already shed. This 
opinion was very decidedly seconded by General Mlondragon, 
Secretary of War, but Mr. Alberto Robles Gil, Secretary of 
Public Works, opposed it although he too believed essential the 
death of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. He claimed that 
the psychological moment had passed, and that in politics, such 
an act committed after the psychological moment becomes a crime 
which can scarcely be condoned. 

However, the Cabinet as a whole emphatically supported 
the Attorney General, and the most prominent member argued 
that without the death of the ex-functionaries a counter revolu- 
tion would be inevitable; and, as such a revolution could be 
initiated only in their name, it would be a greater crime for the 
Cabinet to force the Nation to further bloodshed. The debate was 
now becoming heated, when General Victoriano Huerta, Presi- 
dent ad interim, who had hitherto maintained silence, interposed, 
saying he placed his honor as a soldier above all political expe- 
diency. He had pledged his word that the lives of Madero and 
Pino Suarez would be respected, and therefore could counte- 
nance no form of discussion other than the legal means for bring- 
ing them to trial, nor could he authorize their death unless le- 
gally sentenced. In answer to this statement, Mr. Reyes ob- 
served that such a course would lead to immunity for their 
crimes ; because, he argued, granted that they were convicted by 
the Courts, it would be practically impossible to carry out the 
sentence of death which would surely be imposed, as the Presi- 
dent ad interim would find it hard to refuse the pardon that 
would be undoubtedly urged by the rulers of the World Powers 
and thousands of other people. General Huerta thereupon prom- 
ised to take no definite action without the consent of the Cabi- 
net, and closed the discussion by placing the matter in the hands 
of the Attorney General for his legal decision regarding the 
Department which should have the custody of the prisoners. 
Without adjourning the session he immediately retired to anoth- 
er room accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. 
Toribio Esquivel Obregon, the only member who had not express- 



THE DEATH OF MADERO 197 

ed a single opinion on the matter, and by his private secretary, 
Mr. Aurelio D. Canale, who had just arrived with a number of 
urgent telegrams. 

Hardly had General Hhierta left the room, than General 
Blanquete, Mlilitary Commander of the City, bluntly stated that 
if the Cabinet deemed important the death of Miadero and Pino 
Suarez it would be necessary to execute them without the 
knowledge of the President as his statements left no doubt that 
he would never give his consent. The discussion was re-opened 
and at length it was agreed against the opinion of Secretary 
Robles Gil (*) that the welfare of the nation demanded the 
sacrifice of those two lives. This decision had no sooner been 
reached, than the Lliilitary Commander who had opened the dis- 
cussion and had intimated that he himself would carry out the 
execution without the President's knowledge, now claimed that 
as a soldier he could not disobey the orders of the President 
and could therefore give no orders for the execution. Be pro- 
ceeded to explain, however, that he could, if so ordered by the 
Secretary of War, deliver the prisoners to the Secretary of the 
Interior. Under the latter 's jurisdiction the execution could 
be placed in the hands of the rurales who are not so directly 
under the command of the President owing to the fact that the 
Military Code is not incumbent upon them. His plan, he con- 
tinued, was to have a sham attempt at rescue in the course of 
vi'^hich the prisoners should be killed. With this end in view, he 
already had in mind the officer of Rurales whom he could re- 
commend as best fitted to carry out the execution and in whom 
the greatest confidence could be placed. The plan was finally 
accepted, but not before the Military Commander had twice re- 
quested Mr. Felix Diaz who up to that time had not uttered a 
single word, to express his opinion on the subject, insisting 
pointedly upon a reply, so as to force himi to acknowledge his 
concurrence with the Cabinet. General Diaz finally admitted 
that he, like the Secretary of War, considered the death of Ma- 
dero and Pino Suarez indispensable. No sooner had this ac- 
knowledgment been made, then General Blanquete proposed that 
immediate action should be taken. The receipt for the change 
of custody of the prisoners was then and there drawn up by 
the Attorney General, Rodolfo Reyes, signed by the Secretary 



"*See note on page 194. 



198 FROM DESiPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

of the Interior, Alberto Garcia Oranados, and handed to the 
Military Commander.* At the urgent request of General Blan- 
quete, the Secretary of War and General Felix Diaz promised 
to leave to Mr. Cecilio Ocon the task of assemibling men to make 
the sham attack on the escort which was to convey the prisoners 
to the Penitentiary. Mr. Ocon had been paymaster of the forces 
in the Ciudadela and was therefore in touch with the kind of 
people demanded for such an occasion. General Blanquete fur- 
ther agreed to make arrangements at once with the officer of 
Rurales for the assassination of the doomed man. This officer 
was Francisco Cardenas, t Major of the 7th Corps, who during the 
past few months had been stationed in the District of Lerma, 
State of Mexico, under the direct command of General Blanquete. 
General Hberta's entry from an adjoining room in response 
to a summons from the Military Commander, broke up the Cabi- 
net meeting shortly afterwards, and thereupon Generals Mon- 
dragon and Blanquete hastened to the office of the War Depart- 
ment to issue orders for the official delivery of the prisoners, 
explaining the plan of action agreed upon to M!r. Cecilio Ocon, 
who held some position in the War Department. General Blan- 
quete suggested the advisability of having the assaulting party 
made up of men of the detective force so as to prevent the af- 
fair from coming to light and to this end Mtr. Oicon was commis- 
sioned to confer with Mr. Celso Acosta, Inspector General of 
Police. Upon being approac'hed, Mr. Acosta decided that it 
would be more advisable to have men from' the police rather than 
from the detective force, and immediately issued orders that ten 
armed men of the mounted police in civilian dress place them- 
selves under Mr. Ocon's orders. 

In the meantime the Military Commander, returning to his 
office, ordered that the guard in charge of the prisoners be re- 
lieved by the 7th Corps of Rurales under command of Major 
Cardenas. He also ordered Colonel Ballesteros, in the name of 
the President, to take charge of the Penitentiary immediately and 
come to an understanding with Major Cardenas. But as Mr. 
Ocon already had had a personal interview with the major and 



*Mr. Blanquete says he is not guilty of 'the murder, because 
both Mr. Miadero and Mr. Pino Suarez were out of his control, 
as proved by a document in his possession signed by Secretary of 
Interior Garcia Granados. 

tSee Chapter XXVTI "An Orgy of Blood." 



TIHE DEIATIH OF MADERO 199 

had planned with him all the details, Cardenas told Ballesteros 
that for the present there was nothing further to be done, so 
Ballesteros confined himself to the management of the Peni- 
tentiary, which he held for three days.* 

T!hat night the President and Cabinet Mlinisters attended the 
reception given by the American Ambassador to celebrate Wash- 
ington 's birthday. Whilst at the Eimbassy the great American 's 
birthday was being celebrated, and toasts were being drunk to 
one people's freedom, another people's freedom was being vio- 
lated at the National Palace, when, a few minutes before eleven 
p. m. General Chicarro accompanied by Major Cardenas was 
entering the room in which Messrs. Mladero and Pino Suarez 
were sleeping and was informing them of his orders to transfer 
them immediately to the Penitentiary. In spite of objections by 
Mr. Pino Suarez, they were obliged to dress quickly and were 
hustled into two automobiles, Mr. Francisco I. Mladero, Major 
Cardenas and a Rural entering one, and Mr. Jose Maria Pino 
Suarez, Officer of Rurales Rafael Pimienta, and another Rural, 
the other, t They rode through Rielox, Cocheras and Lecumberri 
Streets to the Penitentiary and upon arriving there, Cardenas 
left the automobile and exchanged a few words with Colonel 
Ballesteros. Hie then reentered the automobile and headed to- 
wards the rear of the Penitentiary where the men sent by Mr. 
Ocon were waiting. Mr. Madero, rather surprised, asked "Where 
are we going ? " " We are going in the back way, ' ' answered the 
Major. "But there is no entrance there," remonstrated Ma- 
dero, but had time to say no more for at that moment the as- 
saulting party fired a volley into the air and the machines were 
brought to a sudden halt. Mlajor Cardenas alighted and turn- 
ing to Madero he said, "Get down, get down quickly or one of 
those fellows may kill you." Mladero, always trustful, stepped 
down without a word, whereupon Major Cardenas fired on him 
from behind, the bullet entering his head, killing him instantly. 
Mr. Pino Suarez, who from the moment they had been awakened 
had suspected what was in the air and had so told Miadero, re- 
fused to move, but was forced to do' so by blows and pushes from 
his escort. No sooner was 'he out of the machine than Pimienta 



*Afterwards Mr. Ballesteros was promoted to Brigadier Gen- 
eral and was put in charge of the Penitentiary in October last. 

tl learned these details from Majior Cardenas himself. 



200 FKOM DESPOTISM TO ANAKCHY 

fired on himi, but either through nervousness or poor aim, the 
bullet did not inflict a mortal wound. He fell, however, but 
quickly picking himself up dashed away, shouting, "Help ! Mur- 
der!" Hlearing the cry, Cardenas, from the other automobile 
darted after him and fired with deadly aim. Pino Suarez fell 
to the ground mortally wounded, and the police were ordered to 
finish the work by firing on the prostrate form. Cardenas him- 
self discharged a final shot, the coup de grace, into the dead 
man's head. Hb then turned to where the lifeless body of Mr. 
Madero lay stretched upon the ground, and fired again into the 
head of the hapless ex-President, although death had been in- 
stantaneous. The bodies were then taken into the Penitentiary 
where M!r. Madero 's was wrapped in a red blanket and Mr. 
Suarez 's in a gray one, and both interred in one of the yards 
of the building. No sooner was this done than the leaders iu'- 
formed the Military Commander and the Inspector General of 
Police by telephone that the escort of Mbssrs. Madero and 
Suarez had been attacked and the prisoners had been killed in 
the encounter. General Blanquete, who had slept all night at 
Mlilitary Hleadquarters at once personally communicated the 
news to General Huerta who was in the same building because 
he had moved his private residence ^^o the National Palace. The 
President had just arrived from the American Embassy where 
he had spent most of the night in conversation with ]\Ir. Henry 
Lane Wilson, and on hearing what had happened then and 
there ordered an immediate special meeting of the Cabinet. One 
of the official advisers of General Hfuerta carried the farce so 
far as to ask the Military Commiander over the phone what the 
trouble was and whether the business in hand was really impor- 
tant, as he was very tired. Otn being informed by General Blan- 
quete personally as to what had happened, he replied that he 
would leave at once for the Capitol. The President also gave 
orders that an aide be sent to request the immediate presence 
of t^e American Ambassador at the Palace. AA^en the Cabinet 
officers had assembled they related to the President what had 
happened, making it clear that Mtr. Felix Diaz, who was con- 
sidered as sharing the power with him, had been in full accord 
with the occurrence, and that measures had been taken to pre- 
vent the disclosure of the plot at the inquest. Furthermore, 
they declared, a letter from Mrs. Madero, which could easily be 
interpreted as a plan of rescue, had been found in the room 



THE DEATH OF MADERO 201 

where Madero had been imprisoned, and this could easily be used 
to place the blame for the entire occurrence on the Madero fam- 
ily. Besides, the autopsy would disclose that the bullets did not 
belong to any of the escort.* The President was further ap- 
praised of the fact that rather than run the risk of having the 
plans overturned by some unexpected change of judges in the 
civil courts, it had been deemed advisable to place the case in 
charge of the Mlilitary Courts, over whom more effective con- 
trol could be exercised. Illpon learning all that had occurred, 
the President expressed his chagrin but declared the necessity 
of submittiQg to the inevitable by accepting accomplished facts. 
The Military Commander, who had previously ordered the burial 
of the bodies of Messrs. M'adero and Pino Suarez, now telephoned 
that they be at once exhumed and washed and that the autopsy 
be held. For this he detailed an army surgeon in whom he had 
entire confidence. 

Two courses of action were now open to the President, as he 
told to his close friends, in the situation officially created by his 
Cabinet Ministers : Either to break at once with the men of the Ciu- 
dadela, or to accept the fraudulent story of an assault in the course 
of which the two former officials met their death. G^eneral Hkierta, 
on learning the situation from his advisers, lamented the course 
events had taken. He declared to his friends with the request that 
they make public his sentiments, that he would never forgive 
his Cabinet for what they had done, but that at that moment he 
lacked the necessary strength to oppose the triumphant partisans 
of Felix Diaz, and in consequence felt obliged to accept the 
version given him by those in charge of the execution. Thus 
did Huerta choose the second alternative. Thereupon, it was 
officially announced that a miob intent on rescuing Messrs. Ma- 
dero and Pino Suarez had assaulted the autos and that in the 
ensuing fight the two prisoners had been killed by the mob. The 
autopsy was held and the bodies were placed in zinc-lined coffins 
which were tightly sealed and delivered for burial to the re- 
spective families of the dead officials. The body oi Mr. Madero 
was placed in the Fi*ench Cemetery where it rests in a grave 
near the entrance, and that of Mr. Pino Suarez was buried in 
the Spanish Cemetery. Both rest in foreign soil ! 



*The arms of the Rurales are Mauser 0.0075 and the Mounted 
Police were armed that night with RIemington 0.44. 



202 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

AS soon as the Cabinet meeting adjourned, the President has- 
tened to Military Headquarters where Ambassador Henry Lane 
Wilson awaited him.* It was there that the latter gentleman 
composed the telegram to his government stating what had oc- 
curred, and rig'ht from Military Headquarters telephoned for 
an employee of the Embassy to caU for it. The version given to 
the United States contained the lie that the escort of Madero and 
Pino Suarez had been attacked and the prisoners killed in the 
skirmish. 

But the public was not deceived, and to everybody the real 
instigator of the crime was General Euerta. The Cabinet had 
fallen into a skillful trap and had assumed the role of instiga- 
tors of an assassination that the President and his close friends had 
planned with cunning. 

On the following day Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, upon learning what had happened, ten- 
dered his resignation, but the President flatly refused to accept 
it, saying, "No, my friend, it would be very fine for you like 
Pontius Pilate, to wash your hands, but such things don't go 
with me. Together we all came into power, and together we'll 
all go to Hell if necessary, with equal responsibilities; but you 
cannot palm these two dead men on us." The gesture of Gen- 
eral Huerta was so forceful that the Minister did not dare to 
insist upon his resignation. Tihis resignation, however, the Presi- 
dent was soon to demand, as his remark about hanging together 
was merely one of the jests characteristic of him; and in fact, 
he was eventually, half in jicst and half in earnest, to demand 
the resignation of every single member of that Cabinet. He had 
appointed them because it had been so exacted of him by Gen- 
eral Felix Diaz and his friends at the critical time when he was 
obliged to make it appear that he was coerced by the rebels of 
the Ciudadela to betray the government of Madero, and he had 
appointed them particularly because that was the surest way for 
him to obtain the Presidency which, after all, was really his ulti- 



*When this chapter was published in the "New York Times," 
Mr. Henry Lane "Wilson in an interview published six days later, 
claimed that this narrative was of my own malicious fabrication, 
but he produced no evidence to prove it ; on the other hand the 
facts were related to me by an eye witness, who was at military 
headquarters that evening, and said that he had seen Mr. Henry 
Lane Wilson there, so I cannot change my opinion. 



THE DEATH OP MADERjO 203 

mate aim. For, the American Ambassador had given his con- 
sent and had accepted in the name of the Diplomatic Corps, the 
proposed Cabinet. In General Hlierta 's opinion at that particular 
moment, this assured the recognition by all the Powers of the 
government over which he was about to preside, and as such a 
recognition was essential to enable him to obtain the loan which 
ifc was imperative to negotialte, he consented to everything. But, 
finding himself secure in power after having gained the recog- 
nition of the Powers and obtained the loan, General Huerta had 
no further use for these Ministers who had been forced upon him 
by Felix Diaz at the American Embassy, and therefore would 
displace them in short order. Such was the intention of the 
new President when he appointed them, and this intention as 
we shall see, was carried out within six months. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 
THE MONEY ORGY. 



The felicistas were delighted. Mr. Rodolfo Reyes and the 
friends of Felix Diaz believed that the so-called compact of the 
Ciudadela gave them power perhaps for all time. They believed 
that they had deceived General Huerta, when in fact they them- 
selves were being deceived by him. As a whole, the Cabinet 
met with public approval, firstly, because the new incumbents 
were considered more competent than the men who had been 
ousted; secondly, because it promised the reestablishment of 
peace which was craved by all; and thirdly, because it assured 
the withdrawal of Mladero from the government, which the pub- 
lic desired being convinced that it was worse than the adminis- 
tration of General Diaz. Besides, the general impression was 
that H!uerta was an intelligent man. It was natural therefore 
that the people, tired of so many revolutions, should be ready 
and glad to countenance the new government. There were some 
skeptics among us who believed that the collapse of the govern- 
ment was a thing of the near future. We were called disaffect- 
ed and accused of lack of patriotism, but the fact was that aside 
of its treacherous origin we knew the men identified with the 
government; we knew the history of each; we knew just what 
each was worth, and consequently we could well foresee what their 
real work would be. Unfortunately, we were not mistaken. The 
public itself soon began to lose all hope in them. The Cabinet, 
instead of dedicating itself to the task of finding a way to re- 
conciliation and harmony for the purpose of obliterating the 
memory of recent events and of joining all Mexicans as one 
family, chose rather to seek revenge for old wrongs which had 
absolutely no connection whatever mth the existing situation. 
Some of the Cabinet members took even a more practical view 
of affairs and began a veritable despoliation of the national cof- 
fers. The War Department principally was the scene of the 

(204) 



THE MONEY ORGY 205 

most scandalous outrages ever recorded in the history of our 
country in the frauds perpetrated against the Treasury. I will 
set forth some examples. 

During Madero's administration the Inspector of the Com- 
aiissary Department had refused from a i'actory "La Estrella," 
in which the Miaderos had an interest, a lot of four thousand uni- 
forms. These uniforms were now accepted at two and one-half 
dollars more per uniform than allowed by the official schedules. 
It is needless to state that General Mondragon, Secretary of War, 
and a son of the President both received very liberal commissions 
for this act. The samie thing was done in the purchase of two 
thousand horses to replace the losses suffered by the cavalry. 
The contractor should have delivered the horses at $65.00 per 
head, but the government paid for them at the rate of $130.00. 
For sandals — a special kind in general use among the lower classes 
in Mlexico — the government was charged one dollar and a half 
more per dozen than the value; the same thing happened with 
cartridge boxes, with saddles for the cavalry, and in fact with 
whatever supplies were needed for the army. All these purchases 
naturally meant a heavy commission for the Secretary of War, 
and some of them meant an additional rake off for one or another 
member of the President's family. General MJondragon made 
contracts for everything, uniforms, arms, belts, ships, aeroplanes, 
etc., etc., in such quantities as would obviate further purchases 
for years to come. 

One of the higher employees made a compilation which show- 
ed that if all the contracts made by Mondragon during the four 
months he was in office had been carried out, his commissions 
would have reached the inconceivable sum of $3,460,000.00. And 
this in only four months ! 

What was happening in the War Department was also hap- 
pening in other departments. In the Department of the Interior, 
the needs of the Rurales and the police were filled for years to 
come; in the Department of Public Instruction, such supplies, 
for instance, as paper which was sold to the general public at one 
dollar ninety cents, was charged up to the government at two 
dollars and sixty-five cents. In all justice to Mr. Garcia Granados, 
I must state that all the grafting in his department was done 
entirely without his knowledge. 

Everybody wanted to make big deals in order to accumu- 
late a fortune in a few days. It seemed as if the government 



206 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

was the only source of riches; and the men, judging that the 
new government could not exist very long, sought to embrace the 
opportunity at hand. When it was learned that the government 
desired to float a loan, hundreds of proposals poured in. All 
posed as representatives of foreign syndicates, each more power- 
ful than the other, and all used every influence possible to be the 
chosen ones. Mondragon, who naturally could not be expected 
to let such an opportunity slip through his fingers, pretended 
to represent a group of French capitalists and made every effort 
to obtain the option. LJ^r. Moheno and several others also used 
the same plans. Among the most unique and worthy of note 
was Mr. Jose Hi. Aspe. 

This gentleman had originally been a very vehement Por- 
firista. In fact he made a very heated speech in the Bouse on 
the day the resignation of General Diaz was accepted.* After 
the fall of Porfirio Diaz, he had figured as a firm supporter of 
Mr. Madero whom he accompanied every day on his morning con- 
stitutional through the woods of Chapultepec. He had succeed- 
ed in obtaining an appointment as representative from the dis- 
trict of Misantla in the State of Vera Cruz, the bloody details 
of which I have set forth in another chapter, t Later he was 
appointed Mnister from Mexico to Italy, but his credentials 
were never issued because Mr. Esteva, who occupied the post 
for many years, successfully fought against his removal. Af- 
ter the victorious uprising against Madero, Mr. Aspe suddenly 
remembered that he had been a classmate of Felix Diaz in the 
Military Academy and joined the ranks of the Felicista party 
in support of his old classmate, playing an important role before 
the House for the acceptance of Mladero's resignation. He then 
attempted to obtain an option for the loan which was about to be 
floated in Europe. He made a bid, justifiable in itself, but it hap- 
pened that the Secretary of the Treasury, at a loss what to do with 
the many proposals received, and by the many requests for options, 
finally telegraphed to Paris regarding the responsibility of the 
firm of which Mir. Aspe posed as agent. The answer he received 
was that the firm did not exist in Paris and was not even known 
in the Paris business world, or rather, cables from Paris were 
being sent with the signature of a man who had not authorized the 



*See Chapter II. 

tin the complete Spanish edition. 



THE MONEY OKGiY 207 

use of his name and did not even desire to have any connection 
whatever with the loan. The letters miade public by the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, Mr. Esquivel Obregon, show clearly the 
audacity of some persons and at the same time prove the authen- 
ticity of these statements. The letters were as follows : 

A letter from Representative Aspe and a reply thereto from 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Miexico, June 24th, 1913. 
To the Editor of the Imparcial, 
Addressed. 

Dear Sir: I beg to request that if convenient, you will 
kindly publish in your paper the enclosed letter which is a copy 
of one I am today addressing to the Secretary of the Treasury 
and National Credit. 

Thanking you in advance for the courtesy of your columns, 
I am 

Yours very truly, 

J. R. Aspe. 

Mexico, June 24th, 1913. 

The Honorable Secretary of the Treasury, 

The Honorable Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon. 

Sir: I have just read in today's paper the reply you 
make to an open letter addressed to you by Representative Que- 
rido Moheno, relative to the loan or contemplated loan, in which 
you make some statements referring to the proposals I had the 
honor to make you. 

Not desiring to interrupt the progress of the affair, which 
1 sincerely trust will be successfully consummated, I nevertheless 
reserve to myself the right of proving minutely and decisively 
the honesty and advantages of my proposals. At the same time, 
I wish to take advantage of the time limit you publicly set, 
the 26th' inst., on which day the truth of the facts can be con- 
clusively proved. 

However, since the reply to which I refer, is not substantiat- 
ed by your signature, since some of the statements contained 
therein may not perhaps be entirely authentic, and since any 
corrections I might now offer could only serve to complicate the 
situation, I limit myself to request that you be kind enough to 
answer the following points: 



208 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

1. Do you confirm the statement that you are in receipt of 
a "cable from the Financial Agent of the Mexican Government 
irt London advising you in the name of the Syndicate itself 
(Syndicat des Banquiers de Province) that this syndicate had 
no interest whatsoever in the affair"? 

2. Do you confirm the statement "That the accredited re- 
presentative in Mexico of this Syndicate (Syndicat des Ban- 
quiers de Province) has denied that his firm was interested in 
the loan"? 

3. Do you confirm the statement that "to a cable sent by 
the TTeasury Department to Mr. Petit, he cabled in reply deny- 
ing any participation in the proposal"? 

I remain, 

Yours respectfully, 



Mexico, June 25th, 1913. 
To the Editor of the Imparcial, 
Present. 

Dear Sir : You will find herewith enclosed a copy of the 
letter I am this day sending to Mr. Jose R. Aspe in reply to 
his letter published today in several newspapers on the subject 
of the loan, and I request that you kindly have it published in 
your paper. 



I am, Dear Sir, 

Yours very truly, 

TO. ESQiUIVEL OBREGON. 

Mexico, June 25th, 1913. 
Mr. Jose R. Aspe, 
Addressed. 

Dear Sir: In reply to your communication of yesterday, 
I beg to state that I sincerely regret the necessity of referring 
again to the proposal you made me regarding the loan. I have, 
however, been forced to do so by Representative IMbheno and 
I repeat, I do so with sincere regret. This feeling I have, not 
because I think I can injure the good name of one to whom I 
have always been bound by ties of friendship, one whom I 



THE MONEY ORGY 209 

have never believed to have had any ulterior motives in making 
the proposals, but because the circumstances might hurt his 
pride, and self respect whicli I would have respected had public 
interest not forced me to allude once more to your participation 
in the affair. 

With this explanation I shall now proceed to grant your 
request. In order to make certain facts concrete, and in order 
that they may appear not as my personal opinions because I 
still do not wish you to think I mean you any harm, but that 
they may appear as undeniable facts, I shall now set forth the 
telegrams which made me form my judgment. 

I requested you to transmit to Paris the fact as the govern- 
ment could not consider proposals coming through Peindre, 
Denois & Roumagnac, the Syndicate of Bankers of Province, 
should address me direct. You agreed to do this, but in spite 
of that, on May 21, I received a cable in F'rench which translated 
freely reads as follows : 

"We repeat our offers made to Legation. We confirm ac- 
ceptance of imhiediate loan conditions proposed by Rioumagnac 
intermediary Aspe will sign here with Charge D 'Affaires or 
await yoar representatives counting first on your support for 
the Syndicate Bankers Province Peindre. ' ' 

In this cable, the last sentence has the word "pour" which 
in French has two meanings. It: could either mean "for" in the 
sense that it was intended to show that Peindre was signing for 
the syndicate, or it could mean "for" in the sense of only re- 
questing our support for the firm since there was nO' period and 
no separate signature. But it is clear that if the cable had been 
sent in accordance with my demand that the Syndicate itself 
wire me direct, the apparent intention of this cable was to con- 
vey the impression that my demand was being complied with 
while at the same time leaving a loophole of escape should any 
question arise as to fraudulent use of the signature. The tele- 
gram as can be clearly seen was not one to inspire confidence, 
and I therefore insisted that Mr. Pdit, Director of the Bank of 
Province, should himself communicate with the Department. By 
this time my suspicions were aroused and I did not wish to rely 
solely upon a reply which could be sent from Paris by any one 
whatsoever. For this reason on May 23rd, I cabled direct to 
Mr. Petit, Directior of the Bank of Province, as follows : 



210 FROM DESPOTISM' TO ANARCHY 

' ' For my information kindly cable confirmation of proposals 
for loan to M'exican Government of fifteen to twenty million 
pounds sterling at 87 (eighty-seven) pounds; 5 (five) per cent 
interest ; fifty years, made in your name by Aspe. ' ' 

That very day I received this reply : 

"We confirm with full guarantees proposals Roumagnac 
intermediary Aspe. We authorize power of Peindre. Greetings. 

"Petit, Director Syndicate Bankers, Corf. Financial Agent." 

Here though the name of Petit appeared, it was not with 
the full title of the Syndicate of Banksi of Province, nor that 
of the Association of Banks of Province, according to the newest 
firm name of the institution. No, he merely signed himself Di- 
rector of Syndicate of Bankers, and as there could exist thous- 
ands of Syndicates of Bankers, the personal identification had 
been eliminated with a singular lack of cleverness. 

On the following day I received a reply direct from Mr. 
Petit, which reads : 

"A long time ago we formulated proposals with view to 
granting loan amounting only to fifty million francs. In view 
of the greater importance of the contemplated transaction and 
owing to other obligations, we have not confirmed proposals. 

"Petit Synprobank." 

"Synprobank" is the cable address of the Syndicate of 
Banks of Province, or rather, Central Association of Banks of 
Province. 

This same cable was transmitted to the Department by the 
Financial Agent of the MIexican Government under date of the 
26th. On the 24th I had received from Vera Cruz another cable 
herewith quoted : 

"I advise I am in receipt just now message Achille Adam 
President Societe Central Banques de Province notifying me 
that said bank has made no bid on the loan of 500 million. Make 
use of this notice at your convenience and with no reservations 
whatever. Signed Mkurice Armand Delille. " 

Mr. Delille is authorized agent in Mexico for the Syndicate 
of Banks of Province. 

Such are the facts of the matter. 

I note, however, a peculiarity, and that is that among the 
various names given to the group in whose name you make the 
proposal, is that used in your above mentioned letter ' ' Syndicat 
des Banquiers de Province, ' ' and it is possible that the Treasury 



THE MONEY ORGY 211 

Department committed a grave error in addressing itself to the 
Syndicat des Banques de Province." 

This deserves an explanation : 

When yon first filed your proposal and I informed you that 
1 would not entertain it unless submitted by a banking house of 
high and recognized standing, you mentioned the Syndicate of 
Banks of Province which is in fact a first class institution. On 
that basis, which was a condition I exacted from all those who 
spoke to me about the loani, we were able to enter into negotia- 
tions. Had I known that we were dealing with a syndicate of 
bankers of a province in general terms, I would never have con- 
sented to continue negotiations in spite of the fact that Messrs. 
Peindre and Roumagnac were members of the syndicate, and 
that the latter gentleman is well known in Mexico, and Central 
America. Moreover, it is a very suspicious coincidence that the 
Director of the Syndicate of Banks of Province should be Petit, 
likewise that of the Syndicate of Bankers of Province, and that 
the latter should have accidently signed the cable when I especi- 
ally demanded his name to appear. 

If you still have any doubts whatsoever as to the cables 
transcribed herewith, I will show them to you personally or give 
the necessary orders to the cable office to produce them at your 
request. I am, 

Yours very truly. 



As I have said, General Mondragon was also posing as the 
representative of a Mr. M,tercurio, wiho called himself agent of 
another syndicate of French bankers. General Mondragon went 
so far as to cause an attack in the House of Representatives to 
be made against the Secretary of the Treasury for refusing to 
deal with the mysterious stranger recommended by the Secre- 
tary of War. This resulted in an unprecedented event in the 
history of the M'exican Congress and probably of any other par- 
liament of the world; that the Secretary of the Treasury should 
question the Secretary of War in an open session of the House. 
Mr. Mondragon presented himself before the House and after 
cross examination by Mr. Esquivel Obregon, confessed that the 
Secretary of the Treasury had acted wisely in the affair and 
had demanded from those who posed as representatives of foreign 



212 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

syndicates proofs as to who they were as well as to their financial 
responsability. When Mr. Aspe and General Mlondragon both 
found themselves in a false position, they placated the public 
and requested that it withhold final judgment for a few days 
when they could present proofs of their statements. These proofs 
naturally have never been submitted up to date although ten 
m-onths have elapsed since these events took place. 



CHAPTER XXXIl. 



THE REIGN OF TERROR. 



The entrance of Don Aureliano Urrutia to the Cabinet was 
not exactly the beginning of the policy of terror, but just at 
that time measures became so bitter that the public naturally 
began to associate both facts. The first victim of the reign of 
terror was Mr. Edmundo Past:elin, alternate congressman for the 
district of Tuxtepec, State of Oaxaca, a trusted employee of the 
firm of Samuel Bros, of Mexico City. Mr. Pastelin who was 
accused of heading a plot against the government of Huerta, 
was arrested as he reached his home on the evening of June 11th 
and was executed without trial two days later in the Peni- 
tentiary.* 

Shortly after, on July 7th, Mr. Pablo Castaiion y Campoverde 
was arrested at his office and sent to Iguala where he was executed 
by Colonel Reynaldo Diaz by direct orders from the government. 

On the 14th of the same month, Messrs. Jesus Velazquez 
and Domingo Juarez, Justices of the Peace in the village of San 
Pedro Mlartir, were denounced to the government by their per- 
sonal enemies, the O'znaya brothers, and both were executed. The 
accusation against tlhem was that in league with Zapata, they 
were the agents who supplied the rebels of Morelos with ammuni- 
tion. They denied the charges and were supported in their pro- 
testations by the villagers, but the government remained inflex- 
ible; and although the charges were not proved, the men were 
executed in the vicinity of Ajusco. 



*The government first stated that Pastelin had escaped, 
then it stated that he had died in an encounter. Both false- 
hoods, for an eye witness to the execution gave me a detailed 
account of it. 

(213) 



214 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

On the 20th of August it was rumored that Representative 
Enrique Bordes Mangel had been executed, but this rumor proved 
false,* 

On the night of August 22nd, as Representative Serapio 
Rendon was leaving the house of Mrs. Clara Scherer, he was ar- 
rested by agents of the Department of the Interior, t bound and 
gagged, and taken in an automobile to the neighboring town of 
Tlakiepantla, where Commander of Rurales Fortuno Miramon 
shot and killed him. Several stories regarding the death of this 
congressman became current, but the facts here narrated were 
told me by the brother of Mr. Rendon, who in turn obtained 
them from the Major of the regiment commanded by Fortuiio 
Miramon. This man was himself killed by Miramon on the ar- 
rival of the regiment a:t San Luis Potosi while on the way to 
join the forces attacking Torreon. On the road, Miramon and 
his second in command began a game of cards, which culminated 
in a quarrel in which the Major was killed and Miramon serious- 
ly wounded. 

The facts of Riendon's murder, as related to me, are as fol- 
lows : Congressman Rendon was taken at night to Tlalnepantla, 
where he arrived while Fortuiio Miramon was at dinner. When 
the bonds and gags were removed, Miramon ordered his Major 
to sitand Rendon up against a wall and shoot him. The Major, 
however, who knew Rendon and was aware that he was a congress- 
man, demanded a written order to that effect, since he did not 
wish to be broug'ht up next day on the charge of having executed 
a member of Congress without due authority. "This," he said, 
* ' is a man of importance and I refuse to be a scapegoat. ' ' For- 
tuno Miramon replied : ' ' Order be d— ; if you do not shoot 
him, I w^ill." "Do as you like" said the Mlajor, "I won't shoot 
him." Ml-. Rendon, to whom nothing whatever had been said 
since his arrest, saw that the affair wasi becoming serious, that 
he was to be killed without a chance of escape. Desperately he 
tried to convince Miramon that this would be murder, but could 
gain no respite other than a few moments to write a farewell 
to his family. As he was writing to his wife, Fortuiio Miramon 



*0n the 20th of August a well dressed individual was mur- 
dered in Tlalnepantla. This man was mistaken for Mr. Bordes 
Mangel. 

tMr. Reudon was arrested as he reached his home situated at 
No. 35 Industria street, three houses from mine. 



THE REIGN OF TERROR 215 

placed his pistol at Rendon's head and fired, killing him in- 
stantly. A squad was then called into the room and ordered to 
fire a volley into the dead body of the unfortunate congressman. 

"Your brother," said the Major relating the occurrence to 
Mr. Rendon's brother, "was the 104th person executed at Tlal- 
nepantla by order of the Secretary of the Interior." Mr. 
Urrutia was determined to strengthen General Hjuerta's posi- 
tion by imbuing terror. In France, during the Reign of Terror, 
there was a certain^ Fouquier Thionville, as accuser. There was 
a committee of Public Safety which ordered the accusation, and 
there was a jury which generally convicted all those accused by 
Fouquier; but in Mexico, all these processes were brushed aside, 
an accusation sufficed, and the penalty was left to Mir. Urrutia 's 
judgment. I have heard the following anecdote which shows how 
this terror was exerted: 

Four individuals in the custody of several soldiers were 
marching throug'h the street of Donate Giierra towards the 8th 
Precinct Police Staitioni, when they met Mr. Rafael Reyes Spin- 
dola. One of the prisoners shouted to the ex-Editor in Chief of 
the Imparcial and attracted his attention. "Save me, sir," he 
cried, "They are going to kill me and I am innocent." The 
commander of the guard would not let him speak further, but 
for Mir. Spindola it was sufficient. He hastened immediately 
to the Department of the Interior and saw Mir. Urrutia. "I 
know that man," he told Urrutia, "he has been in my employ 
and would never think of fomenting a revolt. " "You know 
him?" asked the Secretary, "Do you think him an honest man?" 
"Yes" replied Spindola, "while in my employ, he always be- 
haved well." "All right" said Urrutia; wthereupon he gave 
orders by telephone that the man be set free. The man instead 
of going to his death, obtained his freedom not because he had 
been tried nor because he had been acquitted, buti simply be- 
cause he had accidentally met a man who had befriended him by 
using his friendship with the Secretary. 

A similar story was related to me how Mir. Emilio Rabasa 
also saved an unfortunate who was in the same predicament. 
But Mlariano Salgado, Nestor E. Monroy, Jesus A. Vazquez, and 
Trinidad Zapa Castillo, not meeting in their paths such propi- 
tious influences, were shot to death on July 16th. The charge 
against them was that they had conspired against the government 
and had attempted to hurl a bomb with intent to kill the Presi- 



216 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

dent. Nor did Solon Arguello find any mercy when he was ar- 
rested in Mexico City because he was suspected of being an agent 
of the revolution and to have come to the capital with the sinis- 
ter purpose of assassinating Greneral Huerta. He and three other 
persons, one of whom was supposed to have been Congressman 
Bordes Mangel, and another congressman, Luis F. Navarro, were 
executed on August 29th near the station of Cima between Cuer- 
navaca and Mexico City. 

From the moment he entered upon his duties as Secretary 
of the Interior, Dr. Urrutia had proclaimed very peculiar 
theories. His one object was to set Huerta firmly in power, and 
any means for accomplishing this purpose seemed to him good 
and worthy. One of his pet theories, which caused universal 
amazement, was that men should not be judged by past actions ; 
acting upon this principle, he emphatically declared that his 
candidate for the governorship of Morelos was Zapata, against 
whom the government was at that very moment waging actual 
warfare. This theory was upheld by Mr. Urrutia in an in- 
terview granted to a reporter of El Pais, which appeared in 
that paper on June 19th. The interview, as published, follows : 

ZAPATISMO IN THE GOVEiRNMENT. 



The Attila of the South is Secretary Urrutia 's Candi- 
date for Grovernor of Morelos. 



Yesterday afternoon. Dr. Urrutia, Secretary of the Interior, 
made new and important declarations in an interview granted 
to representatives of the press. 

The Secretary confirmed the statements made at the time 
he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Interior, relative to 
the freedom of the press encouraged by the government. ' ' This 
is a stock in trade phrase of all Secretaries at the beginning of 
their terms," said Urrutia, "So long as the press sings their 
praise ' Long Live the Press ! ' But just as soon as it directs one 
or two attacks on them, then 'DoAvn with the Press!' I assure 
you that the provisional government really desires freedom of 
the press, and furthermore, the Department of which I am in 
charge will gladly welcome any and every suggestion publicly 
where prudence and social welfare permit, and privately where 



THE REIGN OF TERROR 217 

it might be directly barmful to society and indirectly harmful 
to the government." "Well then, Mr. Secretary," said the re- 
porter of El Pais, "My paper has published rumors that Dr. 
Lara Pardo is coming to take over the duties of Assistant Secre- 
tary in your Department. What truth is there in this?" 

"Dr. Lara Pardo is in my opinion, a very intelligent man, 
possessed of administrative ability and I think that if he returns 
to Mexico he will surely be offered an office in the administra- 
tion. I will also say the same with regard to Mr. Luis Cabrera, 
another very capable man who in the near future must and will 
assuredly occupy an important position in shaping the destinies 
of Mexico in spite of the bad feeling created against him in the 
past by certain newspapers. 

"As regards the Assisitant Secretary of the Interior, the re- 
signation of Martinez Carillo has not been accepted. Although I 
have been in office only a few days, I have formed a very favor- 
able opinion of him, and consider him an upright man, learned 
in his profession, and of good sound judgment. All the reports 
I have received concerning him are corroborated. I believe that 
the charges made publicly against him about the 'Covadonga' 
matters are entirely groundless." 

"Mr. Secretary," said another reporter, "The press has 
made further hints. It has been^ rumored that Orozco is candi- 
date for Governor of Chihuahua." 

"I know nothing about that" replied Dr. Urrutia, "but I 
would heartily endorse him just as I would have no objec^tion to 
aid the gubernatorial candidacy of Zapata in Morelos. Zapata 
is my candidate. Men," he added, "should not be judged by 
hearsay. ' ' 

"Wliat are the developments regarding the surrender of 
this Attila?" 

"I have already stated that there are no such negotiations 
in progress. The government does not treat with its enemies. 
The government is strong and is daily becoming stronger. A 
member of Zapata's family approached me to find out whether 
there would be any difficulty in granting guarantees of safety 
to Zapata if he should surrender, and I replied that there would 
be none. The government can make use of Zapata in Morelos 
but he must be unarmed. The government will not agree to allow 
the rebels to retain their arms. The army must be one and must 
be under one head. We cannot have an army of protection. 



218 FROM DESPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 

bodies of irregulars, etc. The army must be oiie and undivided. 
That is why the government so tenaciously insists on disarma- 
ment. Those who imported weapons into the country, and armed 
everybody, are the ones who brought ruin and desolation on the 
country. Moreover, there is the danger that if the rebels are 
allowed to remain in arms, they will never understand the mean- 
ing of force nor cultivate the ideas of discipline. Zapata, weapon- 
less, can be Governor of Mbrelos. This should not seem strange 
to you. Gi'overnors are not appointed for life. If they are in- 
competent, 'they can be removed. ' ' 



But neither the theories nor the actions of Dr. Urrutia 
could halt the downward march of the government of General 
Htierta in the estimation of the general public. 

The President feeling the storm that was gathering around 
the government wished to dispel the clouds by sacrificing his 
Secretary and friends; therefore, about the middle of Septem- 
ber, he removed him and placed in his stead Mir. Mlanuel Garza 
Aldape who was at that moment a great favorite of General 
Huerta. But arbiti*ary measures did not cease with this change ; 
on the contrary, it was then that Senator Belisario Dominguez 
was executed ; and that the Congressmen were imprisoned, some 
of whom suffered brutal treatment, as for instance, Messrs. Pala- 
vicini and Rojas. Not even Rodolfo RIeyes and Jorge Vera 
Estanol* were exempt from such treatment although both had 
been members of General Huerta 's Cabinet and the first one an 
intimate friend of Mr. Garza Aldape, Secretary of the Interior. 
In fact, he owed his present position as adviser to General 
Huerta entirely to the personal influence of Rodolfo Reyes. 
J\Iany other persons were imprisoned, such as Mr. Loaiza who 
was accused of having expressed opinions not flattering to the 
government. But finally even Garza Aldape fell. His conduct 
in all the departments in which he had served as Secretary had 
been disastrous. In the Department of Public Instruction, he 
misappropriated government funds and committed innumerable 



*0'wing to the fact: that the House of Representatives re- 
fused permission to one of its members, ]\llr. Tamariz, to become 
Secretary of Public Instruction, General HYierta ordered the 
arrest of Representative Jorge Vera Estaiiol, who had been one 
of his Cabinet Ministers. Huerta had him taken by the police 
to his own residence at Popotla, and there, in the presence of his 
aides, insulted him and even threatened to thrash him. 



THE REIGN OF TERiROK 219 

injustices against the teaching staff; in the Department of De- 
velopment, at whose head he served only a few days, he flagrant- 
ly disobeyed the law ; and in the Department of the Interior, his 
term of office is marked by the attack on Congress, the imprison- 
ment of many persons without just cause or reason, and the as- 
sassination of many Mexicans, like Senator Dominguez, whose 
only crime was that of telling the truth. 

His work in the State Department was characterized by the 
remarkable stupidity of his official statement that Mr. John Lind, 
the Confidential Ajgent of the President of the United States, was 
"persona non grata," a fact that was absolutely immaterial to 
both President Wilson and his Agent. 

When G^arza lAldape was forced out of the Cabinet, the fear 
which he had instilled in others of the arm of the government, 
suddenly took possession of him. On the night of his dismissal 
he left Mexico City in a special train, and in the early morning 
boarded a French steamer. Living on the Nation's money, he 
serenely views from abroad the results of his work, but his 
conscience must tirouble him at times and must wake him up 
often with a start. 

li'e was a traitor to all parties, stupid in all his political 
deeds and entirely unscrupulous in the handling of public funds. 
In the orgy which General Hhierta. has been carrying on at the 
expense of the Nation, Garza Aldape has drunk deep and has 
been able to fully satisfy his greed. But he has been called be- 
fore the bar of public opinion. Human justice, always weak, 
cannot punish him, but the Justice of History will be implacable. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 
THE PAELIAMENTARY QUADMLATIERIAL. 



Ever since the discussion regarding credentials of new con- 
gressmen war had been waged on the governiment of Madero by 
three members of the old Porfirista Congress, Messrs. Jose Maria 
Lozano, Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, and Francisco Mi de Olaguibel. 
They themselves had had their credentials accepted, but! not with- 
out difficulty, as they were bitterly opposed by the most impor- 
tant member of the Committee on Credentials, Mx. Querido 
Moheno. When accepted, they composed the nucleus of the op- 
position in the House and were called by the press "the Parlia- 
mentary Triangle." 

Following the acceptance of the credentials, and the open- 
ing of the regular session of Congress, a difference arose between 
Mr. Moheno and Gustavo Madero. Mt. Moheno, who is not only 
daring, but totally devoid of scruples, suddenly declared in open 
session that he had broken with the government, after which he 
joined the triangle which now became known as the "Parlia- 
mentary Qiuadrilateral. ' ' 

From the imauguration of his administration, General Huerta 
entrusted to this quadrilateral the defense of the program he 
intended to follow. All four were highly int'elligent men and 
born orators, their election therefore had been a wise move for 
there was no one in the House capable of competing with their 
eloquence or their knowledge of Parliamentary procedure. At 
the time of Madero 's downfall, Mioheno had intrigued for the 
appointment of Tomas Braniff as President pro tem by the 
House;* but as I have remarked, he was intelligent and soon 



*Mr. Braniff and ]\i!r. Moheno had had serious differences 
on account of the elections for Governor in the State of Yera 
Cruz and the former had made serious charges against the latter 
on account of the handling of the campaign funds. 

(220) 



THE PARLIAMENT'ARY QUADRILATERAL 221 

perceived the inadvisability of this move, whereupon he turned 
in favor of Greneral Huerta, whose purposes he served from that 
moment wisely and actively.* 

General Hiuerta, as I have stated before, had been forced 
by circumstances to accept as his Cabinie'ti the men proposed by 
Felix Diaz, but he had done so fully determined tO' displace them 
as soon as events should permit. The day after he had signed 
the pact, he began to devise means to break it, for so far as he 
was concerned, it was not worth the paper it was written on. 
Shortly before the tragic ten days, Mi-, de la Barra had been 
elected Governor of the State of MIexico. He took the oath of 
office on the 4th of March, appointed am acting governor, and 
retlimed immediately to MIexico City to continue his duties as 
Secretary of State. Mr. Giarza Aldape, selected for Secretary of 
Agriculture, an office not existing in the present Cabinet, had 
arrived in MIexico and was attending Cabinet meetings as if he 
were really a member, although as a matter of fact, the law 
creating the new Department had not been passed nor has it 
been passed to date. 

Huerta was fully resolved not to resign in favor of Felix 
Diaz or of any one else for that matter. He and his friends 
were looking for a loophole through which to escape from keep- 
ing the promises made to Diaz at the American Embassy ; to this 
end they formulated numerous plans. Finally General Huerta 
entered into an understanding with the Quadrilateral. He held 
a meeting at his home at which it wast agreed that on October 
26th there be an election held for President and Vice President. 
Congress, agreeing with this plan, issued the necessary procla- 
mation. The Felicistas who believed absolutely in the sincerity 
and honesty of General Huerta 's words, began campaigning for 
their candidate. TIhe Attorney General declared through the 
press that the call for an election quite carried out the compact 
made at the Ciudadela, which, as I have said, was really entered 
into and signed at the American Embassy. De la Barra was 
nominated for vice president. General Felix Diaz had succeeded 
in obtaining the appointment of Mr. Celso Acosta as Inspector 
General of Police. M'r. Acosta, one of his most enthusiastic par- 
tisans, was intimately associated with him, in fact had been his 



*See note referring to the session of Cbngress on F'ebruary 
19, which will be found in the Diario de los Debates. 



222 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

private secretary when Diaz was Inspector Greneral of Police 
in Mexico City during the administration of Don Porfirio Diaz. 
Frankly, however, this appointment was a mistake on the part 
of the felicis'tas because no politician was safe as long as Celso 
Acosta held sway at Police Headquarters. This fact was indi- 
cated to the provisional President who, pretending to satisfy 
public opinion, at once decided on his removal. The truth of 
the matter is that the President himself was the one to feel most 
insecure because Acosta was a tool of Diaz. Huerta saw in 
public opinion an opportunity to deal a blow to the f elicistas and 
to free himself from his bonds. Huerta had twice attempted to 
make this change, but each time had met with opposition from 
his Cabinet and from Don Felix Diaz who reproached and ac- 
cused him of unfaithfulness. Huerta did not yet have the neces- 
sary energy to impose his authority. Finally, one day resolved 
to make the change, he instructed the Gbvernor of the Federal 
District, General Samuel Garcia Cuellar, to advise the Secretary 
lof the Interior that at a certain specified hour, the post should 
be turned over to the new Inspector, Mjr. Joaquin Pita; after 
giving this command, he disappeared for the time being. At 
first, Mr. Alberto Garcia Granados, Secretary of the Interior, 
gave little importance to the orders, and made no objection to 
the appointment, but later, when Acosta was informed of the 
change, Granados complying with suggestions from Diaz, objected 
and issued orders that nothing definite be done until he could 
see the President personally. But it was impossible to find Gen- 
eral Huerta. Therefore in compliance with the President's 
orders. General Garcia Cuellar, duly installed Mir. Pita as In- 
spector General of Police in spite of the strenuous objections of 
the Secretary of the Interior, backed by the Attorney General, 
Rodolfo Reyes, and Felix Diaz. Following this incident, Mr. 
Garcia Granados sent in his resignation. Thus was he the first 
of the Cabinet members chosen at the American Embassy to 
leave his post. The President insisted that the Parliamentary 
Quadrilateral had demanded the removal of Acosta, claiming 
that so long as the police were under the domination of Felix 
Diaz and his friends, it would be impossible to call an election 
since the members of Congress could not act with the liberty 
necessary for the proper performance of their duty. Htierta 
added that he himself was obliged to fulfil his promises, the 
first and foremost of which was to hold an election. 



THE PARLIAMENTARY QUADRILATERAL 223 

The choice of a successor to Mr. Garcia Grauados gave rise 
to much intrigue. The President had offered this portfolio to 
Mir. Lozano, one of the members of the Quadrilateral, but Ro- 
dolfo Reyes, Attorney General, and Garza Aldape, the portfolio- 
less Secretary, intimately associated with Reyes for many years, 
had bitterly opposed this choice. The President had considered 
Dr. Aureliano Urrutia, who was an eminent surgeon of Mexico 
City as well as a friend of his, in fact had attended him when 
he had been forced to give up the campaign in the North because 
of his eye trouble. Mr. Urrutia was finally appointed. This 
led to the resignation of Mir. Vera Estanol as Secretary of Ptiblic 
Instruction ; the vacancy thus formed was filled by Garza Aldape 
whom Congress had left without a post by refusing to vote 
for the proposed reform to create a Department of Agriculture. 
General Huerta had offered the portfolio of Secretary of 
War to General Blanquete for his yeoman service, but in the 
early days of the administration he was forced to yield to the 
demands of Felix Diaz, not because the latter had any real power, 
but because he wished it to appear that he thought so. For this 
reason, he acted as he did. Time was passing and General Blan- 
quete was still waiting for the fulfillment of the promise. For- 
tunately for the President, the public set up such a clamor at 
the highhanded and flagrant graft of General Mbndragon as 
Secretary of War and at the disastrous results of one campaign 
after another that he could truly say that public opinion de- 
manded the removal of Mondragon. Rodolfo Rieyes, the life 
and soul of the felicista party, was commissioned to convince 
Mondragon that his resignation was an absolute necessity. At 
a Cabinet meeting, he finally succeeded in extracting the desired 
resignation, whereupon he himself drew up the letter of resigna- 
tion which was immediately accepted. That very day, June 13th, 
General Blanquete was sworn in as Secretary of War, Mr. Urru- 
tia as Secretary of the Interior, and Garza Aldape as Secre- 
tary of Public Instruction. 

The disorder and confusion in this last Cabineit were matters of 
public scandal. When Garza Aldape was transferred to the De- 
partment of Development and Mir. Jose Maria Lozano was ap- 
pointed Secretary of Public Instruction in his stead, Mr. Lozano 
found that in the few days he had held office, the retiring Secre- 
tary of Public Instruction had almost equalled General Mondra- 
gon 's record, not in the amount of business transacted, because 



224 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

this Department did not lend itself so readily as the War Depart- 
ment to big deals, but in the quality of business which was 
equally detrimental to the Treasury. The new head of the ad- 
ministrative branch, Mr. Antonio Maza, mentioned to me a few 
outrageous cases, but it would be out of place to mention them 
here. I will limit myself to stating that here as in the War De- 
partment, contracts were freely handed out Avhereby the Secre- 
tary made enormous commissions. 

On July 26th then, Mr. Esquivel resigned from the Cabi- 
net after several quarrels with the other Cabinet members and 
with the President relative to the outrageous raids that were 
made or contemplated on the National Treasury. The main rea- 
son, however, for his forced resignation was that it had been 
hinted to President Hluerta that his resignation would serve to 
put an end to certain difficulties which had arisen with the 
United States because of the methods he had employed to attain 
the Presidency, difficulties which seriously compromised the 
financial efforts of Mr. Esquivel Obregon. 

After an all night banquet. General Huerta commissioned 
Mr. Garza Aldape to obtain the immediate resignations of Mr. 
Esquivel Obregon and Mir. Rodolfo Reyes. The latter was able 
to resist sue ccvss fully, but Mr. Esquivel did not force the Presi- 
dent to repeat his request, for as a matter of fact, ever since 
the events of February 22nd, he had wished to resign. 

At first Mr. Garza Aldape was considered as a successor 
to Mr. Esquivel Obregon, and at the same time Mr. Jesus M. 
Rabago was chosen to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation 
of Mir. Robles Gil as Secretary of Development. In fact, this 
appointment had already been made and he had even presented 
himself to be sworn in, when owing to circumstances which have 
not as yet been made public, he was suddenly requested to with- 
draw from the Capital, and Mr. Garza Aldape was sworn in, 
in his stead. The portfolio of the Department of the Treasury 
was offered to Mr. Gorostieta, a lawyer of the State of Nuevo 
Leon. He was a serious minded and calm man, highly esteemed 
in his native State, but advanced in years, worn out, and sickly. 

Mr. Rabago was appointed Assistant Secretary of the In- 
terior. The resignation of Mr. Robles Gil was on the program 
of President Huerta who only awaited a favorable opportunity 
for demanding it. This opportunity came when Jesus Flores 
IMagon attacked the Secretary of Development through the press. 



THE PARLIAMENTARY QUADRILATERAL 225 

The charge made against him was that, as executor, he had notor- 
iously mismanaged an estate, the heirs to which were minors. 

Before Huerta had been in power five months, that is, by 
the end of July, Rodolfo Reyes and David de la Fuente were the 
only members left in the Cabinet appointed in accordance with 
the compact at the American Embassy. These two resigned 
shortly after, as demanded by the Parliamentary Quadrila- 
teral; Reyes was named congressman and de la Fuente, who re- 
presented the Vazquizta faction in the government, was offered 
the command of a force which was to operate against the rebels 
in the state of Sinaloa. He was promoted to the rank of G^en- 
eral of Brigade, but the campaign was never entrusted to him. 

When de la Biarra resigned as Secretary of State, the port- 
folio was offered to Federioo Giamboa, a well known man of 
letters who was then Minister from Mexico at Brussels. Until 
his arrival from Belgium, Glarza Aidape filled the office. It 
was Mr. Aidape who on the 7th of August made the famous 
statement that Mr. John Lind,, the confidential agent of Presi- 
dent Wilson, was "persona non grata" to the Miexican govern- 
ment. 

Tlhe Cabinet was reorganized when Mr. Lozano accepted the 
portfolio of Secretary of Public Instruction and Mr. Garza 
Aidape that of Development. After many futile attempts, Huerta 
was at length able to force Rodolfo Reyes out of his Cabinet 
naming Mr, Adolfo de la Lama in his place. 

On September 14lth, it was again necessary to reorganize 
the Cabinet on account of the retirement of Dr. Urrutia. Mr. 
Aidape took over the Department of the Interior, and the va- 
cancy he left was filled by Leopoldo Rebollar who had formerly 
been Assistant Secretary of Sta'te when Aidape was Secretary, 
and later had been Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Mr. 
Lozano succeeded Mr. de la Fuente as Secretary of Communica- 
tions. Mr. Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, a member of the Quadrila- 
teral, was made Secretary of Public Instruction. There was yet 
another change, which was that Mr. Gorostieta and Mr. de la 
Lama exchanged portfolios, Mr. Gorostieta becoming Attorney 
General and Mr. de la Lama Secretary of the T'reasury. 

When Mr. Gamboa accepted the nomination tendered him 
by the Catholic party to head the ticket as candidate for the 
Presidency, he resigned as Secretary of State, the Assistant 
Secretary, Mt. Antonio de la Peiia y Reyes acting as Secretary ; 



226 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAiRCHY 

8. few days later, by order of the President', Mir. de la Lama, 
Attorney General, requested the resignation of Mr. de la Pena 
y Reyes. Mr. Qnerido Moheno, another member of the Quad- 
rilateral, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State, and when, 
the Cabitiet was reorganized on September 14th, he was made 
Seereltary of State. Mr. Francisco M. de Oiaguibel, the only 
member of the Quadrilateral who did not obtain a Cabinet posi- 
tion, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State. 

As Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Garza Aldape found him- 
self obliged to dissolve Congress on October 10th. This dissolu- 
tion had been desired by both the President and his Cabinet 
ever since the House had refused to sanction the appointment 
of Mr. Tamariz as Secretary of Public Instruction, for which 
position he had been suggested when Mr. Lozano became Secre- 
tary of Communications. The dissolution of Congress was ef- 
fected by violence, eighty-three members were arrested that day 
and warrants were issued for the arrest of ten or twelve others 
who managed to escape. The dissolution of Congress was due 
to the attitude assumed by the House a few days after the death 
of Senator Belisario Dominguez. This gentleman. Senator from 
the State of Chiapas, had arrived in Mexico City after the events 
of February, since he had only been appointed Senator to fill 
out the term of Leopoldo Gout, who had died in Mexico City. 
Immediately upon learning of past events, IVDr. Dominguez, a 
man of action, drew an informal accusation against General 
Huerta which he could not read to the Senate. In it he demanded 
that the President be duly turned over to the proper branch of 
the Grand Jury. Although the Vice President of the Senate 
had very cleverly avoided the issue, the facts became public, and 
the speech of Mr. Dominguez was circulated widely sub rosa. 
On October 5th, Mir. Dominguez disappeared; he had been ar- 
rested by agents of the Department of the Interior as he was 
about to enter his home. A member of the family of Mr. Vera 
Estanol related a few days later at the gates of the Penitentiary, 
that Kr. Dominguez had been stabbed to death by police agents 
who had arrested him under orders of Isidore Cortes and that 
his body had been removed to the Cemetery of Coyoacan where 
it had been cremated. 

Mr. Dominguez had foreseen his tragic end; in fact his 
speech began by stating this fact to the Senate and saying that 



THIE PAEjLIAMENTAKiY QUADRIIiATEilAL 227 

he gladly offered himself as a sacrifice for the salvation of his 
country, a salvation which in his opinion, could only be obtained 
by the overthrow of General Huerta. Foreseeing his death, he 
had made his will and had formulated a request that the colony 
of Chiapanecans in Mexico City see that his little son who was 
with him in Mexico City be safely restored to his family. 



CKAPTER XXXIV. 
THE OONSiTITUCIOiNALISTiA KEVO'LUTION. 



Mr. Venustiano C-arranza had been proposed for Governor 
of the State of Coahuila in the elections of 1910. Hie had been 
proposed by his friend, General Reyes and accepted by General 
Diaz who had authorized him to work for the election. 'After 
the downfall of General Reyes when he was sent to Europe, the 
agreement with ]\i)r. Carranza did not hold and General Diaz 
ordered the election of Mr. Jesus del Valle, an honorable lawyer 
of the State of Coahuila. The result was that Mr. Carranza 
went to the United States to join the Mladerista revolution in 
which he had heretofore taken no part. When Madero triumph- 
ed, Mr. del Valle, like most of the governors, resigned, and the 
election went in favor of Mr. Venustiano Carranza. He was 
still in office when the events of February 1913 took place. Ac- 
cording to the Governor's report to the State Legislature, the 
first news he received of events in Mexico was a telegram sent 
him by General Huerta on February 19th, reading as follows : 

"Authorized by the Senate, I have assumed the Executive 
Power, the President and his Cabinet are under arrest. ' ' 

This telegram was sent before the resignation of Madero had 
been obtained and when General Huerta was pretending to obey 
orders from the Senate. On receipt of this telegram. Governor 
Carranza addressed the State Legislature of Coahuila, inform- 
ing them of the fact and at the same time intimating that he 
intended to ignore the new government since he considered it 
illegal. The Legislature approved of the Governor's conduct, 
whereupon the Governor issued the following proclamation: 

' ' The Government under my charge received yesterday from 
the Capital of the Republic a message from General Victoriano 
Huerta advising that the Senate had authorized him to take 
charge of the Executive Power and that the President and his 
Cabinet are under arrest. This news has been confirmed and I, 

(228) 



THE CONiSTITXJCIONALISTA REVOLUTION 229 

in my official capacity, cannot but deem strange the anomalous 
form of such appointments, because under no circumstances has 
the Senate the constitutional authority to make such designa- 
tion; therefore it matters not what the result has been in the 
City of Mexico of the uprising of Brigadier Felix Diaz, General 
Mondragon, and General Reyes. Besides, whatever may have 
been the cause of the apprehension of the President and his 
Cabinet, it is the Federal Congress that should have held a meet- 
ing to call immediately an extraordinary election as provided 
by Article 81 of our Magna Charta. Therefore, in all events, 
the appointment of General Victoriano BCuerta as President of 
the Republic by the Senate is an arbitrary and illegal act. It 
means nothing more or less than the most scandalous overthrow 
of our Constitution, and a retrogression to our shameful and 
backward period of mutinies. For it seems as if the Senate had 
connived and conspired with those unworthy soldiers, enemies 
of our country and of our liberty, making them turn against 
the Nation which armed them for the support' and maintenance 
of order and legal rights. Therefore, the government under my 
charge, in due respect to the sovereign mandates of our Mexican 
Constitution, in obedience to our institutions, faithful t'o its 
duties, and animated by the purest patriotism, is obliged to dis- 
avow and to resist such a downright transgression against our 
fundamental law. Our government considers it its duty to 
declare this before the whole Nation, inviting all governors by 
this circular, as chiefs of the States to lead in the national sen- 
timent, justly aroused to indignation, to support legal rights and 
to uphold the Constitutional Government recently elected in 1910 
in. accordance with our laws. 

"Saltillo, February 19th, 1913. 

Ylenustiano Carranza. " 

At the same time that Carranza took this stand. General 
Refugio Velasco, Military Commander of Vera Cruz, acted in 
much the same way. For in reply to General Huerta announc- 
ing his rise to power. General Velasco replied that he still recog- 
nized Francisco I. Madero as President of the Republic and that 
from him and from him alone, would he obey orders. 

If Madero had not so completely lost prestige in the eyes 
of the public, he would have been saved in spite of the revolt 
and of General Hiuerta's conduct; but public opinion did not 
respond promptly to the call from the Governor of Coahuila, or 



230 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

to the worthy Military Commander of Vera Cruz. Huerta on 
his side realizing that the method he had adopted would not 
lead to go'od results, began^ to work hard for the resignation of 
Madero. 

The first person that Huerta sent to persuade Madero to 
resign was, as I have said before, General Juveneio Riobles. He 
was sent because General Huerta judged that since he had taken 
no active part in the mutiny, he was probably on good terms with 
the President and his associates. 

When the resignation was secured, General Huerta imme- 
diately telegraphed again to the Governor of Coahuila that he 
was President. This time he did not say that he had been ap- 
pointed by the Senate, but that he had attained to it by virtue 
of an agreement with Mladero and Lascurain which seemed to 
legalize the act. The telegram was the beginning of negotiations 
with the Governor of Coahulia to induce him to recognize the 
Federal Government. General Blazquez, chief of arms in Coah- 
uila and at that moment a resident of Monterey, was sent to con- 
fer personally Math the Governor. At the same time, a commis- 
sion was sent from the City of Mexico to treat with Pascual 
Orozco, Jr., who was in revolt in Chihuahua, and with the Messrs. 
Vazquez Gomez, who were in San Antonio, Texas. The com- 
mission was composed of Messrs. Ricardo Garcia Granados, broth- 
er of the Secretary of the Interior, Jose Maria Garza Ramos, 
ex-Senator and personal friend of both Mr. Carranza and the 
Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, and Mr. Herrejon Lopez, friend and 
correligionist of the Vazquez Gomez. Besides these, in order that 
the felicistas might be represented, Mr. Esteban Maqueo Cas- 
tellanos was appointed. Hie too was an ex-Senator and had al- 
ways loyally supported Pelix Diaz. 

This commission first went to Laredo where it saw Orozco 's 
father; thence it went to San Antonio and to El Paso where it 
held conferences with the Chief of the Chihuahua revolution. 
This the most important revolutionist at the time, agreed to re- 
cognize Huerta 's government; but when Governor Carranza 
heard of Miadero's death, he severed all relations he had thus 
far had with General Huerta; he armed as many troops as he 
possibly could, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Garfias, 
President Madero 's former aide, and he himself left Saltillo, 
going to Monclova and Cuatro Cienegas where he started the 
revolt. Some months later, Castillo Brito, Governor of Cam- 



THE CONSTITUCIONALISTA REVOLUTION 231 

peche, also refused to recognize General Huerta and proclaimed 
himself in revolt against the Central Government. Dr. Cepeda, 
Governor of San L/uis Potosi, and Miguel Silva of Michoacan, 
tried to do the same thing, but there, as in most of the states, the 
new government quickly appointed military governors to mas- 
ter the situation in every locality, suppressing by force if neces- 
sary any revolt that might be started. Governor Abraham Gon^ 
zalez, of Chihuahua, obtained Huerta 's assurance through Gen- 
eral Antonio Rabago, military commander of the federal troops 
that the State sovereignty should be respected and nobody would 
interfere with the local government; but some days later Gen- 
eral Rabago claiming that Governor Gonzalez was planning a 
revolt against the Federal Government, took him prisoner and 
sent him back to Mexico City under the custody of Mayor Ben- 
jamin Camarena, aid and close friend of Huerta. On the way 
Governor Gonzalez was slain. The only civil governors left were 
those of Oaxaea, Jalisco, and Vera Cruz.* In Sonora, Governor 
Pesqueira, provisionally in charge on account of Governor May- 
torena's leave of absence, also refused to recognize Huerta. 
In Nuevo Leon General Tteviiio, who had been appointed to 
substitute the Maderista governor, Mr. Villareal, resigned within 
fifteen days. Mr. Salome Botello, old reyista and personal 
friend of General Huerta, was appointed to succeed him. In 
view of Governor Carranza's attitude, Huerta named Mr. Ignacio 
Alcocer provisional governor of Coahuila. He remained in 
power until last October when General Joaquin Maas, Jr., Gen- 
eral Huerta 's nephew, was assigned to the position. 

The revolution at) once assumed large proportions in C^oah- 
uila and Sonora. Realizing this, General Huerta started great 
preparations to fight it out, but the rebels succeeded in rousing 
the states of T'amaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, and Zaca- 
tecas and even the mountains that border H'idalgo, Vera Cruz 
and San Luis Potosi and Queretaro. Congressman Pedro An- 
tonio Santos, appointed to lead the revolution in San Luis 
Potosi, met his death as he went into the "huasteca Potosina." 
he was shot in T'ancanhuitz City by forces under command of 



*Three months later General Eduardo Cauz was sent as 
Governor of Vera Cruz and when Lopez Portillo was named Sec- 
retary of Sitate General Jose Mier took the governorship of 
Jalisco, thus the only state where its constitutional governor re- 
mained is Oaxaea. 



232 FROM! DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

Colonel Vargas Hluerta. Congressman Rodriguez Cabo and Mr. 
Larraga succeeded him in command in that region and after- 
wards Pedro Carrera Torres and Colonel Hernandez ; on the north 
of the State Eulalio Gutierrez ; Orestes Pereyra and Calixto 
Contreras in Durango and Panfilo Natera in Zacatecas succeed- 
ed in taking possession of the respective capitals of both states. 

In Taniaulipas Pablo Gonzalez, Lucio Blanco, and Luis 
Caballero, and in Coahuila Jesus Carranza and Eugenio Aguirre 
Benavides had raised the banner of the revolution, seconding the 
Plan of Guadalupe and had encountered many obstacles due 
to the lack of arms and ammunition but they carried on their 
military operations with a persistent tenacity of purpose. 

At the same time in the State of Chihuahua RIosalio Her- 
nandez had defeated the federals at Saucillo and Mlaclovio Her- 
rera, a very brave and courageous fighter, defeated Colonel 
Pueblita at Santa Rosalia, and a few days later at the same place 
administered a riotous defeat to Pascual Otozco, Jr. Manuel 
Chao at Parral held his own and compelled the federals under 
General Mercado to retreat to Chihuahua and Chao continued 
and opened up the lines of Constitutionalist communications 
to Durango where Don Venustiano Carranza, named First Chief 
of the Revolution, had established his headquarters after 
the unsuccessful attack on Torreon by the forces of Contreras 
during the month of June. 

At Santa Rosalia all the chiefs of the Chihuahua division, and 
some of the other states, with their respective armies named Fran- 
cisco ViUa as their chief and placed themselves under his leader- 
ship. Some of them like Toribio Ortega, Maclovio Herrera and 
Aguirre Benavides had been in many engagements and had ac- 
quired military training but they all accepted Villa as their chief 
because his many victories had shown them clearly that he was a 
strong military conunander. 

Villa had crossed the American border with only six men 
during the month of March and despite fierce persecution on 
the part of the federals and irregulars, known as the Colorados, 
he was able to organize a strong force with which he took Casas 
Grandes and achieved a great victory over the Federal General, 
Felix Terrazas, at San Andres where he captured nine military 
trains with equipment and war material. He drove out the 
federal garrison at Bustillos and arrived at Santa Rosalia. He 
then marched on Torreon and took personal comlmand of the 



THE CONSTITUCIONiALISTiA REVOLUTION 233 

Constitutionalisit troops there which were attacking that federal 
stronghold and after having fought the battle of Aviles where 
he completely routed the federals and where General Alvirez 
met his death, he was advancing on Tlorreon when the Federal 
General Mhinguia evacuated the city and Yilla entered and took 
possession of same. After establishing civil government there he 
began his advance on Chihuahua and after feinting an attack 
on that city by a clever strategic move surprised the Federal 
General Castro at Juarez capturing the same which was the most 
important port in Northern Mexico. Castro escaped in disguise 
to the American side of the Eio Grande where he was interned 
by the American army. Six days afterwards he fought the cele- 
brated battle of Tierra Blanca where he gave them a crushing 
defeat. The news of this defeat at Chihuahua caused General 
Mercado and his entire division to evacuate Chihuahua and to- 
gether with the combined forces of Orozco and Salazar they 
marched to Oljiuaga where they were immediately attacked by 
Villa and fled across the Rio Grande Rtiver where to the num- 
ber of four thousand men, General Mercado included, they were 
captured by the American army and interned. Salazar escaped 
but was later captured by the American army patrol at Sander- 
son, Texas. Orozco escaped in disguise and reached New Or- 
leans where he boarded the Mjexican gunboat Zaragoza which 
carried him to Vera Cruz. 

Villa hastened to Chihuahua where after establishing a civil 
government he moved his entire command against Torreon 
which had been evacuated by the Arrietas and which was then 
garrisoned by the Federal General Riefugio Velasco. The Tor- 
reon campaign began with an attack at Bermejillo where the 
federals were annihilated. Villa then with twenty thousand men 
attacked Gomez Palacio the federal outposts and after twelve 
days engagement captured Torreon once more. Villa then made 
a flying movement to San Pedro where he met the federals under 
General Miaas, de Mbure, Garcia Hidalgo and Argumedo which 
were coming to the relief of Torreon. This engagement was a 
very fierce one but General Villa succeeded in defeating the 
entire command. Velasco ia the meantime having joined the 
others from Viesca, arrived only on time to cover the retreat to 
Saltillo. Villa at once began preparations for a campaign against 
Saltillo. 



234 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

They destroyed any forces tliat opposed them, but in most 
cases the government forces deserted the towns at the approach 
of the rebels. General Htierta, as I have said, did his best to 
suppress the revolution. Hie appointed military governors, he 
waged merciless war, and ordered a relentless persecution of all 
those who had refused to recognize his government. By follow- 
ing such a course, he succeeded in recapturing Campeche and 
Morelos, the city of Zacatecas, Saltillo and Torreon and finally 
the mountains of Puebla; but thus far he has been unable to 
reestablish peace. In fact, he cannot reesitablish it anywhere. 
The country has never had confidence in him and public opinion 
is against him. Only fear prevents public demonstrations, but 
the whole country is anxiously hoping for his downfall. His 
conduct both public and private does not inspire confidence. 

He expects to remain in power by force, but impossible! 
The people will reclaim their rights and will as soon as po^ible 
work his downfall from a position which has been no less a dis- 
grace to Mexico than an affront to civilization. He has suc- 
ceeded in inspiring terror, but this will not enable him to con- 
solidate his gov3nimeut. The dissolution of Congress should 
have caused his downfall, but the Congress which he dissolved 
had completely lost prestige with the public. In fact, the coun- 
try was indifferent to what the President did with a Congress 
which had never been in its good graces. From the very begin- 
ning the 26th Congress was unworthy. By exasperating injus- 
tice, by frauds, and by violence, at the time of the inauguration, 
it forfeited the good will of the public; but its cowardly atti- 
tude in the course of subsequent events gained for it the abso- 
lute contempt of the people. Impassibly it witnessed the death 
of General Ruiz, a congressman whom the Madero government 
executed; later it impassibly witnessed the assassination of Mr. 
Gustavo Madero, a prominent member of the House of Repre- 
sentatives and one to whom many of its members owed their 
position. It also had a hand in the downfall of IMIadero's govern- 
ment since it accepted the resignation of two prisoners whose 
signature had been obtained by threats of death. Furthermore, 
it accepted Huerta as President of the Republic, it allowed him 
to take the oath, and authorized him' to squander the national 
funds. All these acts were opposed only by an insignificant mi- 
nority. It did not take the slightest action nor did it offer the 
slightest protest against the assassination of the President and 



HHE C'ONSTITUCIONALISTA RE'VOLUTTON 235 

the Vice President. Besides countenancing all these things, 
ait the beginning of the first period of the second year of its 
office, it watched unmoved the murder of Serapio Rendon, at 
that time a member of Congress. When the assassination of 
Senator Dominguez took place, Congress made a pathetic at- 
tempt to take a dignified attitude, but only succeeded in assum- 
ing a ridiculous and foolish one. To threaten a government like 
that of Huerta is the height of folly. The motions passed by the 
House of Representatives on October 9th, showed more than folly, 
they showed flagrant cowardice, because by them the House 
proved that it was conscious of its duties but at the same time 
afraid to accuse those who were in power and to whom it at- 
tributed all the crimes which it censured. In that frame of mind, 
it adopted a middle course which placed it in a very absurd 
position. 

General Huerta soon tired of its impertinences and decid- 
ed to dissolve a congress which had caused so much scandal and 
had done so little good to the country.* This is the only one of 
his crimes which is at all pardonable. It was a terrible dilemma 
to G^eneral Huerta since he either had to dissolve Congress or 
allow Congress to do away with him, and with the country also 
for that matter. It is a fact that the struggles between Huerta 
and Congress did not do him much harm, but they were sapping 
the very strength of the country and reducing it to a deplorable 
condition. For the most part, the House denied Huerta noth- 
ing ; it pleased him in every thing, but when it finally rose against 
him, Huerta did what every slave driver does to a slave who 
mutinies — he punished it. 

The dissolution of Congress caused General Huerta small 
worry, in fact the very night that the members were carried by 
the police to the Penitentiary, the President with his Secretaries 
of the Interior, of Development, of Communications, and of 
Public Instruction, was calmly dining ait Bach's public restau- 
rant. General Huerta was certainly daring. The Congressmen 
attempted to incite the people to revolt, but they had no followers. 
The same thing has happened on previous occasions, when tiie 
government followed a similar course, but heretofore such a 
measure has always in the long run proved fatal to those who 
have adopted it. On October 31st, 1822, Iturbide dissolved Con- 



*Not a single resolution of the 26th Congress can be con- 
sidered to the welfare of the Nation. 



236 FROM DESPOTISIM TO ANARJCHY 

gress in the same way, and on March 19th of the following year 
he was forced to abdicate. On November 29th, 1844, Canalize 
by order of Santana dissolved Congress, and Santana was forced 
to retire on December 6th of the same year. Mr. Jnan Bautista 
Ceballos dissolved Congress on January 19th, 1853 and was over- 
thrown on February 7th. History has repeated itself. The 
congressmen of those days also called on the people for support, 
but the people answered with the same scorn as now. The cause 
of this is that these Congresses have never appealed to the public 
ideals nor have they ever in reality represented the people. 

Constitutional order in Mexico was upset completely from 
the very moment that the Military Commander of the City, with- 
out authority and without legal right, seized the President and 
Vice President, and usurped power. Unquestionably he had no 
legal right for such action since Congress had not previously 
passed judgment convicting Madero and Pino Suarez. Accord- 
ing to the Mexican Constitution, the farce enacted later can in 
no way make Hkierta legitimate President or give legality to 
his acts. 

Covernors Carranza and Pesqueira's attitude ought to have 
been imitated by the governors of all the states, but, in truth, many 
of them were unable to follow the same course because they were 
obliged by force to abandon their offices. There were those, how- 
ever, who did prefer to keep their places, regardless of the situa- 
tion in Mexico. 

The revolt took great impetus in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, So- 
nera, Durango, and Zacatecas, but Mr. Carranza was unable to 
keep Coahuila because General Huerta reinforced his own forces 
strongly. The chief of the revolution was obliged to move through 
Durango to Sonora where the local chief Mr. Alvaro Obregon had 
succeeded in organizing his forces and kept out H^uerta's troops. 
In this State Mr. Carranza established the capital of the Republic, 
proclaiming against General Huerta and his supporters the very 
decree issued on January 25th, 1862 by Juarez when he was forced 
to defend the Nation from foreign invasion. In view of the atti- 
tude assumed by the American government, General Huerta tried 
to arouse public sentiment by representing himself as the zealous 
defender of national autonomy. He thought in this way to 
strengthen his power. When he began to enact this new farce, Car- 
ranza sent him the following telegram, which, although supposed 
to be secret, circulated quite freely throughout Mexico. 



THE CONSTITUCIOiNALISiTA REVOiLUTTON 237 

"Piedras Negras, Coahuila, July 15(th, 1913. 

"Ex-General Victoriano Huerta, National Palace, Mexico, D. F. 

' ' I am informed anti-'Aimerican demonstraJtions your own idea 
as last resort to retain usurped power in the name of the Mexi- 
can people which in the majority are Constitutionalist, I protesit 
against your infamous manipulations and those of your fol- 
lowers, that would throw us into an unlooked for conflict, re- 
serving for a more opportune moment my rights to fix upon 
you the responsibility of this new treason. 

"V. Oarranza. " 
In Sonora, Mr. Carranza has tried to organize a government 
with the best resources at hand. Revolutionists cannot pick 
and choose their people. They have to take all classes that are 
willing to help them; they cannot even do justice to their own 
war cry,* therefore, their hardest task after triumph, is to purge 
the triumphant elements so as to keep only the most able and 
honest men ito aid in the reconstruction of the administrative 
system. 

Will the Chief be able to control all the elements which are 
actually helping him to overthrow General Hhierta? Will he be 
able if he is victorious, to form a government that will inspire 
confidence, that will permit those who are willing to lend their 
services towards its consolidation, at the same time that it en- 
courages the laboring classes to resume their labors, so that to- 
gether, all may undertake the work of National reconstruction? 

Such are the tremendous questions which come to the mind 
of those who love their country. All we wish is to see it come 
back to that life formerly enjoyed. 



*One of the strange features to be noted is that the Consti- 
tutionalist revolution shouts "Mueran los Cientificos ! " (Death 
to the Cientificos) and yet among the men of the Ciudadela, who 
overthrew and killed Madero, there was not a single " Cientif ico. " 
As a matter of fact, the revolution of February 1913 was the work 
of the "Reyistas" and " Felicistas, " both the sworn enemies of 
the ' ' Cientificos. ' ' As regards the Government of General Huer- 
ta, it has not had the support of any of the prominent men of the 
"Cientificos" many of whom have had to leave the country to 
save themselves from assassination. Those who remain in Miexico 
have stayed only through lack of means to leave the country. 
The most prominent ministers of Huerta, Mondragon, Reyes, 
Garza Aldape, Portillo y Rojas, Moheno, have always been the 
declared enemies of the "Cientificos." 



238 FROM DESPCTISM TO ANARCHY 

General Huerta's government is condemned by moral senti- 
ment, by law, and by patriotism. General Huerta is not qualified 
to be the ruler of a civilized people; to support him now would 
be a crime. We could have pardoned his treason and his crimes, 
if their perpetration had brought some benefit to the country; 
it he had by them concentrated all his energies to direct the 
country through channels of labor and morality. But his im- 
moral life, his political ambitions, his actions of an ignorant 
soldier, his primitive and ferocious passions, do not inspire us 
with the hope that he will do any good to the country. We must, 
therefore, give our support to his overthrow; we must, disinter- 
estedly, aid the government of the triumphant revolution, regard- 
less of previous convictions and of our former opinions concerning 
revolutionary methods. To support the Hfuerta government 
would be a crime, but it would be no less a crime to desert the men 
who has taken up arms against his despotism. If the new head of 
the Nation lacks experience and knowledge, let us all join in lend- 
ing him our experience, and our knowledge, slight as these may 
be, to aid the work of reconstruction in our countiy. 

Thus when the time comes for separating the wheat from the 
chaff, it may be that we can form a government just and serene; 
a government free from rancour or radicalism, which may save 
the nation in the present terrible crisis. 

If, contrary to expectations, the new government is urged for- 
ward by the revolutionary current towards an abyss, let us warn 
him, let us clearly make him see his danger, let us raise our voices 
and make ourselves heard. Then if we are ultimately vanquished 
in this awful national catastrophe, Ave shall at least have the con- 
solation that we have performed our duty. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 
THE KING AMUSES HIMSELF. 



General Huerta, as I have stated throughout this work, ever 
since the Battle of Bachimba had been seeking a means of as- 
cending to power, and Madero 's government gave him the oppor- 
tunity by again putting him in command of the troops, a com- 
mand that had been taken from him for the very reason that 
they had no trust in him. From the moment that General Huerta 
was named Military Connnander of the City to fill General Vil- 
lar's place, all of us who had followed closely the political events, 
judged that Huerta would take control of affairs. Only Felix 
Diaz and his friends could place any faith in the compact of the 
Embassy and believe that a man lik© HHierta was going to betray 
the President, carry the stain of traitor, and later that of mur- 
derer before the whole civilized world, so that Mr. Felix Diaz 
or any other person, other than himself, should obtain the Presi- 
dency. When the compact had been entered into at the Ameri- 
can Embassy, and when public opinion, which condones every- 
thing but foolishness, had condemned the rebels of the Ciudadela, 
Mr. Felix Diaz and his friends urged Huerta to hasten the call 
for the presidential elections. Hherta with the cunning which 
is his characteristic trait, let affairs drag along, until finally, 
not wishing further to delay the definite solution of matters, 
he decided to issue a proclamation for an election. 

Felix Diaz and his friends were meantime seeking a Vice 
President who by his prestige might help the work which they had 
begun. They decided on Mr. Francisco de la Barra, who was 
expected to carry the Catholic party by his personal prestige 
which they still believed as great as when he had become pro- 
visional president on the fall of General Porfirio Diaz. M^r. 
de la Barra accepted at first, but finding that his prestige was 
not the same, and that the Catholics did not accept him uncon- 
ditionally, or perhaps guessing General Htuerta's intentions, he 

(239) 



240 FROM DESPOTISM TO AINABCHY 

withdrew his name. Again the Felicistas had to seek a candi- 
date who would help Felix Diaz with the burden he had taken 
upon himself. Various candidates arose in the Central Com- 
mittee which was the only one that busied itself with the matter. 
Among the important ones were the noted lawyer, Senator 
Gumesindo Enriquez, a dignified man of conunon sense and an 
experienced politician, and Mr. Jose Luis Requena, a man of 
great intelligence, a lawyer who has never practised. He had 
never engaged in active politics, but he was a millionaire who 
could defray the urgent expenditures that had to be made. The 
Felicistas decided upon Mir. Requena, and the Diaz-Requena 
combination was the one favored by the rebels of the Ciudadela. 

General Huerta, who was watching the electoral work in 
order to see how he could carry out his deliberate plan of not 
leaving his post, decided that he ought to urge the Catholic party 
to take an active participation in the campaign and nominate 
candidates other than those backed by the Felicistas. Thus, 
he reasoned, by dividing the votes, neither party would obtain a 
majority and the elections would be declared void. The Catho- 
lic party which, since its re-entry into the political arena of the 
country has played a part greatly lacking in dignity, lent itself 
to everything and nominated the Gamboa-Rascon combination.* 

Mir. Gamboa is a good man and an excellent ^vriter, but he 
has never taken any part in- political affairs, has no renown in 
the country, does not know men nor is he himself known, ex- 
cept as a writer. Hlis position as Secretary of State gave him 
the opportunity to write his message in answer to the one taken 
to Mexico by Mr. John Lind, and his decided stand against the 
demands of the American government gave him a popularity 
which nevertheless was not solid and could not carry him through 
a real election. Huerta realized this and it was he himself who 
told the Catholic party that they ought to nominate Mr. Gamboa. 
The same was the ease with General Rascon, a worthy soldier, 
of very little civil ability, and well advanced in years. Neither 



*At the time this book is going to press, I read that Huerta 
has treated the Catholic party as he did the Felicistas and the 
House of Representaltives, just as bartenders do with lemons; 
squeeze them dry and then throw them aside. He has just had 
the President of the Catholic party imprisoned in the Fortress 
of Ulua. 



THE KINiG AMUSES HIMSELF 241 

of the two candidates could win the election, but General Huerta, 
to be even more secure, made Mr. Manuel Calero come forward 
as the candidate of the Liberal Party, fearing then that the 
Catholic party was going to win the election. Mr. Calero, too, 
is not popular, in the country at large or among the intellectual 
element. Hjowever much his talent and political knowledge 
may be granted, no one has any trust in him and ihe frightens 
many on account of his boundless ambition. In order to com- 
plete the list of the Liberal Party, General Huerta himself in- 
sinuated the advantage of naming Mr. Jesus Flores Miagon whom 
I have already described elsewhere. Thus the administration 
counted upon drawing from the resources of Mr. Felix Diaz 
and making the latter lose the election. In order to encourage 
the candidates. General Huerta used to send for them to congrat- 
ulate them on account of the nomination, hinting that the ad- 
ministration would back them, indirectly, because it had to ap- 
pear neutral in the struggle. 

He also called for the anti-relectionists to take a part in the 
farce he was getting ready and had them nominate David de la 
Fuente and Dr. Vazquez Gomez as Liberal candidates in opposition 
to Messrs. Calero and Flores Magon, and to Felix Diaz. Thus 
through the month of O'ctober and part of September did Gen- 
eral Huerta amuse himself. But at the moment of the elections, 
fearful that the game might go against his plans, he decided 
to be more energetic, and the Military Commanders received 
decided orders to have the election result in favor of General 
Huerta for President and General Aiureliano Blanquete for Vice 
President, although neither of the two had presented himself 
as a candidate, nor had been nominated by any party. However, 
General Hfuerta continued to protest that he would fulfil his 
obligations like the good soldier that he was and would respect 
the popular vote. As an added measure of mockery to the can- 
didates, he made them meet at the Palace shortly before the 
election to make them sign a paper to the effect that they would 
respect the outcome of the election whatever it might be. They 
were all present at this meeting except M^r. Felix Diaz who was 
away and who had been the one most flouted in the jest. In 
fact, shortly after the election had been called, Mr. Felix Diaz 
had been sent as special envoy to Japan and he had been forced 
to depart almost without taking leave of any one. Of course, 
in ihis appointment it was stated that the government hoped he 



242 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 

would fulfil his mission before the day of the elections so that he 
might return to the country in time to carry out his political 
engagements. Mr. Felix Diaz, who had re-entered the army 
and had been advanced to the rank of General of Brigade, had 
to start immediately for Japan with the members of the Embassy 
but no sooner had he embarked at Salina Cruz than it became 
known that the Mikado would be unable to see him until the 
middle of October for the latter was on his summer vacation. 
"When Mr. Diaz arrived in California, he was tihe target of an 
inimical demonstration planned by the expatriated Mexicans 
who lived in that American State. The Miexiean government 
ordered him to Canada and from Vancouver he was ordered 
to Europe via the Dominion of Canada. When in Europe, on 
the eve of the election, he was relieved of his mission and per- 
mitted to return to Mexico.* Mr. Diaz took the first steamer 
back to his country. In Havana, he was met by friends who had 
come as members of the felicista party, and by others sent by 
General Huerta to intimidate him and keep him from the coun- 
try. It was considered best to land at Tampico rather than in 
Vera Cruz, but Mr. Diaz, giving a proof of energy and decision, 
heeded no one and continued his voyage on the German ship 
towards Vera Cruz. U^pon their arrival there, the members of 
the Embassy who had accompanied Diaz, were taken into cus- 
tody, conducted aboard the gunboat Zaragoza and sent to Ha- 
vana to resume their journey. It was claimed that they had 
returned to the country without the permission of the govern- 
ment, for the telegram to Mr. Diaz authorized the return of the 
latter only and not that of his friends who accompanied him. 
When they arrived at Havana, they were all dismissed from 
office and nearly all returned to Vera Cruz. Upon their sec- 
ond arrival at this port, those who were army men were taken 
charge of by the military authorities, and some, like Mr. Fiden- 
cio Hernandez, were taken into custody under charges of having 
tried to cause a mutiny among the sailors of the ship that had 
taken them to Havana. 



*Huerta always distrusted, feared that Mr. Felix Diaz, in 
spite of the orders of the government, would return to Mexico, 
and with that audacious step could increase his opportunities; 
then he preferred to allow him to return at once and watch over 
him in Mexico. 



THE KING AIMUSES HIMSELI^ 243 

General Felix Diaz remained in Vera Cruz, bnt the govern- 
ment sent Mr. Antonio Villa-vicencio* at the head of a number 
of detectives to watch him. As there was bitter enmity between 
General Diaz and Mr. Villa-vicencio, to the degree that when 
the former (had triumphed at the Ciudadela orders had been 
given that the latter be shot at sight, General Diaz believed that 
the object of the police was to shoot him. He prudently moved 
his quarters to the German Hotel which borders in the rear to 
the house occupied by the United States Consulate. Villa-vicen- 
cio ordered his people to surround the block and the whole square 
was consequently guarded by detectives. In addition to this 
policing, a rumor was circulated around Vera Cruz to the effect 
that tlhe Felicistas had prepared a riot in order to attack the 
crew of the German warship anchored in the bay and thus bring 
more trouble on the government. These facts served to in- 
crease General Diaz' suspicions of a possible attempt against 
his life. 

On the nigiht of Saturday, the 25th, and Sunday the 26th, 
squads of Rurales patrolled the streets of Vera Cruz, thus show- 
ing that the government believed there really was a plot afoot. 
"Whether due to this or to other reasons, the fact is that on the 
night of Monday the 27th, Diaz passed by way of the roof from 
the German Hotel to the American Consulate. From there, 
accompanied by Messrs. Bonales Sandoval and Ocon, and by 
two American Naval officers, he went hurriedly to the wharf 
that is in front of the American Consulate and boarded a launch 
of Rear Admiral Fletcher's fleet that took him to the "Whitley, 
which was andhored in the Bay. On the following day he was 
transferred to one of the cruisers that were outside the bay and 
one of these transferred him at sea to the American steamer Es- 
peranza when the latter sailed from Progreso on the 2nd of Dec- 
ember. On the eve of the election. General Diaz had again ob- 
tained his retirement from the Federal army. Meanwhile, the 
elections took place. In Vera Cruz, where I was at the time, 
very few went to the poUs, but a Captain in the army took to one 
of the booths the ballots corresponding to all the garrison in the 
city, all of them in favor of General Huerta for President, and 
General Blanquete for Vice President. One of the Felicistas 



* Chief of the detective force when Felix Diaz was Police 
Commissioner, 



244 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO ANARiCHiY 

wis'lied to protest against this as a flagrant violation: of the law, 
and had the weird idea of making Mr. Alcolea, brother-in-law of 
Felix Diaz, the notary to give testimony to the fact. The police 
arrested the partisan who protested and the Notary before whom 
he was to swear to the statement, and sent them both to IMlexieo 
City charged with sedition. 

In Havana, Mr. Felix Diaz met with another misfortune. 
One night, on the "Malecon," a dispute arose between the group 
in which he found himself, and another group of expatriated 
Mexicans, who claimed to be Maderistas or revolutionists. As 
a result of this dispute, Mr. Pedro Guerrero Mtendez, a young 
man, native of Michoacan, an ardent partisan of Madero, was 
wounded by a firearm. When the police examined the parties 
concerned, no firearms were found upon any of them. Never- 
theless, a lady who claimed to have seen the whole affair, ac- 
cused Mr. Felix Diaz as the assailant of Guerrero Miendez, and 
Mr. Diaz was taken prisoner but released on bail upon the fol- 
lowing day to await the trial. 

General Htierta, in the meantime, had convened the new 
Congress, and this had declared the election null and void be- 
cause it did not conform with the legal requisites, and because 
the majority of votes had been cast for Hnerta who was not a 
candidate. This latter point was contrary to the express text 
of the Constitution, a fact that could not in any way be coun- 
tenanced by so ardent a champion of the Constitution as Gen- 
eral Huerta. At the same time the Huertista Congress declared 
that as the election was null and void, General Hhaerta should 
continue in office until such a time as a legal election could 
be held. 



CHAPTER XXXVI. 
AMERICAN POLICY. 



In the whole of our conflict since the revolution began, that 
is, since the end of 1910, the policy of the United States Grovem- 
ment has played an important part, but the policy of the govern- 
ment of the State of Texas has played even a greater part. 

The State of Texas, particularly its cities of San Antonio 
and El Paso, has been the incubator of the last three Mexican 
revolutions. I wish to point out this fact and to lay stress on 
it because since peace in Mexico is of interest to Americans, they 
should begin by taking measures to prevent further conspiracies 
at home against the peace of their neighbor. There have been 
two chief incentives to foment revolutionary movements in Mexi- 
co. The fever for business, which has no limit with some mer- 
chants who seek profit wherever it can be secured, regardless of 
the means employed for obtaining it; and the protection which 
men of doubtful character find in all movements of disorder. 

For instance, under cover of the revolutionary movements, 
cattle stealing on a large scale has been frequent. In the majority 
of cases, the authorities have been powerless to punish the guilty 
parties. Special legislation on the sale of cattle at the border 
would probably prevent the repetition of the evil. 

Regarding the second question, the United States Govern- 
ment is already taking steps to revise the neutrality laws so as 
to authorize the federal authorities to punish violations more 
severely, and especially, to empower them to prevent: the execu- 
tion of acts of rebellion hatched north of the Rio Grande. 

As I have related in different chapters of this book the 
spectre of intervention, which strikes terror to all Mexican poli- 
ticians of whatever party, was conjured up by Ambassador Henry 
Lane Wilson ever since the time of General Diaz, whose downfall 
it powerfully aided. Later, it was used against Madero with 
greater force. Huerta is the only one against whom it has not 

(245) 



246 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAEOHlY 

been employed, either because Ambassador Wilson was early re- 
called or because the new American administration soon under- 
stood that EPuerta wished to be threatened, hoping by that means 
to consolidate his power.* 

From the beginning of his administration, President Wil- 
son outlined his policy against usurpation perfectly, and has con- 
stantly adhered to it. TTie just attitude of the President of the 
American Union is unassailable both morally and legally. 

President Woodrow Wilson has refused to recognize the 
government of General Huerta so as not to establish the pre- 
cedent that governments established by force and through trea- 
chery, are to be considered legitimate. M]r. Wilson justly denies 
the theory that he has no right to question the means by which 
an individual seizes the power. Such theories, as that of the 
legality of Huerta 's government, are worthy of shysters but 
not of conscientious people. In refusing to recognize the govern- 
ment of General Huerta, the President of the United States has 
made use of an indisputable right of the American nation, for 
it is inherent to its sovereignty to decide with whom it should 
have friendly relations without having to declare whether that 
government is legitimate or not; in other words, whether an 
official has complied with his particular constitution so as to 



*The propositions presented to the American Government 
by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson for the pacification of Mexico were 
published in the New York Herald of November 16th, 1913. It 
was proposed to authorize American intervention to the 26th 
parallel of latitude, beginning at Topolobampo, State of Sinaloa, 
and ending at Mlatamoros, State of T'amaulipas. This would 
result in the military occupation by the United States of the 
States of Sonora, Chihuahua, and a large part of Coahuila, Nuevo 
Leon and Lower California. Besides, Mexico was to relinquish 
all claims relating to the Chamizal, give up all share in the waters 
of the Colorado River, pay the claims that might be made against 
it; and express the wish and possibility of holding regular elec- 
tions immediately. Did Mr. Wilson submit these propositions in 
accordance with a previous agreement with Huerta? Tliis is 
quite probable, because Mr. Wilson has been continuously advo- 
cating Huerta 's fitness to govern Mexico; besides the latter 's tele- 
gram to Mr. Henry Lane Wilson thanking him for his work, gives 
peculiar weight to this assumption. The telegram is dated August 
5th, that is, inunediately after Mr. Wilson's dismissal on August 
4th, when President Woodrow Wilson rejected the Ambassador's 
propositions. 



AMEiRICAN POLICY 247 

represent the Nation legitimately. The American Government 
refuses to enter into friendly relations with the government 
of General Hnerta for the same reasons that a merchant might 
refuse to do business with a given house without implying any- 
thing else than the exercise of an unquestionable right. 

The American Government has been harassed by two par- 
ties clamoring for directly opposite courses of action in MIexico. 
On the one hand, it was asked to recognize the H'uerta govern- 
ment, and on the other, to intervene in the affairs of ]\fexico, 
manu militari, and to impose peace by force of arms. Either 
would be a capital mistake. Armed intervention^ is condemned 
by the policy which the American Government has followed for 
a century. 

John Adams, on November 18, 1782, maintained that the 
American people should not intervene in the affairs of others, 
and therefore, would not concede to anyone the right to intervene 
in the affairs of the United States. 

Washington maintained the same principles in his procla- 
mation of April 22, 1793, and particularly recommended them 
in his "Farewell Address" of September 1796. Jefferson also 
upheld them on March 12, 1793, and again recommended the 
same policy on June 30 of the same year. 

MJacon, member of the Senate Committee of Foreign Af- 
fairs, said on January 16, 1826: "The true interest of the 
United States was supposed to be promoted by avoiding all en- 
tangling connections with any other nations whatsoever. ' ' 

Secretary of State Clay said on January 30, 1828: "The 
government of the United States scrupulously refrains from 
taking part in the internal dissensions in foreign states whether 
in the Old World or the New." 

President Van Buren expressed the same views on June 9, 
1829, and Secretary of State Forsyth on November 11, 1834 
addressed a note to the American Minister in Mexico on the 
same subject. Webster, as Secretary of State, on January 29, 
1842, also referred to this matter in the same terms. President 
Fillmore on December 2nd, 1851, said : "Let every people choose 
for itself and make and alter its political institutions to suit its 
own condition and convenience." 

On December 28, 1855, referring to a controversy with Tur- 
key about a man who had been condemned to death for changing 
his religion, Secretary of State Marcy declared that intervention 



248 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCKY 

could not be justified in spite of the absurdity and inhumanity 
of such a sentence. 

On account of the occurrences in JVHexico, Secretary of 
State, General Cass, in a note dated March Tth, 1859, to j\Ir. 
McLane, the representative of the United States near the go- 
vernment of Juarez, maintained the policy of non-intervention 
in spite of the fact that President Buchanan himself desired 
to intervene having gone so far as to ask authority to do so, 
which was refused by Congress. Later the United States had 
their Department of State in charge of that great statesman 
whose name must always be mentioned with respect, Mir. Seward. 
I must cite his notes of November 5, 1861 ; June 23 ; November 
22; and December 14, 1862, and his circular of November 30 of 
the same year, addressed to the Diplomatic Agents of the Uni- 
ted States, in which he denies to the European powers any right 
of intervention ; for at that time, in the name of humanity, they 
were pretending to meddle with the gigantic struggle of the 
American people. 

The importunities of the European powers, chiefly France, 
who wished to re-establish peace in the United States, and to 
force the government to come to an understanding with the re- 
bels, obliged the American Congress to pass a joint resolution, 
which Mi:". Seward published on Miarch 9, 1863 and contains 

the following paragraph: '^....„ In order to remove all chance 

of misunderstanding on the subject and to secure for the United 
States the full enjoyment of that freedom from foreign inter- 
ference which is one of the highest rights of independence for 
Congress to declare its conviction on the subject." 

Finally when things reached a critical point, Mr. Seward 
made a definite declaration which sums up the policy of the 
United States without leaving room for the slighest doubt. It 
is dated June 30, 1864 and in it, Mir. Seward says that "the 
principles of foreign mediation in our affairs can not be in 
any form or under any circumstances, admitted." 

Mr. Fish, Secretary of State in the administration of Gen- 
eral Grant, maintained the same thesis and ratified it on I\Iarch 
26, 1873. 

On April 15, 1885, Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State in 
President Cleveland's administration, referring to the protec- 
tion due to Americans residing in foreign countries, denied the 
right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of a eoun- 



AMERICAN POLICY 249 

try for the purpose of guaranteeing tlie peaceful enjoyment 
of their property to Americans who found themselves endanger- 
ed by civil war. Secretary Biayard declared that "generally 
speaking, persons who quit the shelter of their own flag to take 
up a voluntary residence in a foreign land do so at their own 
risk and subject to the vicissitudes of foreign invasion or dom- 
estic insurrection in the country where they cast their lot in 
common with the natives thereof." 

Secretary of State Day on September 16, 1898, and Presi- 
dent McKinley on December 5, 1899, were even more explicit. 

Lastly, on December 6, 1904, the man who has been consid- 
ered in these times the champion of a strong foreign policy by 
the United States, the famous originator of the "big stick pol- 
icy," Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, said: "Ordinarily it is very 
much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with 
striving for our moral and material betterment here at home 
than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of 
things in other nations. ' ' 

The foregoing citations clearly show that the policy of the 
United States, inspired by a high sentiment of j;ustice and love 
of country, has never tolerated the interference of any nation 
in the interior affairs of the country, and at the same time, 
applying the rule to other nations, has not interfered in their 
interior conflicts. 

This has been the policy not only of its statesmen, who 
have held executive power, but also of the Congress of the Uni- 
ted States, which has continuously refused to give authority for 
such interventions. 

After the revolution of Ayutla, when we had the revolt of 
Tacubaya with the dictatorship of Miramon, President Bucha- 
nan very insistently asked for authority to intervene in Mexican 
affairs and expel Miramon from the Capital. President Bucha- 
nan desired to impress the American Senate with his message of 
December 19, 1859, but did not succeed. A year later, on 
account of the assassination of Crabb and his companions in 
Sonora, and of the murders by Mlarquez in Tacubaya on April 
11, President Buchanan insisted with the American Congress for 
authority to intervene in Mtexican affairs. Congress again re- 
fused; it went even further, it refused to ratify the treaty Mc- 
Lane-Ocampo, which authorized the American Government to 
protect traffic in the Isthmus of TIehuantepec with the forces 



250 FBOM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

of the United States, and. it refused because "the people of the 
United States ought not to meddle in the interior conflicts of 
any nation, ' ' 

This policy was continually maintained by the United States 
during its own civil war in which some excesses were conunitted, 
excesses inevitable in fratricidal wars. Then, as now in Mexico, 
property suffered damages, because Sherman's famous march to 
the sea, begun November 16th. 1864, was a devastation lasting 
five weeks. The commander of the Union army, under the exi- 
gency of war, destroyed everything in his path, without stopping 
to inquire its value or who were the OT^ners. 

The government of General Huerta has entreatingly com- 
plained that it has been unable to restore peace, because the 
American Government has not recognized it. Did General Diaz 
in 1876 need this recog-nition when he entered the capital of the 
Eepublic after his victory at the battle of Teeoac? No. The 
need of it, which General Huerta proclaims, simply shows his 
own weakness. Strong governments, when supported by the 
nation thej'- govern, need nobody's recognition. Foreign nations, 
on seeing them well established, recognize them in their ovm in- 
terests no matter what grievances they may have had previously. 
Spain, Catholic Spain, had seen Juarez expel from Mexican ter- 
ritory the Spanish Ambassador Pacheco, and Clementi, the Nuncio 
of his Holiness, but all that did not prevent Spain from recog- 
nizing Juarez when once she saw him solidly established. France, 
whose soldiers had fought against General Diaz, and Austria. 
which had seen the brother of its own Emperor shot in Mexico 
by the party for which Diaz fought, recognized his government 
and entered into diplomatic relations when they saw that the 
former republican soldier had constituted a real government. 
But as regards General Huerta, he does not possess the necessary 
qualifications to render him capable of establishing a real govern- 
ment, nor does he enjoy the support of the truly representative 
and thoughtful men who could guarantee the proper execution 
of the law and the sway of justice. He has at his side men of 
undoubted intelligence, but of no weight to the countiy or even 
to the mind of General Huerta himself, who listens to them 
only so long as they flatter his passions or do not oppose his 
wishes. 

The representatives of European nations gave their respec- 
tive governments favorable reports of General Huerta because 



AMERICAN POLICY 251 

they only saw in him a bold soldier, and believed that in reestab- 
lishing order he would continue to show the same energy that 
he had used to grasp power. But they failed to apprehend the 
true character of General II*uerta and to gauge correctly the 
medium where the events were taking place. 

President Wilson, however, fully realized both, not because 
his Ambassador faithfully informed him of what occurred, but 
because the nearness to the theater of events, the large current 
of communications and the ease of transportation allowed him 
to receive quickly all the details needed to decide his line of 
conduct. This has tended to conserve peace between the two 
nations, which should always be friendly since their political 
ideals are the same and their mutual interests closely bound. 

Some may complain that we have now been for three years 
in a state of civil war. This is quite true, but most nations have 
passed through similar crises before becoming permanently con- 
stituted. To enjoy the public liberties which so distinguish her, 
England had to go through the direful period from the end of 
the 13th centu.ry to the beginning of the 14th; through the civil 
war of the Koses, and lastly through the period from 1648 to 
1658 which made Cromwell immortal. Besides, England had 
as a powerful auxiliary the Oine Hlundred Yiears' War, which, 
like all foreign wars, served it admirably to consolidate its re- 
sources. 

To reach the present Riepublie, and not considering the con- 
tests prior to Louis XI, France had to pass the revolutionary 
period at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 
19th, one of the most imposing revolutions registered in history, 
and it was only after the commotions of 1830 and 1848 and par- 
ticularly after the great catastrophe of 1870-71 that the country 
succeeded in reorganizing itself. 

Spain has a revolutionary period which covers nearly all 
its history, but in its last stage, it took seven years to enable it 
to constitute a monarchy under the scepter of the present 
Bourbons. 

The United States have been more fortunate because they 
came into being differently from other nations. When the Bri- 
tish Empire was consolidated in America and the Colonies began 
to be formed m 1664, later to be the nucleus of this great nation, 
the great English crisis had passed and the head of Charles I 
had already fallen, carrying with it all future pretensions to 



252 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAEjCHY 

tyrannize the English people. With all these lessons in mind 
the Pilgrims of the Mayflower arrived in America. 

All nations cannot be judged similarly. It is essential to 
study their history and the elements of which they are formed. 
Italy has been unified by its defeats. Turkey has been ruined by 
its victories. How long did that Holy Roman Empire last, 
which appeared so vigorous at the coronation of Charlemagne 
by the Pope on Christmas night of the year 800 ? Only the life- 
time of its founder. 

Why did Austria lose its predominance in Germany? On 
account of its civil wars, yet if we turn to Japan we find that 
it has risen to its present high position because of its civil wars. 

It is true we have had three consecutive revolutions. We 
are now at the crisis. Our enemies say that there is not a single 
man visible with sufficient authority to control the situation. 
That is exactly what the allied nations said in 1861 at the dis- 
cussions of the treaty of London, and yet Juarez demonstrated 
with facts that he did have the requisite authority to form a 
government in the country. 



CONCLUSION. 



The contemporaneous history of our country reminds us 
forcibly of another epoch, also disastrous to the life of our nation. 
Then, as to day, it was necessary to struggle with the natural 
reaction which, after a military revolt, took possession of power. 
Then the populace was victorious in the long run, and the mili- 
tary dictatorship of Santa Ana first, and that of IVTiramon second, 
both backed by a strong and invincible army, were overthrown, 
although in their death agony they nearly dragged with them 
the independence of the Nation. 

The dictatorship of Santa Ana collapsed at the touch of 
the revolution of Ayutla, for this revolt had inscribed on its 
banners principles for making normal the political life of the 
Nation and thus implanting a real democracy. Among these 
principles, and in fact the main one, was the abolition of special 
privileges to the army and to the clergy, and the administering 
of justice equally to all. 

After the triumph of the revolution of Ayutla, Don Juau' 
Alvarez was made provisional President. His administration 
was characterized by the fact thait everybody was president ex- 
cept the President himself. Alvarez was eventually succeeded 
by General Ignacio Comonfort, the first President elected under 
the system established by the Constitution of 1857. 

Comonfort, without a doubt was a good man, but indecisive 
and lacking the necessary capabilities for accomplishing the 
task at hand. Hie was full of illusions which he had to put 
aside, and purposes which he could not carry out. Like all weak 
men, he hesitated, and like all men politically inexperienced, he 
put himself into the hands of the very men who would ruin him. 
These men betrayed him, and his downfall was horrible. The 
military revolt of Tacubaya carried to the Presidency an un- 
known soldier, Zuloaga by name, a man without education, and 
even weaker and more indecisive than Comonfort. 

iSoOn after the revolt of Tacubaya, Miramon, who had been 
its heart and soul, declared the wish of the Nation to be that he 

(253) 



254 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAE,CiHY 

occupy the presidency; witih this excuse, he seized the govern- 
ment and implanted a new dictatorship as bad if not worse than 
that which the revolution of Ayutla had overthrown. 

Juarez, who had been elected Vice President at the time 
Comonfort was elected President, now took up the banner which 
had been dropped by the Constitutional President. He called 
on the Nation to assist him in a war against pretorian militarism^ 
whose title to power was treason, and whose only arms were those 
entrusted to it by the Nation tO' guard its institutions. 

The war lasted three years, but finally, at Calpulalpam, the 
supremacy of the populace over the pretorian militarists was 
decided, and right triumphed over the rebellious soldiery. 

Comparing one epoch with the other, we see the similar- 
ity between them. The dictatorship of General Diaz, like that 
of Santa Ana, collapsed at the touch of a revolution on whose 
banners were inscribed principles which would make Mlexico a 
true democracy. At the elections, the triumphant revolution 
placed Madero at the head of the government, a good man, but 
full of illusions, indecisive, and at the critical moment incompetent 
tC' carry out the promised reforms. Like Comonfort, Mjadero 
found the ground unfavorable since there had been no work of 
preparation and education along democratic lines. He, like 
Comonfort, placed his trust in the very persons who were to be- 
tray him. 

Two revolts, entirely military in origin, planned at 'Tacu- 
baya, brought to the Presidency soldiers like Mramon and Santa 
Ana, who thought to impose their authority by force of arms, 
believing that with bayonets they could establish peace. 

Guillermo Prieto referring to Santa Ana on page 566 of his 
book entitled ''Lessons on Our National History for the use of 
the Cadets of the Military Academy," says: "Needless to say 
that in the administration all members of the President's family 
were acting as brokers in all lines of business, thus converting 
into cash their submission and loyalty to their head. To strength- 
en such a situation, the army was necessarily increased. Out- 
casts of all parties flocked to the ranks, shoving aside and heap- 
ing humiliations upon the men of true merit. As was to be ex- 
pected, the freedom of the press was withdrawn, spying and tale 
bearing, and vshady intrigues became the politics of the time * 
* * * * Santa Ana believed he could do anything and that 
he knew everything, for such is the invariable result where such 



CONCLUSION 255 

petty meannesses and adulations are eombined. This is a symp- 
tom of the ruin of all brainless rulers. ' ' 

All who are familiar with the crisis through which Mexico 
is passing at this time, might think on reading the words of 
Guillermo Prieto about Santa Ana, that they were written about 
the dictatorship of General Huerta. The reason is that all dic- 
tatorships are fundamentally alike ; they all carry to power men 
who as a rule are brutal ; some more intelligent than others, 
and some more easily adaptable to their new surroundings. Of 
these, the intelligent men who harmonize their acts, if only in 
part, are able to make their government tolerable. Such was 
the case with General Diaz. In fact, when they are sufficiently 
clever to develop with the times and adapt themselves to the 
requirements of the people, they end by making themselves loved 
and are able to perpetuate themselves. Such was the case with 
Bernardotte in Sweden, and such would have been the case with 
General Diaz if he had developed politically as he did socially. 

With the fall of the government of Madero, the country has 
been launched into a new revolution which must necessarily be 
the last, if we are to maintain our national independence. The 
present revolution is fully justified because of the unspeakable 
acts committed by those now in power. Entirely filled with the 
idea of gaining supremacy, they did not measure the consequences 
of their conduct, nor have they sought pardon for their deeds. 
On the contrary, they have all in all given ample cause for an 
armed rebellion. I repeat that, in my opinion, the present re- 
volution will be the last ; it therefore behooves us to make up our 
differences in such a way as to prevent the armed intervention 
of foreign nations, since it is not impossible that they may be forced 
to it by the insistent appeals of their citizens who raise before 
the eyes of the world the host of humanity. Intervention by a 
foreign power would be disastrous to Mexico, costly if not dis- 
astrous to the nation attempting it; facts well known to the 
governments of both continents as well as to ourselves. But 
public opinion carries such weight in some countries and imposes 
itself in such a manner that the governments at times, even 
against their better judgment, are obliged to submit to the man- 
dates formulated in terms so imperious, that there is not even 
room for hesitation. 

We should, therefore, not remain complacently tranquil, con- 
fiding in the personal judgment of this or that ruler, or m his 



256 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAROHY 

intentions and personal wishes. AA^e must face the question as 
it stands, measure the conflict in all its phases, and seek a solu- 
tion without imdue haste or delay which may cause our eventual 
social death. 

The government of Gteneral Huerta cannot stand, nor can 
it count on public opinion. It was bom of treason, it lives nursed 
by the heat of a most frightful disorder, and will die execrated 
by the whole nation. Those who are not openly its enemies, hide 
their true feelings through fear, through personal expediency, 
or through misgivings for the future, seeming to believe that by 
merely closing their eyes, the yawning chasms will close. In fact, 
General Hluerta can only count on the bayonet to maintain his 
position ; and the bayonet as has been said by an expert, is useful 
for everything except to lean upon. But like Santa Ana, General 
Huerta will relinquish power only when he is ejected by main 
force. It may be that he intends, like Santa Ana, to put a figure- 
head in the chair; then leaving everybody satisfied, to flee to 
foreign lands to await an opportunity to seize power again, if 
there should be a new outbreak. But to give up of his o'wn ac- 
cord, definitely and completely, power gained by the blackest 
treason ever registered in the annals of our history, will never be 
done by General Huerta. 

Does the salvation of the country then depend upon the 
triumph of the revolution headed by Venustiano Carranza? To 
all appearances; it is the only revolution now existing, and is, 
I insist, the last one we should have. 

Like all revolutions, the Constitutionalista has not been able 
to choose its followers, but has been forced to accept all 
volunteers. For this reason, we cannot condemn it on account 
of having in its ranks men who may have been formerly evil- 
doers, nor because it may have resorted to acts unsanctioned by 
modern warfare. On the contrary, we must close our eyes to 
both these facts and concentrate our minds, as is meet and just, 
on the absolute necessity for the overthrow of a regime whose 
future points to the ruin of the nation ; our eyes should seek to 
see and our minds to grasp the terrible anguish which possesses 
all patriots who think only of the welfare of Miexico. Will the 
government which succeeds that of General Huerta be able to 
establish itself on such a basis as to give promise of final con- 
solidation, and prove itself strong, dignified, and worthy of 
respect ? 



CONCLUSION 257 

If tlie men who are leading the present revolution should 
triumph and attain power, will they be able to establish the peace 
so eagerly desired by the whole nation? Or will they only give 
place to a new period of insurrection which the country itself 
cannot withstand and which foreign powers wiU not tolerate? 

To try to prevent this, I have deemed it my duty to set forth 
a record of what has happened and call the attention of my coun- 
trymen to the danger we are in, pointing out at the same time 
the causes and motives which, in my estimation, have brought 
us to our present deplorable situation. !S^llch has been the prin- 
cipal object of this book, since in itls entirety it has been merely 
a narrative of deeds and a study of the men who have taken 
part in our national politics within the last few years. To attain 
my object fully, I must now name the responsible parties, at- 
tribu'ting to each his responsibility in the deeds set forth in this 
book. Hjere, as throughout my whole work, I have endeavored 
to set aside all personal feelings so far as human nature will 
allow. Therefore, lest I be accused of attempting to shirk re- 
sponsibility or of being moved by personal animosity, or of nurs- 
ing some secret ambition, in writing these final pages I have put 
aside entirely all personal feelings. It has been my endeavor to 
write as though I had not personally known the men I am judging ; 
in fact, as if I had never been connected with them. Only with 
this firm resolution is it possible to write contemporaneous 
history. 

First of all then, before the tribunal of history, I impeach 
Don Porfirio Diaz, not of his acts as a revolutionist, which, as 
I have stated in Chapter II,* do carry with them a certain re- 
sponsibility, but, first and foremost, I impeach him of his acts 
as President of the Nation. Hie enjoyed an authority through- 
out the country never possessed by any other man. Had not 
ambition killed every other sentiment in his soul, he would have 
been able to relinquish power at the proper time to younger, more 
robust, and more energetic hands. At the same time, he could 
have acted as adviser to his successor, protecting him with the 
respect and love his conduct would have of itself won. for him 
in the hearts of the people. He would have been able, in the 
long years of his rule, to set the Nation on the road to a true de- 
mocracy. He would have been able to educate a score of m^en 



^Of the Spanish complete edition. 



258 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

with a thorough knowledge of public affairs, so that they might 
properly control the reins of government and conduct the Nation 
through the paths of peace and order to true liberty. But far 
from that, he passed his official life distrusting the whole world, 
and playing those who surrounded him one against the other 
to their own destruction. He deceived everybody. He used 
everybody to his own ends and personal purposes. He antago- 
nized all who could have served him or the country; some of 
them died, others were totally incapacitated for further work of 
benefit to the country. His political work was one of destruc- 
tion, one of extinction. It is true that he developed and encour- 
aged the material progress of the country, but it is also true that 
he neglected all the rest. He failed to remember that the ma- 
terial progress of a people, when not accompanied by their poli- 
tical education, can only presage ruin and desolation to the 
country ; for, vast material works, unaccompanied by training in 
leadership, citizenship, and interest by all in public affairs, can 
only spell failure. 

Sparta and Athens apparently so strong, so consolidated, 
one with its great military spirit, the other with its laurels of 
art and poetry, disappeared from among the nations of the world 
as soon as they concentrated their activities on material progress 
and delivered themselves body and soul to the spirit of commer- 
cialism, going so far even as to hire those satraps who were tyran- 
nizing the towns bordering on Greece, those peasants crowned 
with glory at Platea and Marathon. 

The same thing is true of the Persian Empire under the 
great Syrian, of the Empire of the Pharoahs, and of the Empire 
of Macedonia which reached the zenith of greatness with the 
genius of Alexander the Great. 

The Roman Empire, that empire which gave birth to men 
who still live by the glory of their deeds and who are known to 
all students throughout the world, also disappeared on the day 
when its citizens, instead of going to the Forum to discuss the 
public welfare, went to inspect and admire the great material 
works which were to perpetuate the glory of the tyrants who were 
snatching from them one by one all their liberties. 

Social development only is permanent. Greece still lives 
today because the poetry and art of the Anthenians will live 
forever. Rome lives because its institutions and laws are an 
eternal fount of inspiration to the jurist and the lawmaker. 



CONCLUSION 259 

Material works fill a momentary need, but in history they 
only serve to recall the epoch of their construction, they are 
useful to posterity as sign posts to stimulate the interest in the 
men who ordered them and in those who constructed them. The 
monuments left by the Arab conquest of Spain remind us only 
that the forces of Tarik and Yousuf reached even across the 
Pyrenees before their progress was stopped by the son of Pepin ; 
they tell us a story of seven hundred years of hideous crimes and 
treasons, and seven hundred years of constant blows against 
liberty. As a whole, those* monuments are testimonials of pain 
more than of power. The great pyramids of Egypt, and the 
beautiful ruins of the civilization of the Indians in our own 
eountry, are altars which grief and shame, exile and slave, have 
raised to perpetuate throughout the centuries the wickedness of 
man and the pleasure of tyrants in the grief of a vanquished 
brother. 

What profit has humanity received from such things as the 
magnificent baths of Caracullus, of Neztahualcoyotl, or the pyra- 
mids of Teotihuacan? iThey are only a reminder of the exis- 
tence of great empires which, like the government of General 
Diaz, have collapsed. Hjis material works will remind genera- 
tions to come that Mexico once possessed a man of great power 
who had vast resources at his command; a man who for many 
years held a people in absolute subjection, but who lived to see 
his work perish because although he conquered his country, he 
was conquered by his own egotism and ambition. Therefore, 
eventually, instead of peace and prosperity, his work brought 
ruin and desolation. But the responsibility does not all belong 
to General Diaz. I now proceed to impeach General Bernardo 
Reyes. Had not the Rieyista movement been a purely personal 
one to disturb our spirit, it is possible that we might not have 
witnessed the events which! fill us with horror and shame, and 
make us shudder when we contemplate the end they may lead 
to in the very near future. Under the shadow and immediate 
supervision of General Reyes, that seed of rebellion and sedition 
was implanted which was the soul of the disgraceful mutiny of 
February 18th, 1913. 

The Mladerista revolution, as I have endeavored to show, in 
the course of this work, found the ground propitious because 
of the lengthy intrigues carried on for ten years by General 
Reyes and his subordinates. His. was an undertaking essentially 



260 PROM DESPOIISM TO ANAEOHY 

disastrous because it aimed at discrediting resources of value, 
offering no substitute for them, and above all, because it stood 
for the supremacy of force as an element of life for the Nation'. 

G^eneral Rieyes created nothing. Hjis work, socially, only 
engendered a spirit of insubordination, of indecisiveness, of dis- 
loyalty, which is reflected throughout his entire political career. 
In fact, he did not even do anything worthy of note for himself 
though he concentrated his efforts to that end. If he had been 
upright and decisive, his energy would have served to consoli- 
date a civil government as well as to restrain General Diaz from 
those acts which were dragging him down, and the whole natioc 
with him. General Reyes could have taken advantage of the 
growing feeling against Porfirio Diaz to place himself at the 
head of a purely democratic movement. The country would have 
welcomed him with open arms, for as a matter of fact the people 
often turned to him and would have delivered themselves to him 
had he not hesitated. But he was not the man to face such situa- 
tions. His work was destructive rather than constructive ; it was 
the forerunner of events which have subsequently taken place. 
I put him down in history as one of those mainly responsible for 
the present conditions, and I impeach him as second only to Diaz 
himself. 

Next, I impeach those officers who have made the army a 
stepping stone to their ambitions, who have forced the country 
back to the pretorian epoch of his Serene HUghness, Santa Ana ; 
an epoch so disastrous to the country. These men have corrupt- 
ed the army whose mission it is to defend the fatherland and 
uphold its institutions; they have made of it an instrument to 
satiate their personal desires; and they have made the present 
time an epoch which will always be a blot on our national life. 
These officers are Vlictoriano Htuerta, Felix Diaz, and Manuel 
Maria Mondragon. 

Next to them, I impeach Mr. Mladero. He is responsible in 
that he attempted a work far above his capability,— to bring into 
one channel the conflicting currents reyismo, the democratic 
party, and the anti-reelectionists, conflicting in everything but 
the desire to expel Diaz and the men identified with him. He 
should have understood that it was necessary to curb them so 
that they should not become anarchical. He should have anal- 
yzed himself carefully to see whether he really possessed the quali- 
fications for such a work; but he did not do so. With no realiza- 



CONCLUSION 261 

tion of the greatness of the mission he was undertaking, and of 
the labor and work involved, he plunged straight to a destruc- 
tion of incalculable consequences to the country. Notwithstand- 
ing, history undoubtedly will have mercy on him, perhaps forgive 
all his errors on account of his martyrdom. 

I also impeach the advisers of General Diaz who were in 
touch with him for many years, who were with him at the crucial 
moment. Among them, in the first rank, I impeach Jose Ives 
Limantour. Mr. Limantour for many years enjoyed the friend- 
ship and affecition of General Diaz and finally his entire confi- 
dence. Hjis egotism and incompetence at the crucial moment, 
were revealed to such a degree that many consider him the con- 
scious author of the fall of General Diaz. Events have not yet 
clearly established it ; therefore, I myself would not dare to make 
such a weighty accusation. However, his incompetence in those 
moments is so plain, his insight into the political situation so 
slight, his acts so erroneous, that it is hard to believe that a man 
of his reputed high intelligence could have acted as he did only 
through error. Like General Diaz, he could have served the 
country, but either through malice, through ambition, or through 
incapacity, he hurled it into the abyss. I place him among the 
most guilty ; in fact, to a degree equal to Bernardo Kieyes. 

I also impeach the American Ambassador, Mr. Henry Lane 
Wilson, whose work, entirely destructive in character, is inexpli- 
cable. He worked against the government of General Diaz, forc- 
ing the collapse of his administration; he was not less hostile to 
that of Mr. Madero, as he has openly admitted,* and in the 
tragedy of February 22nd, his sin of omission is absolutely 
despicable. 

When recalled from office by the Democratic Administra- 
tion, he upheld in this country the government of General Huer- 
ta, for the exploitation of his political party ; but while in Mexi- 
co, his attitude was impertinent. Hfe went so far as to demand 
in his official capacity as Ambassador of a liberty loving people, 
the suppression of the Mexican newspaper "El Pais" and the 
arrest of its editors. t 



*Interview published in the New York Times, Jan. 11th, 1913. 

tLetter from Henry Lane Wilson to President Huerta under 
date of June 11th. 1913. 



262 PROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 

I further impeach the Messrs. Vazquez Glomez and Mt. Fran- 
cisco de la Barra, who also are, in my opinion, greatly to blame 
for present conditions in Mexico. The former for their plottings 
and ambitions ; the latter for his weakness as a ruler. Mr. Lascu- 
rain is to blame, but only to a very slight degree. Be was un- 
doubtedly confronted by a situation which he could not possibly 
have foreseen. It is true he showed lack of energy and foresight, 
but we must judge him at the moment of action, and above all, 
we must remember that he was the only one not moved by a per- 
sonal ambition. Though I do not absolve him entirely, I can 
only place his responsibility on a par with that of the rest of 
us, especially of those who have taken part in one way or another 
in the administration of affairs. I for my part do not shirk this 
responsibility, and I make my confession to extenuate my blame. 

All of us, by our silence, contributed to the destructive 
work of General Diaz. All of us believed with a blind faith 
that we could change a man like Don Porfirio Diaz and induce 
him to institute a democracy. All of us, fearing a revolution 
with its appalling consequences, preferred to kill our desire for 
freedom and allow one man to rule us. We submitted silently 
without considering that our submission and our silence only 
served to postpone the conflict. Our conduct only retarded 
the struggle, but did not prevent it. With history for a teacher, 
we should have foreseen this. In Riome, after Tiberius came 
Caligula, then Nero, then the inevitable anarchy and insurrec- 
tion of the soldiery, which brought into power uneducated, vicious, 
and incompetent soldiers like Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. 

'T!his is now the peril, and we must prevent it at all hazards. 
The people are not always fortunate enough to find a Flavins 
Vespasian, nor is a Domititius often succeeded by a Nervius or 
a Trojan ; but the duty of a true patriot is to seek them, and to 
denounce impostors so that lies may not prosper or wickedness 
flourish. This is the principle purpose of this book. We were 
blindly obedient for thirty odd years and have fought untiring- 
ly for more than three years. The moment has now come for 
us to think, to reflect, and to work conscientiously. Putting 
aside all personal ambitions, we must think only of our father- 
land, and duly consider its well being. For this, Ave must forget 
past strifes, and all purely personal incidents; these must give 
away to the question of greater interest, the welfare of the na- 
tion. Let us all unite, and reunited, gather around the govern- 



COO^CLUSION 263 

ment which will rise when the present tyranny is overthrown, as I 
truly believe it will be. When the revolution should triumph, let 
us place at its command all our energies, all our activities, and all 
our love of country. Let us consecrate ourselves, not to quarrel 
over power, but to choose as our only possible course, the path of 
justice and truth which leads directly to Liberty. 

For my part, I know that by relating events as they have 
truly happened, and by giving this book to the public, I will 
increase the number of my enemies; but for all that, I do not 
hesitate. I gladly place my life and my political honor in their 
hands. I care not if they revive my past and slander me as 
much as they please. In offering this book to the public, 
I have not forgotten the truth of that line of Terence 
"Veritas odiium parit. " 




\ 



INDEX 

Page 

Notice 1 

Preface - 3 

Reelection Witho.jt Eiestrictions, Chapter 1 10 

Loyalty Unto Death, Chapter II 14 

The Revolution in 1910, Chapter III 19 

The Fall of the Colosus, Chapter IV 26 

The White President and the Black President, Chapter V..^ 42 

Zapata, Chapter Yl 47 

The Revolt in Morelos, Chapter VII 51 

The Agrarian Problem, Chapter VIII 55 

The Brains of the Revolt, Chapter IX 60 

The Birth of the "Big Stick" Clique, Chapter X 70 

Madero's Administration, Chapter XI 74 

The New Revolution, Chapter XII 82 

Orozco— Vazquez Gromez, Chapter XIII 91 

Rellano — Conejos — Bachimha, Chapter XIV 96 

The Elections in Vera Cruz, Chapter XV 101 

The First Military Revolt, Chapter XVI 106 

In the Midst of Revolution, Chapter XVII 119 

The Second Military Revolt, Chapter XVIII 127 

The Die is Cast, Chapter XIX 133 

The Ninth of February, Chapter XX 137 

The Last Ovation, Chapter XXI 147 

At the Ciudadela, Chapter XXII 152 

The Tragic Ten Days, Chapter XXIII 154 

The Action of the Senate, Chapter XXIV 161 

An Event of the Merovingian Dynasty, Chapter XXV ;..166 

The Third Mdlitary Revolt, Chapter XXVI 170 

An Orgy of Blood, Chapter XXVII 173 

The Compact at the Embassy, Chapter XXVIII 179 

The Resignation of M^dero, Chapter XXIX 185 

The Death of Madero, Chapter XXX 195 

The Money Orgy, Chapter XXXI , 204 

The Reign of Terror, Chapter XXXII 213 

The Parliamentary Qnadrilateral, Chapter XXXIII - 220 

The Constitueionalista Revolution, ChapterXXXIV 228 

The King Amuses Himself, Chapter XXXV 239 

The American Policy, Chapter XXXVI 245 

Conclusion ( I impeach ) :..^ ...253 



WORKS OF THE SAME AUTHOR 



General Ulysses S. Grant— Address » . . . 1885 



La Ley del JD^omicilio 

{The Ltnw of the DomiciU) 



1888 



El Arbitrage en America . . . 

(Arbitration in America) 



1902 



* Juarez" como lo describe la Historia y como 
\o pinta el Dip. Bulnes ... . . . . . 

(Juarez aa he it in History and a* he ia pictured 
by Congreaaman Bulnea.) 



1904 



La Nueva ley Electoral . . 

(The New Electoral Law.) 



1911 



Forthcoming Book-^ 




"OUR CONFLICT*' 











^P-^-^. 







^ 



v^ .^L'A 








V ^l,^^!'* ^ A' 



\5 'o. . * A 




4 c'v. 



* r. 




. . » .A. 







■^ 




015 991 356 9 



m 



